D
Letter Report to the U.S. Navy



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D Letter Report to the U.S. Navy 147

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148 NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE Naval Studies Board 500 Fifth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 Phone: 202 334 3523 Fax: 202 334 3695 E-mail: nsb@nas.edu www.nationalacademies.org/nsb April 12, 2010 ADM Gary Roughead, USN Chief of Naval Operations 2000 Navy Pentagon Washington, DC 20350-2000 Dear Admiral Roughead: In your letter dated September 12, 2008, to National Academy of Sciences President Ralph Cicerone, you requested that the National Research Council’s (NRC’s) Naval Studies Board (NSB) conduct a study to assess the implications of climate change for the U.S. Naval Services. Accordingly, in August 2009, the NRC, under the auspices of its NSB, established the Committee on National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces. The study’s terms of reference, provided in Enclosure A of this letter report, were formulated by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in consultation with the NSB chair and director. The terms of reference charge the committee to produce two reports over a 15-month period. The present report is the first of these, a letter report issued, as requested, following the third full committee meeting. The terms of reference direct that this study be based on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scenarios and other peer-reviewed assessments. Therefore, the committee did not address the science of climate change or chal - lenge the scenarios on which the committee’s findings and recommendations are based. In short, this letter report summarizes the immediate challenges for U.S. naval forces in addressing each of the four areas listed below and recommends approaches for addressing these challenges. The terms of reference direct that the committee in its two reports do the following: 1. Examine the potential impact on U.S. future naval operations and capabilities as a result of climate change . . . . 2. Assess the robustness of the Department of Defense’s infrastructure for sup - porting U.S. future naval operations and capabilities in the context of potential climate change impacts . . . .

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149 APPENDIX D 3. Determine the potential impact climate change will have on allied force operations and capabilities . . . . 4. Examine the potential impact on U.S. future naval antisubmarine warfare operations and capabilities in the world’s oceans as a result of climate change; specifically, the technical underpinnings for projecting U.S. undersea dominance in light of the changing physical properties of the oceans. This first report is very much an interim report that neither addresses in its entirety any one element of the terms of reference nor reaches final conclusions on any aspect of the potential implications of climate change. Instead, this report highlights issues brought to the committee’s attention during its first three meet - ings that could have potential near-term impacts, impose a need for near-term awareness, or require near-term planning to ensure that longer-term naval capa- bilities are protected. The committee will continue its study during the coming months and expects to complete by mid-2010 its final report, which will address all of the elements in the study’s terms of reference and explore many potential implications of climate change not covered in this letter report. In its initial three meetings, the committee received a number of helpful briefings from commands across the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Coast Guard,1 as well as expert briefings from individuals working at a number of other government agencies, including the following: the National Ice Center, the National Intelligence Council, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Labo - ratory, the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and the United States Geological Survey (USGS). Additionally, the committee conducted data-gathering sessions on national security and climate-change-related issues with Columbia University’s Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN); the Coop - erative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences (CIRES), sponsored by NOAA and the University of Colorado, Boulder; the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence; the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and Security; and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. When combined with the collective knowledge of the committee, these briefings are considered to con - stitute a sufficient basis for development of the findings and recommendations offered by the committee in this report. 1 In its first three meetings, the committee heard from the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard as follows (see Enclosure D for dates, places, and briefers): (1) the U.S. Navy (Navy Meteorology and Oceanography Command, Navy Task Force Climate Change, Navy Energy Coordination Office, Navy Task Force Energy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Plans and Strategy [N3/N5], Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources [N81], Office of the Commander of the Naval Installations Command, and the Navy Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] Integration Group); (2) the U.S. Marine Corps (the Office of the Facilities Branch Head and the Office of Environmental Management Section, Headquarters Command); and (3) the U.S. Coast Guard (Commandant of the Coast Guard; and the Office of Policy Integration, USCG Headquarters).

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150 NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE BACKGROUND ON NAVAL FORCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE The leaders of the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps have recog - nized the potential impact of climate change on naval forces’ missions and have positioned their organizations to make adaptive changes.2 In this regard, the CNO has recognized the linkage between energy use and climate change by establish - ing two key task forces: the Navy Task Force Energy (charged with formulating a strategy and plans for reducing the Navy’s reliance on fossil fuels—and thus for reducing carbon dioxide emissions, operational energy demands, and, potentially, energy costs);3 and the Navy Task Force Climate Change (charged initially with developing a roadmap for Navy actions in the Arctic, and then with addressing longer-term Navy actions regarding global climate change policy, strategy, and plans).4 This committee engaged with the Navy Task Force Energy and the Navy Task Force Climate Change and found that each is providing strong leadership on these issues across the Navy and the Department of Defense (DOD). Both task forces are well positioned in capability and credibility to continue strong contributions within the DOD. It is also noteworthy that the U.S. Navy and its assets are recognized by the national technical community as a critical partner in advancing the understanding of climate science and related policy implications.5 The committee strongly sup- ports the continuation of dedicated efforts by the Navy to be engaged with and to help lead these advances, within the broader context of the DOD’s responsibility to assess the effects of climate change on all DOD missions, capabilities, and facilities. The Navy brings significant historical experience and unique capabili - ties to this arena, and the committee views these assets and related advances as supporting the national security interests of the United States. 2 A board of retired flag and general officers also recognized this impact and provided a broader perspective on the topic of national security and climate change. See Military Advisory Board, 2007, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, CNA Corporation, Alexandria, Va. 3 CAPT James L. Brown, USN, Director, Navy Energy Coordination Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics, “Navy Task Force Energy, Perspec - tives and Related Climate Change Initiatives,” presentation to the committee, September 17, 2009, Washington, D.C. 4 See Vice Chief of Naval Operations Memorandum 4000 Ser N09/9U103035, “Task Force Climate Change Charter,” October 30, 2009. 5 For example, both Navy and Coast Guard assets have been highly important in providing critical scientific data associated with both ice mass and ocean changes over extended periods. Also, the Medea Program, a project of the 1990s, has been highly valuable in providing sea-ice data from military and intelligence assets that would otherwise be unavailable in the civilian sector. See National Research Council, 2009, Scientific Value of Arctic Sea Ice Data, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. In another example, SCICEX (Scientific Ice Expeditions) was a 5-year program in which the Navy made available a Sturgeon-class, nuclear-powered attack submarine for unclassified science expeditions to the Arctic Ocean to gather ice-thickness measurements. Additional information on SCICEX is available at http://www.Ideo.columbia.edu/res/pi/SCICEX/. Accessed November, 24, 2009.

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151 APPENDIX D This committee has found in the assessments it has studied strong scientific evidence to support naval leadership’s continuing to study and act on the implica- tions of climate change and how they will affect naval missions and capabilities. Some areas of current scientific knowledge of climate change, however, lack the near-term specificity that the Navy may need for planning purposes. These areas include, for example, the rate of future sea-level rise, the exact timing of an ice-free Arctic, and reliable predictions of regional climate (given the cur- rent inability to project specific regional impacts). Considering it unlikely that very precise projections of climate change will be available over the next few years, this committee believes that the Navy should adopt a risk management approach to addressing these issues. Such an approach should include a range of contingency plans for the potential sudden onset of climate-induced severe- weather disasters. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The committee focused its initial assessments either on climate change issues that it believes will have the greatest effects on naval forces or on issues that may require immediate planning. The committee views global climate change as a long-term issue that will play out over the next several decades. However, because of the long lead times in developing and changing naval capabilities and because of the potential for global climate change to have a significant impact on future naval missions, near-term awareness, planning, and decisions are needed by the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. The following sections of this report, in which appropriate supporting data are provided, present the committee’s findings and recommendations, at this stage of the study, under the following four key topics, which are embedded in the terms of reference: (1) naval capabilities and potential climate-change-related operational issues globally, together with the closely related matter of the role of allied part - nerships in regard to such global operational issues; (2) climate change impacts on global naval installations; (3) naval capabilities and potential climate-change- related operational issues in the Arctic; and (4) climate-change-related technical issues impacting naval operations, particularly in the Arctic. 1. Naval Capabilities and Potential Climate-Change- Related Operational Issues Globally Naval Forces Responses in Future Climate-Change-Related Events There are numerous peer-reviewed projections of increasing global stress aris- ing from the effects of climate change as well as from the combined effects of cli-

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152 NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE mate change and other global trends, such as projected global population growth.6 Current climate-change-related projections found in recent peer-reviewed reports portray a range of effects.7 In turn, these reports and scientific models suggest that these effects may lead to more severe or frequent droughts, floods, storms, and other events with negative consequences for food and water supplies, leading to possibly even greater stress on the expanded population.8 Viewed from a national security standpoint, these changes would likely amplify stresses on weaker nations and generate geopolitical instability in already-vulnerable regions.9 A range of military missions might be necessary as a result of such conditions, including the sorts of antipiracy and counterterrorism missions now being conducted off the waters of Somalia. However, the clearest implications are for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions, which may increase in frequency, thereby straining military transportation resources and the supporting force struc - tures. The U.S. Navy, as a forward-deployed force in position to reach targeted disaster-relief sites faster than other agencies can, will almost surely experience increased demand for U.S. naval forces’ assistance if climate-related disasters 6 In many regions of the world, the impact of climate change is likely to further exacerbate the preexisting stress on water supplies and the mounting pressures of population growth. For example, Columbia University’s Center for International Earth Science Information Network has compiled in - formation from IPCC assessments, the 2005 World Bank report Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis, and CIESIN’s gridded world population data sets to present a projected geographic distribution of vulnerability in 2050. In presentations to the committee, CIESIN representatives reported that global population nearly doubled from 1968 through 2008, and that by 2048 it could grow another 40 percent, to more than 9 billion people, adding even greater stresses to water and food supplies. CIESIN also reports that population increases are fastest in areas most vulnerable to intense storms and flooding (e.g., coastal areas, islands, and river basins). The CIESIN analysis combines its population data sets with IPCC-projected climate-change-related vulnerabilities, economic data, and past disaster-related losses to identify areas at relative high risk from one or more hazards. See Robert S. Chen, Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University, “Human Dimensions of Climate Change,” and Marc Levy, Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University, “Climate Change and U.S. National Security,” presentations to the committee, November 19, 2009, Washington, D.C. 7 For example, see Thomas R. Karl, Jerry M. Melillo, and Thomas C. Peterson, 2009, Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States, Cambridge University Press, New York. 8 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, “Climate Change 2007: The Physical Sci - ence Basis,” Working Group I contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B Averyt, M. Tignor, and H.L. Miller [eds.]), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York. See also C.P. McMullen and J. Jabbour, 2009, Climate Change Science Compendium, United Nations Environment Programme, EarthPrint, Nairobi, Kenya. 9 See June 25, 2008, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and House Select Com - mittee on Energy Independence and Global Warming: Statement of the Record by Dr. Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis—National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030 . Available at http:www.dni. gov/testimonies/20080625_testimony.pdf. Accessed November 24, 2009. See also Military Advisory Board, 2007, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change. CNA Corporation, Alexandria, Va.

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153 APPENDIX D increase.10 The demand for Navy Construction Battalion capability in support of HA/DR operations is expected to increase in proportion to the operational tempo of U.S.-sponsored international HA/DR operations.11 Likewise, the U.S. Marine Corps should expect that it will be called on as an expeditionary ground force to assist with extreme-weather-related HA/DR events in a changing climate and to help secure U.S. interests in sensitive regions.12 However, the pace and extent of this increase are unknown. Based on the current uncertainty regarding the pace and extent of this demand, the Navy should not at present fund changes to force structure for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, but over time it should consider changes to the construction of future naval platforms of appropriate classes in order to accom - modate HA/DR operations and potential increases in climate-change-related mass human migration. The benefit of the Navy’s providing such HA/DR support was demonstrated in the 2004 tsunami relief effort in Indonesia and in the recent earthquake relief work in Pakistan and Haiti.13 The U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps need to consider the ramifications of this enhanced HA/DR mis- sion and the ways to prepare for it, including regular reviews of advanced staging requirements. A possible near-term investment might be considered for increased Navy Construction Battalion capacity for such deployments. If such efforts are not 10 A 2007 joint maritime strategy document for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard calls out “humanitarian assistance and disaster response” as one of six capabilities that constitute the core of U.S. maritime power and that “reflect an increased emphasis on those activities that prevent war and build partnerships.” See Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, available at http:// www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf. Accessed November 23, 2009. However, it is not the sole responsibility of the U.S. military to respond to national and international humanitarian and disaster-relief emergencies; many U.S. and international governmental and private agencies may be engaged in any given relief operation. 11 For a review of U.S. Navy Construction Battalion operations, see U.S. Navy Seabees First Naval Construction Division, Strategic Plan 2008-2011, Norfolk, Va. 12 For example, in the aftermath of Tropical Storm Ketsana striking the Philippines on September 25, 2009, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps worked with the Philippine government (and in support of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) to rapidly provide critically needed supplies in support of disaster relief to help mitigate human suffering and prevent further loss of life. In this case, a team of approximately 100 personnel composed of Marines from 111 Marine Expeditionary Forces flew from Okinawa to the Philippines on September 29, 2009, to conduct humanitarian assistance assessments. On September 30, U.S. Navy ships USS Denver, USS Tortuga, and USS Harpers Ferry, with embarked Marines and sailors of the 31st Expeditionary Unit, set sail from Okinawa toward the Philippines. On October 1, the commanding general of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade flew from Okinawa to the Philippines to lead planning and humanitarian assistance efforts. See U.S. Marine Corps News. Available at http:// www.okinawa.usmc.mil/public affairs/info/archive/news. Accessed November 23, 2009. 13 See “U.S. Navy Relief Efforts After the Indian Ocean Tsunami,” December 26, 2004, Depart - ment of the Navy—Navy Historical Center, available at http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq130-4. htm; and “U.S. Navy Transports UAE Donation to Earthquake Victims in Pakistan,” November 3, 2005, Department of the Navy news article, available at http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display. asp?story_id=20885. Accessed November 23, 2009.

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154 NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE planned already, U.S. naval forces could benefit from a full inventory and review of the lessons learned from recent HA/DR deployments, such as the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard deployment to provide HA/DR after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Allied Forces Responses in Future Climate-Change-Related Events An issue closely related to U.S. naval capabilities and global response to projected climate change is the role of allied forces partnerships. The commit - tee received briefings from the National Intelligence Council suggesting that, in addition to the security challenges discussed above, the impact of projected severe climate change on food or water supplies and on disease patterns in certain regions of the world may lead to large-scale regional population movements, resulting potentially in millions of what some have termed “climate refugees” fleeing environmental “hotspots.”14,15 These assessments suggest that if such large-scale movements were to develop, U.S. naval leadership should be prepared for the pos- sibility that allied forces might be occupied by their own domestic and regional climate-change-related responses, or that allied forces might lack the appropriate response capacities to assist with international efforts. In such cases, the National Command Authority might require U.S. naval forces to act alone, without allied forces’ assistance. This committee has not yet fully explored the views, issues, and capabilities concerning climate change with respect to allied forces, nor has it conducted an assessment of projections involving associated climate-change-related geographic hotspots. The committee’s early assessment of allied partnerships indicates that several countries, especially in Europe, are already assuming strong public military postures on climate change,16 and those countries may be open to the 14 MajGen Richard Engel, USAF (Ret.), Director, Climate Change and State Stability Program, Na - tional Intelligence Council, “National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030,” presentation to the committee, October 19, 2009, Washington, D.C. 15 The term “climate refugee” in this report refers to persons who cross international borders because of drought, flooding, or other severe weather or extreme events related to climate change. Currently the term “climate refugee” or “environmental refugee” has no standing in international law; it is not defined with any entitled protection under the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention or the 1967 UN Refugee Protocol, although there is a movement among many nongovernmental organizations to petition for this recognition. See Bonnier Docherty and Tyler Giannini, 2009, “Confronting a Ris - ing Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees,” Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vol. 33, pp. 349-403. 16 The committee received a briefing on the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence climate-change- related policies and plans from the British Defence Staff of the United States British Embassy, and will pursue discussions with official representatives of other U.S. allies. Related to this, military experts from many nations are increasingly expressing concerns about the need for attention to climate- change-related national security. For example, see “Australian Military Warns of Climate Conflict,” available at http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSTRE5060FU20090107. Accessed November 24, 2009. See also statements endorsed by military experts of the United Kingdom, the

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155 APPENDIX D establishment of cooperative partnerships for leveraging capabilities to meet potential global climate-change-related HA/DR needs. The committee plans to address more expansively in its final report issues related to allied partnerships, but it believes that early planning and engagement by U.S. naval leadership with allied partners to address climate change issues are called for. Finding 1: Scenarios of global climate change from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change project impacts on both developing and developed nations, and such impacts may be destabilizing in many parts of the world. These projected changes would affect U.S. national security and stress naval resources. In particular, naval forces might be required to carry out more frequent humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions. At the same time, U.S. naval forces would be expected to execute their ongo- ing national-security-related military missions and to position themselves for supporting missions in destabilized regions around the globe. Also, it is expected that the demand for U.S. Navy Construction Battalion capabil- ity would increase in proportion to the operational tempo of U.S. HA/DR operations. Recommendation 1: Although the committee has not yet completed its full analysis of the implications of climate change for future Navy force structure, it is clear that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) needs increasingly to take such implications into account. The committee believes that the CNO should not in the near term specifically fund new force-structure capability to deal with the effects of climate change but should hedge against climate change impacts through planning for the modification of the existing force structure as the climate-change-related requirements become clearer. All of the U.S. naval forces (the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) should begin to consider potential specific force-structure capabilities and training standards over the next 10 years for conducting missions arising from the effects of climate change. In particular, the Navy should review the current and projected Navy Construction Battalion capability and capacity in light of the potential acceleration of the current operational tempo as a result of climate change effects. Netherlands, and India in the October 29, 2009, press release “Military Experts from Five Continents Warn of Impact of Climate Change on Security,” Institute for Environmental Security, Washington, D.C.

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156 NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 2. Climate Change Impacts on Global Naval Installations Global sea-level rise is projected to be a major impact of climate change.17 Many naval coastal installations would be affected and would likely require adaptation. Measurements show that the 20th-century rate of global average sea-level rise is about 2 millimeters (mm) per year, and the rate of sea-level rise since 1993 has been measured to be about 3 mm per year.18 This acceleration is consistent with an increase in the contribution from the melting of mountain glaciers and ice sheets on Greenland. However, the U.S. Naval Services cannot assume that the recent rate of sea-level rise will remain steady for the rest of the 21st century. Prudent planning and routine reevaluation of the rate and pace of change are necessary. The projected increased intensity of storms and storm surges also contributes to the anticipated increased vulnerability of naval coastal installations. 19 Sea-level rise is not uniform around the globe, and the potential coastal impact of regional sea-level rise is not linear with elevation. Because of shifts in ocean circulation and the redistribution of mass in the global ocean, regional sea-level changes can vary from the global mean. Indexes of coastal vulnerabil- ity should take into account factors such as coastal topography, the local rate of relative sea-level rise, subsidence, regional extreme-weather history, population density, local freshwater supply sources, and critical infrastructure—such as com- munications, transportation, and utilities. The committee reviewed an assessment of U.S. military coastal installations at risk from coastal inundations caused by sea-level rise.20 Many of the 31 U.S. military installations identified in the assessment as being at “very high risk” or at “high risk” are naval installations. These data provide a starting point for more in-depth evaluations. As directed by requirements for the DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a broader analysis of global military coastal installations is also being conducted at this time.21 This broader QDR-driven assessment will 17 See Thomas R. Karl, Jerry M. Melillo, and Thomas C. Peterson, 2009, Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 25-47. 18 Konrad Steffen, Director, Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences, Uni - versity of Colorado, “State of the Science for Sea-Level Rise Data,” presentation to the committee, October 20, 2009, Washington, D.C. 19 See Thomas R. Farl, Jerry M. Melillo, and Thomas C. Peterson, 2009, Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 114, 149. 20 For this particular assessment, the U.S. Geological Survey’s Coastal Vulnerability Index (CVI) was used. This index estimates risks of impact related to sea-level rise using a set of factors such as rate of sea-level rise, tidal range, and coastal geomorphology. See MajGen Richard Engel, USAF (Ret.), Director, Climate Change and State Stability Program, National Intelligence Council, “National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030,” presentation to the committee, October 19, 2009, Washington, D.C. 21 The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a legislatively mandated (USC 10, Sec. 118 [a]) review of the Department of Defense strategy and priorities. The review takes place every 4 years and will be provided to Congress in early 2010. For the first time, the 2010 QDR is explicitly

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157 APPENDIX D provide a foundation, but there is a clear need for a more detailed global analysis and an action plan to address the vulnerabilities of those coastal installations identified as being at very high risk and at high risk. The assumptions, decisions, and time lines for addressing these risks should be determined on a consistent basis across the DOD. The committee suggests that additional risk factors beyond the current indicators of sea-level rise, tidal range, and coastal geomorphology be included in future analyses: such additional risk factors as regional weather history and potential impacts on critical infrastructure, as outlined above, in addition to shifts in storm tracks, changes in ocean circulation, and the impact of groundwa - ter drawdown and recharge on subsidence are critical. The committee believes that these analyses must explicitly address the broader issue of the potential for sea-level rise and more intense storm surges to impact critical military missions. On the basis of presentations to the committee, there appear to be at least three separate Navy groups involved in the analysis of coastal-installation vulnerability issues for the Navy: the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), the Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NAVFAC ESC),22 and the Naval Installations Command.23 Additionally, according to presentations provided to this committee, prior to the QDR request the U.S. Marine Corps began conducting an analysis of its U.S. coastal-installation vulnerabilities.24 Also, the DOD’s Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) has initiated cli - mate-change-related military infrastructure studies.25 This committee believes that to avoid duplication of effort and to ensure a more comprehensive and consistent assessment, a more coordinated vulnerability analysis is needed across the naval installations nationally and internationally and in conjunction with all Services. Considering the current measurements for sea-level rise, a major resource investment is not anticipated to be required by the Navy in the near term (the next asked to include climate-change trends in its address of the national strategic and security environ - ment. See U.S. Department of Defense, “2010 QDR Terms of Reference Fact Sheet,” April 27, 2009, Washington, D.C. 22 See for example, Kathleen Paulson and Dallas Meggitt, 2008, US Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center Environmental Program on Climate Change, Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center, Port Hueneme, Calif. 23 CAPT Brant Pickrell, USN, Deputy Director, Shore Readiness, Commander, Naval Installations Command, “Preliminary Climate Change Related Naval Base Assessments—A Status Report,” pre - sentation to the committee, October 19, 2009, Washington, D.C. 24 Elmer W. Ransom, Environmental Management Section, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, and Capt Anthony V. Ermovic, USMC Facilities Branch Head, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, “Marine Corps Perspectives and Climate Change Initiatives,” presentation to the committee, September 18, 2009, Washington, D.C. 25 The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program currently sponsors several projects related to the assessment of the impact of global sea-level rise on military infrastructure. These projects are managed under SERDP’s Sustainable Infrastructure Projects Program. Descriptive information on these projects (SI-1700, -1701, -1702, and -1703) is available at http:/www.serdp.org/Research/SI-Facilities-Management.cfm. Accessed November 23, 2009.

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162 NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE report by the Center for Naval Analyses noted that current surface combatants might be modified or retrofitted for Arctic operations by having steel added around the waterline but that this would provide only marginal capability.37 Ice-capable operation requires not only hull protection, but also strengthened propellers, rud - ders, seawater intakes, and so on. In this committee’s opinion, it is better to build ice-capable ships from the ground up, either by incorporating the capability into current designs or by redesigning a new class of vessels, as Norway and Denmark are reportedly doing. It may also be wise to build more robust under-ice capabil - ity into some fraction of future Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) to support the projected increase in under-ice missions.38 Importance of Strong Maritime Partnerships The committee recognizes that policy decisions and associated trade-offs against current national defense priorities will be necessary before additional Arctic-related resources are allocated. However, if Arctic sea ice continues to retreat at a rapid pace and the Arctic region becomes truly ice-free during the sum- mer months as predicted by the upper-end projections—such as those adopted by the Navy Task Force Climate Change39—the current naval asset posture may be insufficient for the U.S. Navy’s maritime domain awareness strategy and insuf - ficient to support U.S. national security interests.40 37 Michael D. Bowes. 2009. Impact of Climate Change on Naval Operations in the Arctic, CAB D0020034.A3/1REV, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va., April. 38 Public news articles have reported that the nuclear-powered-submarine Texas (SSN-775) and its 134-member crew recently completed an Arctic mission. The Texas reportedly broke through the ice near the North Pole and stayed on the surface for 24 hours and was the third U.S. submarine to visit the region in 2009. For deployment on Arctic missions, Virginia-class attack submarines such as the Texas reportedly carry an “Arctic sensor suite” similar to that carried by the older Los Angeles-class submarines that have previously traversed waters near the North Pole. This sensor suite is not a built- in capability, but instead only an add-on before deploying to an Arctic region. A Navy spokesperson has been quoted as saying that “Virginia-class submarines are not ice-hardened, and there are no plans to add ice-hardening to their designs.” See “Loose Cannon and Nuclear Submarines,” CanWest News Service, November 16, 2009, and “VA-Class Submarines Carry Arctic Sensor Suite in Northern Waters,” Inside the Navy, November 30, 2009. 39 Throughout this report, the term “ice-free” is used to mean that sea ice is diminished to the point that ice-hardened vessels are not required for safe navigation. In the near term, ice-laden Arctic waters will continue to have an ice cover of variable thickness and duration and will continue to pose navigational hazards for non-ice-hardened vessels. The Navy Task Force Climate Change uses a projection of ice-free summer months in the Arctic by the year 2030 based on work conducted for the Department of Defense by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory using outputs from the Community Climate System Model version 3 (CCSM3). See Karsten Steinhaeuser, Esther Parish, Alex Sorokine, and Auroop R. Ganguly, 2009,“Projected State of Arctic Sea Ice and Permafrost by 2030,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn. 40 For example, see U.S. Navy, “Maritime Domain Awareness Concept” (MDA 2007), available at http:www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/Navy_Maritime_Domain_Awareness_Concept_Final_2007.pdf. Accessed November 23, 2009. See also U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, “Cooperative

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163 APPENDIX D In the committee’s opinion, strong maritime partnerships will be an important component of Arctic engagement. The U.S. Coast Guard reported to the commit - tee that it is increasing its maritime partnerships with other Arctic nations, 41 and the committee sees a need for such partnerships in the Arctic region (including bilateral and multinational alliances) to be strengthened and extended for both the Navy and the Coast Guard.42 This should involve particular attention to coopera- tion with Canada, with the potential for the sharing of facilities and capabilities. There are also national and international policy implications for naval opera- tions in the Arctic. For example, the fact that the United States has signed but not yet ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS)43 will become even more problematic with time and as more states call for inter- national recognition of their claims in the Arctic. The UNCLOS provides a legal framework for the settlement of such disputes.44 Finding 3: Activities in the Arctic sponsored by commercial enterprises and nation-states are increasing. However, neither the U.S. Navy nor the U.S. Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” available at http:www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf. Accessed November 23, 2009. Also, recent news articles report that Russia’s Security Council has publicly outlined plans to create a dedicated Arctic military force to protect the country’s interest in the Far North. One goal of the plan is “to increase the effectiveness of cooperation with the border agencies (coast guards) of neighboring states in the fight against terrorism on the high seas, combat illegal migration and defend marine life and resources.” See “Russia’s New Arctic Fighting Force,” available at www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/russias-new/. Accessed November 24, 2009. 41 CAPT James J. Fisher, USCG, Chief, Office of Policy Integration, Headquarters, “The Coast Guard Has 143 Years of Arctic Service,” presentation to the committee, September 18, 2009, Wash - ington, D.C. 42 See National Research Council, 2008, Maritime Security Partnerships, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. 43 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) comprises 320 articles and 9 annexes governing all aspects of ocean space, including marine scientific research, commercial activities, the permissible breadth of the territorial sea (the part of the ocean nearest the shore, over which the coastal state enjoys sovereignty), and the settlement of disputes relating to ocean matters. A full profile of the UNCLOS, its origin, and its original issues is provided in a publicly available report, Law of the Sea: The End Game, Intelligence Community Assessment, published by the National Intelligence Council in 1996. The report is available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/special_endgame.html. Accessed November 23, 2009. 44 U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard leadership have provided public testimony on the potential value and impact of UNCLOS ratification on U.S. naval operations. For example, the congressional testimony of former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vernon Clark states that the Law of the Sea Convention “supports our ability to operate wherever, whenever, and however needed under the authority of widely accepted law. The Convention codifies the right to transit through, over, and under essential international [straits] and archipelagic waters. It reaffirms the sovereign immunity of our warships and other public vessels. . . . And it preserves our rights to conduct military activities and operations in exclusive economic zones without the need for permission from or prior notice to foreign governments.” See Statement of Admiral Vernon Clark, U.S. Navy (Ret.), former Chief of Naval Operations, to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Available at www. virginia.edu/colp/pdf/ClarkTestimony071004.pdf. Accessed December 14, 2009.

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164 NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE Coast Guard is currently well equipped for increased maritime operations in the Arctic, or for what might become contentious positioning for territo - rial sovereignty and for natural resources among bordering nations. This situation may pose a risk for future U.S. national security in the longer term owing to the inability of current U.S. naval assets to project a routine military presence in the region, despite the opening of new sea-lanes. Partnerships with other nations will help mitigate this risk, although the U.S. failure to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) exacerbates the matter. Recommendation 3: The Chief of Naval Operations should support the ini - tiatives of the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard to define future Coast Guard icebreaker needs, as well as return operational control to the Coast Guard as soon as possible. The committee sees a need in the Arctic region for increased partnerships, including bilateral and multinational alliances. These partnerships should be strengthened and extended for both the Navy and the Coast Guard. The CNO should also continue his efforts, together with other military and political leaders, to secure rapid U.S. ratification of the UNCLOS. 4. Climate-Change-Related Technical Issues Impacting Naval Operations, Particularly in the Arctic and at High Latitudes In its initial deliberations, the committee identified four general areas of climate-change-related technical issues that may affect naval operations: antisub - marine warfare (ASW), sensors, communications, and information and charting systems. The committee’s preliminary observations on these systems are offered below. Antisubmarine Warfare Global climate change is projected to have a growing impact on the properties and dynamics of the ocean. This committee received initial briefings on two areas associated with these changes: (1) the direct effect of changing thermal structure, ocean salinity, and acidification on the performance of acoustical sensors and torpedoes; and (2) the future viability of Navy databases that are used in tactical planning. The second of these is of more concern for naval warfighting capabili- ties, especially antisubmarine warfare.45 45 This letter report addresses only the most immediate concerns of potential ASW implications in the Arctic. The committee has received briefings which suggest that potential increases in ocean acidification will have only minor effects on sound transmission; acidification thus does not receive expansive coverage in this letter report as an immediate item of concern. All aspects of the potential

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165 APPENDIX D Warming of the upper layers of the ocean produces downward-refracting acoustical conditions, which exist routinely during the summer months through - out much of the world’s ocean area. These conditions normally produce shorter acoustic detection ranges, but this is nothing inherently new or climate-change- related and is not outside the operating scope of current systems. Some ocean areas—most notably the high northern latitudes of the Atlantic—may also have reduced salinity in the upper layer due to freshwater input from melting land-ice and from higher than average precipitation and runoff into rivers. This reduced salinity may also affect acoustical propagation conditions, but, similar to the warming of upper layers discussed above, it produces nothing inherently outside the operating scope of current systems. In general, the U.S. Navy needs to moni - tor the changes in Arctic water mass on an ongoing basis, with the monitoring supported by high-resolution bathymetric data in the Navy’s databases. According to presentations to the committee, the ocean temperature and salinity data that currently support the Navy’s ASW tactical planning may need attention. Fleet ASW platforms make tactical predictions based on in situ mea - surements of ocean temperature versus depth, using expendable bathythermo- graphs (XBTs). These in situ measurements of temperature are then combined with historical measurements of salinity to produce profiles of sound velocity. The temperature data can be gathered by unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and thermometry systems. The profiles are then used to calculate how sound will propagate and thus to determine how best to employ acoustic sensors. An altered ocean can cause two problems with this system: (1) The in situ XBT temperature profiles are compared to climatological values contained in the Navy’s historical ocean-temperature databases. The committee was informed that if this in situ measurement deviates too much from historical norms, the actual, in situ reading is disregarded or assigned a different statistical weighting.46 (2) As mentioned above, in some areas such as the high-latitude North Atlantic, the oceans may experience reduced salinity in their upper layers. Thus, the databases with histori - cal data on salinity used in at-sea tactical predictions may be inaccurate and could lead to incorrect ASW decisions regarding employment of the acoustical sensors. Sensors Global Positioning System coverage for surface navigation is slightly degraded in the high latitudes (50-ft. horizontal precision has been demonstrated impact of increases in ocean acidification on naval operations, including the most recent research in this area, and broader climate change implications for ASW in the world’s oceans, will be explored during the preparation of the committee’s final report. 46 Naval operators do not actually throw out XBTs based on a fixed deviation from historical clima - tology data. Instead, they use statistical techniques that assign error probabilities (based on climatology and other factors) to each data point in the XBT, and then weight each data point when assimilating it into an ocean model run.

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166 NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE at the North Pole), but this coverage is adequate for the navigational purposes of surface ships. However, due to low satellite-elevation angles, GPS altitude preci - sion in high latitudes is substantially degraded and may adversely affect certain aircraft operations. Taken together, these conditions make precision search-and- rescue operations difficult, especially in severe weather. Also, naval airborne sur- veillance and surface-ship-radars operating in high latitudes may suffer degraded performance due to ionospheric activity. As ocean-floor surveys and mineral exploration operations increase in the Arctic, accurate underwater navigation and position fixing will become increas - ingly important. Although relative undersea navigation techniques are well developed, absolute-reference undersea navigation is not, and it should be further developed for this region. Additionally, interest in high-accuracy bathymetric data will accelerate. Satellites now provide abundant information about the retreat of Arctic ice caps, but data on ice thickness continue to be sparse. Innovative ways to obtain that data (such as through the use of UUVs or submarine upward-looking sonar) should be explored. Communications In general at the present time, commercial voice and low-data-rate communi- cations in the high latitudes are robustly supported by Iridium satellites. However, as discussed above, high-data-rate communications provided by GEO-based satellites degrade quickly above 65° latitude and therefore are not reliable. This inherent GEO limitation equally affects commercial communications and secure military communications. Reliable high-data-rate communications coverage in high latitudes should be explored further. Information and Charting Systems Accurate nautical charts of the Alaska region are limited. For example, the nautical charts of the region show vast areas that have never been surveyed or that have not been surveyed for years.47 These limitations include widespread gaps in sounding and shoreline data on nautical charts of the region and 2-meter-level errors in the state geodetic positioning framework. There are also large gaps in tidal data and tidal-current-prediction coverage. These shortcomings have poten - 47 NOAA is responsible for providing nautical charts of the Alaska region. The fundamental geospa - tial infrastructure that NOAA provides for the rest of the nation is lacking for Alaska and the Arctic, in particular. Alaska is the only state without digital shoreline imagery and elevation maps that meet nationally accepted standards. Also, the state’s reference system has neither the density of control points to support submeter-level accuracies for surveying and positioning activities, nor vertical data coverage for the western half of the state to support the accurate determination of elevation heights. See CAPT James J. Fisher, USCG, Chief, Office of Policy Integration, Headquarters, “Waterways Management in the Arctic,” communication to the committee, September 25, 2009.

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167 APPENDIX D tial implications for U.S. naval operations in the broader Arctic region that the committee believes should be addressed in a review of high-latitude U.S. naval research needs. Findings and Recommendations Finding 4: Naval operations that depend on an accurate knowledge of the ocean’s properties and of atmospheric conditions could be adversely impacted, based on projections indicating that Earth is continuing to warm, if the supporting ocean and atmospheric databases are not updated. Addi- tionally, naval sensors, communications, satellite observation, and charting systems would be significantly challenged with respect to both capacity and performance in supporting expanded levels of naval operations in high latitudes. Recommendation 4: The Department of the Navy (the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, in con- junction with the Office of Naval Research) should begin a critical review of climate-change-related research, technology, and supporting systems— especially those related to expanded naval operations in high latitudes. In addition, the Department of the Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard should reestablish a program of routine operations in the high latitudes to develop a better understanding of the requirements for improved performance of sensors, communications, satellite communications, and information and charting systems, as well as to plan for continual awareness of the state of the Arctic through a steady focus on data gathering and supporting research and technology development. THE WAY AHEAD The committee plans to continue its work over the coming months to pro- vide an expanded and more comprehensive examination of the topics covered in this letter report and to complete its final report expeditiously. Furthermore, in the preparation of its final report, the committee plans to explore additional climate-change-related topics, such as the potential impacts on the hydrological cycle and regional freshwater balances, potential changes in disease vectors and marine and terrestrial ecosystems, and the ability of the naval forces to train and operate in more extreme weather conditions—including the potential for naval vessels to experience more severe and unpredicted storms at sea. The committee will also address the general topic of risk management for naval forces and will comment on the possible benefits of applying the U.S. Navy’s unique ocean and ice scientific data collection capabilities to support and enhance the understand -

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168 NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ing of potential impacts of climate change critical to national security and future naval operations. In the committee’s opinion, U.S. maritime forces are more likely than other U.S. military forces to experience more direct impacts of climate change on their operations, installations, and missions. U.S. naval leadership should thus continue to exercise a strong voice and leadership in influencing the U.S. and international military adaptive response. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The committee thanks Captain Timothy Gallaudet, USN, and it also thanks Commander Esther McClure, USN, for their invaluable work as early-stage liai - sons to the committee and for their input on briefings for the committee to receive. Additionally, the committee thanks members of the Chief of Naval Operations staff, N81 in particular, and the leadership of the Navy Climate Change Task Force for meeting with the committee throughout the course of the study to date. The committee would be very happy to brief you and your staff regarding the views expressed in this letter. Sincerely, ADM Frank L. Bowman, USN (Ret.), Dr. Antonio J. Busalacchi, Jr., Co-Chair Co-Chair Committee on National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces Enclosures A Terms of Reference B Committee on National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces C Acknowledgment of Reviewers D Summary of Data-Gathering Sessions

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169 APPENDIX D Enclosure A Terms of Reference At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council will establish a committee to study the national security implications of climate change for U.S. naval forces (i.e., the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard). Based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli - mate Change assessments and other subsequent relevant literature reviewed by the committee, the study will: 1. Examine the potential impact on U.S. future naval operations and capa - bilities as a result of climate change (e.g., how will U.S. future naval operations be impacted and what capabilities will be needed for U.S. future naval forces as a result of climate change? This includes an assessment of the U.S. Coast Guard and Marine Corps, and where the U.S. Navy might be required to supplement or augment their capabilities). 2. Assess the robustness of the Department of Defense’s infrastructure for supporting U.S. future naval operations and capabilities in the context of poten - tial climate change impacts (e.g., are there any U.S. military installations and/or forward-deployed bases providing support to U.S. naval forces that are potentially vulnerable as a result of climate change?). 3. Determine the potential impact climate change will have on allied force operations and capabilities (e.g., are there any allies who may need U.S. naval force support as a result of climate change? Conversely, which allied force opera - tions and capabilities may U.S. naval forces wish to leverage as a result of climate change?). 4. Examine the potential impact on U.S. future naval antisubmarine warfare operations and capabilities in the world’s oceans as a result of climate change; specifically, the technical underpinnings for projecting U.S. undersea dominance in light of the changing physical properties of the oceans. This 15-month study will produce two reports: (1) a letter report following the third full committee meeting that summarizes the immediate challenges for U.S. naval forces in addressing each of the four above areas, as well as recommends approaches to address these challenges; (2) a comprehensive report that addresses in greater depth the full terms of reference.

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170 NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE Enclosure B Committee on National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces FRANK L. BOWMAN, ADM, USN (Ret.), Strategic Decisions, LLC, Co-Chair ANTONIO J. BUSALACCHI, JR., University of Maryland, Co-Chair ARTHUR B. BAGGEROER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology CECILIA M. BITZ, University of Washington SHARON E. BURKE, Center for New American Security RONALD FILADELFO, Center for Naval Analyses JEFFREY M. GARRETT, RADM, USCG (Ret.), Mercer Island, Washington HARRY W. JENKINS, JR., USMC (Ret.), Gainesville, Virginia CATHERINE M. KELLEHER, University of Maryland and Brown University MAHLON C. KENNICUTT II, Texas A&M University RONALD R. LUMAN, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University W. BERRY LYONS, Ohio State University JAMES J. McCARTHY, Harvard University MICHAEL J. McPHADEN, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration JOHN H. MOXLEY III, Solvang, California DAVID J. NASH, RADM, USN (Ret.), Dave Nash & Associates, LLC HEIDI C. PERRY, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc. J. MARSHALL SHEPHERD, University of Georgia at Athens JOHN P. STENBIT, Oakton, Virginia CHARLES G. WALD, Gen, USAF (Ret.), Deloitte Services, LLP DAVID A. WHELAN, The Boeing Company CARL WUNSCH, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Staff CHARLES F. DRAPER, Director, Naval Studies Board BILLY M. WILLIAMS, Study Director RAYMOND S. WIDMAYER, Senior Program Officer MARTA V. HERNANDEZ, Associate Program Officer SUSAN G. CAMPBELL, Administrative Coordinator MARY G. GORDON, Information Officer SEKOU O. JACKSON, Senior Project Assistant SIDNEY G. REED, JR., Consultant

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171 APPENDIX D Enclosure C Acknowledgment of Reviewers This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council’s Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report: Robert Duce, Texas A&M University, Florence Fetterer, University of Colorado, Boulder, Paul G. Gaffney II, VADM, USN (Ret.), Monmouth University, Jacques Gansler, University of Maryland, James D. Hull, VADM, USCG (Ret.), Annapolis, Maryland, William A. LaPlante, Johns Hopkins University, Applied Physics Laboratory, Joseph Pedlosky, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, and John E. Rhodes, LtGen, USMC (Ret.), Balboa, California. Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive com- ments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recom- mendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Robert A. Frosch of Harvard University. Appointed by the National Research Council, he was responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accor- dance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.

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172 NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE Enclosure D Summary of Data-Gathering Sessions The Committee on National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces first convened in September 2009 and held three full commit - tee meetings prior to issuing this letter report. In addition to deliberating on its tasks and approach and preparing its letter report, the committee also participated in the data-gathering sessions at these meetings, which are summarized below. · September 17-18, 2009, in Washington, D.C. First full committee meeting: Briefings on current climate-change and energy-related initiatives from the Navy Task Force Climate Change; the Navy Task Force Energy; the Navy Quadrennial Defense Review Integration Group; the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Oper- ations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N81); the Office of Facili - ties Branch Head, U.S. Marine Corps; the Office of Environmental Management Section, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; and the Office of Policy Integration, Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard. Additionally the committee received briefings on recently completed climate-change-related reports by the Center for New American Security, the CNA Corporation, and the National Research Council. · October 19-20, 2009, in Washington, D.C. Second full committee meeting: Briefings on climate-change-related national security issues, naval installation vulnerabilities, and current research activities by representatives from the National Intelligence Council, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Navy Task Force Climate Change, Naval Installations Command, the Office of Naval Research, the U.S. Geological Survey, the National Ice Center, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the University of Wash - ington, and the University of Colorado. · November 19-20, 2009, in Washington, D.C. Third full committee meeting. Briefings on human dimensions, allies’ perspectives, water resource issues, and maritime operational perspectives of climate change from Columbia University’s Center for International Earth Science Information Network, the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security, the British Defence Staff of the United States British Embassy, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Plans and Strategy, and the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.