This report assesses the status of energy-supply and end-use technologies 1 in the United States, both at present and over the next two to three decades. It is intended to inform the development of wise energy policies by our nation’s decision makers and to provide the technical underpinnings for more detailed explorations of key energy-policy options in the second phase of the National Academies America’s Energy Future (AEF) project. The complete study charge is presented in Box 1.1.
This first chapter, which establishes the context for the detailed energy-technology assessments that appear in Part 2 of this report, is divided into five sections. They describe the current U.S. energy system; some challenges that are likely to be encountered in transforming it; the role of technology in this transformation; the AEF Committee’s strategy for addressing its study charge; and the report’s organization.
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1 Context and Challenges
T
his report assesses the status of energy-supply and end-use technolo-
gies1 in the United States, both at present and over the next two to three
decades. It is intended to inform the development of wise energy policies
by our nation’s decision makers and to provide the technical underpinnings for
more detailed explorations of key energy-policy options in the second phase of
the National Academies America’s Energy Future (AEF) project. The complete
study charge is presented in Box 1.1.
This first chapter, which establishes the context for the detailed energy-
technology assessments that appear in Part 2 of this report, is divided into five
sections. They describe the current U.S. energy system; some challenges that are
likely to be encountered in transforming it; the role of technology in this trans-
formation; the AEF Committee’s strategy for addressing its study charge; and the
report’s organization.
1The AEF Committee uses the term “energy-supply and end-use technologies” in this report
to connote the spectrum of technologies involved in the production, distribution, storage, and
consumption of energy. These technologies include those that convert primary energy resources
(e.g., fossil fuels, nuclear, solar, and wind) into useful forms (e.g., gasoline and electricity); tech-
nologies that transmit this energy to consumers (e.g., electrical transmission and distribution
systems); technologies that store and utilize this energy (e.g., batteries, motors); and associated
technologies, sometimes referred to as “demand-side” technologies, that control energy use
(e.g., advanced electricity metering systems, or “smart meters”).
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0 America’s Energy Future Summary Edition
BOX 1.1 Study charge
This study will critically evaluate the current and projected state of develop-
ment of energy-supply, storage, and end-use technologies. The study will not
make policy recommendations, but it will analyze where appropriate the role
of public policy in determining the demand and cost for energy and the con-
figuration of the nation’s energy systems. The committee will develop a “refer-
ence scenario” that reflects a projection of current economic, technology cost
and performance, and policy parameters into the future. Within that scenario,
the committee will evaluate energy technologies with respect to:
•
Estimated times to readiness for deployment
•
Current and projected costs (e.g., per unit of energy production or
savings)
•
Current and projected performance (e.g., efficiency, emissions per unit of
output)
•
Key technical, environmental, economic, policy, and social factors that
would enhance or impede development and deployment
•
Key environmental (including CO2 mitigation), economic, energy security,
social, and other life-cycle impacts arising from deployment
• Key research and development (R&D) challenges.
The committee may assess the sensitivity of these factors to possible varia-
tions in the key economic, technology cost and performance, and policy param-
eters that define the reference scenario.
The primary focus of the study will be on existing technologies and technol-
ogies likely to be available for deployment within the next decade. A secondary
focus will be on technologies with longer times to deployment. The study will
specifically provide estimates and findings on the following:
•
For current technologies and technologies where initial deployment is
judged to be within the next decade: estimates of costs, performance,
and impacts
•
For technologies where deployment is judged likely to be between 10
and 25 years: findings regarding key factors that enhance or impede
adoption, implications for costs, and R&D challenges
•
For technologies where deployment is judged likely to be greater than
25 years: findings regarding key factors that enhance or impede R&D
challenges.
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Context and Challenges
THE CURRENT U.S. ENERGY SYSTEM
The U.S. energy system currently comprises a vast and complex set of interlock-
ing technologies for the production, distribution, and use of fuels and electricity
(Boxes 1.2 and 1.3; Figure 1.12). It evolved over the last century in response to a
broad set of circumstances: rapidly growing demand for energy, advances in tech-
nology, diverse public policies and regulations, and the powerful market forces
that have accompanied economic growth and globalization. As a result, the energy
system’s technologies and production assets are of many different vintages and
often rely on aging and increasingly vulnerable infrastructures.
Five critical characteristics of this system stand out:
1. The United States relies on the burning of carbon-based fossil fuels for
more than 85 percent of its energy needs (Figure 1.2).
2. The burning of fossil fuels has a number of deleterious environmental
impacts, among the most serious of which is the emission of greenhouse
gases,3 primarily carbon dioxide (CO2). At present, the United States
emits about 6 billion tonnes (6 gigatonnes) of CO2 per year into the
atmosphere. Emissions have grown by almost 20 percent since 1990 but
have recently leveled off somewhat (Figure 1.3). However, CO2 emis-
sions are projected to increase in the future under the Energy Information
Administration’s (EIA’s) “business as usual” reference case (see Box 2.1 in
Chapter 2).
3. Despite decades of declining energy intensity (i.e., energy consumption
per dollar of gross domestic product; see Figure 1.4), the United States
still has a higher per capita consumption of energy than either the Euro-
pean Union or Japan (Figure 1.5). And despite improvements in energy
efficiency, U.S. energy consumption continues to rise, in part because of
2Figures 1.1 through 1.12 are grouped under the section titled “America’s Energy Past, Pres-
ent, and Future: An Overview in Charts and Graphs,” which starts on page 17.
3Greenhouse gases are so named because of their ability to absorb and emit infrared radia-
tion. Water vapor and CO2 are the most common greenhouse gases in Earth’s atmosphere, but
methane, nitrous oxides, and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are also greenhouse gases. Recent
studies (e.g., IPCC, 2007) indicate a high probability of a link between anthropogenic green-
house gas emissions and observed effects on global warming, precipitation patterns, ocean acidi-
fication, and weather patterns. The National Academies recently initiated “America’s Climate
Choices,” a suite of studies to inform and guide responses to climate change across the nation.
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America’s Energy Future Summary Edition
BOX 1.2 Primary Energy and useful Energy
The energy that powers our civilization is obtained from a number of pri-
mary energy sources that exist in nature. These sources fall into two categories:
flows of energy and stored energy. Examples of energy flows include sunlight,
wind, and waves. Stored energy includes fossil energy (petroleum, natural gas,
and coal), bioenergy (contained in biomass), and nuclear energy (stored in
atomic nuclei in radioactive elements such as uranium) and the heat stored in
Earth’s upper crust. Primary energy sources can be converted into useful energy
that, for example, powers a vehicle, lights a building, or supplies heat for an
industrial process, although the conversion process inevitably involves energy
losses (which can be quite considerable) and often entails substantial costs.
While the extent of these primary energy sources is usually large, there are
a number of technological, economic, environmental, and labor constraints on
converting them into useful energy. For example, many remaining domestic
supplies of petroleum and natural gas are in difficult-to-access locations. Some
are in environmentally sensitive areas. And renewable energy is unevenly dis-
tributed across the United States; in some cases, regions with abundant renew-
able potential are physically distant from demand centers. Such constraints are
in fact critical in determining the actual mix of useful energy supplies that are
available at particular times. Much of this report deals with the technology
options for overcoming some of these constraints.
economic and population growth.4 U.S. dependence on energy imports
continues to rise as well (Figure 1.6). And steady increases in energy use
are projected for the future (Figure 1.7) under EIA’s business-as-usual
reference case.5
4. The United States is almost completely dependent on petroleum for
transportation—a situation that entails unique energy-security6 chal-
4In many cases, energy efficiency gains that could have further moderated per capita energy
demand have instead been used to support new demands for energy, for example, through in-
creased size and performance of light-duty vehicles.
5These are long-term projections that do not account for short-term demand variations. For
example, global consumption of petroleum dropped in 2008 and is projected to drop in 2009
because of the current worldwide economic recession.
6The committee uses the term “energy security” to mean protection against disruptions to the
energy supply chain that produces, distributes, and uses energy. Such disruptions can result from
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Context and Challenges
BOX 1.3 resources, reserves, and Potential
The terms “resource,” “reserve,” and “potential” are used throughout
this report to describe the primary energy sources that exist in nature and
may be tapped to produce useful energy. “Resource” refers to quantities of
stored energy—i.e., solid, liquid, or gaseous fuels derivable from petroleum,
natural gas, coal, uranium, geothermal, or biomass—that exist in nature and
may be feasible to extract or recover, given favorable technology and econom-
ics. ”Reserve” refers to that portion of the resource that can be economically
extracted or recovered with current technology. “Potential” is used instead of
resource to describe energy flows—such as from sunlight, wind, or the move-
ment of water—that occur in nature and may be feasible to recover, given
favorable technology and economics.
These primary energy sources are very large compared to U.S. energy
demand. For example, the energy from sunlight reaching the land surface of
the United States is thousands of times greater than the country’s current annu-
al consumption of energy; the energy from wind available in the United States
is at least an order of magnitude larger; and the energy stored in geothermal,
nuclear, and fossil reserves available to the United States is at least thousands
of times larger. The challenge is to transform these vast resources into energy
forms that are readily usable in a commercially and environmentally acceptable
fashion.
lenges. The nation relies on coal, nuclear energy, renewable energy (pri-
marily hydropower), and, more recently, natural gas for generating its
electricity (Figures 1.8 and 1.9).
5. Many of the energy system’s assets are aging: domestic oil and gas
reserves are being depleted; currently operating nuclear plants were con-
structed largely in the 1970s and 1980s, and many coal plants are even
older (Figure 1.10); and electrical transmission and distribution systems
contain infrastructure and technologies from the 1950s. Renewing or
replacing these assets will take decades and require investments totaling
several trillion dollars.
interruptions in energy imports, for example, or from damage to the energy infrastructure (either
through intentional acts or overuse).
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America’s Energy Future Summary Edition
Fossil fuels have supported U.S. economic prosperity since the latter part of
the 19th century. But their low market prices during most of this period encour-
aged high levels of energy consumption per capita and generally discouraged the
development of alternative sources of energy, with two notable exceptions: hydro-
electric and nuclear power, which currently account for about 7 percent and 19
percent, respectively, of U.S. electricity generation. Our nation’s dependence on
fossil fuels evolved not only because they were available at low market costs7 but
also because their physical and chemical properties are well suited to particular
uses: petroleum for transportation; natural gas as an industrial feedstock, for
residential and commercial space heating, and, more recently, as a fuel for electric-
power generation; and coal for the generation of electricity and as a feedstock for
some industrial processes (Figure 1.8). Indeed, most consumer-based, industrial,
and governmental activities require, either directly or indirectly, the consumption
of fossil fuels.
The current profile of U.S. energy use, summarized in Figures 1.1 and 1.2,
shows that nearly 40 percent of the nation’s economy is fueled by petroleum.
More important, nearly all of our nation’s transportation needs are being met
by petroleum-based fuels, as shown in Figure 1.8, and prospects for alternatives
are currently limited. Domestic production of petroleum in the United States
peaked8 in the 1970s and has been in decline for the past three decades. However,
improvements in exploration and production technologies have helped to moder-
ate these declines. About 56 percent of the petroleum consumed in the United
States in 2008 was imported, in some cases from geopolitically turbulent or fragile
regions.9
America’s enormous appetite for oil, coupled with growth in demand from
other countries, puts upward pressures on world prices, increases revenues to oil-
exporting nations, and heightens the influence of those nations in world affairs.
7These market costs often did not account for “externality” costs such as those stemming
from the environmental and health impacts of producing, distributing, and consuming energy.
8There is a vigorous debate among experts about when we can expect world oil production to
peak—and also about the importance of this issue for long-term energy supplies. Some judge that
world production has already peaked or will do so in the near future; others argue that world
oil production will continue to increase slowly for the foreseeable future or will have a sustained
plateau. See, for example, Simmons (2005) and Wood et al. (2004).
9Each nation’s access to or competition for energy is central to some of the major geopolitical
tensions of our time. Using energy more efficiently and developing new domestic energy sources
could help reduce U.S. dependence on imports from these unstable regions.
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Context and Challenges
Historically, this influence has often been expressed in directions that are neither
supportive of a well-functioning world oil market nor consistent with U.S. inter-
ests. Since U.S. consumption of oil is concentrated in key economic activities,
such as transportation and home heating, this produces what many consider to be
increasingly substantial economic and national security vulnerabilities. The cur-
rent recession has reduced petroleum demand, and this condition may persist until
the economic recovery gets under way. But if history is any guide, the resumption
of worldwide economic growth will again raise the demand for petroleum and
increase pressures on prices.
Almost a quarter of our nation’s economy is fueled by natural gas, mostly
for residential and commercial space heating and industrial uses, but increasingly
for electric-power generation (see Figure 1.8). Indeed, over the past two decades,
natural-gas-fired facilities have accounted for a significant fraction of new U.S.
baseload power plants (Figure 1.10).10 About 86 percent of the natural gas used in
the United States at present is produced domestically, and much of the remainder
comes from Canada. Prices for natural gas in the North American market have
been lower than the price for liquefied natural gas11 on the world market.
During the last 2 years, North American natural gas production from con-
ventional resources has declined. But production from unconventional sources—
such as coal beds, tight gas sands (rocks through which flow is very slow), and
shale—has increased, largely in response to higher prices and new technology.
Recent price declines, however, have reduced the incentive to develop new natu-
ral gas production, especially from unconventional sources. If domestic produc-
tion growth could be continued and production sustained over long periods,
North American sources could meet some portion of the potential growth in U.S.
demand for natural gas. If, however, growth in domestic natural gas production is
limited—by some combination of production declines from existing sources and of
less-than-expected growth in new sources—the United States might have to import
more natural gas, which would result in increased import dependence and expo-
sure to world prices for liquefied natural gas.
10Natural gas plants are used to provide both baseload and peaking power, but Figure 1.10
shows only baseload plants.
11Liquifying natural gas by cooling it to low temperatures (about –160°C) at close to atmo-
spheric pressures makes it easier to transport and store.
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America’s Energy Future Summary Edition
Which of these futures occurs will depend as well on a set of interrelated
factors including the following: demand growth, production technology, resource
availability, and prices. There is some uncertainty, for example, regarding how
easily domestic sources of natural gas production could be expanded and how
quickly a global market for natural gas would emerge. If North American natural
gas production cannot be expanded to meet demand, then dependence on natural
gas imports could mirror that on petroleum.
Figure 1.8 also shows that the burning of fossil fuels—principally coal and
secondarily natural gas—accounts for almost 75 percent of the electricity gener-
ated in the United States. Coal is abundant in this country and relatively inex-
pensive compared to other fossil fuels. The United States currently has about 20
years’ worth of identified coal reserves in active mines. However, a much larger
resource would be available for production if new mines were opened and if the
rail infrastructure required to deliver coal—or sufficient long-distance transmission
lines for delivery of electricity generated near the mine mouth—could be put in
place. Costs of production are low enough that substantial quantities of coal can
be produced at current coal prices. However, coal mining has significant environ-
mental impacts, which will limit its suitability in some locations.
The use of fossil fuels to generate energy has a number of deleterious impacts
on land resources, water supplies, and the well-being of citizens. Arguably, the
most important unregulated environmental impact of fossil-fuel use is the emis-
sion of greenhouse gases, primarily CO2, to the atmosphere. Petroleum use for
transportation accounts for about one-third of total annual U.S. emissions of CO2
(Figures 1.11 and 1.12), and fossil-fuel use for electricity generation accounts for
more than another third (Figure 1.11). Coal use causes most of the emissions from
electricity production. Natural gas produces about half as much CO2 as coal per
kilowatt-hour of electricity generated, but its emissions can be some 10–20 times
higher per kilowatt-hour than those from nuclear or renewables (see Figure 2.15
in Chapter 2).
Although technologies for capturing and storing CO2 have been demon-
strated in nonelectrical applications, they have not yet been shown to be safely
deployable at a sufficient scale for coal- and natural-gas-fired power plants. Even
if the technology were to be proven for electrical applications, building the neces-
sary infrastructure would require major investments over long periods of time,
and substantial new regulations would have to be formulated to address safety,
ownership, and liability issues. And, of course, there would be impacts on the
price of electricity.
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Context and Challenges 7
AMERICA’S ENERGY PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
An Overview in Charts and Graphs
Net Electricity
0.10
Imports
Solar
8.41
0.08 12.67
7.04 27.77
Electricity
Nuclear
Generation
8.41
Rejected
40.46
20.83
2.44 Energy
Hydro
58.47
2.46 2.28
4.74
0.31
Wind
Residential
0.31 9.14
0.07
0.31 11.43
Geothermal 0.02
1.28
0.35 0.46
4.84 1.69
4.58
0.01
Natural Commercial
6.78
Gas 8.47 Energy
23.63 3.08 0.63 Services
0.02 43.04
4.96
3.43
0.06 0.10
8.00
Coal Industrial
19.87
22.76 24.84
9.52
1.86
0.42
2.00
Biomass 21.77
0.02
3.61
0.62
0.66 0.66
Trans-
portation
27.71
Petroleum 29.03
7.25
39.81
Figure 1.1 Energy consumption in the United States in 2007 in quadrillions of British
thermal units (quads). The figure illustrates the delivery of energy from primary fuel R01203
sources, which are shown in the boxes on the left side of the figure, to the residential, 1-1
Main Report
commercial, industrial, and transportation sectors, which are shown in the boxes at the
center-right side of the figure. Energy is delivered to these sectors primarily in three
forms: (1) electricity, which is produced principally from coal, natural gas, and nuclear
power, and to a much lesser extent from renewable sources (hydro, solar, wind, and
biomass); (2) liquid fuels, principally petroleum, with a small contribution from biomass-
derived fuels (e.g., corn ethanol); and (3) natural gas for heating and as an industrial
feedstock. Small quantities of coal and biomass are also used as industrial feedstocks.
The width of the bars indicates the relative contributions of each energy source; the
absolute contribution (in quads) is shown by the numerical labels next to each bar.
The bar for electricity represents retail electricity sales only and does not include self-
generated electricity. The boxes on the right side of the figure show that a total of
about 101.5 quads of energy were consumed in the United States in 2007; about 43
quads were used to provide energy services, and more than 58 quads were “rejected”
(i.e., not utilized to provide energy services) because of inefficiencies in energy produc-
tion, distribution, and use.
Sources: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Department of Energy, based
on data from the Energy Information Administration, 2008a.
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8 America’s Energy Future Summary Edition
Biomass
3%
Other Renewables 1%
Hydro 2%
Nuclear
8%
70
60
Quadrillion Btu (Quads)
50
Fossil Fuels
86%
40
Total U.S. Consumption = 101.6 Quads
30
20
10
0
Petroleum Natural Gas Coal Nuclear Hydropower Biomass Other
Power Renewables
Energy Source
Figure 1.2 Energy consumption in the United States in 2007 by fuel source, in quads
(bars) and as percentages (pie chart).
Source: Energy Information Administration, 2008b. R01203
Main Report 1-2
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Context and Challenges
8000
7300
Million Tonnes CO2 Equivalent
6200
6000
Total
4000
Carbon Dioxide
Other GHG
2000
0
1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Figure 1.3 Greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, 1990–2007, in millions of
tonnes CO2 equivalent. The “other” greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions shown on the
diagram include methane and nitrous oxide, converted to CO2-equivalent units. The
1990 and 2007 point estimates have been rounded to two significant figures.
Source: Energy Information Administration, 2008b. R01203
Main Report 1-3
1.2
Historical Projected
1.0
Energy Use Relative to 1980
0.8
0.6
0.4
Energy Use per Capita
0.2
Energy Use per Dollar of GDP
0
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
2006
Year
Figure 1.4 Energy use in the United States per dollar of GDP and per capita, with 1980
energy use per dollar of GDP and per capita set to 1.0.
Source: Energy Information Administration, 2008b.
R01203
Main Report 1-4
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24 America’s Energy Future Summary Edition
3000
2500 Coal
Million Tonnes CO2
Natural Gas
Petroleum
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Residential Commercial Industrial Transportation Electric
Generation
Sector
Figure 1.11 Primary CO2 emissions by production sector and fuel type in the United
States in 2007 in millions of tonnes per year. Emissions from the electric power sector
result from the production of electricity that is consumed by the end-use sectors shown
in the figure. R01203
Source: Data from Energy Information Administration, 2008b. Main Report 1-11
2500
Coal
2000
Natural Gas
Petroleum
Million Tonnes CO2
Electricity
1500
1000
500
0
Residential Commercial Industrial Transportation
Sector
Figure 1.12 Total CO2 emissions in the United States in 2007 by end-use sector and pri-
mary energy source, in millions of tonnes per year. Also shown is each end-use sector’s
consumption of electricity. Electricity is a secondary energy source and is generated using
fossil fuels and nuclear and renewable sources.
Source: Data from Energy Information Administration, 2008b. R01203
Main Report 1-12
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Context and Challenges
Nevertheless, new technologies that use energy more efficiently and that
avoid, or capture and safely store, greenhouse gas emissions are essential com-
ponents of a portfolio of alternatives for transforming energy production and
use. Indeed, failure to develop and implement such technologies will greatly limit
the options available for reducing the nation’s greenhouse gas emissions to the
atmosphere.
CHALLENGES TO TRANSFORMING ENERGY PRODUCTION AND USE
There is a growing recognition that our nation’s current approaches for obtaining
useful energy, being largely dependent on fossil fuels, are unsustainable over the
long term and that we must therefore transform the manner in which energy is
produced, distributed, and consumed. The need to transform the U.S. energy sys-
tem is motivated by several factors.
• Heightened long-term competition for fossil fuels as a result of world-
wide population and economic growth.
• Increasing U.S. reliance on world markets and their vulnerable supply
chains for supplies of petroleum (and possibly, in the future, of natural
gas).
• Mounting volatility in market prices for fossil fuels. For example, petro-
leum prices have ranged from about $32 to $147 per barrel over the
past 2 years, which has helped to promote volatility in prices for coal
and natural gas.
• Growing concerns about the impacts on the environment of burning
fossil fuels—especially the impacts of CO2 emissions to the atmosphere
on global warming—and the time spans of such impacts.12
The challenge before us is to transform the U.S. energy system in a manner
that increases its sustainability, supports long-term economic prosperity, promotes
12The committee refers in particular to uncertainties in the time-dependent relationships asso-
ciated with anthropogenic CO2 emissions and the resulting changes in atmospheric temperatures
and sea levels. These uncertainties make it difficult to judge precisely how soon CO2 emissions
must be reduced to prevent major environmental impacts around the world. Many experts judge
that there are, at most, just a few decades remaining in which to make these changes.
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America’s Energy Future Summary Edition
energy security, and reduces the adverse environmental impacts arising from
energy production and use. Such a transformation could, for example, promote
sustainability by using energy more efficiently and increasing the use of renewable-
energy sources; support long-term economic prosperity by ensuring the availability
of adequate supplies of energy; improve energy security by decreasing the nation’s
reliance on petroleum imports; and reduce adverse environmental impacts by
reducing CO2 emissions to the atmosphere.
Concerns about the sustainability, security, or environmental impacts arising
from energy production and use have been reflected in the agendas of all U.S. presi-
dents since Franklin D. Roosevelt. Such concerns were reflected, for example, in:
• Richard Nixon’s “Project Independence” (1974)
• Gerald Ford’s “Energy Independence Act” (1975)
• Jimmy Carter’s “National Energy Plan” (1977)
• Ronald Reagan’s “Energy Security” report (1987)
• George H.W. Bush’s “National Energy Strategy” (1991)
• Bill Clinton’s “Federal Energy R&D for the Challenges of the 21st
Century” report (1997)
• George W. Bush’s “Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound
Energy for America’s Future” report (2001).
Environmental policies and regulations—including, for example, those stem-
ming from the Clean Air Act and the National Environmental Policy Act—have
at times focused our nation’s attention on energy efficiency and conservation and
the use of renewable sources of energy, which has led to dramatic improvements
in air quality. In fact, statutes such as the Clean Air Act demonstrate that thought-
ful regulation can be a very useful tool for dealing with important externalities—
those involved, for example, in the unconstrained emissions of pollutants (e.g.,
NOx, SOx) from the burning of fossil fuels.
These policies and regulations have focused in part on mitigating the envi-
ronmental impacts of energy production and use, but they have been piecemeal
efforts. The fact is that the United States has never implemented a truly compre-
hensive set of national policies for obtaining and using energy to meet national
goals for sustainability, economic prosperity, security, and environmental quality.
Instead, as noted previously, the U.S. energy system has developed in response to
an array of uncoordinated market forces and shifting public policies.
Yet there has been a growing recognition over the past decade of the need
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Context and Challenges 7
for such comprehensive national policies. Congress made an unsuccessful attempt
to pass major energy legislation in 2002, successfully passed such legislation in
2005 (Energy Policy Act of 2005) and in 2007 (Energy Independence and Security
Act [EISA] of 2007), and was working on another major energy bill as the pres-
ent report was being completed. Additionally, the Obama administration recently
announced a new national fuel efficiency policy that will accelerate the implemen-
tation of EISA fuel economy standards for light-duty vehicles. During this same
period there has been a sharp rise in investment activity focused on clean energy—
from a few tens of millions of dollars in the late 1990s to hundreds of billions of
dollars today.
It is the AEF Committee’s judgment that comprehensive and sustained
national policies for energy production and use will be needed to achieve a timely
transformation to the more sustainable, secure, and environmentally benign
energy system envisioned in this report. However, to help shape these policies
will require sound and dispassionate technical analyses of the opportunities and
challenges before us. Such analyses should address technology capabilities, costs,
times to maturity and commercial deployment, and impacts on the environment,
economy, and national security. The technical analysis in the present report aims
to help support the development of such policies.
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY
Transforming the U.S. energy system as described in the preceding section will
require the continued improvement of existing technologies as well as the develop-
ment and national-scale deployment of new technologies, including:
• Existing and new energy efficiency technologies.
• Existing and new energy-supply technologies—including wind, solar,
geothermal, biofuels, and nuclear power.
• Carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies on a large-enough scale
to reduce CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil fuels.
• Modern electrical transmission and distribution systems to accom-
modate 21st-century electricity supplies (especially from intermittent
resources such as wind and solar), support future growth in electric-
ity demand, and enable national-scale deployments of sophisticated
demand-side technologies.
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8 America’s Energy Future Summary Edition
Many different pathways can potentially be pursued to these ends. But identify-
ing pathways that are consistent with the nation’s priorities and then taking the
actions needed to achieve the desired transformations are among the most difficult
challenges of our time.
The national-scale deployment of new technologies will have learning
curves and will entail a variety of risks, and such deployments can have unfore-
seen economic and environmental impacts. Thus, in addition to evaluating the
potential contributions of existing and emerging technologies, we also need to
understand the nontechnological constraints on their rates of deployment and
to decide on the roles of the public and private sectors and current and future
generations for shouldering deployment costs and risks. In short, transformation
of our nation’s energy system will require a sustained national effort involving
carefully focused technology research, development, and demonstration; realign-
ments of public policies and regulations; substantial capital investments; and
allied resources (materials, infrastructure, and people) in both the public and the
private sectors.
Many energy-supply and end-use technologies are ready for significant
deployment now, but others will not be available until they have been demon-
strated at scale13 or until important technological barriers have been overcome.
Of course, once a technology is ready for deployment, a number of important
economic, regulatory and policy, and resource factors will govern the actual
pace, scale, and cost of deployment. Especially important in this regard are the
prices for fossil fuels and other materials, the availability and costs of special-
ized resources and capital, and key public policies and regulations that address,
for example, renewable-energy portfolio standards, building regulations, corpo-
rate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards, and carbon prices.14 Because of
the uncertainties about how these factors will play out in the decades ahead, the
technology-deployment options that are identified in this chapter and in Part
of this report should be considered as important first-step technology assessments
rather than as forecasts as to which technologies will be implemented and how
important each technology will be.
The committee also recognizes that currently unpredictable developments in
13The scale of a demonstration should be large enough to give an investor or company the
confidence in the technology’s economics, performance, and regulatory acceptability to build a
commercial plant. The actual scale of demonstration required will vary across technologies.
14The term “carbon prices” denotes the costs that would be imposed through statute or regu-
lation for emitting CO2 and other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere.
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technology could have dramatic impacts on future deployment options. There is
little doubt that beyond the next few decades, new technologies—which employ,
for example, advanced materials and innovative chemical processes not yet in
view—could play transformative roles. Along these same lines, better understand-
ing of how geoengineering15 or the ecology of microbial systems affects climate
could yield new insights on managing greenhouse gas emissions from energy pro-
duction and use. In fact, unexpected breakthroughs might even enable fusion tech-
nology to contribute to the U.S. energy supply before 2050. Given the contingent
nature of technology development, there will always be uncertainties in future
technology pathways.
While the development and widespread deployment of both evolutionary and
new technologies will play a central role in transforming the energy system, so
too will new public policies and international collective actions that are equitable,
efficient, and effective. Such collaborations will be needed not only because of the
inherently global nature of the challenges but also because of the differing priori-
ties and capacities of other countries. Market forces alone will not be sufficient
to effect this transformation, as market externalities—including social costs not
reflected in prices, regulatory constraints, the lack of information for knowledge-
able market decision making, and other significant uncertainties—are likely to
prevent energy markets from generating fully adequate price signals. Access to and
competition for capital will be pertinent as well. And conflicts could arise when
individual nations seek their own economic, political, or other national benefits—
not necessarily consistent with shared international interests—in addressing issues
such as global warming.
Because the energy system is so large, complex, and fully integrated into all
aspects of American life, its successful transformation will take the full ingenuity
and commitment of the public and private sectors. Moreover, the transforma-
tion must engage the routine attention of the public itself. In this sense, the pres-
ent energy challenge is fundamentally different from historical efforts such as the
Manhattan Project and the Apollo Project, which focused on specific technical
objectives rather than on a very large and complex societal infrastructure. Those
15Geoengineering involves the use of technology to change the environment of Earth. For ex-
ample, the emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere from human activity is now judged
with very high confidence by climate scientists to cause global warming. Some scientists have
proposed geoengineering as a way to reduce global warming—such as by changing the amount
of sunlight that reaches the planet’s lower atmosphere and surface or by removing greenhouse
gases from the atmosphere.
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0 America’s Energy Future Summary Edition
projects were enormous technological and organizational triumphs, to be sure,
but they were generally disconnected from the daily lives of the nation’s citizens.
Nevertheless, particular technological elements—such as CCS, advanced batter-
ies for transportation, advanced geothermal energy for electricity production, and
low-cost efficient lighting and solar panels—might very well benefit from focused
development and demonstration programs even as the many nontechnological
challenges are being addressed.
STRATEGY FOR ADDRESSING THE STUDY CHARGE
The focus of this study, consistent with its charge (Box 1.1), is on energy-supply
and end-use technologies—in particular their deployment-readiness, performance,
costs, barriers, and impacts. The AEF Committee also assessed the prospects
of some other technologies that will be critical both in meeting the anticipated
growth of energy demand and in enabling the deeper market penetration of the
new energy-supply and end-use technologies themselves. These critical technolo-
gies range from CCS, which would support not only the continued use of fossil
fuels for electricity generation but also any future production of liquid fuels, to
advanced battery, fuel-cell, and hydrogen technologies.
The committee considered technology development and deployment over
three time periods—2008–2020, 2020–2035, and 2035–2050—but focused
mainly on the first two periods, not only because the more distant future is harder
to analyze but also because it depends critically on what occurs (or does not
occur) earlier. Notably, the committee found that what can be realized in the two
later periods will be contingent on the accomplishments in the critical first period,
which is immediately ahead of us. Indeed, a major message of this report is that
the nation can achieve the necessary and timely transformation of its energy sys-
tem only if it embarks on an accelerated and sustained level of technology devel-
opment, demonstration, and deployment along several parallel paths between now
and 00. The cases for such urgent actions are strikingly similar in virtually all
of the energy domains addressed in this report, whether they pertain to specific
energy-supply technologies, end-use technologies, or electricity transmission and
distribution.
In addressing its study charge, the committee avoided reinventing the wheel.
Where appropriate, it took advantage of the existing energy literature, which is
both extensive and information-rich, to inform its judgments. In some selected
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Context and Challenges
cases, the committee performed additional technical analyses to fill gaps in the
literature or reconcile conflicting assessments. The approaches that the committee
used are described in more detail in Part 2 of this report.
The committee also relied heavily on the reports of the three panels that were
created as part of this Phase I study to undertake detailed examinations of energy
efficiency technologies, alternative transportation fuels, and renewable-energy
technologies. The three panel reports are, specifically:
• Real Prospects for Energy Efficiency in the United States (available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12621)
• Liquid Transportation Fuels from Coal and Biomass: Technological
Status, Costs, and Environmental Impacts (available at http://www.nap.
edu/catalog.php?record_id=12620)
• Electricity from Renewable Resources: Status, Prospects, and Impedi-
ments (available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12619).
The AEF Committee used these panel reports to inform its judgments about
energy supply and cost for the particular technologies involved. Selected members
of these panels, including their chairs and vice chairs, also served on the authoring
committee for the present report.
The U.S. energy system is so large and complex that the committee was
unable, in the time available, to assess the potential for transformation of its every
relevant aspect. Note in particular that:
• The focus of the report is on energy-supply and end-use technologies
that are most likely, in the judgment of the committee, to have mean-
ingful impacts on the U.S. energy system during the three time periods
considered in this study (encompassing the next 40 years or so). How-
ever, the committee did not assess the future role of technologies for the
exploration, extraction, storage, and transportation of primary energy
sources (e.g., fossil fuels), nor did it assess the role of some critial
components of a modernized infrastructure—including tankers, roads,
pipelines, and associated storage facilities—in delivering these resources
from suppliers to consumers.
• The report does not explore in any depth the U.S. energy system at the
regional level. Thus, the implications of the dramatic regional hetero-
geneity in the United States—for example, in energy resource endow-
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America’s Energy Future Summary Edition
ments, climates, and prices—on energy-supply and end-use technologies
are not considered in any detail.
• The potential energy-supply contributions from the options assessed in
this report have been estimated technology by technology. The commit-
tee did not, however, conduct an integrated assessment of how these
technologies might compete in the marketplace and how that competi-
tion and other external factors could affect actual deployment rates and
outcomes over time. For example, the successful deployment of energy
efficiency technologies could reduce the demand for electricity and the
need to deploy additional electricity-generation capacity, except perhaps
to correct regional supply imbalances or replace aging assets with more
efficient and environmentally benign facilities. Also, the utilization of
biomass for liquid fuels production could reduce the supplies of bio-
mass available for electricity generation. Therefore the potential contri-
butions of the energy-supply and end-use technologies identified in this
report should not be viewed as predictions of any specific future mix of
primary energy resources and conversion methods.
• The committee has not made judgments about the relative desirability
of the supply options described in this report or about their appropriate
pace and scale of deployment. Such decisions are beyond the commit-
tee’s charge and are the responsibility of policy makers, investors, con-
sumers, and, indeed, all citizens.
• The committee and its panels developed the cost estimates presented in
this report by using a range of methodologies (as described in Annex
3.A in Chapter 3 and in Part 2). It derived some of these estimates inde-
pendently, with the assistance of consultants, whereas other estimates
came from assessments documented in the literature. The cost estimates
themselves were based on a number of underlying assumptions about
commodity prices, construction costs, and fuel, regulatory, and operat-
ing costs, as well as on “conditional” assumptions16 about the success
of new-technology deployment. As a consequence the cost estimates
presented in this report should not be used to make detailed compari-
sons across technologies. However, because these estimates are pre-
sented as ranges that reflect the principal uncertainties in the underlying
16Conditional assumptions posit that new technologies can be successfully deployed within a
given time and at a given cost, even though the deployment is the first of its kind.
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Context and Challenges
assumptions, the committee judges that they are sufficiently robust to
be useful for rough comparisons.
• The report does not provide an evaluation of the full range of options
for reducing energy use. Such reductions are generally understood to
be obtainable in two ways: (1) deploying technologies to improve the
efficiency of energy production and use and (2) conserving energy
through behavioral or lifestyle changes (e.g., taking public transporta-
tion to work rather than driving).17 The focus of this report is on the
assessment of technologies that address the first factor—improving the
efficiency of energy use. It addresses energy conservation only insofar
as conservation is affected by the deployment of more energy-efficient
technologies. To be sure, conservation is an important option for reduc-
ing energy use, but its detailed consideration is well beyond the tech-
nological scope of this study. A study on energy conservation would
require, for example, an in-depth understanding of how social, eco-
nomic, and policy factors affect energy consumption.
• The report does not provide forecasts of future prices of primary energy
inputs (e.g., for petroleum and coal) or the effects of possible future
policies and regulations concerning CO2 emissions on such prices.
Such prices, however, will influence the relative competitiveness of the
energy-supply and end-use technologies discussed in this report, and
they will affect technology choices and paces of development, especially
in the private sector.
REPORT ORGANIZATION
This chapter has briefly discussed the current characteristics of the U.S. energy
system, the challenges to improving the system’s sustainability and security, the
role of technology, and the committee’s strategy for addressing its study charge
(Box 1.1). The next two chapters complete Part 1 of this report by providing sum-
17Per capita energy use in a particular country can also be reduced by lowering energy inten-
sity, for example, by importing energy-intensive goods from abroad rather than producing them
domestically. However, this approach would not reduce overall energy use and could in some
cases even result in increased energy use.
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America’s Energy Future Summary Edition
maries of the study’s key findings (Chapter 2) and of the technology assessments
(Chapter 3) of Part 2.
Part 2 contains six chapters (Chapters 4–9), which document the commit-
tee’s detailed assessments of energy-supply and end-use technologies. The topics
addressed in these chapters are, specifically,
• Energy efficiency in transportation, industry, and residential and com-
mercial buildings (Chapter 4)
• Production and use of alternative transportation fuels, in particular bio-
fuels as well as fuels derived from converting coal, or mixtures of coal
and biomass, into liquids (Chapter 5)
• Production of renewable energy such as wind, solar, and geothermal
energy, as well as hydropower and biopower (Chapter 6)
• Domestic fossil-fuel energy, particularly as coupled with technologies
that would capture and safely store CO2 (Chapter 7)
• Production of electricity from nuclear energy (Chapter 8)
• Electricity transmission and distribution systems that reliably accom-
modate intermittent energy supplies such as solar and wind and sophis-
ticated demand-side energy efficiency technologies (Chapter 9).
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EIA. 2008b. Annual Energy Outlook 2008. DOE/EIA-0383(2008). Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2007. Climate Change 2007:
Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Geneva: IPCC.
Simmons, M.R. 2005. Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World
Economy. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Wood, J.H., G.R. Long, and D.F. Morehouse. 2004. Long-Term World Oil Supply
Scenarios: The Future Is Neither as Bleak nor as Rosy as Some Assert. Energy
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