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1
Introduction
In 2007, more than 11 million cargo containers arrived on ships and were offloaded at
U.S. sea ports. An approximately equal number arrived by truck and another 2.75 million arrived
by rail across land borders. The previous year, the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347) was signed into
law and required that “not later than December 31, 2007, all containers entering the United
States through the 22 ports through which the greatest volume of containers enter the United
States by vessel shall be scanned for radiation. To the extent practicable, the Secretary shall
deploy next generation radiation detection technology.” Cargo screening at ports of entry to the
United States2 is carried out by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO, also in DHS)
coordinates federal, state, and local detection efforts to address the threat of nuclear terrorism,
and develops, procures, and supports the deployment of detection equipment within the United
States. One of DNDO’s chief clients is CBP. This report concerns efforts to develop, test, and
deploy next generation radiation detection technology. The following paragraphs provide some
history of events that preceded the request for this study.
DNDO requested proposals for the next generation of radiation detectors for cargo
screening (called advanced spectroscopic portals, or ASPs) from commercial vendors. DNDO
selected three vendors for full testing, awarding contracts worth up to $1.2 billion for both
testing and acquisition. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and others raised
questions about the reliability of DNDO’s testing of the devices. Consequently, Congress
restricted use of the funds for “full-scale procurement of Advanced Spectroscopic Portal
Monitors” until the Secretary of Homeland Security submits to Congress “a report certifying that
a significant increase in operational effectiveness will be achieved” by deploying ASPs to
replace the screening devices that are already in place.3
The GAO has on-going audits of the ASP testing and procurement program and has
raised several objections to the way the program, including its testing, evaluation, and life-cycle
cost analyses have been conducted (GAO 2006; 2007a; 2008a), as well as criticisms of the larger
“global architecture” of which the cargo screening is a piece (GAO 2008b; 2009). In August
2007, the DHS Secretary formed a group to carry out an independent review. That group issued
its draft final report in November 2007.4 In December 2007, the 2008 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161) stated “[t]hat the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
consult with the National Academy of Sciences before making such certification.” In its Joint
Explanatory Statement accompanying the legislation, Congress clarified its intent and this
statement was the basis for the committee’s statement of task (see Appendix A).
The ASP testing and evaluation program encountered some delays in 2008, which
delayed any NAS report but created an opportunity for the NAS committee to provide input on
2
“A Port of Entry is any designated place at which a CBP officer is authorized to accept entries of merchandise to
collect duties, and to enforce the various provisions of the customs and navigation laws (19 CFR 101.1).”
3
See Title IV of division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Public Law 110-161.
4
The Independent Review Team’s final report was issued in February 2008. Some of its findings are discussed in
Chapter 3.
8
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 9
how testing and evaluation and the cost-benefit analysis should be completed. This interim report
provides that advice to support future decisions by the Secretary of Homeland Security
concerning development, certification, and deployment of ASPs. This chapter describes the
origin of the study, the broader context of the threat of nuclear terrorism, and the currently
deployed system for screening cargo containers for radiation. Chapter 2 gives readers who are
not familiar with technologies for radiation detection some background on how detectors work.
Chapter 3 provides the committee’s views on ASP testing and analysis conducted by DHS
offices both prior to 2008 and during 2008, including findings and recommendations on how to
complete the work. Chapter 4 provides the committee’s findings and recommendations for
completing the ASP cost-benefit analysis. A final report will contain the committee’s findings
and recommendations on DNDO’s completed tests and analyses.
WHY SCREEN FOR RADIATION? THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM
The possibility of nuclear terrorism has become more credible as it has become clearer
that non-state actors may have or be able to acquire the means for a nuclear attack: gaining the
knowledge of how to design a weapon, the materials for a nuclear explosive, and the ability to
deliver and detonate the device. After the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001,
there is little doubt that well-funded, well-organized, and capable groups have the motive and
intent to carry out high-consequence attacks on the United States. The knowledge of how to
build a nuclear explosive is increasingly seen as a small hurdle, as designs of simple weapons
have been discovered in non-nuclear weapons states, and given reports that A.Q. Khan’s black
market nuclear distribution network offered a weapon design, in addition to designs and
equipment for uranium enrichment.5 Production of special nuclear material (SNM)—the fuel for
a nuclear explosive—is still generally thought to require the resources of a nation, but the
material could be acquired by other means, such as theft or black market sales. After the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the United States and Russia agreed to work together to ensure that
scientists with weapons-design and production expertise remain in Russia, and not sell their
expert services to others. They agreed to begin to account for and secure weapons-grade material
in states of the former Soviet Union and to emplace radiation detectors to catch special nuclear
material illicitly leaving Russia (the second line of defense). It became evident through this
cooperation that the Soviet Union had not kept careful records of its inventory of special nuclear
material at several dozen locations, so it is unknown whether material was already stolen from
the stockpiles.6
To detonate a nuclear device on U.S. soil (including smuggled weapons, improvised
nuclear devices, or dirty bombs), a terrorist must either acquire the necessary materials within the
United States or smuggle them across U.S. borders. One potential path would be to bring the
material in through one of the 327 official ports of entry into the United States, including land,
air, and seaports, concealed as apparently ordinary cargo.
Each day in 2007, U.S. container ports7 handled an average of 71,000 twenty-foot
equivalent units (TEUs, a measure of container size) of cargo.8 In addition, an average of 22,000
5
See, e.g., Corera (2006).
6
See, for example, reports from the National Research Council on materials protection control and accounting (NAS
2009, 2007, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 1999, and 1997)
7
In this case, “container ports” refers to sea ports, and excludes cargo coming into the United States via land border
crossings.
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10 EVALUATING TESTING, COSTS, & BENEFITS OF ASPs: INTERIM REPORT
truck and rail containers entered the U.S. by land each day in 2007. In fact, an average of one in
nine containers carrying global trade is bound for or is coming from the United States (USDOT,
2007).
According to testimony from Jayson Ahern, acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, in March 2009, radiation portal monitors (RPMs) in place now scan about
98% of the shipping containers entering U.S. maritime ports, 96% of trucks at Northern land
border crossings, and 100% of those at Southern border crossings.9 Additional monitors are
being installed in the remaining ports and border crossings, and plans are in development to
cover rail lines. This is a significant accomplishment. However, it is only a first step. The system
does not cover small water vessels or general aviation, and much uncertainty remains about how
to improve the overall capability of the system to reduce the threat posed by nuclear terrorism10
in view of ever-increasing technological innovations and limited financial resources.
EFFORTS TO INTERDICT NUCLEAR MATERIALS AT PORTS OF ENTRY
The U.S. government—both the administration and Congress—concluded that it would
be valuable to screen people, luggage, vehicles, and cargo entering the United States for nuclear
and radiological material. U.S. Customs and Border Protection put in place a system of RPMs
that use passive devices to detect radioactive material entering the country. Typical RPMs at a
small border crossing are shown in Figure 1.1. In the towers on each side of the roadway or
traffic lane are two panels (one high, one low) containing radiation detectors. The RPMs use
PVT plastic scintillation detectors, which detect gamma rays emitted by most radionuclides, but
have a limited ability to characterize the source of those gamma rays. The PVT detectors are
capable of measuring only crude spectral information. The RPMs also have neutron detectors,
which can detect neutron-emitting materials, such as plutonium.
Cargo screening is just one of several overlapping layers of defense against unlawful
import of nuclear material, none of which offers perfect protection. The layered defense system
begins with securing the materials in the facilities where they reside overseas and has additional
layers for detecting and preventing smuggling efforts at foreign nations’ borders and interdicting
in transit. The Department of Energy, through the Second Line of Defense and other programs,
uses many of the same detectors as CBP but deploys them overseas at border crossings and sea
8
The numbers cited for container traffic can be confusing. The maritime industry counts twenty-foot equivalent
units (TEUs) when counting cargo containers of varying lengths—a forty foot container is two TEUs—but others
count actual containers, or even conveyances. In this report, TEUs will only be used to describe overall container
traffic for sea ports.
9
Statement of Jayson P. Ahern, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of
Homeland Security before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, April 1, 2009.
10
In 2008, David Maurer of the Government Accountability Office testified that the Department of Homeland
Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) “lacks an overarching strategic plan to help guide how it
will achieve a more comprehensive architecture.” (GAO 2008b)
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 11
(a) (b)
Figure 1.1 (a) The tall pillars closest to the foreground in this photograph are RPMs at a land
border crossing between Canada and New York. (b) A truck is shown passing through a series of
RPMs and ASPs on a test track. SOURCE: CBP (2008).
ports under agreements with the foreign governments where they are located.11 The final layer is
at our borders’ ports of entry, with the RPMs (and the associated hand-held radiation detectors).
Over 1070 RPMs were in operation at U.S. ports of entry, as of July 2008. Hand-held
radioisotope identification devices (RIIDs)12 also were in operation at ports of entry at that time.
Every container of foreign origin carried by a truck passes through screening. At sea
ports, the procedure is not totally consistent at each site or for each container. Containers may be
loaded onto a chassis which is then connected to a tractor that drives the container through an
RPM and off the terminal. Containers destined for rail transport may be carried by a truck to a
nearby location with a rail line where the train is built (some of these are screened with a RPM
when the truck is pulling them) or they may be loaded directly onto rail cars (so-called on-dock
rail or roll-on, roll-off rail loading). Mobile detectors are used for some of the containers that are
not conveyed by truck. The ASP-C RPMs are only used for containers conveyed by truck.
The current concept of operations (CONOPS) for screening of cargo containers for
radioactive material consists of a two-stage screening process. In the first stage, primary
screening, the container is driven through a PVT RPM. When an RPM used in primary screening
detects radiation levels above a gamma-ray or neutron alarm threshold, the container is diverted
to a lane dedicated to secondary screening. Because there is radioactive material in a small but
significant fraction of ordinary cargo, radiation alarms in primary screening are quite common.
This radioactive material includes naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM),13 as well as
11
The National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy
(DOE), runs these programs. The committee refers to DOE here and throughout the report for simplicity. The
similarity and overlapping nature of the DOE and CBP-DNDO programs has led DNDO to consult and cooperate
with DOE on some aspects of the ASP program.
12
The term “isotope identification” or “radioisotope identification” is commonly used, although it is usually not
technically correct. It is only meaningful to refer to an isotope in the context of a specific element. The same is true
of the term radioisotope. A nuclide or a radionuclide may be any isotope of any element. In this report, the terms
“isotope” and “radioisotope” are synonymous with nuclide and radionuclide, respectively, consistent with common
usage.
13
NORM comprises many materials derived from rocks, such as granite table tops, porcelain, and kitty litter, and
materials high in potassium, such as bananas and potassium chloride (salt substitute).
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12 EVALUATING TESTING, COSTS, & BENEFITS OF ASPs: INTERIM REPORT
radiopharmaceuticals used in medicine and industrial radiation sources. Even when radiation is
not detected at a primary RPM, secondary actions may be taken based on independent
information about the cargo or a CBP agent’s judgment that the cargo is suspect.
In secondary screening, the container is driven through another RPM and examined with
a “spectroscopic” detector, which in principle is capable of identifying specific radioactive
substances. The spectrometer currently in use is a handheld radioisotope identification device
(RIID, see Figure 1.2).
One or more CBP officers examine the container with a RIID to identify whether the
source is NORM, an industrial source, medical radionuclides, a threat object, or some
combination of these. CBP may decide to send the spectrum electronically to a centralized group
of specialists, called Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS), for analysis. CBP may also open
the container and visually inspect the contents as well as further monitor the contents with the
RIID. At some ports of entry, the container may also be subject to additional inspections such as
imaging with an X-ray type machine (a radiography device with a gamma or X-ray source) to
look for localized heavy metal objects (shielding or SNM), and direct examination of the cargo,
including removal from the truck or shipping container.
Figure 1.2: A handheld RIID. SOURCE: DNDO (2008a)
Committee members observed secondary screening operations at two border crossings
and three ports. The committee’s observations were consistent with descriptions given in
briefings to the committee by CBP in May and October. A truck carrying a container that
triggers a primary alarm may be delayed by 5 to 15 minutes or more, depending on the
configuration of the port of entry and the relative ease or difficulty of identifying the source of
radiation. First, because of the layout of the primary and secondary screening areas, at some
ports of entry it may take several minutes for a truck stopped in primary screening to be diverted
to secondary screening. At some ports of entry, it requires that a CBP officer stop all lanes traffic
through the RPMs to allow the truck that caused the alarm to cross to the secondary screening
area. Switching to ASPs would not reduce this delay for a truck that triggers a primary alarm, but
to be certified for primary screening, ASPs must alarm on fewer trucks. The result of deploying
ASPs that meet the criteria would be some reduction in the time spent in screening overall.
Screening a truck with a handheld RIID may take several minutes or more, depending on how
quickly the alarm can be resolved.
However, the time required to carry out screening is only part of the picture of actual
operations at ports of entry. CBP has stated repeatedly that the current system of radiation
screening, using PVT RPMs and RIIDs, does not impede the flow of commerce. The
committee’s observations were, again, consistent with those statements. In no case that the
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 13
committee observed was there a backup of trucks resulting from radiation screening. Other
steps—manifests and immigration at border crossings, and safety inspections at border crossings
and ports—had trucks waiting. While an alarm on the primary screening detectors sometimes
stopped traffic for all of the lanes, typically it resulted in no net delay for the trucks that did not
trigger the alarm. This is because the queue at the next inspection station usually had not yet
cleared. DNDO and CBP officials also told the committee that replacing the current system with
an ASP system would not reduce the number of CBP officers who conduct radiation screening at
ports of entry.
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