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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009)

Chapter: THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY

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Suggested Citation:"THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY." National Academy of Sciences. 2009. Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12590.
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Suggested Citation:"THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY." National Academy of Sciences. 2009. Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12590.
×
Page 50
Suggested Citation:"THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY." National Academy of Sciences. 2009. Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12590.
×
Page 51
Suggested Citation:"THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY." National Academy of Sciences. 2009. Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12590.
×
Page 52
Suggested Citation:"THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY." National Academy of Sciences. 2009. Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12590.
×
Page 53
Suggested Citation:"THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY." National Academy of Sciences. 2009. Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12590.
×
Page 54
Suggested Citation:"THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY." National Academy of Sciences. 2009. Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12590.
×
Page 55
Suggested Citation:"THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY." National Academy of Sciences. 2009. Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12590.
×
Page 56

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THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY Sergei V. Antipov, Nikolai N. Ponomarev-Stepnoi, Vladimir K. Sukhoruchkin, Kurchatov Institute The development of new, modern systems for the physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear materials and the modernization of existing systems at naval nuclear and radioactive-hazard sites and a number of other Russian Defense Ministry sites is one of the real results of successful cooperation between the Russian Navy, the Kurchatov Institute, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and U.S. national laboratories working together through the program for the protection, control, and accounting of nuclear materials (MPC&A program). These systems were designed, built and installed from 1998 to 2007, and have begun operation at 14 sites belonging to Russia’s Northern Fleet, eight sites belonging to the Pacific Fleet, and at a number of sites belonging to other subdivisions of the Defense Ministry. The largest number of sites equipped with the new systems (13 in total) is on the Kola Peninsula. The introduction of new systems is not sufficient in itself to guarantee protection of nuclear materials. Systematic technical servicing by qualified and trained operating personnel is also required to keep the systems operating reliably. Initially (for free during the guarantee period and on a contract basis thereafter) technical servicing was carried out by the organizations that installed the systems and took part in their construction. The training issue was resolved using the following method: at the same time the systems were developed and installed, training was organized for the personnel who would be operating the new systems during the initial phase. This training took place at the Kurchatov Institute and was organized by the Institute’s specialists and specialists from the L.G. Osipenko Naval Training Center in Obninsk. Representatives of the organizations that developed and manufactured the technical systems were also brought in. Financial support for training came from the U.S. national laboratories. The following training courses took place as part of the training program for Defense Ministry officers at the Kurchatov Institute between 1998 and 2005: 1) A two-week basic training course on MPC&A at Russian naval nuclear sites for eight groups of Defense Ministry personnel. A total of 180 people went through this training course. 2) A two-week inspectors training course for six groups of Defense Ministry personnel. A total of 80 people went through this training course. 3) A one-week training course for the commanders of Russian naval nuclear sites. Three training courses were organized for a total of 40 people. 4) Two two-week training courses for the heads of nuclear materials physical protection services at Russian naval nuclear sites. A total of 30 people attended these courses. 49

5) Two training courses for one group of Russian strategic nuclear forces personnel. A total of 16 people attended these courses. 6) One training course for senior command officers, attended by approximately 30 people. Overall, approximately 370 Russian Defense Ministry personnel received training in different aspects of MPC&A. This made it possible to launch the new systems and ensure their reliable operation during the initial phase. But guarantee periods always come to an end sooner or later and the staff working at sites gradually changes. Protection of nuclear materials, meanwhile, requires the reliable and guaranteed long-term work of the systems in place, from both a technical and personnel point of view (personnel are needed for technical servicing and repairs and for the systems’ operation). Practice in developing and operating the MPC&A systems at the Northern Fleet sites highlighted the need to establish specialized regional training and technical centers as the most effective solution to providing systematic training for personnel and technical service to maintain these complex systems in operational state. Work began on establishing just such a center, the Kola Training and Technical Center (KTTC), in Severomorsk in 2001, in close cooperation with the Russian Navy, the Kurchatov Institute and the U.S. national laboratories. This center will train personnel and provide technical servicing for MPC&A systems not only at Russian naval sites but also at other Defense Ministry sites and civilian sites. All equipment used for physical protection systems at special facilities is of Russian origin. And all personnel working at these facilities are trained with the purpose of operating this very equipment, not American equipment. KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER Construction Stages and Technical Characteristics of the KTTC Design of the KTTC began at the end of 2001 and construction began in mid-2002. The KTTC consists of a group of functionally interrelated buildings and facilities that blend harmoniously into the urban design of the city of Severomorsk and are located on a territory measuring 0.66 hectares in area. The complex includes: • a training center • a test ground for Technical Protection Systems • workshops • a training checkpoint • a training zone for technical inspections • a distribution sub-station • a module-based diesel electricity station • engineering and communications infrastructure for the complex’s operations Functional ergonomics and optimization of the interrelations between the different parts of the complex are at the basis of all the design and planning solutions for the buildings and facilities. 50

The engineering and communications infrastructure enables the site to function in ordinary and autonomous regimes. A comprehensive quality control system was used during the center’s construction, as were modern technology methods and the most advanced, certified materials, designs, and equipment. The KTTC complex offers: • classrooms for theoretical training in MPC&A and communications systems • facilities and a test ground for practical work • technical service workshops for MPC&A and communications systems for Russian naval sites • administration and auxiliary premises The center’s training and administrative building is a three-storey building with a workspace of approximately 2,600 square meters. It includes classrooms, rooms for practical work, a library, one large and two small conference halls, MPC&A system technical service workshops, teachers’ rooms, and rooms for the center’s administrative personnel. Workshops are located in a one-storey building with an area of approximately 250 square meters. These workshops will carry out repairs and tests of MPC&A systems installed at Northern Fleet naval sites. The KTTC also has a training checkpoint that includes a training zone for vehicle inspections. This facility is designed to enable people to learn and practice correct access procedures to and from Russian naval sites and for practical work on technical maintenance of the equipment installed at the facility. Installed at the test ground are technical protection systems that are linked to the information collection and processing control posts and the access control system located in the main building. A particular feature of the test ground’s location is that students can observe work in the test ground from the windows of the classrooms where the control posts are located. The KTTC makes it possible to fully meet the demand for MPC&A technical maintenance, tests, technical support, and staff training for Northern Fleet and other Defense Ministry nuclear-hazard sites. Development of Training and Methodological Documents and Training for the KTTC Teaching Staff The following work was required for organizing MPC&A training for Russian Defense Ministry personnel: 1) training teachers in the area of MPC&A for the KTTC 2) drawing up a training program and training and methodology documents for the KTTC Toward these goals, specialists from the Kurchatov Institute, Eleron Federal Unitary Special Scientific Production Enterprise, and Eskort Center Closed Joint-Stock Company worked closely with Defense Ministry personnel on the following tasks: 1) drafting planning documents for the naval training programs 51

2) drafting guidelines for MPC&A training programs for naval specialists 3) drawing up an MPC&A training program for the KTTC 4) drawing up standards for the teaching management process and carrying out analysis of existing commercial systems 5) drawing up quality evaluation guidelines for the training courses provided at the KTTC 6) drawing up a catalogue of the training courses offered at the KTTC 7) drawing up training and methodological material for 18 courses on MPC&A at naval sites and two courses on communications systems Eleron and Eskort Center, the two companies developing physical protection systems, are carrying out training for the teachers at the KTTC. Teacher training in the area of communications systems is being carried out by the Kurchatov Institute. The first training course for KTTC teaching staff took place from August 16 to September 10, 2004. Training for the KTTC teaching staff was fully completed in 2006. The KTTC Training Program The KTTC offers unique technical training resources and an operational training and resource base for training all types of nuclear materials specialists in MPC&A at nuclear-hazard sites. The Center has unique specialized classrooms for training people to operate the physical protection system control posts and for training specialists in the use of site and perimeter detection systems, security television systems and access control systems. Classes take place in classrooms, laboratories, computer classes and at the physical protection engineering and technical systems test ground. All of the necessary technical resources, installations and equipment are in place to carry out practical exercises and laboratory work. In order to make training more effective, classrooms have been equipped with computers, multimedia projectors and other technical teaching equipment. More than 40 percent of the teaching time when training engineering and technical personnel is spent on practical work, during which time students study regulation and adjustment procedures for technical physical protection systems. The Center’s staff have extensive experience in operating engineering and technical systems and hold senior positions in the Russian navy. The Center’s teachers attended a special training course at the Kurchatov Institute and at Eleron and the Eskort Center, the main organizations developing physical protection systems for nuclear materials. They also received methodological training and had internships at the Naval Training Center in Obninsk. The KTTC will also organize the following MPC&A training courses for naval personnel: • one training course on the basics of MPC&A • 12 training courses on physical protection systems • two training courses on communications systems • six training courses on control and accounting of nuclear materials All personnel at nuclear-hazard sites working in security and safety of nuclear materials will undergo training at the KTTC. This includes the sites’ commanders and their deputies, the 52

heads of physical protection services, the operators of central and local physical protection system control posts, physical protection system engineers and technicians, access checkpoint operators, communications engineers and technicians, and other personnel, including guards. The length of training will differ depending on the course. Access checkpoint operators, for example, will receive one week of training, while training for physical protection system operators will last five weeks. Practical activities will form part of the training process for some categories of students. For this purpose, the KTTC is equipped with training equipment of the same kind as that operated at naval sites on the Kola Peninsula. During practical classes and individual study, students will have the opportunity to develop practical skills in working with all of the different types of equipment used during the training process. The training programs are designed so that the personnel receiving training at the Center will be able to independently operate and service physical protection systems installed at naval sites in the Kola region. The KTTC Program for Technical Support for MPC&A Systems Operation at Russian Naval Sites The KTTC’s program of technical support for MPC&A systems operation at naval sites includes the following: • coordination and planning of technical operation of physical protection systems, communications systems, and accounting and control systems at the sites • organization of technical service and repairs of MPC&A and communications systems’ engineering and technical systems at the sites in accordance with the guidelines for technical service • delivery upon request of equipment, spare parts, and materials needed for technical service of the systems, spare parts storage, and additions • collection, processing, and statistical analysis of information on failures of physical protection system engineering and technical systems, preparation of proposals for their repair and upgrade • organization of reclamation work The Center’s technical support functions are carried out by its technical departments. The Center’s cooperation with the sites to which it provides services is carried out in accordance with the technical service guidelines that have been drawn up and approved for a five-year period and the annual technical service plans. These documents are used as the basis for calculating costs and resources (the necessary human resources, amount of equipment, spare parts, and materials to be delivered). The operators of the systems at the sites carry out the initial collection of statistical information on any failures in the physical protection system engineering and technical systems, and this information is then sent to the Center for further review and analysis. This processed statistical material is the information source used for organizing work to improve the systems’ robustness and operational reliability, forecast critical situations, plan and distribute spare parts needs, and carry out reclamation work. Division of responsibility between the KTTC and the sites is determined by the types of technical service in question. The sites are responsible for carrying out technical service on a 53

daily, weekly and monthly basis, and carrying out rapid repair of any failures in accordance with a list approved by the KTTC. The sites are also responsible for routine technical repairs of security systems. The KTTC carries out all other regulation work, rapid repair of failures, medium-scale repairs of technical equipment and replacement of broken down equipment, and also delivers to the sites, upon request, the equipment, components and materials needed for technical service of the systems. The Center’s control and revision function consists of developing programs for regulation checks (tests), organizing tests of the systems, and evaluating the overall effectiveness of the systems and their individual components. The aim of carrying out regulation tests is to determine the systems’ effectiveness and establish how ready they are to ensure protection of nuclear materials from any illegal action. Tests check how the systems function with the aim of determining their effectiveness. The tests include: • equipment tests • tests to determine how correctly the staff carry out procedures • tests to determine how well prepared the operations, security, and other departments are to react to routine and emergency situations Systems tests can be planned or unplanned. Planned tests are carried out in accordance with the annual work plan. The sites concerned are informed in advance of the planned tests. Unplanned tests (without prior warning) are carried out: • if there have been violations of a system’s condition and organization • if decided by the Fleet command or other state services of the Russian Federation with the relevant powers CONCLUSION The start of operations at the KTTC does not mean that work in this area has ended. The next stage has now begun: that of maintaining the systems in operational state and ensuring the reliability and effectiveness of MPC&A systems at naval and other Defense Ministry sites in order to guarantee protection of nuclear and radioactive materials and nuclear installations. All of this work is part of the effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and prevent nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. The effectiveness of the MPC&A systems will be determined by a complex of measures that include maintaining their technical state and selecting and training personnel for their operation, drawing up normative instructions and documents, ensuring material and technical supplies, and ensuring financing for all of these different areas of work. The positive international experience of establishing and operating the KTTC gives us reason to believe that it could be used in other regions as well. An agreement has already been reached between the Russian Defense Ministry and DOE to establish a similar center in Russia’s Far East region. The ambitious plans to develop the nuclear energy sector not only in Russia but in other countries make the issue of material protection, control, and accounting more relevant than ever. 54

Not only will it be necessary to develop new technical systems for the physical protection of new sites over the coming years, but it will also be necessary to ensure the guaranteed operation of both the earlier and the new systems. There will also be a need to train qualified personnel to operate these systems and provide them with ongoing training. The establishment of regional training and technical centers along the lines of the KTTC can help to resolve these complex tasks over the coming years. As experience gained from the cooperation between Russia and the U.S. has proven to be effective for Russian facilities and regions and as it continues to develop, it could be reasonably applied to third countries. Strong, mutually collaborative, experienced teams of Russian and American specialists could arrange initial training, including in safety culture issues, develop criteria and requirements for the MPC&A systems, design and modify or create such systems, and further establish on-site technical training centers on the model of the Kola Training and Technical Center to organize regular training of local personnel. 55

Next: PARTNERSHIP IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY »
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The U.S. National Academies (NAS) and the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), building on a foundation of years of interacademy cooperation, conducted a joint project to identify U.S. and Russian views on what the international nuclear security environment will be in 2015, what challenges may arise from that environment, and what options the U.S. and Russia have in partnering to address those challenges.

The project's discussions were developed and expanded upon during a two-day public workshop held at the International Atomic Energy Agency in November 2007. A key aspect of that partnership may be cooperation in third countries where both the U.S. and Russia can draw on their experiences over the last decade of non-proliferation cooperation. More broadly, the following issues analyzed over the course of this RAS-NAS project included: safety and security culture, materials protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) best practices, sustainability, nuclear forensics, public-private partnerships, and the expansion of nuclear energy.

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