The National Research Council (NRC) issued a report in 2008 entitled Pre-Milestone A and Early-Phase Systems Engineering: A Retrospective Review and Benefits for Future Air Force Systems Acquisition (hereinafter referred to as the Kaminski report, after Paul G. Kaminski, the chair of that report’s study committee).1 The Kaminski report emphasized the importance of systems engineering early in the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition life cycle and urged the revitalization of the systems engineering and Development Planning (DP) disciplines throughout the DoD.2
No less important to the future combat capability of the armed services is the development of new, cutting-edge technology. This is particularly true for the United States Air Force (USAF), which from its very inception has sought to capitalize on technological and scientific advances. Even before there was a United States Air Force, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army Air Corps Henry H. “Hap” Arnold was committed to giving his forces a decisive technological edge:
Arnold … intended to leave to his beloved air arm a heritage of science and technology so deeply imbued in the institution that the weapons it would fight with would always be the best the state of the art could provide and those on its drawing boards would be prodigies of futuristic thought.3
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1
Preacquisition Technology
Development for Air
Force Weapon Systems
The National Research Council (NRC) issued a report in 2008 entitled Pre-
Milestone A and Early-Phase Systems Engineering: A Retrospective Review and Ben-
efits for Future Air Force Systems Acquisition (hereinafter referred to as the Kaminski
report, after Paul G. Kaminski, the chair of that report’s study committee).1 The
Kaminski report emphasized the importance of systems engineering early in the
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition life cycle and urged the revitalization of
the systems engineering and Development Planning (DP) disciplines throughout
the DoD.2
No less important to the future combat capability of the armed services is
the development of new, cutting-edge technology. This is particularly true for the
United States Air Force (USAF), which from its very inception has sought to capital-
ize on technological and scientific advances. Even before there was a United States
Air Force, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army Air Corps Henry H. “Hap” Arnold
was committed to giving his forces a decisive technological edge:
Arnold . . . intended to leave to his beloved air arm a heritage of science and technology so
deeply imbued in the institution that the weapons it would fight with would always be the
best the state of the art could provide and those on its drawing boards would be prodigies
of futuristic thought.3
1 NRC. 2008. Pre-Milestone A and Early-Phase Systems Engineering: A Retrospective Review and
Benefits for Future Air Force Systems Acquisition. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
2 Ibid.
3 Neil Sheehan. 2009. A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon. New
York, N.Y.: Random House, p. xvi.
11
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12 of
General Arnold succeeded in his dream of building the foundations of an Air
Force that was second to none technologically. Dramatic innovations in aeronau-
tics and later in space were fielded, with schedules that today seem impossible to
achieve. The first U-2 flew just 18 months after it was ordered in 1953, and it was
operational just 9 months after that first flight.4 The SR-71, even more radical, was
developed with similar speed, going from contract award to operational status in
less than 3 years.5 In the space domain, innovation was pursued with similar speed:
for example, the Atlas A, America’s first intercontinental ballistic missile, required
only 30 months from contract award in January 1955 to first launch in June 1957.6
At that time, the American military and defense industry set the standard in
the effective management of new technology. In fact, the entire field known today
as “project management” springs from the management of those missile develop-
ment programs carried out by the Air Force, the United States Navy, and later the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Tools used routinely
throughout the project management world today—Program Evaluation Review
Technique (PERT) and Critical Path Method (CPM) scheduling systems, Earned
Value Management (EVM), Cost/Schedule Control System Criteria (C/SCSC), for
example—trace back directly to the work of the Air Force, the Navy, and NASA
in those years.7
Clearly those days are gone. The Kaminski report cites compelling statistics
that describe dramatic cost and schedule overruns in specific, individual programs.
Taken all together, the picture for major system acquisition is no better:
The time required to execute large, government-sponsored systems development programs
has more than doubled over the past 30 years, and the cost growth has been at least as great.8
STATEMENT OF TASK AND COMMITTEE FORMATION
The Air Force requested that the National Research Council review current
conditions and make recommendations on how to regain the technological exper-
tise so characteristic of the Air Force’s earlier years. Such outside studies have long
been part of the Air Force’s quest for improvement in technology. For example,
4 Clarence L. “Kelly” Johnson. 1989. More Than My Share of It All. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian
Institution Scholarly Press.
5 Ibid.
6 For additional information, see http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/icbm/sm-65.htm. Accessed
May 10, 2010.
7 For additional information, see http://www.mosaicprojects.com.au/PDF_Papers/P050_Origins_
of_Modern_PM.pdf. Accessed May 10, 2010.
8 NRC. 2008. Pre-Milestone A and Early-Phase Systems Engineering: A Retrospective Review and Ben -
efits for Future Air Force Systems Acquisition. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, p. 14.
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Preacquisition technology develoPment air force weaPon systems 13
for
General Hap Arnold, in his autobiography, described the difficulties that he faced
leading the pre-World War II United States Army Air Corps:
Still, in spite of our smallness and the perpetual discouragements, it was not all bad. Prog-
ress in engineering, development, and research was fine. At my old stamping grounds in
Dayton, I found the Materiel Division doing an excellent job within the limits of its funds.
[General Oscar] Westover was calling on the National Research Council for problems too
tough for our Air Corps engineers to handle. . . .9
Early in the present study, the Air Force pointed to three elements of the ex-
isting acquisition process as examples of things that required improvement. First,
evolutionary technology transition has suffered from less-than-adequate early
(pre-Milestone A) planning activities that manifest themselves later in problems
of cost, schedule, and technical performance. Second, revolutionary transition too
often competes with evolutionary transition, as reflected in efforts to rush advanced
technology to the field while failing to recognize and repair chronic underfunding
of evolutionary Air Force acquisition efforts. Third, there appears to be no single
Air Force research and development (R&D) champion designated to address these
issues.
Although technology plays a part in all Air Force activities, from operations to
sustainment and systems modification, the task for the present study was targeted
at the development and acquisition of new major systems. Accordingly, this study
focuses on how to improve the ability to specify, develop, test, and insert new tech -
nology into new Air Force systems, primarily pre-Milestone B. Box 1-1 contains
the statement of task for this study.
To address the statement of task, the Committee on Evaluation of U.S. Air Force
Preacquisition Technology Development was formed. Biographical sketches of the
committee members are included in Appendix A.
THE PARAMETERS OF THIS STUDY
The statement of task specifically requires assessment of relevant DoD processes
and policies, both current and historical, and invites proposed changes to Air Force
workforce, organization, policies, processes, and resources. Issues of particular
concern include resourcing alternatives for pre-Milestone B activities and the role
of technology demonstrations. Previous NRC studies, and studies by other groups,
9 H.H. Arnold. 1949. Global Mission. New York, N.Y.: Harper, p. 165.
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14 of
have addressed portions of the material covered in this report.10,11,12,13,14,15,16 Im-
portantly, however, no previous report was expressly limited to addressing the topic
of early-phase technology development that is the focus of this study.
Studies of major defense systems acquisition are certainly not in short supply.
Over the previous half-century there have been literally scores of such assessments,
and their findings are remarkably similar: Weapons systems are too expensive, they
take too long to develop, they often fail to live up to expectations. A central ques-
tion for a reader of this report has to be—What makes this study any different?
The answer is, in a word, technology, and its development and integration
into Air Force systems. From those early days of Hap Arnold, it was the capable
development, planning, and use of technology that set the Air Force and its pre-
decessors apart from the other services. That technological reputation needs to be
preserved—some would say recaptured—if the Air Force is to continue to excel in
the air, space, and cyberspace domains discussed later in this chapter.
One cause of this technological challenge is that, for a variety of reasons, the
Air Force has lost focus on technology development over the past two decades.
The Kaminski report makes clear that Air Force capabilities in the critical areas of
systems engineering and Development Planning were allowed to atrophy. These
declines had their origins in legislative actions, financial pressures, demographics,
workforce development, and a host of other sources. But altogether, they led to a
10 NRC. 2008. Pre-Milestone A and Early-Phase Systems Engineering: A Retrospective Review and
Benefits for Future Air Force Systems Acquisition. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
11 NRC. 2010. Achieving Effective Acquisition of Information Technology in the Department of Defense.
Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
12 Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project. 2006. Defense
Acquisition Performance Assessment Report. A Report by the Assessment Panel of the Defense Acqui-
sition Performance Assessment Project for the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Available at https://acc.
dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=18554. Accessed June 10, 2010.
13 Gary E. Christle, Danny M. Davis, and Gene H. Porter. 2009. CNA Independent Assessment.Air
Force Acquisition: Return to Excellence. Alexandria, Va.: CNA Analysis & Solutions.
14 Business Executives for National Security. 2009. Getting to Best: Reforming the Defense Acquisi-
tion Enterprise. A Business Imperative for Change from the Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law
and Oversight. Available at http://www.bens.org/mis_support/Reforming%20the%20Defense.pdf.
Accessed June 10, 2010.
15 USAF. 2008. Analysis of Alternative (AoA) Handbook: A Practical Guide to Analysis of Alterna -
tives. Kirtland Air Force Base, N.Mex.: Air Force Materiel Command’s (AFMC’s) Office of Aerospace
Studies. Available at http://www.oas.kirtland.af.mil/AoAHandbook/AoA%20Handbook%20Final.
pdf. Accessed June 10, 2010.
16 DoD. 2009. Technology
Readiness Assessment (TRA) Deskbook. Prepared by the Director,
Research Directorate (DRD), Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E). Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense. Available at http://www.dod.mil/
ddre/doc/DoD_TRA_July_2009_Read_Version.pdf. Accessed September 2, 2010.
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Preacquisition technology develoPment air force weaPon systems 15
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BOX 1-1
Statement of Task
The NRC will:
1. Examine appropriate current or historical Department of Defense (DoD) policies and processes, including the
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System, DoD Instruction 5000.02, the Air Force Acquisi -
tion Improvement Plan, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, and DoD and Air Force
competitive prototyping policies to comprehend their impact on the execution of pre-program of record
technology development efforts.
2. Propose changes to the Air Force workforce, organization, policies, processes and resources, if any, to better
perform preacquisition technology development. Specific issues to consider include:
a. Resourcing alternatives for Pre-Milestone B activities
b. The role of technology demonstrations
3. Study and report on industry/Government best practices to address both evolutionary (deliberate) and revo -
lutionary (rapid) technology development.
4. Identify potential legislative initiatives, if any, to improve technology development and transition into opera -
tional use.
decline in the Air Force’s ability to successfully integrate technology into weapons
systems in a timely and cost-effective manner.
This study was also commissioned at a time of increased interest in technol-
ogy management outside the Air Force and beyond the DoD. Disappointed by
acquisition programs that underperformed in terms of cost and schedule, Congress
enacted the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA; Public Law
111-23). One of WSARA’s major goals is to reduce the likelihood of future pro-
grammatic failure by reducing concurrency (i.e., the simultaneity of two or more
phases of the DoD acquisition process), thus ensuring that systems and major sub-
systems are technologically mature before entering production. This congressional
intent is apparent in WSARA’s emphasis on systems engineering and development
planning, and in other mandates’ requirements for technology demonstrations,
competitive prototypes, and preliminary design reviews earlier in the acquisition
cycle, before costly system development and production decisions are made.
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16 of
COMMITTEE APPROACH TO THE STUDY
Throughout the study, the committee met with numerous Air Force stakehold-
ers to gain a fuller understanding of the sponsor’s needs and expectations relating to
the elements contained in the statement of task. The full committee met four times
to receive briefings from academic, government, and industry experts in technology
development, and it conducted a number of visits during which subgroups of the
committee met with various stakeholders. The committee met two additional times
to discuss the issues and to finalize its report. Appendix B lists specific meetings,
individual participants, and participating organizations.
The almost absurd complexity of Figure 1-1 illustrates how daunting the DoD
acquisition system is. A clearer image is not available. Given the incredible intricacy
of the system, coupled with the relatively short time line of the study, the com-
mittee endeavored at the outset to distill this complexity into a basic touchstone
mission statement: How to improve the Air Force’s ability to specify, develop, test,
and insert new technology into Air Force systems.
THREE DOMAINS OF THE AIR FORCE
The mission of the United States Air Force is to fly, fight, and win . . . in air, space, and
cyberspace.17
This mission statement, set forth in a joint September 2008 letter from the Sec-
retary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff, emphasizes the importance
of all three domains in which the Air Force must operate. Each domain involves
special considerations and challenges. Consequently, each of the three domains
represents a unique environment in terms of science and technology (S&T) and
major systems acquisition.
Air
The air domain is perhaps most frequently associated with Air Force major
systems acquisition. It is characterized by relatively low (and declining) numbers of
new major systems, with a relatively small number of industry contractors compet-
ing fiercely to win each new award. In this realm, relationships between government
and industry tend to be at arm’s length and sometimes adversarial. The duration
17 “U.S. Air Force Mission Statement and Priorities.” September 15, 2008. Available at http://www.
af.mil/information/viewpoints/jvp.asp?id=401. Accessed May 19, 2010.
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Version 5.4 15 June 2010
DoD Decision
Planning,
Support Systems
Programming,
Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle Management System
Effective Interaction
Budgeting & Execution
Process This chart is a classroom aid for Defense Acquisition University students. It provides a notional illustration of interfaces among three major
is Essential
DEPSECDEF Oversight
decision support systems used to develop, produce and field a weapon system for national defense. Defense acquisition is a complex process
DoD 7000.14-R Following the Materiel Development Decision, the Milestone Decision Authority may authorize entry into the acquisition process at any point, consistent with phase-specific entrance criteria and statutory requirements with many more activities than shown here and many concurrent activities that cannot be displayed on a two-dimensional chart. Supporting
information is on back of this chart. For more information, see the Defense Acquisition Portal (http://dap.dau.mil).
Joint Defense
Capabilities Integration Acquisition Operations & Support Phase
Production & Deployment Phase
Materiel Solution Analysis Phase Technology Development Phase Engineering & Manufacturing Development Phase
& Development System System
VCJCS Oversight USD(AT&L) Oversight Develop a system or increment of capability; complete full system integration, develop affordable and executable manufacturing process; Achieve operational capability that satisfies mission needs. Low-rate initial production (limited deployment for software intensive Execute support program that meets materiel readiness and
Complete Analysis of Alternatives to assess potential materiel solutions to Reduce technology risk, determine and mature appropriate set of technologies to integrate into full system,
CJCSI 3170.01 series DoDD 5000.01 ensure operational supportability; reduce logistics footprint; implement human systems integration; design for producibility; ensure systems with no development hardware) and full-rate production (full deployment for software intensive systems). Deliver operational support performance requirements and
capability need, identify key technologies and estimate life cycle costs. demonstrate critical technology elements on prototypes, and complete preliminary design. Identify an
affordability; protect critical program information; and demonstrate system integration, interoperability, safety, and utility. fully funded quantity of systems and supporting material and services for program or increment to users. sustains system in most cost-effective manner.
Consider commercial-off-the-shelf and solutions from both large and affordable program or increment of militarily useful capability, demonstrate technology in relevant
small business. Identify materiel solution to capability need. MS environment, and identify and assess manufacturing risks. Provide for two or more competing teams MS MS Full-Rate Production/Deployment Overlaps Production and Deployment Phase.
Integrated System System Capability & Manufacturing
Complete Technology Development Strategy. producing prototypes of system and/or key system elements prior to or through Milestone B. Disposal
Low-Rate Initial Production
Design Process Demonstration Life Cycle Sustainment
Post-
A B C FRP
Decision Points/Milestones MDD CDR A DR IOC FOC
R01861 AF PTD--CS4 final.indd 17
FDDR
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System - Acronyms System Threat Assessment System Threat Assessment System Threat Assessment
For software
Supportability Supportability
Supportability
Strategic Guidance Requirements Requirements
Requirements
IOC – Initial Operational Capability intensive
CDD – Capability Development Document
Force Force Force
Compliant Compliant
Compliant Technical Technical
Survivability Survivability Survivability
IT – Information Technology Technical
CPD – Capability Production Document systems
Protection Protection
Protection Solution Solution
Solution Standards & Standards &
Standards &
JP 3 0 – J i t P bli ti
3-0 Joint Publication 3 0 “J i t O
3-0, “Joint Operations”
ti ”
DCR – DOTMLPF Change Recommendation
Ch R d ti KPP
KPP KPP
Net-Ready Net-Ready
Net-Ready Architectures Architectures
Architectures interfaces interfaces
interfaces KPP KPP KPP
KPPs KPPs
Joint Operations Concepts KPPs
DOTMLPF – Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, JROC – Joint Requirements Oversight Council
KPP KPP
KPP Traceable Traceable
Traceable
Leadership and Education, Personnel, & Facilities MUA – Military Utility Assessment
Concept of Operations To ICD & To ICD &
To ICD & Net Centric Net Centric
Net Centric
FOC – Full Operational Capability KPP – Key Performance Parameter Information Information
Information
Operations Plans JP 3-0 JP 3-0
JP 3-0 Data & Services Data & Services
Data & Services Selectively Applied Selectively Applied Selectively Applied
ICD – Initial Capabilities Document KSA – Key System Attribute Assurance Assurance
Assurance
Joint Strategy Strategy
Strategy
System System System
Energy Energy Energy
Capabilities-Based
Training Training Training
Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency
Assessment Joint Operations Concepts Joint Operations Concepts
KPP KPP KPP
KPP KPP KPP
Joint Operations Concepts
Capabilities Concept of Operations Concept of Operations
Joint Staff Review Joint Staff Review Joint Staff Review
Concept of Operations
System Threat Assessment System Threat Assessment
J-1 – Joint manpower. J-2 – Intelligence/threat. J-1 – Joint manpower. J-2 – Intelligence/threat. J-1 – Joint manpower. J-2 – Intelligence/threat.
Technology Development Strategy Validated and approved
J-3 – Operational suitability, sufficiency, & J-3 – Operational suitability, sufficiency, & J-3 – Operational suitability, sufficiency, &
Component/JROC
Component/JROC Component/JROC
Threshold/objective tradeoffs – Threshold/objective tradeoffs – Threshold/objective tradeoffs –
AoA (if updated) AoA (if updated)
Draft
AoA Report supportability. J-4 – Facilities, sustainment, & energy supportability. J-4 – Facilities, sustainment, & energy supportability. J-4 – Facilities, sustainment, & energy CDD & CPD for each increment of
ICD
Integration & Validation &
Validation & Validation &
Revised Performance Attributes DoD Enterprise Architecture & Revised Performance Attributes DoD Enterprise Architecture & Revised Performance Attributes
CDD CPD
CDD efficiency. J-5 – Alignment with strategy & priorities. efficiency. J-5 – Alignment with strategy & priorities. efficiency. J-5 – Alignment with strategy & priorities.
DoD Enterprise Architecture & evolutionary acquisition
Solution Architecture Solution Architecture
Approval
Approval Approval
J-6 – IT/NSS interoperability & supportability. J-6 – IT/NSS interoperability & supportability. J-6 – IT/NSS interoperability & supportability.
Solution Architecture J-7 – Systems training. J-8 – Weapons safety. J-7 – Systems training. J-8 – Weapons safety. J-7 – Systems training. J-8 – Weapons safety.
KPPs KPPs
Information Support Plan Information Support Plan
Technical Standards Profile
Technical Standards Profile Technical Standards Profile
Development JROC/
Information Information Information
MUA/Final Demo MUA/Final Demo MUA/Final Demo
Component
Support Support Support
Validation and Report for Report for Report for
Availability Ownership Availability Ownership Availability Ownership
Reliability Reliability Reliability
Plan Plan Plan
Approval Joint Capability Technology Joint Capability Technology Joint Capability Technology
Cost Cost Cost
System KPP KPP KPP
KSA KSA KSA
Demonstrations & other Demonstrations & other Demonstrations & other
KSA KSA KSA
prototype projects prototype projects prototype projects
Materiel Availability & Materiel Availability & Materiel Availability &
Operational Availability Operational Availability Operational Availability
(need-driven)
DCR
Non-materiel
solutions
Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy
Initiate Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy
A B C
(If program initiation, or if equiv to FDDR)
P-
Clinger-Cohen Act (IT incl NSS)
Clinger-Cohen Act (IT incl NSS) Clinger-Cohen Act (IT incl NSS) Clinger-Cohen Act (IT incl NSS) FRP
CDRA
- Compliance
- Compliance - Compliance - Compliance Increment 2
- CIO Confirmation of Compliance
- CIO Confirmation of Compliance - CIO Confirmation of Compliance - CIO Confirmation of Compliance
MS B
MS A
Cert
Cert B C
A
Cost-Type Exit
E it Exit
E it
Exit
E it Exit
E it
Exit
E it Contract Post-
TRA TRA P-
DAB/ DAB/ DAB/ DAB/ DAB/
CDRA FRP
PSR
ADM
Determination Criteria Criteria
PDR A
Criteria Criteria APB MDA APB MDA
Criteria APB MDA MDA
PSR ADM ADM
ADM ADM
MDA ADM
MDA ADM Increment 3
(if applicable)
ITAB ITAB ITAB ITAB ITAB
PSR PSR Met Met
Met Met
Met Required if PDR is
Exit Exit Exit
Exit Exit Exit
after Milestone B
Criteria Criteria Criteria
Criteria Criteria Criteria
PDR Report
Oversight PDR Report Post-CDR Report
Acquisition Strategy
Technology Development Strategy (TDS) Acquisition Strategy Acquisition Strategy
• Acquisition Approach • Resource Management • Acquisition Approach •
• Acquisition Approach • Business Strategy Resource Management • Acquisition Approach • Resource Management
& • Source & Related Documents • Program Security • Source & Related Documents •
• Source & Related Documents • Resource Management Program Security Considerations • Source & Related Documents • Program Security Considerations
Oversight & Review and Contracting Acronyms
• Capability Needs Considerations • Capability Needs •
• Capability Needs • Program Security Test & Evaluation • Capability Needs • Test & Evaluation Total Life
MAIS – Major Automated Information System
ADM – Acquisition Decision Memorandum
• Top-Level Integrated Schedule • Test & Evaluation • Top-Level Integrated Schedule •
• Top-Level Integrated Schedule Considerations Data Management • Top-Level Integrated Schedule • Data Management
Review MDA – Milestone Decision Authority
AoA – Analysis of Alternatives
• Program Interdependency & • Data Management • Program Interdependency & •
• Program Interdependency & • Test Planning Life-Cycle Sustainment Planning • Program Interdependency & • Life-Cycle Sustainment Planning
TLCSM TLCSM TLCSM
MDD – Materiel Development Decision
APB – Acquisition Program Baseline Cycle Systems
Interoperability Summary • Life-Cycle Sustainment Planning Interoperability Summary •
Interoperability Summary • Data Management & Life-Cycle Signature Support Plan Interoperability Summary • Life-Cycle Signature Support Plan
NSS – National Security Systems
CDR – Critical Design Review
• International Cooperation • Life-Cycle Signature Support • International Cooperation •
• International Cooperation Technical Data Rights CBRN Survivability • International Cooperation • CBRN Survivability
PDR – Preliminary Design Review
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Management
• Risk & Risk Management Plan • Risk & Risk Management •
• Risk & Risk Management • Life-Cycle Sustainment Human Systems Integration • Risk & Risk Management • Human Systems Integration
P-CDRA – Post Critical Design Review Assessment
DAB – Defense Acquisition Board
• Technology Maturation • CBRN Survivability • Technology Maturation •
• Technology Maturation & Planning ESOH • Technology Maturation • ESOH
AoA Study P-PDRA – Post PDR Assessment
ECP – Engineering Change Proposal
• Industrial Capability & • Human Systems Integration • Industrial Capability & •
Competitive Prototyping • Life-Cycle Signature Military Equipment Valuation & • Industrial Capability & •
AoA Study Military Equipment Valuation &
PSR – Program Support Review
ESOH – Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health
Manufacturing Readiness • ESOH Manufacturing Readiness
• Industrial Capability & Support Plan Accountability Manufacturing Readiness Accountability
Guidance Plan RAM-C – Reliability, Availability, Maintainability & Cost
EVM – Earned Value Management
• Business Strategy • Corrosion Prevention & Control • Business Strategy
Manufacturing Capabilities • CBRN Survivability • Corrosion Prevention & Control • Business Strategy • Corrosion Prevention & Control
Rationale Report
FRPDR – Full Rate Production Decision Review Purpose of LRIP:
RFP – Request for Proposals
FDDR – Full Deployment Decision Review
updated as MAIS
•Complete manufacturing development
updated as
RFI – Request for Information
IBR – Integrated Baseline Review only
necessary necessary
Initial AoA
AoA Final RFP cannot be released
AoA Final RFP cannot be released
Final RFP cannot be released Final RFP cannot be released
AoA •Establish initial production base
TRA – Technology Readiness Assessment
ITAB – Information Technology Acquisition Board
RAM-C until Acq Strategy is approved until Acq Strategy is approved
until TDS is approved until Acq Strategy is approved
TLCSM – Total Life Cycle Systems Management
LRIP – Low Rate Initial Production •Ramp to production rate
Report
Draft RFP Draft RFP
•Produce systems for IOT&E
Draft RFP
Draft RFP Source Source
Source Source
Acq Source Source
Source Source
Acq Acq Acq
RFP & RFP &
RFP & RFP & Selection Selection
Selection Selection
Study Post-Production Software Support Contracts
Selec on
Selec on
Plan Proposals Selec on
Plan Plan Plan Proposals
Proposals Proposals Selec on Engineering &
Contracting Technology Plan Production
Plan
Plan Plan
Contracts LRIP
Manufacturing
Development Contract
Contract Management ECPs/Changes Contract Management ECPs/Changes Contract Management ECPs/Changes Contract Management ECPs/Changes
Contract
Development Contract
Contract Contract Contract Contract
Contract
Closeout Closeout Closeout Closeout
IBR IBR IBR
EVM
EVM EVM Sustainment Contracts
IBR EVM
Surveillance
Surveillance Surveillance Surveillance
Initial
Alternative Production
System Low-Rate Initial Full-Rate
Initial Final
Major Product
Materiel
Materiel Performance Product Product
Prototypes Representative Production Production
Prototypes Baseline Post-Deployment
Solutions Solution Spec Baseline Baseline
(verified)
Products Review
Articles Systems Systems
Product Support/PBL Management
Product Support Package/PBL Implementation
Product Support Plan Demonstrate Product Support Capability
Refine •Public-Private Partnering Operations and Sustainment
•Continuous Tech Refreshment
Develop Initial Product Support Strategy Set
Define •Supply Chain Management
•Product Support Elements
•Statutory/Regulatory •Footprint Reduction
•Product Support Elements
Supportability
Evaluate Product •Joint Operations
•Supply Chain Management •Obsolescence Management •Peacetime
Product Support •Revalidate BCA
Initiate Product Support BCA •Support and Cost Baseline
-Supply Support -Training
•Source of Support •Supply Chain Management
Supportability Objectives/ •Crises
Logistics/ •Configuration Control
•PBA Modifications •Training
Support Capabilities -Maintenance -Support Data
Strategy •Refine Life Cycle Sustainment
•Legacy Considerations •Product Support Elements •Contract for Sustainment
(Define Ground Rules & Assumptions)
Constraints
Objectives •Data Management •Refine LCSP
•Revalidate BCA
•Assessment of PSI/PSPs
Plan
•Conduct Product Support BCA -Manpower & personnel •Finalize Product Support BCA (organic & Commercial) •Monitor Performance & Adjust
•Revalidate PBA/BCA
Sustainment FRP Product Support
Production Qualification
Post-CDR A
MDD Testing DR
A B
OUTPUTS INPUTS
INPUTS OUTPUTS INPUTS OUTPUTS
Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) Strategy (Preferred Product Support Approach)
C Pre-IOC and Post IOC Supportability Assessments
Business Case Product Support Integrator/
Performance-Based
•ICD •System Allocated Baseline •Sys Performance Spec
•Preliminary System Spec •ICD & Draft CDD •Initial Product Baseline AOTR OTRR
Analysis Product Support Provider
Agreements
•PDR Report •Test Reports •Acquisition Strategy •Test Reports
•AoA Study Plan •Systems Engineering Plan •Approved Materiel Solution
Technical & Logistics Acronyms IOT&E
•SEP •TEMP •PESHE •PPP •TRA •Exit Criteria •SEP •TRA •PESHE •TEMP BLRIP
•Exit Criteria •T&E Strategy •Exit Criteria
OA – Operational Assessment
ASR – Alternative Systems Review Report to Disposal
•NEPA Compliance Schedule •APB •CDD •STA •ISP
Defense •NEPA Compliance Schedule
•Alternative Maintenance •System Safety Analysis •Support & Maintenance Concepts OTRR – Operational Test Readiness Review FOT&E
AOTR – Assessment of Operational Test Readiness Most
Congress
Full-Up System Level LFT&E
•Risk Assessment •LCSP •SEP •TEMP •PESHE •PPP •Elements of Product Support
PBA – Performance-Based Agreement
BCA – Business Case Analysis
& Sustainment Concepts •Support & Maintenance Concepts & Technologies Acceptable
PESHE – Programmatic Environment,
BLRIP – Beyond Low Rate Initial Production as required
•Validated Systems Support & Maint •NEPA Compliance Schedule •Risk Assessment
& Technologies •Systems Engineering Plan Recycle/Reuse
Safety & Occupational Health Evaluation
CDR – Critical Design Review
Objectives & Requirements •Risk Assessment •Life Cycle Sustainment Plan
Acquisition •Inputs to
puts to: •AoA Report
o epo t Joint Interoperability
PDR – Preliminary Design Review
Preliminary
CI – Configuration Item
•System Safety Analysis •Validated Sys Support & Maint •System Safety Analysis LFTE
PCA – Physical Configuration Audit
DT&E – Developmental Test & Evaluation
-draft CDD -AoA -TDS -IBR •T&E Strategy Certification Testing Report to
•Inputs to: -CDD -ISP -STA -IBR Objectives & Requirements •Inputs to: -CPD -STA -ISP
PRR – Production Readiness Review
EOA – Early Operational Assessment
-Cost/Manpower Est. •Technology Development Strategy Reprocessing
Congress
JITC Joint Interoperability
PPP – Program Protection Plan
-Acq Strategy •Product Support Strategy ESOH – Environment, Safety & Occupational Health -IBR -Cost/Manpower Est.
System -Product Support Strategy •System Safety Analysis PSI – Product Support Integrator
FCA – Functional Configuration Audit
-Affordability Assessment •System Safety Analysis Test Certification
PSP – Product Support Provider
FMECA – Failure Mode Effects & Criticality Analysis
-Cost/Manpower Est.
(event-driven) RCM – Reliability Centered Maintenance FCA
FOT&E – Follow-On Test & Evaluation Disposal Landfill
RMS – Reliability, Maintainability & Supportability
FTA – Failure Tree Analysis PRR
SVR
ITR ASR SRR SEP – Systems Engineering Plan INPUTS OUTPUTS INPUTS OUTPUTS
IOT&E – Initial Operational Test & Evaluation Least
Interpret User Needs, Interpret User Needs.
Analyze/Assess Interpret User Needs, Interpret User Needs,
Demo & Validate System SFR – System Functional Review Integrated DT&E/OT&E/LFT&E
ISR – In-Service Review •Test Results •Service Use Data
•Product Baseline •Data for In-Service Review
Verification/
Validation Validation Acceptable
SRR – System Requirements Review
ISP – Information Support Plan
Analyze Operational Analyze Operational Refine System Refine System
Concepts Versus & Tech Maturity Versus Demonstrate System to •Exit Criteria •User Feedback •Failure Reports
•Test Reports
Validation •Input to CDD for next increment
Linkage Linkage STA – System Threat Assessment
ITR – Initial Technical Review
Performance Specs & Performance Specs &
Capabilities & Capabilities & Defined User Needs &
Defined User Needs & Specified User Needs and
Linkage •APB •CPD •SEP •TEMP •Discrepancy Reports
•SEP •PESHE •TEMP •Modifications/upgrades to fielded
SVR – System Verification Review
Environmental Constraints Environmental Constraints Trades JITC – Joint Interoperability Test Command
Environmental Constraints Environmental Constraints
Environmental Constraints •Product Support Element •SEP
TEMP – Test & Evaluation Master Plan
Environmental Constraints Trades LFT&E – Live Fire Test & Evaluation •System Safety Analysis
Environmental Constraints Trades systems
TDS – Technology Development Strategy
LORA – Level of Repair Analysis Requirements •System Safety Analysis
•Inputs to: -IBR •SEP •Test Reports
Technical TRA – Technology Readiness Assessment
MTA – Maintenance Task Analysis •PESHE •Product Support Element
- Cost/Manpower Est. •System Safety Analysis
Trades Trades TRR – Test Readiness Review
NEPA – National Environmental Policy Act
Develop Concept Assess/Analyze Develop System Performance Trades System DT&E, OT&E, LFT&E
Develop System Functional
Develop System Functional
Systems Engineering •System Safety Analysis Requirements
- Product Support Package
Demo/Model •Product Support Package
Performance (& Constraints) Concept & Verify (& Constraints) Spec & & OAs Verify System
Specs & Verification Plan to
Verification Verification Specs & Verification Plan to Verification
Integrated System Versus
Test and Evaluation Enabling/Critical Tech & Functionality & Constraints
Definition & Verification Linkage Linkage Evolve System Functional
System Concept’s Linkage
Evolve System Functional
Performance Spec In-Service
Prototypes Verification Plan Compliance to Specs
Baseline
Objectives Performance Baseline
Supportability PCA
Lighter blocks reflect technical Review
Monitor & Collect
Analyze Deficiencies
efforts required if PDR is Verify and Validate Implement and
Verification/
required after Milestone B. Service Use & Supply
To Determine Corrective Production
Validation Field
Decompose Concept Assess/Analyze Develop Functional SFR SFR
Evolve Functional Integrated DT&E, LFT&E &
Demo System & Prototype Evolve Functional Actions Configuration Chain Performance Data Trades
Linkage
Verification
Performance into System Concept
Verification Definitions for Enabling/ Verification Performance Specs into EOAs Verify Performance
Functionality Performance Specs into Linkage
Linkage
Functional Definition & Versus Functional Linkage
Critical Tech/Prototypes & System Allocated Baseline Compliance to Specs
Versus Plan System Allocated Baseline
Verification Objectives Capabilities Associated Verification Plan
Trades
Analyze Data to:
TRR
PDR
PDR Assess Risk of
FMECA Validate Failures &
Modify Configuration Improved System
Decompose Functional
Assess/Analyze FTA Evolve CI Functional Determine Root Causes
Decompose Concept (Hardware/Software/Specs)
Individual CI
Demo Enabling/Critical Verification
Verification
Definitions into Critical
Verification Enabling/Critical Specs into Product
Functional Definition into To Correct Deficiencies
RCM Verification
Technology Components Linkage
Linkage
Linkage Component Definition &
Components Versus (Build to) Documentation
Component Concepts & DT&E
Versus Plan
Technologies Verification Plan
Capabilities & Verification Plan
Assessment Objectives LORA
Determine
CDR
MTA Integrate and Test
System Risk/
Corrective Action
Hazard Severity
Design/Develop System Concepts,
Develop Component Concepts, Fabricate, Assemble,
LFT&E (with alternate
i.e., Enabling/Critical Technologies,
i.e., Enabling/Critical Waiver Code to “Build-to”
LFT&E Plan)
Update Constraints, &
Technologies, Constraints, (if appropriate) Documentation
Cost Acronyms
Cost/Risk Drivers
& Cost/Risk Drivers • Process Change
CARD – Cost Analysis Requirements Description Develop
MSA Phase TD Phase Full Funding Full Funding Full Funding
CCE – Component Cost Estimate - Operations/Maintenance Support
Corrective
CCP – Component Cost Position
Fully Funded Fully Funded In FYDP In FYDP In FYDP • Materiel Change
Economic Analysis (MAIS) Economic Analysis (MAIS) Action
ICE – Independent Cost Estimate
Economic Analysis (MAIS) Manpower Estimate (MDAP)
Manpower Estimate (MDAP) Manpower Estimate (MDAP) - Hardware/Product Support Package
MDAP – Major Defense Acquisition Program
MAIS – Major Automated Information System
Financial PMO – Program Management Office Affordability
Affordability
CCE CCP ICE
CARD CARD CCE CCP ICE CARD CCE CCP ICE CARD CCE CCP ICE
RDT&E – Research, Development, Test & Evaluation Assessment
Assessment
Management MDAP/MAIS MDAP MDAP MDAP/MAIS MDAP MDAP MDAP/MAIS MDAP MDAP MDAP/MAIS MDAP MDAP
Cost Estimation Actual Costs
Parametric
Engineering
Analogy
Methods
RDT&E – Advanced Technology Development RDT&E – Systems Development & Demonstration
RDT&E – Advanced Component Development and Prototypes
Types of Procurement Operations and
PMO POM Input
Funds Maintenance
RDT&E – Management & Support
PMO Budget Estimate
Appropriated Funds To Support Contracts
Military Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Acronyms
FYDP – Future Years Defense Program PMO – Program Management Office
Planning, Departments and POM/Budget Formulation POM/Budget Submit MBI – Major Budget Issues POM – Program Objectives Memorandum
OMB – Office of Management and Budget DoD Testimony DoD Appeals
Defense Agencies July
Programming,
Issue Nominations/Disposition Allocation
Budgeting Defense Planning & SECDEF Option
National Military Strategy Programming Guidance Integrated Program/Budget
Office of the Decisions DoD Budget Apportionment
MBI
& Execution Review
Secretary of Defense
FYDP FYDP
Fiscal Guidance August - November November December
National Defense Strategy
and Joint Staff updated updated
Process April
Authorization/
Authorization
Budget Appropriation
(annual- Appropriation
President’s Budget to Committees
Committees Committees
OMB Acts Passed
calendar-driven) White Congress
National Security Strategy Fiscal Guidance
Congressional Budget Process
January
House February (1st Monday)
National Strategy Documents (updated as necessary) March
February – September
Authors Chuck Cochrane and Brad Brown For a single copy of this chart, send a request to daupubs@dau.mil Send recommendations to improve the content of this chart to wallchart@dau.mil
FIGURE 1-1
Department of Defense acquisition process. SOURCE: Defense Acquisition University. Available at https://ilc.dau.mil/default_nf.aspx. Accessed June
17
11, 2010.
1-1.eps
landscape
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e va l u at i o n u. s . a i r f o rc e P r e ac q u i s i t i o n t e c h n o lo g y d ev e lo P m e n t s
18 of
of acquisition programs tends to be long, often measured in decades, whereas “buy
quantities” have declined dramatically over time.18
In the air domain, not all technology insertion takes place prior to the initial
delivery of a system. Aircraft stay in the active inventory for far longer periods than
in years past. For example, the newest B-52 is now 48 years old, and most KC-135
aerial refueling tankers are even older. The advancing age of such aircraft means
that numerous carefully planned and executed technology insertions are therefore
required to upgrade and extend the lives of aging fleets.
These post-acquisition technology-based activities are in themselves both
militarily necessary and economically significant, and they are increasingly char-
acteristic of the air domain. The financial impacts of these activities are especially
noteworthy. For example, the periodic overhauls of B-2 stealth bombers require 1
year and $60 million—per aircraft. Yet the military imperatives leave the Air Force
little choice:
“Although there is nothing else like the B-2, it’s still a plane from the 1980s built with 1980s
technology,” said Peter W. Singer, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution think tank.
Other countries have developed new ways to expose the B-2 on radar screens, so the Air
Force has to upgrade the bomber in order to stay ahead. “Technology doesn’t stand still;
it’s always moving forward,” he said. “It may cost an arm and a leg, but you don’t want the
B-2 to fall behind the times.”19
Major aeronautical systems are thus characterized by large expenditures for re-
search and development, as well as for the initial procurement and periodic updates
of the end items themselves. But the largest expenditures tend to be in operations
and support (O&S) costs over the life of a system. This is increasingly true, as sys-
tems are kept in the inventory for longer periods: The initial purchase price of the
Air Force’s B-52 bomber was about $6 million in 1962; that sum is dwarfed by the
resources required to operate and support the bomber over the last half-century.20
Space
“Space is different.” This idea was raised repeatedly during the course of this
study. The challenges of the space world are, in fact, significantly different from
18 Following, for example, are approximate buy quantities in the world of multi-engine bombers,
from World War II to today: 18,000 B-24s; 12,000 B-17s; 4,000 B-29s; 1,200 B-47s; 800 B-52s; 100
B-1s; 21 B-2s. Similar purchasing patterns exist for fighter and cargo aircraft.
19 W.J. Hennigan. 2010. “B-2 Stealth Bombers Get Meticulous Makeovers.” Los Angeles Times, June
10. Available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/10/business/la-fi-stealth-bomber-20100610. Ac -
cessed June 22, 2010.
20 Information available at https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=241468. Accessed May
18, 2010.
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Preacquisition technology develoPment air force weaPon systems 19
for
those in the air domain. Some of those differences are obvious. For example, space
presents an extraordinarily unforgiving environment in which few “do-overs” are
possible; by comparison, the air domain offers the luxury of maturing complex
technology prototypes through a sequence of relatively rapid “fly-fix-fly” spirals
during the development phase. This “spiral development process” for aircraft allows
the refinement of complex technologies through responses to empirical observa-
tions. In contrast, the space domain offers few such opportunities. Furthermore,
in contrast with aircraft production lines, space systems tend to be craft-produced
in small quantities by skilled craftspeople.
Additionally, in the space domain there are few if any “flight test vehicles,”
in that every launch is an operational mission, and failures in the always-critical
launch phase tend to be spectacular and irreversible. Therefore, space development
programs rely on “proto-qualification” or engineering models and must “test like
you fly” in order to maximize the opportunity for on-orbit mission success. Once
on orbit, a space platform must work for its lifetime as designed, since the oppor-
tunities for in-space rework, repair, and refurbishment are limited.
In consideration of these factors, the space domain has led the way in develop-
ing measures of technological stability. With the stakes so high and with so little
ability to rectify problems once a spacecraft is in operational use, space developers
and operators have found it necessary to ensure that only tested and stable systems
and components make their way into space. Thus, NASA developed the concept
of Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) in the 1980s.21 Based on the idea that in-
corporating unproven technology into critical space systems was neither safe nor
cost-effective, NASA used the seven-tiered TRL process (later expanded to nine
tiers) to assess objectively the maturity and stability of components prior to placing
them in space systems (illustrated in Figure 1-2). This TRL concept later spread to
the military and commercial worlds and developed into an entire family of assess-
ment tools—Manufacturing Readiness Levels, Integration Readiness Levels, and
Systems Readiness Levels.
As with the air domain, the R&D phase in the space domain is expensive, as is
the purchase of a space vehicle itself. Unlike with aircraft, however, the O&S costs
tend to be relatively low throughout the life of space systems, with operational ex-
penses generally limited to ground station management and communication with
the space vehicle. According to Defense Acquisition University, O&S costs consume
41 percent of a fixed-wing aircraft’s life-cycle cost (LCC), but only 16 percent of
the LCC for the average spacecraft.22
21 Additional information on TRL definitions is available through the NASA Web site at http://esto.
nasa.gov/files/TRL_definitions.pdf. Accessed June 22, 2010.
22 Information available at https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=241468. Accessed May
18, 2010.
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System Test, Launch
Actual system “flight proven” through successful
TRL 9
& Operations
mission operations
Actual system completed and “flight qualified”
TRL 8
System/Subsystem
through test and demonstration (Ground or Flight)
Development
System prototype demonstration in a space
TRL 7
environment
Technology
System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration
Demonstration TRL 6
in a relevant environment (Ground or Space)
Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant
TRL 5
Technology
environment
Development
Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory
TRL 4
environment
Research to Prove
Feasibility Analytical and experimental critical function and/or
TRL 3
characteristic proof-of-concept
Technology concept and/or application formulated
TRL 2
Basic Technology
Research
Basic principles observed and reported
TRL 1
FIGURE 1-2 1-2.eps
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) descriptions. SOURCE: NASA, modified from http://www.hq.nasa.
gov/office/codeq/trl/trlchrt.pdf. Accessed June 22, 2010.
Compared to an aircraft system that can be modified to extend its life for many
years, a spacecraft has a finite life on orbit, limited by the operating environment
of space and the amount of fuel onboard. As a result, space systems tend to be in a
constant state of acquisition. As an example, the Global Positioning System (GPS)
Program, managed by the Space and Missile Systems Center, is responsible for fly-
ing the current generation of satellites on orbit, for producing the next generation
of satellites, and for developing the follow-on GPS system—all at the same time.
The space domain’s heavy reliance on Federally Funded Research and Devel-
opment Centers (FFRDCs) is another characteristic that sets it apart from the air
domain. The Aerospace Corporation has partnered with the Air Force since 1960
to provide five core technological competencies to the Air Force’s space efforts:
The Aerospace FFRDC provides scientific and engineering support for launch, space, and
related ground systems. It also provides the specialized facilities and continuity of effort
required for programs that often take decades to complete. This end-to-end involvement
reduces development risks and costs, and allows for a high probability of mission success.
The Department of Defense has identified five core competencies for the Aerospace FFRDC:
launch certification, system-of-systems engineering, systems development and acquisition,
process implementation, and technology application. The primary customers are the Space
and Missile Systems Center of Air Force Space Command and the National Reconnaissance
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Preacquisition technology develoPment air force weaPon systems 21
for
Office, although work is performed for civil agencies as well as international organizations
and governments in the national interest.23
Senior warfighters have raised concerns about the overall health of the space in-
dustrial base and its ability to meet the needs of U.S. national security. In particular,
studies have pointed to inconsistent performance and reliability among third- and
fourth-tier suppliers, many of which perform space contracts intermittently and
cannot sustain design, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities in the absence
of continual work.24,25,26,27,28
Cyberspace
In the early years of the Air Force’s space era, there was much uncertainty about
roles and missions, about organizational structure, about boundaries and poli-
cies and processes. It took decades to resolve these matters, and in fact issues still
arise from time to time—an example being the recently resolved issue of whether
strategic missiles logically belong to the Air Combat Command, or to the Global
Strike Command, or to the Space Command.
That same level of uncertainty now characterizes the Air Force’s cyberspace
efforts. For example, in August 2009, a joint letter from the Secretary of the Air
Force (SAF) and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) countermanded previ-
ous guidance and set up a new command—the 24th Air Force—as “the Air Force
service component to the USCYBERCOM [United States Cyber Command], align-
ing authorities and responsibilities to enable seamless cyberspace operations.”29
23 Information from the Aerospace Corporation. Available at http://www.aero.org/corporation/ffrdc.
html. Accessed May 18, 2010.
24 Information from Booz Allen Hamilton. May 19, 2003. Available at www.boozallen.com/consult -
ing/industries_article/659130. Accessed May 27, 2010.
25 Eric R. Sterner and William B. Adkins. 2010. “R&D Can Revitalize the Space Industrial Base.”
Space News, February 22.
26 Aerospace Industries Association. 2010. Tipping Point: Maintaining the Health of the National
Security Space Industrial Base. September. Available at http://www.aia-aerospace.org/assets/aia_re-
port_tipping_point.pdf. Accessed January 29, 2011.
27 Jay DeFrank. 2006. The National Security Space Industrial Base: Understanding and Addressing
Concerns at the Sub-Prime Contractor Level. The Space Foundation. April 4. Available at http://www.
spacefoundation.org/docs/The_National_Security_Space_Industrial_Base.pdf. Accessed January 29,
2011.
28 Defense Science Board. 2003. Acquisition of National Security Space Programs. Washington, D.C.:
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). Available at http://
www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2003/space.pdf. Accessed January 29, 2011.
29 Available at http://www.24af.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090821-046.pdf. Accessed May
18, 2010.
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22 of
But as late as August 2010, much about Air Force efforts in cyberspace remained
unresolved. As quoted from a 24th Air Force Web site:
At this time, we do not yet know the full complement of wings, centers and/or other units
to be assigned to 24th Air Force. The organization of the required capabilities is still being
determined. . . . The exact size of 24th Air Force is unknown at this time. . . . The final
numbers for Headquarters 24th Air Force are yet to be determined.30
Similarly, there is much yet to be learned about systems acquisition in the
cyberspace domain. However, some themes can be deduced.
The first theme is the need for speed and agility in a world where threats can
arise in days, or even hours. Throughout the course of this study, considerable time
was devoted to learning about rapid-reaction acquisition efforts in organizations
such as Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works, the Air Force’s Big Safari organization,
and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). Com-
mon to all of these efforts was a strong sense of urgency, with program durations
often measured in weeks or months rather than years and decades. But cyberspace
reaction cycles are often even shorter, which for some raises the question: Is the
term “major system acquisition” even relevant in the cyberspace domain?31
Program offices like Big Safari and JIEDDO highlight the need to keep pace
with an agile and adaptive enemy; in such programs rapid acquisition processes
are vital to the safeguarding of military forces and thus to the national interest. The
cyberspace domain has similarly short time horizons, and these can be expected to
place special demands on the acquisition of cyberspace technology (see Figure 1-3).
A second likely theme is that success in cyberspace acquisition will depend on
building and rewarding a culture of innovation, and in that sense it will require
more risk tolerance and failure tolerance than are commonly found in bureaucratic
organizations. In 2008, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Michael
Wynne, said that a new cyberspace organization would need to encourage innova-
tion from the bottom ranks to the top:
Calling innovation the top goal of the command, Wynne said the fledgling organization
must be “more agile than any other in the Department of Defense” if it is to succeed at
fighting in a climate where technology and tactics are often obsolete just months after being
introduced. . . . to compete in the cyber battlefield, AFCYBER [Air Force Cyber] must be
able to rapidly invent, develop and field new technologies, sometimes in a matter of weeks.
To do this, the command will have to adopt a culture that encourages risk taking, especially
among its young officers. . . . “Innovation will almost always come from the lower ranks,”
he said, “from those who have not internalized any agreed upon ways of doing things.”
30 Available at http://www.24af.af.mil/questions/topic.asp?id=1666. Accessed August 25, 2010.
31 Jon Goding, Principal Engineering Fellow, Raytheon. 2010. “Improving Technology Development
in Cyber: Challenges and Ideas.” Presentation to the committee, June 7, 2010.
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Preacquisition technology develoPment air force weaPon systems 23
for
• Example:
• Modification of existing Net Attack tool to optimize use against
W specific target
IO
• Ops & • Purchase and/or modification of Net Defense tool to provide
88
Innovation defense against newly detected virus
•6
• (Hrs – Weeks)
• Example:
I
R
FA
• Transition of mature AFRL technology to meet
SA
urgent Net Defense tool need
• Rapid
ER
• Contractor development of new Net Attack tool to
YB
satisfy urgent tasking
• (Weeks – Months)
•C
• Example:
E
SA
• Combat Info Transportation System
O/
• Foundational (CITS)
PE
• Major modification to existing AF
M/
Network infrastructure
•P
• (Months – Years)
• Overarching processes defined and controlled through
• Foundational Tier necessary to ensure configuration control
FIGURE 1-3
Cyberspace agile acquisition construct recently adopted by the United States Air Force. NOTE: Program Man -
1-3.eps
ager (PM), Program Executive Officer (PEO), Service Acquisition Executive (SAE), Information Operations Wing
(IOW). SOURCE: Air Force Materiel Command/Electronic Systems Center.
Wynne called on the command to foster officers who make mistakes and take risks that will
lead to innovation. “Not only must you allow good ideas to percolate up, you must make
your officers’ careers dependent upon demonstrating innovation. Being a flawless officer
in Cyber Command should lead to early retirement.”32
A third probable characteristic of cyberspace acquisition is likely to be even
closer collaboration between government, industry, and academic institutions,
domestic and international. The FFRDC model discussed in the preceding subsec-
tion, on the space domain, is already a critical part of the cyberspace domain—that
is, the MITRE Corporation’s long-standing support of the Electronic Systems
Center, and the Software Engineering Institute’s support of the DoD. The need for
ready access to highly specialized cyberspace expertise is very similar to the type
of needs found in the space domain. Additionally, commercial industry must be
brought into the collaboration, as commercial communities—for example, finan-
32 Inside the Air Force. Available at http://integrator.hanscom.af.mil/2008/June/06262008/06262008-
08.htm. Accessed May 18, 2010.
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24 of
cial services, computer security—have a long history of dealing with cyberspace
security, integration, and testing, and thus can contribute usefully to the Air Force’s
operational capability.
Technology development for air and space domains is driven by domestically
based defense contractors, focusing largely on military applications. In the cyber-
space world, however, the commercial market dwarfs that of the military, and both
threats and resources are largely unaffected by political or geographic boundaries.33
Cyberspace acquisitions will therefore require much tighter cooperation between
technology development communities, foreign and domestic, inside and outside
the military-industrial complex. A recent paper from the Air Force illustrates some
of the benefits of collaborative approaches to cyberspace acquisition:
A collaborative environment and integrated network that enables rapid reach-back into
a broad and diverse array of cyber experts throughout the nation, giving the warfighter
access to cutting edge technology and expertise that otherwise would be unavailable to the
military. . . . A process to discover world-class cyber experts, who may be either unaware
of the military cyberspace requirements or overlooked because they work for smaller, less-
known firms.34
It may also be useful to consider that the state of the cyberspace domain has
similarities to that of the nascent air domain circa 1910, or to the fledgling space
world in 1960.
AIR FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIC PLANNING
During this study, technology transition was described as a “contact sport: ev-
ery successful technology hand-off requires both a provider and a receiver.”35 The
probability of a successful technology handoff increases when the provider and the
receiver work together in a disciplined way to identify capability needs and match
them to an S&T portfolio.
Approximately 30 percent of the Air Force Research Laboratory’s (AFRL’s)
technology development efforts are “technology-push” efforts driven by technolo-
gists who perceive how an emerging technology might enable a new operational
capability in advance of a stated user need—as opposed to “technology-pull” ef-
forts, or technology development done in response to a known capability need. The
33 Jon Goding, Principal Engineering Fellow, Raytheon. 2010. “Improving Technology Development
in Cyber: Challenges and Ideas.” Presentation to the committee, June 7, 2010.
34 Available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/30607347/The-Collaboration-Imperative-for-
Cyberspace-Stakeholders. Accessed May 18, 2010.
35 Michael Kuliasha, Chief Technologist, Air Force Research Laboratory. 2010. “AFRL Perspective on
Improving Technology Development and Transition.” Presentation to the committee, May 13, 2010.
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technology-pull portion of AFRL technology development is motivated by user
requirements, which originate from multiple sources, including Major Commands
(MAJCOMs), Product Centers, and air logistics centers.36
In some cases, user needs are assessed and prioritized before they are provided
to the AFRL. For example, Product Centers are again working with their warf-
ighter partners to prioritize requirements, which are influenced, in part, by their
understanding of technology enablers emerging from the Air Force, industry, and
university laboratories. These needs are prioritized within a particular MAJCOM
and Product Center channel, but there is no mechanism that can adequately filter
and prioritize needs across the Air Force today. To its credit, the Air Force recognizes
this deficiency and is taking steps to develop a more robust corporate mechanism
for technology needs assessment and prioritization.37
THE “THREE R” FRAMEWORK
At the beginning of the study, the committee found it useful to organize its
thinking around simple axiomatic principles. This resulted in a framework in-
corporating the following: (1) Requirements, (2) Resources, and (3) the Right
People—or the “Three Rs.” The framework is a concise and simple expression of
unarguable criteria for successful program execution. If all three of these compo-
nents are favorable, program success is possible. If any of the three is unfavorable,
the program will most likely fail to deliver as expected. The framework is shown
concisely in Box 1-2, and the principles are considered individually in the subsec-
tions below.
Requirements
The importance of clear, stable, feasible, and universally understood require-
ments has been long understood and has been validated by countless studies.
Further, requirements need to be trade-off tolerant, that is, they need to be flexible
enough to permit meaningful analysis of alternative solutions. Inadequately defined
requirements drive program instability, through late design changes that drive cost
increases and schedule slips, which in turn lead to an erosion of political support for
the program. These ripples do not end at the boundary of a problematic program:
As costs rise and schedules slide, the impact is transferred to other programs, and
they then bear the costs imposed to save the original troubled system.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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BOX 1-2
The “Three Rs”
Early in this study, the committee developed a framework, the “Three Rs,” for organizing its findings and recom -
mendations. The framework describes characteristics that, in the committee’s judgment, need to be addressed
fully in order for successful technology development to occur. That framework is composed of the following:
1. Requirements—clear, realistic, stable, trade-off tolerant, and universally understood;
2. Resources—adequate and stable, and including robust processes, policies, and budgets; and
3. The Right People—skilled, experienced, and in sufficient numbers, with stable leadership.
Our assessment is that the current requirements process does not meet the needs of
the current security environment or the standards of a successful acquisition process.
Requirements take too long to develop, are derived from Joint Staff and Service views of
the Combatant Commands’ needs and often rest on immature technologies and overly
optimistic estimates of future resource needs and availability. This fact introduces instabil -
ity into the system when the lengthy and insufficiently advised requirement development
process results in capabilities that do not meet warfighter needs or the capabilities that are
delivered “late-to-need.”38
A second cause of difficulty in the area of requirements is that there can be a
large disconnect between what the warfighter wants—“desirements,” as expressed
by one presenter to the committee—and what the laws of science permit. In those
cases, overly optimistic estimates early in the project life can end up requiring
miracles—or worse, sequential miracles—in order to become reality. In the words
of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report (called the DAPA report;
commissioned by Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England in June
2005):
Neither the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System nor the Services
requirement development processes are well informed about the maturity of technologies
that underlie achievement of the requirement or the resources necessary to realize their
development. No time-phased, fiscally and technically informed capabilities development
38 Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project. 2006. Defense Ac-
quisition Performance Assessment Report. A Report by the Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition
Performance Assessment Project for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, p. 35. Available at http://www.
frontline-canada.com/Defence/pdfs/DAPA-Report-web.pdf. Accessed January 29, 2011.
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and divestment plan exists to guide and prioritize the development and understanding of
weapon system requirements.39
In sum, then, a successful program requires the vigilant management of the
requirements process. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) summed it
up well in its 2010 report Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership Is Key to Planning
and Executing Stable Weapon Programs, which studied 13 successful acquisition
programs and drew lessons from those successes:
The stable programs we studied exhibited the key elements of a sound knowledge-based
business plan at program development start. These programs pursued capabilities through
evolutionary or incremental acquisition strategies, had clear and well-defined requirements,
leveraged mature technologies and production techniques, and established realistic cost and
schedule estimates that accounted for risk. They then executed their business plans in a dis-
ciplined manner, resisting pressures for new requirements and maintaining stable funding.
The programs we reviewed typically took an evolutionary acquisition approach, addressing
capability needs in achievable increments that were based on well-defined requirements.
To determine what was achievable, the programs invested in systems engineering resources
early on and generally worked closely with industry to ensure that requirements were
clearly defined. Performing this up-front requirements analysis provided the knowledge
for making trade-offs and resolving performance and resource gaps by either reducing the
proposed requirements or deferring them to the future. The programs were also grounded
in well-understood concepts of how the weapon systems would be used.40
Resources
As is the case with requirements, stability of resources is essential to program
success. Turbulence in any of the following areas—technology, budgets, acquisition
regulation, legislation, policy, or processes—contributes to program failure, as the
resulting uncertainty deprives government and industry of the ability to execute
programs as planned. One key area is technological maturity. The GAO has ex-
amined the importance of technological maturity in predicting program success.
In 1999, the GAO examined 23 successful technology efforts in both government
and commercial projects, concluding that the use of formal approaches to assess
technological stability, like the NASA-developed TRL system discussed elsewhere
in this report, was crucial to program success. As stated in the 1999 GAO report:
[D]emonstrating a high level of maturity before new technologies are incorporated into
product development programs puts those programs in a better position to succeed. The
39 Ibid., p. 36.
40 GAO. 2010. Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership Is Key to Planning and Executing Stable Weapon
Programs. Washington, D.C.: GAO, p. 16. Available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10522.pdf.
Accessed June 11, 2010.
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TRLs, as applied to the 23 technologies, reconciled the different maturity levels with subse -
quent product development experiences. They also revealed when gaps occurred between a
technology’s maturity and the intended product’s requirements. For technologies that were
successfully incorporated into a product, the gap was recognized and closed before product
development began, improving the chances for successful cost and schedule outcomes. The
closing of the gap was a managed result. It is a rare program that can proceed with a gap
between product requirements and the maturity of key technologies and still be delivered
on time and within costs.41
Additional emphasis on the achievement of technological maturity was man-
dated in the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, which requires,
among many other provisions, that Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs)
must, prior to Milestone B, carry out competitive prototyping of the system or of
critical subsystems and complete their Preliminary Design Review.42
Similar to the need for technological maturity, there must be stability and
predictability in the financial resources available to a program manager. During
this study, frequent reference was made to the Valley of Death, that graveyard for
technology development efforts that might survive early exploratory R&D phases,
but then fall victim to a lack of funding for bridging the gap to the system develop-
ment and production phases.43 With its longer time horizons, the DoD’s Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System is ill equipped to handle problems
like the Valley of Death, or the sorts of rapid acquisitions that are often required
today. A 2006 study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies focused
on joint programs, but the message applies to all acquisition efforts:
The current Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) resource
allocation process is not integrated with the requirements process and does not provide
sufficient resources for joint programs, especially in critical early stages of coordination
between and perturbations in resource planning and requirements planning frequently
result in program funding instability. Such instability increases program costs and trig-
gers schedule slippages across DoD acquisition programs. Chronic under-funding of joint
programs is endemic to the current resource allocation system.44
41 GAO. 1999. Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon
System Outcomes. GAO NSIAD-99-162. Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, p. 3. Available
at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99162.pdf. Accessed June 11, 2010.
42 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-23, May 22, 2009).
43 Dwyer Dennis, Brigadier General, Director, Intelligence and Requirements Directorate, Head -
quarters Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. 2010. “Development
Planning.” Presentation to the committee, March 31, 2010.
44 David Scruggs, Clark Murdock, and David Berteau. 2006. Beyond Goldwater Nichols: Department
of Defense Acquisition and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System Reform. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available at http://csis.org/files/media/
csis/pubs/bgnannotatedbrief.pdf. Accessed June 11, 2010.
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Among the most critical resources are robust processes, from the very con-
ception of a program. For both government and industry, well-defined and well-
understood work processes in all phases of program management are essential to
successful technological development. Repeatedly during this study, evidence was
presented that within the Air Force some of these processes have been diluted in
significant ways in the past decade and are only now beginning to be reinvigorated.
In particular, there was general agreement on the decline of the systems engi-
neering field.45 After a period of decline, systems engineering has been revived and
received additional attention in the 2009 WSARA legislation. But once a field has
been allowed to atrophy for whatever reason, the redevelopment of that capability
is a long and arduous task.
A similar situation exists with the field of Development Planning. For decades,
Product Centers had DP functions (“Product Center Development Planning Or-
ganizations,” or, as referred to in headquarters shorthand—XRs) that worked with
warfighter commands to address alternatives to meet future needs. These offices
operated in the early conceptual environs, pre-program of record, to help a using
command clarify its requirements, assess the feasibility of alternatives, and settle
on the preferred way to meet those requirements. Often, the DP resources that
worked on the early stages of a program were later used to form the initial cadre
of a program office, if indeed one was ultimately established.
As with the rebirth of systems engineering, the disestablishment of Develop-
ment Planning is being rectified. Product Center DP directors provided valuable
input to this study, and although it is clear that their function is being reborn, it
is equally obvious that a capability can be eliminated quickly by one decision but
can only be revived with time and with great difficulty.
The Right People
The third critical element for a successful program is the right people, which
translates to program managers and key staff with the right skills, the right experi-
ence, and in the right numbers to lead programs successfully. This category also
includes the right personnel policies and “right” cultures, which can contribute to
program success.
The acquisition workforce has been buffeted by change for decades. Every
acquisition setback has generated a new round of “fixes,” which by now have so
constrained the system that it is to some a wonder that it functions at all. This
workforce has been downsized, outsourced, and reorganized to the point of dis-
45 For a thorough discussion of the importance of systems engineering, see the Kaminski report—
NRC. 2008. Pre-Milestone A and Early-Phase Systems Engineering: A Retrospective Review and Benefits
for Future Air Force Systems Acquisition. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
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traction, yet there is little or no evidence to suggest that discernible improvements
have resulted.
This disruption in the acquisition workforce was well recognized by those
close to it. Beginning in the early 1990s, many of the best and brightest Air Force
acquisition professionals chose to retire—many of them early—to take jobs with
advisory and assistance services (A&AS) contractors. As these highly competent
and experienced performers left, they were often not replaced, and so an enormous
“bathtub” developed: Air Force acquisition specialties became understaffed, and
many of the people who did remain were either in very senior oversight positions,
or were very junior and, lacking mentors, very inexperienced. The middle of the
force, the journeymen and junior managers, quite literally disappeared.
This was recognized by the authors of the DAPA report.46 Released in 2006,
that report accurately described the state of the acquisition workforce:
Key Department of Defense acquisition personnel who are responsible for requirements,
budget and acquisition do not have sufficient experience, tenure and training to meet
current acquisition challenges. Personnel stability in these key positions is not sufficient
to develop or maintain adequate understanding of programs and program issues. System
engineering capability within the Department is not sufficient to develop joint architectures
and interfaces, to clearly define the interdependencies of program activities, and to manage
large scale integration efforts. Experience and expertise in all functional areas [have] been
de-valued and contribute to a “Conspiracy of Hope” in which we understate cost, risk and
technical readiness and, as a result, embark on programs that are not executable within
initial estimates. This lack of experience and expertise is especially true for our program
management cadre. The Department of Defense exacerbates these problems by not having
an acquisition career path that provides sufficient experience and adequate incentives for
advancement. The aging science and engineering workforce and declining numbers of sci-
ence and engineering graduates willing to enter either industry or government will further
enforce the negative impact on the Department’s ability to address these concerns. With
the decrease in government employees, there has been a concomitant increase in contract
support with resulting loss of core competencies among government personnel.47
In May 2009, 3 years after the DAPA release and after being rocked by two major
failed source selections in the previous year, the Air Force released its Acquisition
Improvement Plan.48 It cited five shortcomings of the acquisition process, all of
46 Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project. 2006. Defense
Acquisition Performance Assessment Report. A Report by the Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisi-
tion Performance Assessment Project for the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Available at http://www.
frontline-canada.com/Defence/pdfs/DAPA-Report-web.pdf. Accessed January 29, 2011.
47 Ibid., p. 29.
48 USAF. 2009. Acquisition Improvement Plan. Washington, D.C.: USAF. Available at http://www.
dodbuzz.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/acquisition-improvement-plan-4-may-09.pdf. Accessed
June 11, 2010.
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which pointed, in whole or in part, to failures in the human side of the acquisition
enterprise:
1. Degraded training, experience and quantity of the acquisition workforce;
2. Overstated and unstable requirements that are difficult to evaluate during source
selection;
3. Under-budgeted programs, changing of budgets without acknowledging impacts on
program execution, and inadequate contractor cost discipline;
4. Incomplete source selection training that has lacked “lessons learned” from the current
acquisition environment, and delegation of decisions on leadership and team assignments
for MDAP source selections too low; and
5. Unclear and cumbersome internal Air Force organization for acquisition and Program
Executive Officer (PEO) oversight.49
Clearly the two failed source selections had been a major blow to the Air Force’s
reputation in acquisition. The Acquisition Improvement Plan closes with a call to
recapture the successes of yesterday:
We will develop, shape, and size our workforce, and ensure adequate and continuous train -
ing of our acquisition, financial management, and requirements generation professionals. In
so doing we will re-establish the acquisition excellence in the Department of the Air Force
that effectively delivered the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile; the early reconnaissance,
weather, and communication satellites; the long-range bombers like the venerable B-52;
and fighters like the ground-breaking F-117A. . . .50
Those steps are under way. Evidence was presented during this study indicat-
ing that expedited hiring was being used to fill empty positions, in accordance
with the DAPA recommendations.51 However, the redevelopment of a skilled and
experienced workforce is in some ways reminiscent of the challenges facing those
seeking to reinvigorate systems engineering or Development Planning: Similar to
what was seen with those critical processes, a skilled workforce can shrink quickly,
yet will take decades or more to rebuild and mature.
REPORT ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this report is structured as follows, to correspond to the
four main paragraphs of the statement of task. Chapter 2, “The Current State of
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., p. 14.
51 Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project. 2006. Defense
Acquisition Performance Assessment Report. A Report by the Assessment Panel of the Defense Acqui-
sition Performance Assessment Project for the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Available at https://acc.
dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=18554. Accessed June 11, 2010.
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the Air Force’s Acquisition Policies, Processes, and Workforce,” addresses the first
paragraph of the statement of task. Chapter 3, “Government and Industry Best
Practices,” addresses the third paragraph of the statement of task. Chapter 4, “The
Recommended Path Forward,” responds to the second and fourth paragraphs of
the statement of task. Importantly, the committee chose to present its findings in
Chapters 2 and 3, and the associated recommendations (plus the reiterated relevant
findings from the earlier chapters) are consolidated in Chapter 4. Finally, Appen-
dixes C and D provide background information related to the subjects addressed
in Chapter 2.
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