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Russian Views on Countering Terrorism During Eight Years of Dialogue: Extracts from Proceedings of Four Workshops (2009)
National Research Council (NRC)

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271
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Russian Views on Countering Terrorism During Eight Years of Dialogue: Extracts from Proceedings of Four U.S.-Russian Workshops

Electromagnetic Terrorism: Threat to the Security of the State Infrastructure*

Vladimir Ye. Fortov, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)

Moscow High Temperature Institute, and Yury V. Parfyonov, RAS Institute of High Energy Densities


A real danger has arisen in recent years, namely, the possible appearance of a new variety of terrorist acts—so-called electromagnetic terrorism. This term refers to the intentional use of powerful electromagnetic pulse emitting devices or high-voltage pulse generators with the aim of disrupting the normal operations of a country’s technical systems. Such systems include, for example, aircraft takeoff and landing control instrumentation; telecommunications systems; electronic devices used in managing nuclear power plant operations; systems for electricity generation, transmission, and transformation; equipment used in protecting environmentally hazardous facilities; and so forth.

The world has seen the creation of many powerful electromagnetic pulse generators capable of knocking modern electronic systems out of commission. We shall cite an example of one such piece of equipment that has been created in the laboratory. It consists of a semiconductor-based high-voltage short-pulse generator and an amplifying emitting antenna. Electromagnetic pulses with amplitude on the order of 5 kilovolts per meter and length of about 0.2 nanosecond are formed at a distance of about 10 meters from the emitter. The feature that

*

Translated from the Russian by Kelly Robbins.

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271
Front Matter (R1-R10)
Papers from *High Impact Terrorism: Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop* (2002) (1-2)
Cooperation Among Ministries of Internal Affairs of CIS Member States in the Fight Against Terrorism and Other Manifestations of Extremism--Igor L. Dimitrov (3-8)
Russian Legislation and the Struggle Against Terrorism--Mikhail P. Kireev (9-18)
Selected Technologies and Procedures Intended to Restrict Unauthorized Access to Explosives--Bronislav V. Matseevich (19-22)
Bioterrorism: A View from the Side--Oleg S. Morenkov (23-30)
Electromagnetic Terrorism--Yury V. Parfyonov (31-34)
Russian Legislation and the Fight Against Terrorism--Viktor E. Petrishchev (35-46)
Could Terrorists Produce Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons?--Stanislav Rodionov (47-50)
Problems of Biological Security in Agriculture--Georgy A. Safonov and Vladimir A. Gavrilov (51-60)
International Centers as a Basis for Controlling Infectious Disease and Countering Bioterrorism--Lev S. Sandakhchiev, Sergey V. Netesov, Raisa A. Martynyuk (61-70)
The Role of Internal Affairs Agencies in Efforts to Fight Terrorism Under High-Technology Conditions--Oleg A. Stepanov (71-78)
Papers from *Terrorism - Reducing Vulnerabilities and Improving Responses: U.S.-Russian Workshop Proceedings* (2004) (79-80)
Analysis of the Threats and Consequences of Terrorist Acts in Urban Settings: Outline of a Protection System--Vladimir Z. Dvorkin (81-92)
Lessons Learned from the Nord-Ost Terrorist Attack in Moscow from the Standpoint of Russian Security and Law Enforcement Agencies--Yevgeny A. Kolesnikov (93-102)
Technical Protection of Electronic Documents in Computer Systems--Valery A. Konyavsky (103-114)
International Aspects of Creating a State System for Countering the Illegal Circulation of Radioactive Materials in the Russian Federation--Vladimir M. Kutsenko (115-118)
Computer Security Training for Professional Specialists and Other Personnel Associated with Preventing and Responding to Computer Attacks--Anatoly A. Malyuk, Nikolai S. Pogozhin, and Aleksey I. Tolstoy (119-128)
Medical Aspects of Combating Acts of Bioterrorism--Gennady G. Onishchenko (129-132)
Certain Aspects Regarding the Development of Conditions Favorable to Cyberterrorism and the Main Areas of Cooperation in the Struggle Against It--Igor A. Sokolov and Vladimir I. Budzko (133-140)
The Role of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Combating Terrorism in Urban Conditions--Sergey A. Starostin (141-152)
The Role of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations and Executive Branch Agencies of the City of Moscow in Dealing with Emergency Situations Arising from Acts of Terrorism--Aleksandr M. Yeliseev (153-158)
Papers from *Countering Urban Terrorism in Russia and the United States: Proceedings of a Workshop* (2006) (159-160)
Unauthorized Use of Radiation Sources: Measures to Prevent Attacks and Mitigate Consequences--Leonid Bolshov, Rafael Arutyunyan, Elena Melikhova, and Oleg Pavlovsky (161-178)
Special Characteristics of Firefighting in Urban Areas--Nikolay P. Kopylov (179-198)
On the Events in Beslan--Gennady Kovalenko (199-214)
Terrorist Acts in Moscow: Experience and Lessons in Eliminating Their Consequences--Aleksandr Yu. Kudrin (215-220)
Methodology for Assessing the Risks of Terrorism--Nikolay A. Makhutov (221-236)
Cybercrime and the Training of Specialists to Combat It in Russia--Nikolay V. Medvedev (237-246)
On Efforts to Counter International Terrorism in the Russian Federation and Possible Areas of U.S.-Russian Cooperation in this Area--Valentin A. Sobolev (247-256)
Efforts of Russian Ministries in Implementing Measures to Prevent Acts of Terrorism--Sergey G. Vasin (257-268)
Papers from *Countering Terrorism - Biological Agents, Transportation Networks, and Energy Systems: Summary of a U.S.-Russian Workshop* (2009) (269-270)
Electromagnetic Terrorism: Threat to the Security of the State Infrastructure--Vladimir Ye. Fortov and Yury V. Parfyonov (271-274)
Use of Predictive Modeling Packages for Effective Emergency Management--Nikolai Petrovich Kopylov and Irek Ravilevich Khasanov (275-288)
Organizational Measures and Decision Support Systems for Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Acts at Potentially Hazardous Facilities, on Transportation Systems, and in Locations Where Large Numbers of People Congregate--A. Yu. Kudrin, I. Zaporozhets, and S. A. Kachanov (289-296)
International and National Priorities in Combating Terrorism in the Transportation Sector--Vladimir N. Lopatin (297-304)
Characteristics of Technological Terrorism Scenarios and Impact Factors--Nikolai A. Makhutov, Vitaly P. Petrov, and Dmitry O. Reznikov (305-322)
Emerging Viral Infections in the Asian Part of Russia--Sergei V. Netesov and Natalya A. Markovich (323-338)
Activities of the Russian Federal Medical-Biological Agency Related to Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Security--Vladimir V. Romanov (339-342)
The Problem of Oil and Natural Gas Pipeline Security--S. G. Serebryakov (343-352)

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Russian Views on Countering Terrorism During Eight Years of Dialogue: Extracts from Proceedings of Four U.S.-Russian Workshops Electromagnetic Terrorism: Threat to the Security of the State Infrastructure* Vladimir Ye. Fortov, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) Moscow High Temperature Institute, and Yury V. Parfyonov, RAS Institute of High Energy Densities A real danger has arisen in recent years, namely, the possible appearance of a new variety of terrorist acts—so-called electromagnetic terrorism. This term refers to the intentional use of powerful electromagnetic pulse emitting devices or high-voltage pulse generators with the aim of disrupting the normal operations of a country’s technical systems. Such systems include, for example, aircraft takeoff and landing control instrumentation; telecommunications systems; electronic devices used in managing nuclear power plant operations; systems for electricity generation, transmission, and transformation; equipment used in protecting environmentally hazardous facilities; and so forth. The world has seen the creation of many powerful electromagnetic pulse generators capable of knocking modern electronic systems out of commission. We shall cite an example of one such piece of equipment that has been created in the laboratory. It consists of a semiconductor-based high-voltage short-pulse generator and an amplifying emitting antenna. Electromagnetic pulses with amplitude on the order of 5 kilovolts per meter and length of about 0.2 nanosecond are formed at a distance of about 10 meters from the emitter. The feature that * Translated from the Russian by Kelly Robbins.

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Russian Views on Countering Terrorism During Eight Years of Dialogue: Extracts from Proceedings of Four U.S.-Russian Workshops makes this unit unique is its compactness. We direct your attention to the maximum size of the generator, which is only about 30 centimeters. Further reductions in the size of the generator are possible, and a flat antenna may also be used. Existing small high-voltage pulse generators make it possible to inject into data transmission chains or even into buildings’ electricity supply and grounding networks pulses that are harmful to the equipment located in such buildings. They form short pulses with amplitude of 80 kilovolts, periodically repeating at a frequency of 1,000 gigahertz. Such a generator could be manufactured with a volume on the order of 500-800 cubic centimeters. There are two possible scenarios for how acts of electromagnetic terrorism could be carried out using powerful electromagnetic sources. Option 1 would be by aiming a powerful electromagnetic field at a facility, and option 2 would be by injecting high-voltage pulses into the data transmission lines and into the electricity supply and grounding network in buildings. To assess the degree of danger presented by these scenarios, a large number of facilities were studied to determine their resistance to the impact of powerful super-broadband electromagnetic radiation and high-voltage pulse disruptions. The results of the experiments show that the intentional use of powerful pulse disruptions could lead to dangerous wide-scale consequences, such as communications breakdowns, power failures, alarm systems blockages, and so forth. At the same time, it must be said that the designers of the most critical facilities recognize this danger and apply all possible measures to protect electronic systems from various types of electromagnetic disruptions. However, there is an enormous quantity of civilian-use electronic equipment for which there are no requirements for protection against powerful electromagnetic disruptions. Of course, if a few individual pieces of such equipment crash, there will be no serious consequences. Meanwhile, if such equipment fails on a massive scale, chaos will ensue. Therefore, systematic studies have been initiated regarding the stability of civilian-use technical systems against intentionally directed electromagnetic impacts. As an example, presented below are the results of tests on an electronic electricity-use meter and electric power line isolators. The typical electricity meter is a complex device that includes a special integrated system, a microcontroller, power-independent memory, flow sensors, a pulse power source, an optical port, a liquid crystal indicator, a quartz generator, and a light diode. Experiments have indicated that if the meter is irradiated from a distance of 10 meters, operational failures occur. Furthermore, the personnel responsible for the electricity-use monitoring and accounting system are, as a rule, not capable of establishing the causes of the equipment failure in a timely manner or taking effective measures to eliminate them. Thus, the vulnerability of electronic electricity meters has been established experimentally. The tests have also demonstrated the fundamental possibility of intentionally disrupting their operating capacity for criminal purposes, for example, for unauthorized selection

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Russian Views on Countering Terrorism During Eight Years of Dialogue: Extracts from Proceedings of Four U.S.-Russian Workshops of a favorable electricity rate, and so forth. It is significant that these actions could be taken remotely and without anyone’s notice. As previously noted, electric power line isolators were among the items tested. A transformer substation would undoubtedly be a more interesting test subject; however, it is too expensive. Therefore, high-voltage isolators were selected as a focus of the experiments instead. The results of these tests are extremely interesting. It is generally believed that technical systems that include semiconductor devices are the most sensitive to the effects of pulse disruptions. As for high-voltage equipment, it is deliberately deemed resistant to such disruptions. This conclusion is based on the results of standard tests on high-voltage equipment for the impact of such disruptions in the absence of operating current. However, in actual conditions, the equipment will be simultaneously affected by both the disruptions and the operating current. Therefore, researchers concluded that special studies were needed. An experimental setup was developed for this purpose. The unit reproduces the joint action of short pulses of up to 400 kilovolts and operating electric current of up to 30 kilovolts. Electric power line isolators were tested using this setup. Experiments on the isolators showed that with the simultaneous effects of high-voltage pulse disruptions and operating current, degradation of the isolators’ electric parameters was observed along with their mechanical destruction. Such effects may lead to catastrophic phenomena in power systems similar to the widespread failure in the Mosenergo system in the summer of 2005 or the fire that broke out in the cable collector in Moscow’s Central District in July 2006. Thus, the experimental data indicate that compact super-broadband electromagnetic pulse emitters and high-voltage pulse generators could easily be used in dishonest competitive struggles, in unauthorized and unnoticed lowering of rates paid for electricity, in the organization of power system failures, and so forth. It would seem reasonable not to wait for these potential threats to be realized but instead to take timely measures to prevent them. Such measures would include evaluating the vulnerability of the most important infrastructure elements. It is also necessary to develop effective measures to protect infrastructure elements from electromagnetic terrorism. Perhaps a review and clarification will also be needed regarding rules for grounding devices and means of laying data transmissions lines, power cables, and so forth. Because terrorism has become international in recent years and is evoking serious concern in all industrially developed countries, it would be expedient to take measures to promote international cooperation on this issue. It seems necessary to organize a joint experiment to assess the real danger of electromagnetic terrorism and develop means of protection. In addition, international and Russian standards must be developed with the aim of providing better protection for the civilian infrastructure against intentionally directed electromagnetic impacts.

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