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1
Public Understanding of Climate Change
Decades of research on climate have made it increasingly clear to
Earth scientists that Earth’s “climate is changing, and that these changes
are in large part caused by human activities” (National Research Council,
2010b:1). However, these conclusions have recently lost support among
the U.S. public. Similarly, scientists find that “climate change . . . poses
serious risks for both human societies and natural systems” and that ac-
tions to mitigate (slow down) and adapt to these changes are needed and
urgent (National Research Council, 2010b:1). This understanding and level
of concern are not yet evident in national public policy. These divergences
between science and society raise important social science questions: an-
swers to those questions can help the nation make progress in dealing with
climate change.
This chapter summarizes research that helps to answer some of these
questions by explaining why understanding and responding to climate
change have been so difficult. Anthony Leiserowitz’s research describes
“six Americas,” each characterized by a unique set of understandings of
and responses to climate change, some sharply at variance with climate sci-
ence. Susanne Moser puts these differences in perception, understanding,
and behavior in a broader context of societal forces. She discusses multiple
reasons why climate change is hard for nonspecialists to understand, includ-
ing that the topic is inherently difficult and complex; that understanding it
requires a kind of cognitive functioning that does not come easily to most
people; and that the media and society have not sent clear signals for the
need to respond for the common good. The studies by Daniel Read and
his colleagues find that many people’s mental models of climate change
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FACILITATING CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSES
are inadequate or different from scientific understanding and that people’s
confusions have persisted for almost two decades despite education and
communication on the issue. Elke Weber discusses how ingrained cognitive
and affective responses to risk can lead people astray when they consider
the risks of climate change. Finally, the research reported by Riley Dunlap
shows how an organized climate change denial “counter-movement” linked
to conservative political institutions and elements of the fossil fuel industry
has worked to influence public understanding and how an increasing ideo-
logical polarization in U.S. public opinion on the topic has followed their
efforts. The chapter concludes by summarizing a discussion that considered
how ongoing structural changes in the mass media might affect the poten-
tial to improve public understanding and what might be done to improve
understanding through the education system and in the broader society.
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
Anthony Leiserowitz1
Yale University
Anthony Leiserowitz began by noting that the topic is of great current
interest. Public support or its lack is clearly a constraint on national climate
legislation, and global public opinion will affect action at the December
2010 Copenhagen meeting. Polls in late 2009 suggested that Americans
were somewhat less convinced than before that climate change is real and
human caused. The recent scandal of hacked e-mails, centered on the Uni-
versity of East Anglia, may also have influenced public opinion. Leiserowitz
offered three comments to frame the discussion.
First, decades of research by natural scientists have tremendously im-
proved understanding of how the climate system works, showing unequivo-
cally that Earth is warming, that human activities are the primary cause,
and that impacts are already beginning to be felt, with stronger ones ex-
pected in the future. Now, however, climate change is a major problem for
the social and behavioral sciences, because it is rooted in the factors that
drive human decision making and behavior and because the solutions to
climate change will require human beings to choose and act differently as
individuals, families, communities, nations, and societies. In addition, many
of the impacts of greatest concern are the potential consequences of climate
change for human well-being.
Second, the greatest source of uncertainty in climate models is future
1 Presentation is available at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/hdgc/Session_Moderator_
Public%20Understanding_of_Climate_Change_Anthony_Leiserowitz.pdf [accessed September
2010].
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PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF CLIMATE CHANGE
human behavior. Whether the world stabilizes global warming at 2 degrees
Celsius or warming reaches a much higher level depends fundamentally
on whether humans act to alter the trajectory of climate change. Thus, the
social sciences are key to meeting the climate challenge. Furthermore, hu-
man systems are much more complex and hard to predict than the climate
system. Carbon dioxide molecules all behave in the same way and do not
change their behavior appreciably when scientists study them, but hu-
man beings do. Human beings as individuals and as societies are capable
of a wide range of potential responses, making it very difficult to predict
how they will respond to future climate change or to research on climate
change.
Third, the U.S. public is not homogeneous. Leiserowitz and his col-
leagues have identified six distinct groups or segments (what they have
termed “The Six Americas”), each of which responds in a very different
way to climate change (Leiserowitz et al., 2008). They have labeled the seg-
ments as “alarmed” (18 percent of the population), “concerned” (33 per-
cent), “cautious” (19 percent), “disengaged” (12 percent), “doubtful” (11
percent), and “dismissive” (7 percent). These groups vary in terms of how
much they believe global warming is a reality, how concerned they are, and
how motivated they are to take action. He emphasized that public response
to climate change is not a linear response to scientific information. Rather,
people are already predisposed either to accept or reject what scientists say
about it and, similarly, to support or oppose proposed policies.
THE TROUBLE WITH CLIMATE CHANGE:
WHY IS CLIMATE CHANGE HARD TO UNDERSTAND?
Susanne Moser2
Susanne Moser Research and Consulting
Susanne Moser began by stating that climate change as a phenomenon
has attributes that make it extremely difficult for nonspecialists to under-
stand. She posed a series of questions. Is the difficulty of understanding cli-
mate change in the nature of the topic? Is there a problem with how human
brains are “wired”? Does the ultimate challenge lie in people’s world views,
which don’t allow them to see climate change as a problem or to accept
proposed solutions to it? Is the problem a failure of communication? Does
the problem lie with how the mass media work and describe the issue? Are
there too many more pressing distractions that preoccupy people’s atten-
2 Presentation is available at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/hdgc/Why%20is%20Clim
ate%20Change%20Hard%20to%20Understand%20Susanne%20Moser%20SM%20Consu
lting.pdf [accessed September 2010].
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10 FACILITATING CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSES
tion? Finally, does it actually matter whether the public understands? She
concluded that there are partial answers to all of these questions, and that
the challenge of engaging the public on climate change involves a “perfect
storm” of all of these factors operating together.
The difficulty of understanding is partly due to the characteristics of
the problem. First, you cannot see climate change. You cannot see carbon
dioxide: if it made the sky black, it might be more easily noticed. Second,
change is happening very slowly on the time scale of human perception.
People can easily remember one cold winter, but they cannot notice a sea
level rise at the rate of 1 mm/year. And a driver from the city into the
suburbs experiences a temperature change due to leaving the urban heat
island that is larger than has been seen for the Earth over the past century.
In addition, there is the perception that many of the impacts are distant in
time and space. Public opinion polls in the United States and some other
countries show that respondents see greater harm from global warming
coming to animals, plants, and people and things that are far away from
them than to those close to them (see Figure 1-1). Next, modern humans
are insulated from their environments. People spend 20 hours or more
per day in buildings. A time survey conducted in 2000 indicated that 51
percent of Americans spend no time outside, and an additional 30 percent
spend no more than one hour outdoors. All of this makes people highly
dependent on mediated communication for information on climate change.
In addition, there is no quick, simple, or good fix. Taking action gives no
gratification or very highly delayed gratification. A recent study by Solomon
et al. (2009) shows that, short of active interference with the climate system
to take carbon back out of the atmosphere, the climate will not return to
the preindustrial state in the lifetime of anyone now living.
Climate change is also challenging for the human brain. People tend to
react quickly to things that stem from the ill intent of an identifiable actor,
that provoke moral outrage, that present clear and present danger, and that
happen fast. Moser quoted Harvard psychologist Daniel Gilbert as saying
that the ability to duck what is not yet coming is a stunning but recent in-
novation. Also, our impact outstrips our brain. Many people believe and
everyone hopes that climate change is just the result of a natural cycle.
Also, it is difficult to understand systems, which must be understood in
order to comprehend the nature and magnitude of change that is needed to
limit climate change. In addition, most people are much better at intuitive
information processing than systematic processing. They have trouble deal-
ing with uncertainty, so that uncertainty about climate, for many, provides
a rationale for postponing action. It is demanding to deal not only with
the overwhelming scientific complexity, but also with the moral complexity
of the climate issue. Furthermore, the signals indicating that responses are
needed are inadequate.
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11
PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF CLIMATE CHANGE
How much do you think global warming will harm . . .
A great deal A moderate Only a little Not at all Don’t know
amount
Your
People
People in People You
Plant and Your
Future
family
in other in the US
generations developing personally
animal community
countries industrialized
species of people
nations
N = 2,164
FIGURE 1-1 Perceived degree of harm from global warming to various entities,
perceived by U.S. respondents.
SOURCE: Leiserowitz et al. (2009:30). Reprinted with permission.
Figure 1-1
R01827
Moser said that society has failed to signal the need for change. Climate
change is the ultimate market failure. We have noimage carbon to signal
uneditable bitmapped price on
the value of reducing emissions, no uniform and steady messaging, a lack
of consistency between what leaders say and do, and a lack of social nar-
ratives that portray “climate protection” as a source of a socially desirable
identity. Such signaling would be necessary to help people see beyond nar-
row self-interest and act for the common good. People filter information
through a “cultural” lens colored by their general beliefs about society and
about right and wrong. This filter operates prior to facts and shapes the
interpretation of information. Moser remarked that she sees this filtering
as the underlying cause of the “six Americas” reported by Leiserowitz.
Particularly, the people at the extremes of that continuum of views say they
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12 FACILITATING CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSES
are highly unlikely to change their views, probably because of their strong
attachments to preexisting cultural world views.
Moser drew several implications from this analysis. People reject infor-
mation that contradicts their beliefs and selectively attend to information
that confirms them. This process leads to social and political polarization.
Moser suggested that people need different forums for deliberation so they
can understand each others’ world views and seek common ground.
She noted that climate change is presented within multiple “frames,”
each of which works for some audiences, but none of which works for all.
Some frames (such as some scientific ones) fail to resonate with audiences,
yet when climate change is framed as a catastrophe or a threat to the social
system, it may threaten some people’s sense of self.
The media also are part of the problem. The traditional media are orga-
nized for profit, not for education. This fact shapes their choice of stories.
Techno-cultural and economic changes in the media industry are part of
the picture. They include a change from broadcasting to “narrow-casting”
focused on selected audiences. The downsizing of the reporter corps, in-
cluding on environmental and science issues, results in a greater probability
of reporting with factual mistakes and shallower treatment or simply less
climate change coverage. The mass media—as corporate businesses—focus
on news that “sells,” which puts a premium on extreme events, human
interest stories, and controversies over slowly developing stories. The rise
of the Internet and “social media” democratizes, but people are not ex-
posed to ideas across the spectrum and tend to get news more frequently in
sound bites and through peripheral information processing or from sources
that conform to their preexisting views. Mass media can do less than they
once could, and they are not good at direct persuasion, fostering behavior
change, promoting two-way communication, dealing with issues in depth,
or resolving conflicts, although some of these are much needed in climate
change policy.
Finally, Moser offered a list of what climate change is not, as a way
to explain why it is hard to keep the topic on the public agenda. To many
people, climate change is not visible and so may not seem real. It is not im-
mediate, even in its threat, cost, or the pleasure or satisfaction of trying to
solve the problem. It is not (yet) relevant in the sense of being personal, here
and now. It is not intuitively understandable. It is not easy to talk about at
the dinner table. It is not easily solvable, which would provide a sense of
personal and response efficacy. It is not morally simple. And it is not yet
seen or perceived as a threat to everything people are and value.
In the discussion that followed the presentation, Richard Andrews
noted that climate response is being given positive frames in some states, for
example, as a development issue. Moser responded that the climate change
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PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF CLIMATE CHANGE
discussion has been framed mainly by scientists and environmentalists, even
though other framings are valid for certain audiences.
A questioner asked whether audiences can be segmented to focus dif-
ferently on groups that have different views on the topic. Moser replied
that an economic framing cuts across the population and that, for some
audiences, an environmental justice frame can engage people with climate
change. However, she doubted that there is a single frame that would work
for everybody. Leiserowitz commented that an energy frame works for
almost everyone because there is widespread concern about the nation’s
energy future.
NOW WHAT DO PEOPLE KNOW ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE?
A STUDY OF LAY BELIEFS AND MENTAL MODELS
Daniel Read
Yale University
Daniel Read presented work he did in collaboration with Ann Bostrom,
Rebecca Hudson, Anu Narayanan, and Travis Reynolds. An earlier related
project in 1992 in which he, Bostrom, and others participated resulted in
two papers (Bostrom et al., 1994; Read et al., 1994). Since then, popular
sources have bombarded people with information and arguments on cli-
mate change. In a new study, the research group replicated the methods
from 1992 using very similar people under similar circumstances in 2009
(in both cases, July 4, in the same park in Pittsburgh). (Note: This study,
Reynolds et al., 2010, was accepted for publication after the workshop.) Its
goal was to see whether and how public understanding had changed. The
2009 sample scored a bit lower on education level and was augmented by
a more highly educated subsample for comparability.
The results showed little change from 1992 in beliefs about whether hu-
man actions have changed global climate—if anything, there was a decline
in this belief. Understanding of the nature of the greenhouse effect has in-
creased only slightly in 17 years. As in 1992, people were asked how much
temperature change there has been to date, how much they would expect
in 10 years, and how much they would expect by 2050. The results were
highly similar in both samples: people believe temperature has changed, and
will change, much more than the estimates provided by the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). These beliefs are very unrealistic,
3 Presentation is available at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/hdgc/Mental%20Model
s%20of%20Climate%20Change%20Daniel%20Read%20Yale%20University.pdf [accessed
September 2010].
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14 FACILITATING CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSES
suggesting that if people fully understood the IPCC projections, they might
lose interest in climate change as a problem.
The researchers tried to understand whether people distinguish be-
tween climate and weather. Between 1992 and 2009, knowledge declined
on several questions about this topic. The researchers have not yet selected
subsamples to equate on education. Responses to open-ended questions
about what might cause global warming indicated not only many similari-
ties across time, but also two important changes. In 2009, respondents were
much less likely to attribute warming to aerosol cans, chlorofluorocarbons,
and ozone depletion, or to loss of biomass. Read concluded that public
understanding is very volatile and is possibly reflective of changes in media
coverage. Results with closed-ended questions were similar. The rank order-
ing of causes is similar in both samples, but some items were considered less
important in 2009 (e.g., deforestation, the hole in the ozone layer).
There were some changes in the effects that respondents anticipated
from climate change. There was an increase in the extent to which respon-
dents expected a number of impacts (ecological disasters, more frequent
and larger storms, increased precipitation and humidity globally, and war
and immigration problems), all of these consistent with scientific projec-
tions. However, there was decreased expectation of sea level rise and of
shorter, milder winters globally—both changes in opinion that are opposite
to scientific expectations.
An open-ended question about the most effective actions to help pre-
vent global warming yielded the same most common response as in 1992—
reduce driving. However, political action and raising awareness, which
were the second and third most frequently mentioned responses in 1992,
were mentioned much less frequently in 2009. The second and third most
frequently mentioned responses in 2009 were recycling and saving energy,
which were mentioned more frequently in 2009 than in 1992. There were
some major changes in response to a parallel open-ended question on what
are the most effective actions the U.S. government could take. Reducing
auto emissions was at or near the top of the list in both samples, but pro-
tecting biomass, limiting pollution, and protecting the ozone layer were
much less frequently mentioned in the 2009 sample, and alternative energy
was much more frequently mentioned.
Closed-ended questioning about the effectiveness of various actions
for preventing global warming indicated that actions that are generally
seen as green are ranked highly, regardless of whether they in fact limit
climate change, indicating a conflation of protecting the environment in
general with preventing climate change. For example, stopping pollution
from chemical plants, stopping the use of aerosol cans, recycling consumer
goods, and compliance with the Clean Air Act were all among the more
highly rated actions in both samples.
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PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Read concluded that, overall, mental models have not changed a lot
since 1992, despite a lot of publicity. There was less reference in 2009 to
the burning issues of 1992, such as the “ozone hole,” but some common
misconceptions of 1992—the confusion of climate and weather and the
pollution model of climate change—remained prevalent in 2009. There was
some evidence of better understanding of the role of greenhouse gases.
Read spoke briefly about an interview study his group carried out in Se-
attle in 2008. It revealed a “natural causes” or “natural cycles” story about
climate change that some respondents offered, which was not revealed in
the survey study.
In the discussion following the presentation, a participant from the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reported that an EPA study
has indicated that 42 percent of U.S. emissions are due to materials man-
agement, suggesting that recycling makes a huge difference, contrary to an
implication of the presentation.
PERCEPTIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS
Elke Weber4
Columbia University
Elke Weber began by noting that people study risk perception because
of its importance in responding to hazards. It prepares organisms for action
by changing physiological stress levels and affecting immune reactions; in
addition, perceived risk combined with perceived control leads to positive
or negative emotional reactions. This emotional aspect of risk perception
serves as an early warning system that motivates action and also leads to
expectations of actions by others.
Perceptions of climate change risks are influenced by cognitive and af-
fective processes. One feature of climate change that has cognitive implica-
tions is the gradual nature of the change, which makes “signal” detection
(i.e., noticing that there is a change) difficult. As a result of people’s great
adaptability, they sometimes do not even perceive gradual changes.
The uncertainty and time delay that are characteristic of climate change
are additional cognitive challenges to taking protective action because the
costs of climate change adaptation or mitigation are immediate and certain,
but the future benefits of such action are uncertain and delayed in time,
with large discounting as a result. Moreover, if such actions are successful
in terms of preventing future negative consequences, the result may be that
4 Presentation is available at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/hdgc/Insights%20from%2
0Research%20on%20Risk%20Perception%20Elke%20Weber%20Columbia%20University.
pdf [accessed September 2010].
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16 FACILITATING CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSES
the actions appear to have been unnecessary. Weber noted that when people
are considering possible future losses, they tend to be risk seeking—that is,
they tend to take their chances. Thus, if climate change is seen in terms of
future possible economic or environmental losses, there is a tendency to
accept the risk and take the chance on future losses. She also noted that
time discounting is not done at a constant rate per time period but follows
a hyperbolic form (anything that does not occur right away is discounted
very highly), and the discount rate is typically large. Although losses are
discounted less than gains, time discounting rates are still very high even for
losses and are higher than the rates typically advocated or used in current
economic models.
Weber noted that how information is acquired matters. For example,
many potential consequences of climate change are low-probability, high-
consequence events. People tend to overweight rare events when they are
described symbolically, so rare potential climate events could get a strong
reaction. However, when people learn from personal experience, recent rare
events are overweighted, but those that have not been experienced tend to
be ignored. Rare events have a low probability of having occurred recently
and thus will have low impact on perceived risk. Personal experience tends
to be a stronger determinant of choice than vicarious descriptions because
it is more engaging. Consequently, climate change events are not likely to
provoke strong reactions in many people.
The absence of a visceral reaction matters, because emotions drive
action. Analytic considerations are neither necessary nor sufficient
for action. Evolution has prepared humans for simpler risks: “dread”
and “unknown” risks get much stronger reactions than those that do
not have these characteristics. Most people do not dread climate change.
When affective reactions do exist, they are often incorrectly calibrated or
misdirected. Climate change is not a risk people are hard-wired to care
about. The threats are slow, intangible, uncertain, and statistical, lie in the
future, and are not caused by a hostile agent. These characteristics help
explain why global warming is low on people’s policy priority lists. Poll
data show that the importance given to climate change has dropped when
there are other major worries (e.g., after the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks and the recent economic downturn), indicating that people may
have a finite pool of worry.
Emotions affect how people process information, with different presen-
tations of information pressing different emotional buttons. For example,
carbon offsets are more palatable than carbon taxes, especially among Re-
publicans. Recent research elaborating “query theory” indicates that people
argue with themselves, evaluate alternatives sequentially, and generate more
arguments about the first-choice option they consider. Thus, whatever op-
tion is considered first gets more consideration. Default options (i.e., the
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PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF CLIMATE CHANGE
option one gets if no decision is made, often the status quo) are so popular
at least in part because they are the ones people consider first.
Weber noted several lines of theory and research that discuss risk as a
social construction: the cultural theory of risk propounded by Douglas and
Wildavsky (1982); the social amplification perspective (Pidgeon, Kasperson,
and Slovic, 2003), which identifies as an important role of the mass media
creating tipping points in public reaction; and research on how perceived
risk can be affected by the expectation of action by others.
In final comments, Weber noted the mismatch between the magnitude
of the problem and the nature of the solutions offered, as well as the ab-
sence of major events that might catalyze action. She said that Hurricane
Katrina came closest, commenting that people need to be better prepared to
respond to such events when they occur. Weber emphasized that perceptions
of climate change risk are multiply determined, that nonanalytic processes
are very important, and that affective reactions often guide cognitive pro-
cesses. She argued for better appreciation that perceptions are malleable—
that risk is not an immutable attribute of an event or action, but rather a
judgment and a feeling that are constructed. Therefore how attention is
focused, how information about action alternatives and their outcomes are
acquired, what attributions are made about the causes of events, familiarity
with events and outcomes, and perceptions of control all matter.
CLIMATE CHANGE DENIAL AND CONSERVATISM
Riley Dunlap
Oklahoma State University
Riley Dunlap began with the observation that the U.S. conservative
movement has had a significant impact on debates over climate change.
The historical background of this impact, Dunlap said, can be traced to the
rise of a powerful conservative movement in the 1970s in reaction to what
conservatives saw as threats posed by the progressive movements of the
1960s. The success of this “countermovement” can be seen in the general
rightward shift of the U.S. policy agenda from the Reagan administration
onward. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of
global environmentalism with the Earth Summit in 1992, the movement
began to focus increasingly on the perceived threat posed by environmental
regulations. It basically substituted a “green scare” for the declining “red
scare.” Conservatives launched an antienvironmental countermovement to
combat environmentalism, which they saw as a threat to the conservative
agenda of laissez-faire economics, free trade, the privatization of resources,
and so forth.
During the Reagan administration, the movement learned that direct
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1 FACILITATING CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSES
attacks on environmental regulations can produce a backlash and that it
was more effective to question the seriousness of environmental problems.
Because proponents of environmental regulations typically employ scientific
evidence to make their case, the movement began to challenge such evidence
as a key strategy. It did this by promoting “environmental skepticism,”
a dismissive view of the scientific evidence for environmental problems,
particularly by “manufacturing uncertainty”—a strategy long employed
by the tobacco industry and other industries to fight governmental regula-
tions. Dunlap cited a book by David Michaels, Doubt Is Their Product, in
which the author notes that “industry has learned that debating the science
is much easier and more effective than debating the policy” (Michaels,
2008:xi).
Dunlap and his colleagues have been studying the efforts of the con-
servative movement to undermine the scientific evidence for environmental
problems and climate change in particular. One study examined 141 Eng-
lish language books espousing environmental skepticism (Jacques, Dunlap,
and Freeman, 2008): 81 percent of these were published after the 1992 Rio
summit, and 92 percent were linked to a conservative think tank either by
author’s affiliation, publication by a conservative think tank press, or both.
With the emergence of the 1997 Kyoto protocol, these books gave increas-
ing attention to climate change, portraying efforts to limit global warming
as threats to economic growth, free enterprise, personal freedom, and the
American way of life.
In the past decade, climate change has become the preeminent environ-
mental issue for conservatives, and manufacturing uncertainty has become
the primary strategy for challenging the evidence for anthropogenic climate
change. In fact, several figures in climate change denial were previously
heavily involved in challenging the evidence concerning the harmful ef-
fects of tobacco smoke. The small number of contrarian scientists who
have challenged mainstream climate science now have been augmented by
a wide range of actors in the conservative movement. (Evidence for these
conclusions appears in a paper published since the workshop: Dunlap and
McCright, 2010.)
Dunlap said that as a way of examining the growth and diffusion of
climate change skepticism/denial and the role of the conservative movement
in promoting it, he and Peter Jacques are working on a study of books on
this topic published through 2009. They are examining links between 84
books and conservative think tanks, using the criteria employed in their
earlier study, as well as the major themes of the books and the credentials
of their authors or editors. There was a sharp rise in publication of these
books in 2007, which is continuing, and several of the books are bestsell-
ers. A total of 64 (or 79 percent) of the books are linked to one or more
conservative think tanks, and all but one of those not affiliated with a think
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PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF CLIMATE CHANGE
tank have been published in the last decade. A growing proportion of the
books are written by people who do not have natural science doctoral de-
grees, including several that are self-published, and these volumes are less
likely to be affiliated with conservative think tanks. Eight children’s books
have also appeared in recent years giving reasons not to worry about cli-
mate change. While books espousing climate change denial were published
primarily in the United States early on, they are increasingly appearing in
the United Kingdom and other countries, particularly those affiliated with
conservative think tanks.
The climate change denial books take issue with each of the major
IPCC claims: that global warming is occurring and will continue, that hu-
man activities releasing greenhouse gas emissions are a major cause of the
warming, that global warming produces harmful impacts on human and
natural systems, and that a response is called for if harmful consequences
are to be avoided. Nearly half of the 59 books published in the 2000s still
question the warming trend, almost 90 percent challenge the attribution of
climate change to human activities, and close to three-fourths are skeptical
about negative impacts. There is also “delay skepticism,” or the argument
that there is no need to do anything now, even if climate change is occur-
ring, and all but four of the books endorse this view. Dunlap argued that
while the counterclaims to the IPCC have changed as the evidence support-
ing anthropogenic climate change accumulates, the bottom line in these
books remains the same: no regulations. This reflects the near universal
conservative ideology behind different versions of climate change denial. In
fact, the sequence of arguments over time parallels that used in the past by
contrarians (e.g., regarding the smoking-cancer link, acid rain).
Dunlap said that the counterclaims presented in these books and a
wide range of other fora employed by contrarian scientists and conserva-
tive think tanks have been effective. He said that the U.S. media have given
much more attention to climate change contrarian arguments and have
been more likely to portray climate science as uncertain than have media
in other countries. Not surprisingly, the U.S. public consistently expresses
less concern about climate change than do the publics in other developed
nations and is more likely to perceive a significant lack of consensus in the
scientific community. The United States has yet to enact meaningful climate
policy and has been an impediment to international policy making. Dunlap
said that climate change contrarianism has become a core tenet in conserva-
tive policy circles and now has hegemonic status in the Republican Party,
as evident in recent criticisms of any Republican politician who calls for
action to deal with climate change.
Importantly, there is widespread evidence of a polarization of the U.S.
public on the climate issue. Climate change denial has diffused to the gen-
eral public, particularly to the conservative sector. Before the 1980s, views
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of environmental issues were only modestly associated with political ideol-
ogy and weakly and, frequently insignificantly, with party preference. In the
1980s and 1990s, environmental issues gradually became more politicized,
and political polarization began to increase. Today, party identification and
political ideology are both good predictors of environmental positions on
many issues. For example, trend data on opinions about “when the effects
of global warming will begin to happen” (already happening . . . will never
happen) showed a very modest increase since 2001 in the percentage of
people saying that the effects of warming have already begun, but the par-
tisan difference continually widened, with Democrats up, and Republicans
slightly down (Dunlap and McCright, 2008; see Figure 1-2). Furthermore,
among Democrats, belief in global warming increases with education and
self-assessed understanding of the issue, but among Republicans, higher
education or levels of understanding have little impact on such beliefs.
On the question of whether global warming is due more to human or
natural causes, the trend since 2001 has been flat, but again there has been a
growing divide between Republicans and Democrats, with the gap growing
Percentage
FIGURE 1-2 Percentages of Democrats and Republicans who believe the ef -
fects of global warming have already begun to happen, from Gallup poll data,
2001-2008.
SOURCE: Dunlap and McCright (2008, Figure 1). Reprinted with permission.
Figure 1-2
R01827
uneditable bitmapped image
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PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF CLIMATE CHANGE
most among people who think they understand climate change very well.
Dunlap summarized this evidence by saying that for a significant portion
of the public, the conservative movement has been successful in portraying
climate science as a hoax, a liberal plot, or “junk science” pursued by self-
serving researchers.
Dunlap concluded by saying that, in addition to focusing on mental
models and other cognitive phenomena impeding effective climate change
communication, social scientists need to pay attention to the increasing
flow of messages that are undercutting mainstream climate science. Lack
of public acceptance of climate science does not occur by happenstance
or stem predominantly from cognitive limitations; it is clearly affected by
the perceived uncertainty concerning climate change that is purposefully
and effectively generated by the climate change denial movement. The sci-
entific community cannot craft more effective messages regarding climate
change for the American public without taking into account what Dunlap
described as the barrage of “disinformation” the public receives from those
intent on undermining the credibility of climate science and thus the need
for climate policy.
INVITED COMMENT
Frank Niepold
Climate Office, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and
Interagency Working Group on Education,
U.S. Global Change Research Program
Frank Niepold said that the climate literacy/outreach/extension com-
munity has known for at least 2 years that knowing more climate science
will not get the problem solved, that the “information deficit model” is
not adequate. The education community is coming around to the social
science work, and he expressed interest in making a greater effort toward
understanding this work.
Mentioning the 2009 federal climate literacy document (U.S. Global
Change Research Program, 2009a), he went on to say that education re-
form is hard to do in the United States because of state-level control. There
are 15,000 school districts, plus museums and other venues for learning. In
his view, a very broad consortium is needed to engage the country. Because
it is easier to sow doubt than to remove it, people will be doing climate
change education for a very long time. He said that to raise the literacy
of the nation, both audience differentiation and sustained engagement are
needed (which educators do naturally, but advertisers and people in com-
munications do not).
Niepold called on the social science community to help the education
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22 FACILITATING CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSES
community figure out how to use the social sciences in the education pro-
cess. The disconnect between the two communities is a chronic problem,
and he encouraged that community to help educators learn how to use
social science work in education. He noted signs of increased attention to
the topic. There has been a shift from an attitude of “let them know it’s a
problem” to “then what?” He said that teachers in some schools are do-
ing 3-week units on climate change in fifth grade that leave some children
crying. Many teachers do not have expertise in climate change science, nor
in how to deal with the impacts of what they are teaching (i.e., the pupils’
emotional responses). And although many are not familiar with solutions
to the climate change problem, they need to teach about them in a way
that will leave the students with some hope. Teachers need help to be fluent
with the science and to teach what can be done about the problem. Niepold
concluded by saying that federal science agencies, including the Agency
for International Development, the National Institutes of Health, the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. Departments of
Defense and Energy, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, are
working together on education, but they need help with best practices and
techniques.
Roger Kasperson asked whether it is realistic to expect any major
change in the American public’s views. Niepold said it is, because federal
science agencies are working hard on the issue and will monitor change,
focusing on particular target groups. He noted that the United Nations
(UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change requires all signatories to
do outreach and said that not enough has been done in the United States in
this respect. He said that this type of work is not sufficiently funded, and a
way needs to be found to do it. Both federal agencies and nonfederal actors
are increasingly aware of the issue.
In the discussion following the presentation, Dunlap noted a need to
be sensitive to the climate contrarian literature moving into the classroom,
for example, in the form of a clean coal coloring book given to schools for
free or through the influence of conservatives on school curricula, textbook
choices, and pressure on teachers. Stewart Cohen asked whether there is an
information flow to professional networks—engineers, accountants, public
health workers, among others—to engage them as professionals and turn
them into extension agents. Niepold responded that the discussions of a Na-
tional Climate Service (NCS) focus on this. Although it is not yet sufficiently
resourced, there is talk about building capacity in professional associations.
Cohen added that sustained conversations also have to occur in the profes-
sions. Niepold agreed that education in these communities would require
a sustained effort. There was a question about involvement with the busi-
ness community. Niepold said that in the NCS discussions, there was also
emphasis on dialogue sessions with the business community to learn about
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PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF CLIMATE CHANGE
its needs. He added that these discussions imply a paradigm shift in the
science community toward public-private partnerships, in addition to the
usual emphasis on satellites, physical observations, and climate models.
INVITED COMMENT
Bud Ward
Yale Forum on Climate Change and the Media
Bud Ward began by stating that the United States is in the early stages
of a long and fundamental transformation of the media. He said journal-
ism lacks a successful business model that supports quality journalism as a
component of profitability. He noted that Ann Arbor, Michigan, now has
no daily newspaper and predicted that other major U.S. cities also will find
themselves without print dailies in coming years. There have been major
layoffs at many newspapers, an ongoing process that he said has come to
be known as “journicide.” There also has been a reduction of specialty
beats, with what had been environment specialty beats now expanded
to cover issues as broad as environment, science, medicine, space, and
technology. Ward said that the old rule of thumb of reporters spending
80 percent of their time doing reporting (research) and 20 percent of time
doing writing has now been flipped, with reporters under intense and con-
tinual pressure to “feed the beast” of both their print and online outlets,
including such electronic media as Twitter and Facebook.
Ward emphasized the importance of having climate change issues re-
ported beyond the science and environment pages given that the issue can
affect education, business, religion, travel, national security, and other news
beats. Although such broader reporting is needed, it carries the risk of a
return to an overemphasis on a false or simplistic “balance” or the inad-
vertent insertion of factual mistakes, because reporters new to the climate
change issue lack familiarity with the scientific underpinnings. So, as the
issue moves to other news beats, there will be a fallback in the learning
curve. Science and environment journalists by and large accept that Earth
is warming and that humans are significantly responsible, and they are be-
ing accused of being “template followers” by those critical of the scientific
evidence. Another issue with news coverage is that if a story discusses
uncertainty or risk assessment, it ends up being buried or killed outright.
Pointing to increasing financial pressures facing the media and to something
of a collapse of the traditional “iron wall” separating editorial and business
interests, Ward said that the term “media industry” is now apropos. Today,
journalists have to entertain as well as inform, and climate stories are not
always amenable to this treatment. He agreed with Moser’s observation
that the media are not an educational institution. Reporters educate, he
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emphasized, but they are not educators, and the public should not expect
the mass media or the mini-media to be educators. Ward anticipates that
the revolution in mainstream media will result in a lot less investigative
journalism. He concluded that how society will handle climate change will
depend on how it handles journalism and other means of informing the
public in a democratic system.
DISCUSSION
Much of the discussion focused on questions related to how greater lev-
els of public concern and action might come to pass in response to climate
change, considering the challenges to public understanding identified in the
presentations. Andrews suggested that the conversation had evidenced an
absence of positive ideas for framing climate change, for example, in terms
of energy policy needs, economic development, and so forth. He noted that
there are business allies for action on climate change. For example, the
electric utility industry is seriously divided—Duke Energy has come out
for a carbon tax, for example. He said there is a need to get beyond the
information deficit idea and the environmentalist model in which public
understanding and action all follow from rational science.
Moser suggested that it is important first to affirm the audience before
presenting new ideas. People want to be “good people,” so messages favor-
ing climate responses should frame the responses as “what a good person
does.” She said that Americans want to see the positive side of everything
and suggested that, in Europe, it is easier to have a conversation focused
on difficult societal changes and on an important role for government in
overseeing and guiding them. She suggested the value of framing messages
in terms of how to be a good person while facing the realities of climate
change.
Dunlap said that although positive framings, such as in terms of
“green” jobs, are being made, public opinion has not changed. He noted
that companies positioning themselves as green are vilified by conservative
think tanks as anticapitalist.
Weber noted that people have multiple goals, including long-term and
social goals, which may be activated as they make choices. Read pointed
out that, in one study, telling people what a 9 cent/gallon tax on gasoline
would be used for (to clean up the pollution caused by a gallon of gasoline)
greatly increased willingness to pay.
Miron Straf noted methodological issues with survey responses, which
are influenced by question wording, but identified ways to get past them.
For example, people can be asked to think aloud about survey questions.
Deliberative polling can also be used. Moser said that some research has
gone beyond self-reported subjective opinions, but little has yet integrated
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deliberative processes with the goals of education. She suggested that if at-
titudes and beliefs are to change, different tactics must be used, including
well-led deliberative processes. Dunlap said there have been some examples
of such approaches.
Thomas Dietz pointed to some additional complexities in promoting
greater public understanding. Recent analyses from the Stanford Energy
Modeling Forum suggest that it is no longer possible to keep global warm-
ing below 2 degrees Celsius, “unless we continue to pump out aerosols.”
He said that because of the caveat about aerosols, it is incorrect to simply
say that the 2 degree target has already been overshot. Moser suggested
that no single message can adequately convey an understanding of climate
change, noting the need to consider mitigation and adaptation together. She
suggested that people would be more willing to hear such a complex mes-
sage as part of a dialogue. Also, she emphasized that a message about the
difficult challenges and great risks has to be paired with a message about
the positive, constructive things that individuals, communities, and a nation
can do. Without options for action, the conversation ends—environmental
despair is a huge issue.
Nicholas Pidgeon noted that the science of climate change impacts
is increasingly using the language of uncertainty. He asked how one can
separate the uncertainty about impacts from the much lesser uncertainty
about whether climate change is happening. He said that research in politi-
cal psychology shows that conservatives reject any presentation of the issue
that includes mention of uncertainty and suggested that this audience needs
a framing that has more certainty. Dunlap noted that for a climate contrar-
ian, even 95 percent confidence is evidence of uncertainty.
Cohen suggested that the climate deniers need to defend their certainty
that climate change is not a danger and claimed that they are never asked
to defend their beliefs. Ward added that climate scientist Stephen Schneider
often said that scientists who speak with certainty are engaging in politi-
cal rhetoric. Leiserowitz suggested that there are widely resonant frames
available for talking about responses to climate change that address the
uncertainty, such as making the analogy to buying insurance or gambling
with the future.
Leiserowitz concluded the discussion by noting that a lot has been
said about the complexities, the barriers to changing behavior, and how
the problem is difficult. On the more positive side, he said that researchers
have not really applied themselves scientifically to this question. He said
that with an empirical approach, a lot can be learned. He noted that even
if people understand climate change, they may not change all their relevant
behaviors. Different behaviors present different barriers, and analysis has
to become more sophisticated. He agreed with Andrews that there has been
tremendous change in the corporate world, which has been responding
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to the huge financial opportunities in solving the climate problem. Cities,
states, the federal government, many civic and environmental groups, and
religious groups also are engaging. He concluded by saying that nature
bats last: there will be teachable moments to which scientists will need to
respond.
