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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009)
Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC)

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. "MINIMIZING CIVIL HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM STOCKS BY 2015: A FORWARD-LOOKING ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION." Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009.

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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian—U.S. Workshop

Acquiring nuclear-explosive material remains the most challenging step in the weapons acquisition process. Given such material, a sophisticated terrorist organization or a state could plausibly construct a rudimentary nuclear bomb.

As the now-defunct U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment concluded: “A small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to the classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive device… Only modest machine-shop facilities that could be contracted for without arousing suspicion would be required… The group would have to include, at a minimum, a person capable of searching and understanding the technical literature in several fields and a jack-of-all-trades technician.”98 This assessment is particularly relevant for HEU, because its usefulness in the most rudimentary gun-type design makes it the material of choice for terrorists as well as states seeking a more rapid or less challenging route to a crude nuclear bomb. A few tens of kilograms are sufficient for such a primitive design, similar to that used in 1945 to destroy Hiroshima. As enrichment levels decline, more material is required, yielding both a larger and less powerful device, but the former might not be problematic for terrorists contemplating delivery via truck or ship and even a relatively weak device could have a yield equivalent to thousands of tons of conventional explosive.

Luckily, HEU is extremely difficult to manufacture. Unfortunately, thousands of tons were manufactured over the past half-century for diverse uses, from nuclear weapons to targets used in civil production of medical isotopes. State weapons establishments are more likely to provide high degrees of security for their nuclear-explosive materials, although even here there is room for concern. Conversely, non-military or civil stockpiles of HEU are often less well secured, although their usefulness for constructing nuclear explosives is not necessarily commensurately lower.

Although comprehensive, detailed data on civil sites possessing nuclear explosive materials has not been compiled, estimates suggest that there are approximately 100 metric tons of civil HEU worldwide.99 Located in civil research and test reactors, critical and subcritical assemblies, and medical isotope production facilities worldwide, some of this material is in facilities with high levels of security, some in facilities secured with little more than a padlock and a guard.100 Today there are more than 140 research reactors in more than 40 countries fueled

U233 isotope. Constructing an explosive device with uranium at the lower end of the highly enriched spectrum poses additional technical challenges and also yields a larger and less powerful device. Material enriched to 90 percent is preferred by weapons designers and is often referred to as “weapons-grade.”

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U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards (Washington, D.C.: OTA, 1977) p. 140. Available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1977/7705/7705.PDF, accessed October 24, 2007.

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The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) estimates that there are “very roughly, 100 tons of…HEU in the fuel cycles of civilian research reactors worldwide and in Russia’s nuclear powered civilian vessels.” According to IPFM, the United States has about 45 tons of civilian HEU, 10 tons of civilian HEU are in non-nuclear weapons states, and 8 tons in the UK and France combined. Good estimates for China and Russia do not exist, but Russia can be assumed to have at least as much as the United States. International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2007, Princeton University (2007), p. 11 and fn.23. Matthew Bunn estimates that “60 metric tons of HEU is in civilian use or storage throughout the world,” Securing the Bomb 2007, Harvard University (September 2007), p. 32.

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In addition, HEU is also used, to a lesser extent, for naval and space propulsion and as fuel for commercial fast-neutron reactors. For further information on the various civil uses of HEU, see “Civilian Uses of HEU” in “Civilian HEU Reduction and Elimination,” Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library, available at http://www.nti.org/db/heu/civilian.html; accessed October 21, 2007.

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Front Matter (R1-R14)
OVERVIEW OF U.S. - RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT (1-2)
LEADERSHIP THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: A VISION FOR THE 2015 NUCLEAR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (3-12)
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF RUSSIAN – U.S. COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR ARENA: A REVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS (13-26)
ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE THROUGH LONG-TERM COOPERATION: APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM U.S.-RUSSIAN MPC&A PROGRAMS (27-28)
THE EXPERIENCE OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN COOPERATION ON PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS (29-36)
MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING:LESSONS LEARNED APPLIED TO UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015 (37-48)
THE KOLA TRAINING AND TECHNICAL CENTER OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY (49-56)
PARTNERSHIP IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (57-58)
ASSURANCES OF SUPPLY VS. PROLIFERATION: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY (59-68)
FULL PARTNERSHIP: SHARING STRATEGIC, MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES (69-70)
THE SALIENT NEED TO DEVELOP NEW APPROACHES TO ADDRESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION ISSUES (71-88)
MINIMIZING CIVIL HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM STOCKS BY 2015: A FORWARD-LOOKING ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION (89-104)
COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION: THE CRDF EXPERIENCE (105-110)
A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE: EXPANDING NUCLEAR ENERGY AND ASSOCIATED SECURITY CHALLENGES (111-112)
INTERNATIONAL URANIUM ENRICHMENT CENTER IN ANGARSK: A WAY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY AND NON-PROLIFERATION (113-124)
NUCLEAR POWER OF FAST REACTORS: A NEW START (125-134)
LEGAL ASPECTS OF NEGOTIATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (135-144)
PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIA-U.S. COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBLEMS ARISING FROM A NUCLEAR POWER RENAISSANCE (145-150)
CREATIVE SOLUTIONS TO TOMORROW'S CHALLENGES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR BI-LATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL COOPERATION (151-152)
NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREATS AND RESPONSES (153-162)
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIPS: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, PROMISING DIRECTIONS AND METHODS OF RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (163-178)
U.S. AND RUSSIAN COLLABORATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR FORENSICS (179-202)
MAXIMIZING U.S.-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 2015: LEGAL OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES (203-214)
NUCLEAR SECURITY AND NON-PROLIFERATION FOR THE COMING DECADES: COOPERATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT (215-216)
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL (217-228)
APPROACHES TO REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR MULTI-POLARITY (229-236)
NUCLEAR SECURITY IN 2015: THE CASE OF NORTH KOREA (237-244)
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OFEXPERIENCE: TRENDS, PRIORITIES, AND TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION (245-246)
BUILDING PARTNERSHIP ON THE STRENGTH OF EXPERIENCE: TRENDS, PRIORITIES, TOOLS FOR CONTINUED RUSSIAN-U.S. COOPERATION (247-254)
LIST OF ACRONYMS (255-260)
APPENDIX A: AGENDA (261-264)
APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANTS LIST (265-266)
APPENDIX C: JOINT NATIONAL ACADEMIES'/RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' COMMITTEE BIOGRAPHIES (267-271)
APPENDIX D: JOINT STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENTS VLADIMIR V. PUTIN AND GEORGE W. BUSH AND INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR SECURITY (272-298)
APPENDIX E: AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (299-309)