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ASSURANCES OF SUPPLY VS. PROLIFERATION: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY

Tariq Rauf,69

International Atomic Energy Agency


The past few years have been a time of significant challenges and achievements for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the area of nuclear non-proliferation, the Agency has been at the center of attention and has demonstrated its ability to perform objective and credible verification—but we continue to face a number of difficult and unresolved situations. In the area of nuclear safety and security, we see overall improvement and our work is making a difference, but much remains to be done. In the area of nuclear technology, the Agency is contributing to sustainable development through its technical co-operation program—with the benefits of nuclear applications increasingly recognized—but more partnerships are needed to optimize the use of these valuable technologies.

For the past five decades, the role of nuclear power has been shaped by many factors such as growing energy needs, economic performance, the availability of other energy sources, the quest for energy independence, environmental factors, nuclear safety and proliferation concerns, and advances in nuclear technology. And while nuclear power continues to hold great potential as an environmentally clean source of energy, it remains in a holding position due to a number of associated concerns.

NUCLEAR POWER

The urgent need for sustained human development will clearly necessitate increases in the supply of energy in the coming decades. In recent years, nuclear power has supplied about 16 percent of world electricity production, and it remains the only energy source that can provide electricity on a large scale with comparatively minimal impact on the environment.70

There are currently 439 nuclear power reactors operating in 30 countries, and they supply about 15 percent of the world’s electricity.71 To date, the use of nuclear power has been concentrated mostly in industrialized countries. But of the 30 new reactors currently under

69

These remarks are based on a presentation made on November 10, 2007, in Houston, Texas, at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Workshop on the Policy Implications of Managing or Preventing Proliferation.

70

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Reference Data Series, No. 1, Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up to 2030. 2007 Edition,” p. 21. Available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/RDS1-27_web.pdf; accessed April 6, 2008.

71

Ibid, pp. 12-13.



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ASSURANCES OF SUPPLY VS. PROLIFERATION: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY Tariq Rauf,69 International Atomic Energy Agency The past few years have been a time of significant challenges and achievements for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the area of nuclear non-proliferation, the Agency has been at the center of attention and has demonstrated its ability to perform objective and credible verification—but we continue to face a number of difficult and unresolved situations. In the area of nuclear safety and security, we see overall improvement and our work is making a difference, but much remains to be done. In the area of nuclear technology, the Agency is contributing to sustainable development through its technical co-operation program— with the benefits of nuclear applications increasingly recognized—but more partnerships are needed to optimize the use of these valuable technologies. For the past five decades, the role of nuclear power has been shaped by many factors such as growing energy needs, economic performance, the availability of other energy sources, the quest for energy independence, environmental factors, nuclear safety and proliferation concerns, and advances in nuclear technology. And while nuclear power continues to hold great potential as an environmentally clean source of energy, it remains in a holding position due to a number of associated concerns. NUCLEAR POWER The urgent need for sustained human development will clearly necessitate increases in the supply of energy in the coming decades. In recent years, nuclear power has supplied about 16 percent of world electricity production, and it remains the only energy source that can provide electricity on a large scale with comparatively minimal impact on the environment.70 There are currently 439 nuclear power reactors operating in 30 countries, and they supply about 15 percent of the world’s electricity.71 To date, the use of nuclear power has been concentrated mostly in industrialized countries. But of the 30 new reactors currently under 69 These remarks are based on a presentation made on November 10, 2007, in Houston, Texas, at the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Workshop on the Policy Implications of Managing or Preventing Proliferation. 70 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Reference Data Series, No. 1, Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up to 2030. 2007 Edition,” p. 21. Available at http://www- pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/RDS1-27_web.pdf; accessed April 6, 2008. 71 Ibid, pp. 12-13. 59

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construction, 16 are in developing countries.72 And while the highest percentage of existing reactors is in North America and western Europe, recent expansion has been primarily in Asia and eastern Europe. In other regions, the more immediate focus is on power upgrades, restarts of previously shutdown reactors, and license extensions. For example, in the United States of America, 16 reactors have had their operating licenses extended to 60 years, and many more applications are under review.73 The long term prospects for nuclear power, however, will depend on the industry’s success in addressing concerns associated with waste disposal, safety and security, and proliferation, while also improving economic competitiveness of future reactors. Nearly 20 IAEA Member States are currently involved in projects to develop reactor and fuel cycle designs that would address some of these concerns, and a number of countries are also exploring the nuclear co-generation of hydrogen, to address demands for cleaner energy in the transportation sector. The current spectrum of proliferation and security issues should provide the impetus for greater innovation in policy as well as technology. One example relates to the operation of sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is time to re-consider the merits of limiting the reprocessing of weapon-usable material (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium) in civilian nuclear programs—as well as the production of new material through reprocessing and enrichment—by agreeing to restrict these operations exclusively to facilities under multinational control and verification. These limitations would need to be accompanied by appropriate rules of transparency and—above all—assurance of supply for would-be users. Furthermore, it is also important to consider multinational approaches to the management and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Over 50 countries currently have spent fuel stored in temporary locations awaiting reprocessing or disposal.74 Not all countries have the appropriate geological conditions for such disposal—and, for many countries with small nuclear programs for electricity generation or for research, the financial and human resource investments required for the construction and operation of a geological disposal facility are daunting. ENERGY FOR DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY Recently, the IAEA has begun emphasizing the role of “energy for development” since it is becoming more and more clear that without energy there can be no development, and without development there is misery that can often lead to violence. The energy shortage in developing countries is a staggering impediment to development. To give some perspective, it is enough to mention that the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, on average, consume electricity at a rate roughly 100 times that of the world’s least developed countries.75 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, Statement to the Forty-ninth Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference 2005. Available at www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n010.html; accessed May 26, 2008. 75 IAEA, “Reference Data Series, No. 1.” See also, “Nuclear Energy: The Need For A New Framework,” statements by Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, April 17, 2008, Berlin, Germany, International Conference on 60

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The IAEA offers energy assessment services that build a State’s capability for energy analysis and energy planning, taking into account the country’s economic, environmental, and social development needs. These services treat all energy supply options equally. They are in increasingly high demand and we have been expanding our capacity to offer them. The G8 Summit in St. Petersburg in 2006 emphasized the importance of “global energy security.”76 At the expanded summit, the IAEA Director General emphasized that global energy security means fulfilling the energy needs of all countries and peoples, including the 1.6 billion people who have no access to electricity and the 2.4 billion who continue to rely on traditional biomass fuels. He also emphasized at that meeting that the current global organization of energy resource management and distribution is quite fragmented in terms of both geographical coverage and the types of energy resources managed. Global structures for setting norms, oversight, and management exist in most other key areas of human activity such as trade, civil aviation, labor relations, and health. However, no similar structure currently exists for energy.77 It is important to note that, as a sophisticated technology, nuclear power requires a correspondingly sophisticated infrastructure. For new countries considering nuclear power, it is essential to ensure that such necessary infrastructure will be available. This infrastructure includes many components from industrial infrastructure such as manufacturing facilities, to the legal and regulatory framework, to the institutional measures to ensure safety and security, to the necessary human and financial resources. The IAEA recently published guidance on the infrastructure needed for countries to introduce nuclear power, and we are working to define a set of milestones for the development of this infrastructure to assist us in prioritizing our support for those Member States.78 Nuclear energy might not be the choice of all countries and some, such as Germany and Sweden, have decided to phase out their nuclear power programs. Other countries have also adopted a policy against the use of nuclear power. However, for those Member States that choose to use nuclear power as part of their energy mix, there is much the Agency can do to make this option accessible, affordable, safe and secure. NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE The increase in global energy demand is driving a potential expansion in the use of nuclear energy. And concern is mounting regarding the proliferation risks created by the further spread of sensitive nuclear technology, such as uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. The convergence of these realities points to the need for the development of a new framework for the nuclear fuel cycle. Nuclear Fuel Supply: Challenges and Opportunities. Available at www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2008/ebsp2008n004.html; accessed May 26, 2008. 76 See Appendix D for the texts of 2006 G8 St. Petersburg Summit Statements. 77 “IAEA Chief Calls for Global Framework on Energy Security. New International Pact and Body Needed, He Says,” Staff Report, July 21, 2006. Available at www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2006/G8_2006.html; accessed May 26, 2008. 78 IAEA, “Milestones in the Development of a National Nuclear Infrastructure for Nuclear Power,” Nuclear Energy Series, N. NG-G-3.1, Vienna, 2007. Available at www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1305_web.pdf; accessed May 26, 2008. See also, IAEA, “Considerations to Launch a Nuclear Power Programme,” Vienna, 2007; available at www.iaea.org/Nuclear Power/Downloads/Launch_NPP/07-11471_Launch_NPP.pdf. 61

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For the last two years, the IAEA Director General has been calling for the development of a new, multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle, as a key measure to strengthen non- proliferation and cope with the expected expansion of nuclear power use. The establishment of a framework that is equitable and accessible to all users of nuclear energy acting in accordance with agreed nuclear non-proliferation norms will be a complex endeavor that needs to be addressed through progressive steps. The first step is to establish mechanisms for assurances of fuel supply for nuclear power reactors and, as needed, assurance of supply for the acquisition of such reactors. The second step is to limit future enrichment and reprocessing to multilateral operations and to convert existing enrichment and reprocessing facilities from national to multilateral operations. A broad range of ideas, studies, and proposals have been put forward on this topic. At the IAEA General Conference in September 2006, we organized a Special Event, in which experts from all relevant fields discussed ways and means to move forward. A report on this Special Event was submitted to the General Conference and the IAEA Secretariat, in consultation with Member States. We will continue to work on identifying options and alternatives to move this concept forward.79 It has been more than fifty years since the Atoms for Peace initiative; the time has come to think of a new framework for the use of nuclear energy – a framework that accounts for both the lessons we have learned and the current reality. This new framework should in our view include: • innovative nuclear technology that is inherently safe, proliferation resistant, and more economical • universal application of comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol • concrete and rapid progress towards nuclear disarmament • a robust international security regime • an effective and universal nuclear safety regime The first notion of fuel assurances came in the 1946 Baruch plan.80 Some thirty years later, the 1976 international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation looked at multilaterally owned-and- operated nuclear frameworks.81 Sixty years after the Baruch Plan, the 2006 Special Event focused on several new proposals for multilateral approaches such as commitments to supply enrichment services, international nuclear fuel centers, and even multilateral control over all fuel cycle facilities. So, what has changed in the intervening half-century? It is obvious that many changes have taken place with significant implications. There is a spread of dual-use material and technologies with attendant risks of proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Such nuclear threats have impact on the future of both peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the prospects for nuclear disarmament. 79 This report can be found at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC50/SideEvent/report220906.pdf; accessed April 6, 2008. 80 The text of the Baruch plan can be found at http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml; accessed April 6, 2008. 81 IAEA, Expert Group Report to the Director General of the IAEA, “Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” Vienna, 2005; available at www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/mna-2005_web.pdf; accessed July 13, 2008. See also, pp. 30-31 and Annex IV, pp. 156-169. 62

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The spread of nuclear fuel cycle facilities and technologies is motivated in part by States’ interest in ensuring reliable fuel cycle services through indigenous capability. This then is the challenge: What needs to be added to the existing market fuel-cycle services to provide enough assurance of supply in order to obviate the need for indigenous fuel cycle facilities? Nuclear fuel assurance is an issue that the IAEA Director General has been dealing with for the past four years. Starting at the IAEA General Conference in September 2003, the Director General once again pointed to the need for balancing access to nuclear energy for generating power and balancing non-proliferation considerations. In that context, he proposed the possibility of revisiting previous approaches to multilateral solutions to the nuclear fuel cycle and to find a new framework for the utilization of nuclear energy.82 At that time, his comments were partly driven by one special verification case that is still continuing on the books of the IAEA, but since then, given the multiplicity of proposals, the debate has been considerably enlarged. We are now looking at the fuel cycle in its broadest aspects, looking not only at the front end of the fuel cycle (uranium enrichment), but eventually also at the back end, (spent fuel and reprocessing).83 The Director General has also focused specifically on providing assurances, not only of fuel but also of reactor technology. This is an area where, again, at the IAEA we need to do some more work. In the first instance, we focused on the front end, and that is uranium enrichment. In our view, we need to balance the interests of all Member States. The IAEA needs to make sure that the needs of developing countries, countries that are already relying on nuclear power or those countries that have plans to develop nuclear power are adequately represented while at the same time ensuring that we minimize the possibility of the misuse of sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, in particular, uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. In the discussion on energy, there is now increasing talk about a potential nuclear renaissance. For the past 20 years, nearly 16 percent of the world’s energy has come from nuclear sources, and this percentage has remained relatively stable. But over the next couple of decades, the projections are that this percentage will increase and as the world’s energy requirements increase and as the pressures of reducing carbon emissions become more pressing on governments, there is expected to be an increasing reliance on nuclear energy. If there is to be this nuclear renaissance, there will be a major new demand for nuclear energy, both in terms of reactors, as well as in terms of fuel supply. The question then is where the new fuel supply will come from? Will it remain in the hands of the existing suppliers who would then perhaps expand capacity? Would new countries develop their own national indigenous enrichment capabilities? The vision of the IAEA’s Director General is that all enrichment and reprocessing over time should be exclusively under multinational control. In that context, the task that has been given to the policy staff at the Agency is to look at the existing proposals that have already been formulated to try and find a framework that draws upon the common elements of those proposals and to suggest a possible framework for the 82 The IAEA Director General’s Statement to the General Conference of September 2003 can be found at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n020.html; accessed April 6, 2008. 83 The Nuclear Energy Agency defines the stages of the fuel cycle as follows: “a) the so-called front-end which extends from the mining of uranium ore until the delivery of fabricated fuel elements to the reactor site; b) fuel use in the reactor, where fission energy is employed to produce electricity, and temporary storage at the reactor site; c) the so-called back-end, which starts with the shipping of spent fuel to away-from-reactor storage or to a reprocessing plant and ends with the final disposal of reprocessing Vitrified High-Level Waste or the encapsulated spent fuel itself.” For further information, see http://www.nea.fr/html/ndd/reports/efc/efc02.pdf; accessed April 6, 2008. 63

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consideration of the IAEA’s policymaking organs that will focus on assurances of supply. The second task for the medium term would be to convert existing enrichment and reprocessing facilities to multilateral auspices; and, third, over the longer term to have all enrichment and reprocessing under multilateral control. In this context, one will also need to have a global, internationally verifiable treaty on the prohibition of fissile material production for nuclear weapons. As long as the loophole is there, any new framework for multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle will still have a backdoor. So in that context, the challenge is to find a way of balancing both non-proliferation and economic considerations with the choices that are facing States. ASSURANCE OF SUPPLY We need to find a way to promote the expanded use of nuclear energy to those countries that have made a sovereign choice to do so. The IAEA is not in the business of pushing countries to go into the nuclear field, but we can assist them in making energy choices; at the end of the day, it’s the decision of the State to decide whether or not it chooses nuclear power. And if it does so, then the IAEA is there to assist it in the safety, security, and non-proliferation, regulatory, legal, and other aspects of that decision. In our discussions both with supplier States, but more importantly also with consumer States, it has become abundantly clear that different States will choose different policies and solutions. And this will depend on their historic situations; it will depend on their geography, their technical abilities, and their individual choices. Thus, in this context, it is of utmost importance that we retain flexibility in this area and not try to suggest solutions that are perceived to be imposed, particularly on consumer States. This was something that became abundantly clear at the 2006 Special Event on the nuclear fuel cycle. During the summary of the Special Event, the chairman mentioned in part that the recent proposals for assuring supplies of uranium-based nuclear fuel can be seen as one stage in a broader, longer-term development of a multilateral framework that could encompass assurance- of-supply mechanisms for both natural and low-enriched uranium, as well as nuclear fuel and spent fuel management.84 In this context, establishing a fully developed multilateral framework that is equitable and accessible to all users of nuclear energy is a key element for the IAEA and its Director General. The chairman’s summary also pointed to why we need an assurance of supply mechanism. An assurance of supply mechanism could potentially address two particular challenges. The first is to deal with the possible consequences of interruptions of nuclear fuel supply due to political considerations that are not associated with non-proliferation, commercial, or other considerations related to contractual obligations. Such interruptions might dissuade countries from initiating or expanding nuclear power programs and, at the same time, might create incentives for countries to build new national enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Hence, an assurance of supply mechanism would be envisaged solely as a backup mechanism to the operation of the current, normally functioning market in nuclear materials, fuels and technologies. This would not be a substitute for the existing market, nor would it deal 84 For further information, see Report of the Chairman at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC50/SideEvent/report220906.pdf; accessed April 6, 2008. 64

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with disruption of supply due to commercial, technical, or other failures. In this regard, an assurance of supply mechanism would be designed to give supply assurances to States that potentially voluntarily choose to rely on the international market for their nuclear fuel requirements, and therefore, no country would be asked or expected to give up or abridge any of their rights under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.85 A summary of various existing proposals is available on IAEA’s website. There are, at the moment, 13 proposals that are mutually complimentary.86 These proposals range from providing backup assurance of supply to establishing an IAEA-controlled fuel reserve to setting up international uranium enrichment centers where the IAEA would have some role in the decision-making process; all of these proposals are currently under consideration in the secretariat of the IAEA. A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK: A THREE-LEVEL APPROACH Drawing in part upon the World Nuclear Association study and the various other proposals, we in the IAEA Secretariat are proposing to our Board of Governors and Member States a possible framework that is based on three levels. The first is the existing market, based on existing commercial and other arrangements. The second would be backup commitments provided by suppliers of enrichment and fuel fabrication services and their respective governments that would be utilized when predetermined conditions and criteria had been met following a political supply disruption. This can be viewed as a combined virtual enrichment and fuel fabrication reserve mechanism. There may be some States that still might not be fully assured by the first two levels, and therefore it is essential to also have a third level. The third level could be a real reserve of low-enriched uranium stored in one or several separate locations, and a set of arrangements and agreements between suppliers of fuel fabrication services as well as owners of fuel intellectual property rights, creating additional fabrication possibilities. So, we need assurances not only of natural and low-enriched uranium, but also of fuel fabrication if necessary for the consumer State. In his Statement to the IAEA Board of Governors in June this year, the IAEA Director General presented his report on a possible new framework for the utilization of nuclear energy assurances of supply.87 In this statement he said that we are looking at these proposals and their associated legal, technical, financial and institutional aspects: the trends clearly point to the need to develop a new multilateral framework for the nuclear fuel cycle, and it is clear that an incremental approach with multiple assurances is the way to move forward. And he said that such a multilateral framework would best be achieved through establishing mechanisms that would, in the first instance, assure the supply of fuel for nuclear power plants, over time convert enrichment and reprocessing facilities from national to multilateral operations, and third, limit future enrichment and reprocessing to multilateral operations exclusively. Such a framework 85 To read the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, see http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf; accessed April 6, 2008. 86 For further information and to access these proposals, see http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/FuelCycle/index.shtml; accessed April 6, 2008. 87 For information regarding this statement, see http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2007/ebsp2007n007.html; accessed April 6, 2008. 65

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would be voluntary, States would be free to choose their fuel options, and no rights of States would be compromised. This is something that is critical to understand in the debate outside of Vienna, because more often than not, a certain word is used: “forego” (foregoing of rights). In this day and age, no country is prepared to give up any rights, and one of the so-called perverse outcomes of these various proposals and this larger discussion is that at least seven countries have said that while they do not necessarily need enrichment technology today, they might need it in the future, and they are not prepared to compromise, dilute or give up any rights. These countries, for example, are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa; Brazil and Iran are already continuing with enrichment at the research and development level. Japan has a small enrichment capability to serve its domestic markets. None of these countries is prepared to dilute its rights, and therefore we need to frame this debate in a way that enables countries to make sovereign choices in a context where they feel comfortable relying on a multilayered mechanism that is built upon the market, backup assurances, as well as a real physical reserve of nuclear material. The IAEA report, which was released to the Board of Governors on the 13th of June 2007, was still restricted when this proceedings was published.88 The Board of Governors decided not to make this report available for public distribution at this time. This report has 90 plus pages and outlines a possible framework based on the three levels that I just mentioned. It discusses all of the various existing proposals, and provides some description of the release criteria that would be needed: the IAEA’s Board of Governors could agree in advance on certain non-proliferation criteria that would need to be met by consumer States when they invoke the supply assurance mechanism if a supply of fuel has been cut off for political reasons so that the Board would not need to decide on eligibility on a case by case basis. Finally, as the Director General has mentioned, this is a complex approach. It will need more time to develop. We in the Secretariat are not in a hurry. Some of the proposals are very complex. They require a great deal of legal and technical discussion, and therefore, in order to make sure that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past, we do not bring under-developed proposals for consideration before the Board of Governors. We bring proposals for consideration only after a full, frank, and comprehensive discussion both with consumer States as well as with supplier States so that when States meeting in the framework of the IAEA’s Board of Governors decide to meet to consider this issue they can do so with the full range of information available. Hopefully they will then take the right decisions to empower the IAEA to continue to work on this issue and to help create a framework for establishing a nuclear fuel bank and for developing a partnership with the international uranium enrichment centers that have been proposed by the Russian Federation and by Germany. There also is a proposal from the Nuclear Threat Initiative under consideration offering the IAEA $50 million on the condition that the IAEA’s Member States raise an additional $100 million in material or cash donations within two years to set up an IAEA-controlled reserve of nuclear materials for those States that would choose to rely on the market.89 One year has already elapsed, but this is also an area where we need the support of Member States. 88 At the time of this publication, it still was not clear when the IAEA Board of Governors would include multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, assurances of supply on its agenda for discussion. 89 For further information on this proposal, see http://www.nti.org/c_press/fuel_bank_122707.pdf; accessed on April 6, 2008. 66

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CONCLUSION The Agency continues to play a key role in ensuring that the benefits of nuclear technology are shared globally for economic and social development, that nuclear activities are conducted safely, that nuclear and radioactive materials and facilities are adequately protected, and that a credible inspection regime exists to verify compliance with non-proliferation commitments. In his ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower articulated a vision, shared by many world leaders, that would enable humanity to make full use of the benefit of nuclear energy while minimizing its risk.90 This vision led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Much has changed since that time, and I believe it is appropriate for us to take stock of our successes and failures, and to resolve to take whatever actions are required, including new ways of thinking and unconventional approaches, to ensure that nuclear energy remains a source of hope and prosperity for humanity, and not a tool for self- destruction. In the present context of Atoms for Peace, the IAEA Director General believes the time has come to think of a new framework for the use of nuclear energy – a framework that accounts both for the lessons we have learned and the current reality. This new framework should include swift and concrete action to achieve: • robust technological development and innovation in nuclear power and nuclear applications • a new multinational framework for the fuel cycle, both the front and the back end, to assure supply and curb proliferation risk • universal application of comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol as the standard for nuclear verification to enable the Agency to provide assurance about declared activities as well as the absence of undeclared activities • recognition of the linkage between non-proliferation and disarmament and therefore the need for concrete and rapid progress toward nuclear disarmament through deep cuts in existing arsenals, downgrading of alert levels for deployed nuclear weapons, and the resuscitation of multilateral disarmament efforts starting with bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty91 and beginning negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty92 • a robust international nuclear security regime, in light of the diverse threats we face • an effective and universal nuclear safety regime, a cornerstone for any expansion in the use of nuclear power • sufficient funding for the Agency to meet its increasing responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner 90 The text of this speech can be found at http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html; accessed April 6, 2008. 91 The text of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can be found at: http://www.ctbto.org/; accessed April 6, 2008. 92 For more information on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, see http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/fmct/index.html; accessed April 6, 2008. 67

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