National Academies Press: OpenBook
« Previous: Appendix B: Preliminary Letter Report
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Public Meeting Agendas." National Research Council. 2010. Evaluation of a Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security's Planned National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13031.
×
Page 127
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: Public Meeting Agendas." National Research Council. 2010. Evaluation of a Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security's Planned National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13031.
×
Page 128

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Appendix C Public Meeting Agendas February 26, 2010 Washington, DC 8:30 – 8:40 a.m. Welcome and Introductions Ron Atlas, Chair 8:40 – 9:00 a.m. Introduction to the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) Site-Specific Risk Assessment (SSRA) Jamie Johnson, Director, Office of National Laboratories, DHS 9:00 – 9:45 a.m. Overview of the NBAF SSRA Work Plan Adam Hamilton, Signature Science 9:45 – 10:15 a.m. Background and Overview of the Work Plan Questions Julie Brewer, NBAF Project Manager 10:15 – 10:30 a.m. Break 10:30 – 12:15 p.m. Discussion Moderator: Ron Atlas, Chair 12:15 – 12:30 p.m. Concluding Remarks Ron Atlas, Chair 127

EVALUATION OF THE NBAF SITE-SPECIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT 128 July 13, 2010 Washington, DC 1:00 – 1:15 p.m. Welcome and Introductions Ron Atlas, Chair 1:15 – 1:25 Introductory Remarks by DHS Jamie Johnson, Director, Office of National Laboratories, DHS 1:25 – 3:00 Q&A Session with Committee Moderator: Ron Atlas, Chair 3:00 – 3:15 Break 3:15 – 4:00 Q&A Session with Committee (cont’d) Moderator: Ron Atlas, Chair 4:00 – 4:15 Public Comments Please register ahead of time 4:15 – 4:30 Concluding Remarks Ron Atlas, Chair 4:30 Adjourn open session

Evaluation of a Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security's Planned National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas Get This Book
×
 Evaluation of a Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security's Planned National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas
Buy Paperback | $48.00
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

Congress requested that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) produce a site-specific biosafety and biosecurity risk assessment (SSRA) of the proposed National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in Manhattan, Kansas. The laboratory would study dangerous foreign animal diseases—including the highly contagious foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), which affects cattle, pigs, deer, and other cloven-hoofed animals—and diseases deadly to humans that can be transmitted between animals and people. Congress also asked the Research Council to review the validity and adequacy of the document. Until these studies are complete, Congress has withheld funds to build the NBAF.

Upon review of the DHS assessment, the National Research Council found "several major shortcomings." Based on the DHS risk assessment, there is nearly a 70 percent chance over the 50-year lifetime of the facility that a release of FMD could result in an infection outside the laboratory, impacting the economy by estimates of $9 billion to $50 billion. The present Research Council report says the risks and costs of a pathogen being accidently released from the facility could be significantly higher. The committee found that the SSRA has many legitimate conclusions, but it was concerned that the assessment does not fully account for how a Biosafety-Level 3 Agriculture and Biosafety-Level 4 Pathogen facility would operate or how pathogens might be accidently released. In particular, the SSRA does not include important operation risks and mitigation issues, such as the risk associated with the daily cleaning of large animal rooms. It also fails to address risks that would likely increase the chances of an FMD leak or of the disease's spread after a leak, including the NBAF's close proximity to the Kansas State University College of Veterinary Medicine clinics and KSU football stadium or personnel moving among KSU facilities.

READ FREE ONLINE

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!