Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 27
2
What Is National Earthquake Resilience?
T
he concept of “resilience” is fundamental to a roadmap for real -
izing the major technical goals of the 2008 NEHRP Strategic Plan
within 20 years. The Strategic Plan articulates a vision, mission,
and goals that aim to “improve the nation’s earthquake-resilience in
public safety, economic strength, and national security” (NIST, 2008;
p. iii). The meaning of “resilience,” however, is far from clear. Numerous
definitions of “resilience” exist, and the term is often used loosely and
inconsistently. To provide a context and vision for the roadmap, this
chapter sets out a working definition of “national earthquake resil -
ience” that includes a brief discussion of conceptual and measurement
issues. The discussion draws on committee discussions, the rapidly
expanding literature on resilience, and input from more than 50 leading
earthquake professionals at an August 2009 workshop sponsored by the
committee. Two examples are then provided—Evansville, Indiana, and
San Francisco, California—to illustrate how a community might work
toward a vision of resilience.
DEFINING NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE
Dozens of definitions of “resilience” can now be found in the lit-
erature, reflecting a range of perspectives and a lack of consensus on the
meaning of the term. In the context of hazards and disasters, three defini -
tions of resilience that are often cited are:
The capability of an asset, system, or network to maintain its function or
recover from a terrorist attack or any other incident (DHS, 2006).
27
OCR for page 28
28 NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE
The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to
hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain
an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by
the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself to
increase this capacity for learning from past disasters for better future
protection and to improve risk reduction measures (UN ISDR, 2006; also
SDR, 2005).
The ability of social units (e.g., organizations, communities) to mitigate
risk and contain the effects of disasters, and carry out recovery activities
in ways that minimize social disruption while also minimizing the effects
of future disasters. Disaster Resilience may be characterized by reduced
likelihood of damage to and failure of critical infrastructure, systems,
and components; reduced injuries, lives lost, damage, and negative eco-
nomic and social impacts; and reduced time required to restore a specific
system or set of systems to normal or pre-disaster levels of functionality
(MCEER, 2008).
Of these, the Department of Homeland Security’s National Infrastruc-
ture Protection Program (NIPP) definition is narrower in scope than the
MCEER (Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research)
definition, and the concept of maintaining function is somewhat vague in
the former. It could include maintaining as high a function as possible at
the moment the disaster strikes. Alternatively, resilience might refer only
to maintaining function through activities undertaken after the event,
and hence would not necessarily include pre-event mitigation. This focus
on post-shock activities (both inherent and adaptive) and the emphasis on
recovery as both goal and process are more consistent with the origins
of the term resilience. The United Nations International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction (ISDR) definition, in contrast, departs further from
the origins of the term and appears to emphasize pre-disaster mitigation
and preparedness, with the only allusion to the idea of rebounding from a
disaster relating to the speed of recovery. It does, however, emphasize that
resilience is a process. This definition is also used in the National Science
and Technology Council’s Grand Challenges for Disaster Reduction.
Although the 2008 NEHRP Strategic Plan (NIST, 2008; p.47) adopts
this latter definition, for purposes of the roadmap, it is important to con -
sider several issues:
• “National earthquake resilience” should primarily involve build-
ing resilience at the level of communities. It is also important, however, to
prepare for the rare instances where earthquake disasters could extend
beyond localities and have national-level consequences (see Box 2.1).
• In order for communities to be more resilient, support from both
state and federal levels is required.
OCR for page 29
29
WHAT IS NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE?
• Building national earthquake resilience should foster synergies
between resilience to earthquakes and to other hazards.
• Communities should consider developing multi-tier resilience
goals and strategies, i.e., different performance expectations for different
scale events. In some cases, it may be effective to focus actions on containing
the effects of “expected” events, rather than very rare, “extreme” events.
• Resilience involves both pre-disaster mitigation (activities to
reduce the amount of loss in an event) and the ability to mute post-event
losses and rapidly recover from an event.
• Resilience should allow for systemic change, especially in low-
probability, high-consequence events. Resilience does not necessarily
entail a return to “normal” or “pre-disaster” conditions. Reducing future
risk should also be a goal of recovery activities.
With these considerations in mind, the committee recommends that
NEHRP adopt the following working definition for “national earthquake
resilience” (applicable more generally to all-hazards resilience):
A disaster-resilient nation is one in which its communities,
through mitigation and pre-disaster preparation, develop the
adaptive capacity to maintain important community functions
and recover quickly when major disasters occur.
MEASURING DISASTER RESILIENCE
Reflecting the lack of a consensus definition, no standard metric
exists for measuring disaster resilience. Indeed, one of the priorities in the
National Science and Technology Council’s (NSTC’s) Grand Challenges for
Disaster Reduction is to “assess disaster resilience using standard methods”
(SDR, 2005; p. 2). As this report noted, such metrics are needed for several
reasons: “With consistent factors and regularly updated metrics, com-
munities will be able to maintain report cards that accurately assess the
community’s level of disaster resilience. This, in turn, will support com-
parability among communities and provide a context for action to further
reduce vulnerability. Validated models, standards, and metrics are needed
for estimating cumulative losses, projecting the impact of changes in tech-
nology and policies, and monitoring the overall estimated economic loss
avoidance of planned actions” (SDR, 2005; p. 2). Perhaps most importantly,
standardized methods are needed to gauge improvements in resilience as
a result of disaster risk reduction planning and mitigation.
Metrics of disaster resilience differ from the familiar metrics of disaster
risk in several ways. Standard risk measures include expected casualties,
property damage, and business interruption loss—that is, estimates of
OCR for page 30
30 NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE
BOX 2.1
Widespread Consequences of a Central U.S. Earthquake
An analysis of the impacts of a magnitude-7.7 earthquake on all three
New Madrid faults was performed by the Mid-America Earthquake Center
under the FEMA New Madrid Catastrophic Planning Initiative (Elnashai
et al., 2009). Results indicated that this event would have widespread,
catastrophic consequences (Figure 2.1), including:
• Nearly 715,000 buildings damaged in eight states.
• Substantial damage to critical infrastructure (essential facilities,
transportation, and utility lifelines) in 140 counties: 2.6 million house-
holds without electric power; 425,000 breaks and leaks to both local and
interstate pipelines; and 3,500 damaged bridges, with 15 major bridges
unusable.
• 86,000 casualties for a 2:00 am scenario, with 3,500 fatalities.
• 7.2 million people displaced, with 2 million seeking temporary
shelter.
• 130 hospitals damaged.
• $300 billion in direct economic losses, including buildings, trans-
portation, and utility lifelines, but excluding business interruption costs.
Moreover, infrastructure damage would have a major impact on inter-
state transport crossing the Central United States.
OCR for page 31
31
WHAT IS NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE?
FIGURE 2.1 Distribution of top) the nearly 86,000 total casualties, in-
cluding 3,500 fatalities, and bottom) the more than 713,000 buildings
damaged, in the eight-state study region from a magnitude-7.7 scenario
earthquake at 2:00 am on the New Madrid faults. SOURCE: Elnashai et
al. (2009); Courtesy of the Mid-America Earthquake Center, University
of Illinois.
OCR for page 32
32 NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE
these losses in potential earthquakes weighted by the probability of such
events occurring. Resilience differs from risk in three important ways.
First, resilience includes performance in the post-disaster (response and
recovery) timeframes, including aspects such as business interruption
and the time required to recover, while risk typically focuses on immedi -
ate property damage. Second, resilience embodies some sense of goals
and considerations of what risk is acceptable. Third, it also encompasses
ideas of capacity-building and process, rather than being limited in scope
to goals and outcomes.
Because the concept of resilience is specific to the context of the spe -
cific community and its goals, it can be expected that no single measure
will be able to capture it sufficiently. Moreover, different measures will be
needed for different purposes. Thus for federal agencies, a national-scale
overview may be useful; a simple measure might be the percentage of
these states with active seismic safety programs. For a state government,
a useful marker may be the percentage of communities that are actively
engaging in seismic risk reduction. For a city, however, more specific mea -
sures would be needed. An overall metric of the time required to recover
“community wellness” (e.g., an aggregation of casualties, property, and
economic losses) in the event of an “expected” earthquake may be one
possibility. Annualized expected earthquake losses in that community
may provide another alternative. Within a community, organizations such
as local fire departments may have yet more specific measures in relation
to seismic performance goals. Thus multi-level assessments are needed,
rather than searching for a “one size fits all” metric.
Researchers and practitioners have proposed a number of ap -
proaches for measuring disaster resilience at the community level.
These approaches can be broadly categorized into two types—those
emphasizing resilience as a goal, and those emphasizing it as a process.
A few examples are briefly reviewed here.
Bruneau et al. (2003), on which the NEHRP definition of resilience is
based, treats resilience in terms of performance outcomes or goals. They
propose as a measure of resilience the functional or performance loss of
a system (such as a city) evaluated over the timeframe for recovery. This
is illustrated schematically in Figure 2.2. The smaller the initial drop in a
disaster, and the more rapid the recovery, the smaller the aggregate loss
(“loss triangle”) and the higher the assessed resilience.
Within this framework, recovery is assumed to entail a return to
normal (without-disaster) conditions. Thus, it is difficult to address some
of the aspects of resilience discussed above, such as allowing for system
change and rebuilding in ways that reduce future risk. However, the
framework can be generalized to accommodate these considerations. A
summary of recent progress includes:
OCR for page 33
33
WHAT IS NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE?
FIGURE 2.2 Measuring resilience using the “Loss Triangle” concept. Note that the
degree of “robustness” depends upon both the system’s inherent resilience and the
Figure 2.2.eps
additional effect of any pre-disaster mitigation actions. SOURCE: Modified from
bitmap
Bruneau et al. (2003) and McDaniels et al. (2008). Reprinted from McDaniels et al.
(2008) with permission from Elsevier.
• Several researchers have proposed operational metrics (e.g., Chang
and Shinozuka, 2004; Rose, 2004, 2007). The most basic of these provides
a starting point for measurement as the avoided losses due to resilience
actions divided by the maximum potential losses for a given event.
• An important distinction has been made between system resil-
ience and broader concepts such as economic resilience. The latter is more
encompassing because it focuses on the contribution these services make
to the economy, including not just the supply but also demand (not just to
the first line of customers but also to successive ones down the customer
chain, e.g., Cox et al. (2011).
• Recent programs have embraced the resilience concept. The SPUR
(San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association–Resilient City
Initiative) approach (SPUR, 2009) also focuses on outcomes (see Figure 2.3
and related discussion). Data for these outcomes are derived, however,
from expert judgments, rather than either community consultation or a
computer model.
• Broader measures of resilience emphasize the capacity, or process,
dimensions of resilience. These typically characterize resilience through
OCR for page 34
34 NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE
FIGURE 2.3 Resilience goals in San Francisco described in the policy paper
adopted by the Board of the San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Associa -
tion (SPUR, 2009). SOURCE: SPUR (2009).
2-3 replacement
OCR for page 35
35
WHAT IS NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE?
describing features of more disaster-resilient communities or identifying
specific actions, adaptations, or tactics both pre- and post-disaster (e.g.,
Tobin, 1999; Godschalk, 2003; Berke and Campanella, 2006; Cutter et al.,
2008a, 2008b; Norris et al., 2008). More recently, progress has been made on
developing indices of community resilience (e.g., Emmer, 2008; Cutter et al.,
2010; CARRI, 2011). These prospective measures of resilience are facilitated
by the use of census or other generally available data and self assessments.
These examples illustrate the range of approaches that have been
applied to assess the disaster resilience of communities. As noted earlier,
no one resilience indicator can suit all purposes, and different measure-
ment approaches may be appropriate in different contexts for assessing
current levels of disaster resilience and incremental progress in developing
resilience.
WHAT DOES AN EARTHQUAKE-RESILIENT
COMMUNITY LOOK LIKE?
The NSTC’s Grand Challenges for Disaster Reduction identified four key
characteristics of disaster-resilient communities (SDR, 2005; p. 1): 1
• Relevant hazards are recognized and understood.
• Communities at risk know when a hazard event is imminent.
• Individuals at risk are safe from hazards in their homes and places
of work.
• Disaster-resilient communities experience minimum disruption
to life and economy after a hazard event has passed.
Within the context of this broad vision, more specific, tangible charac-
terizations of a more earthquake-resilient community are proposed here
in order to guide prioritization of efforts. In a major disaster:
• No systematic concentration of casualties . Important or high-
occupancy structures (e.g., schools, hospitals, and other major institutional
buildings; high-rise commercial and residential buildings) do not collapse,
and significant numbers of specific building types (e.g., hazardous unrein-
forced masonry structures) do not collapse. There are no major hazardous
materials releases that would cause mass casualties.
1 A number of other similar characterizations have also been proposed (e.g., Godschalk,
2003; Foster, 2007). Tierney (workshop presentation) notes that resilience has multiple
aims—reduced loss of life and economic impact; equity and fairness (addressing disparities
in vulnerability); and sustainability (laws, processes, etc. are robust over time and support
social values of quality of life, environmental quality, community safety, and livability).
OCR for page 36
36 NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE
• Financial loss and societal consequences are manageable, not
catastrophic. Damage to the built environment is reduced to avoid cata-
strophic financial and societal losses due to overwhelming cost of repair,
casualties, displaced populations, government interruption, loss of hous -
ing, or loss of jobs. Community character and cultural values are main -
tained following disasters; there is not wholesale loss of iconic buildings
(including those designated as historic), groups of buildings, and neigh -
borhoods of architectural, historic, ethnic, or other significance.
• Emergency responders are able to respond and improvise. Roads
are passable, fire suppression systems are functional, hospitals and other
critical facilities are functional. It is noteworthy that during the 9/11
attacks, New York City’s response was hampered by the need to set up a
new Emergency Operations Center, the existing one having been located
in the World Trade Center.
• Critical infrastructure services continue to be provided in the
aftermath of a disaster. Energy, water, and transportation are especially
critical elements. Telecommunications are also very important. Continued
service is needed for critical facilities such as hospitals to function, as well
as for households to remain sheltered in their homes.
• Disasters do not escalate into catastrophes. Infrastructure inter-
dependencies have been anticipated and mitigated, so that disruptions to
one critical infrastructure do not cause cascading failures in other infra -
structures (e.g., levee failures in New Orleans escalated the disaster into
a catastrophe). Fires are quickly contained and do not develop into major
urban conflagrations that cause mass casualties and large-scale neighbor-
hood destruction.
• Resources for recovery meet the needs of all affected community
members. Resources for recovery are available in an adequate, timely,
and equitable manner. To a large extent, local governments, nonprofit
organizations, businesses, and residents would have already materially
and financially prepared for a major disaster (e.g., are adequately insured;
have undertaken resilience activities on their own and in cooperation with
others). Safety nets are in place for the most vulnerable members of society.
• Communities are restored in a manner that makes them more
resilient to the next event. Experience is translated into improved design,
preparedness, and overall resilience. High-hazard areas are rebuilt in ways
that reduce, rather than recreate, conditions of disaster vulnerability.
Each community will face unique gaps and challenges in meeting
these resilience goals. The priorities and mix of strategies and actions will
differ from one community to the next. Each community could translate
these general goals into specific, transparent performance goals appropri -
ate for the locality and scaled for different size disasters. These perfor-
OCR for page 37
37
WHAT IS NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE?
mance goals can then provide a basis for developing consistent design
standards and retrofit guidelines.
Two examples are provided below to illustrate different approaches
that proactive communities have undertaken to enhance their disaster
resilience. The Evansville, Indiana, example is noteworthy for the long-
term, cumulative efforts of multiple stakeholder groups. Evansville
focused largely on traditional pre-disaster mitigation and planning
actions—that is, enhancing “robustness” as noted in Figure 2.2. In con -
trast, the San Francisco example is noteworthy for pioneering commu -
nity discussions and prioritizing activities that focus explicitly on the
“rapidity” dimension of resilience in the aftermath of an earthquake.
Example 1: The Process of Developing Resilience in Evansville
This example outlines the history of Evansville, Indiana’s Disaster
Resistant Community (DRC) efforts as an example of one community’s
long-term, multi-faceted approach to developing disaster resilience. After
a 1987 central U.S. earthquake and the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake,
geologists and emergency response planners recognized that Evansville,
Indiana, was at greater risk from earthquakes than most Indiana cities
because parts of the city are built upon thick soft soils. In 1990, long before
the national programs to improve resiliency of communities, Evansville
started its own effort with support by the Indiana Department of Fire
and Building Services (IDFBS) and the City of Evansville. Initial activities
involved gathering subsurface soil property information by the Indiana
Geological Survey and Ball State University. The geologic, geotechnical,
and shear wave velocity data provided the basis for risk analysis for the
IDFBS and Vanderburgh County Building Commission and emergency
management response planning.
In 1997, the Central U.S. Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC) embarked on
a pilot disaster-resistant community project involving two communities—
Evansville, Indiana, and Henderson, Kentucky. To launch the pilot project,
a workshop was held to bring together a multi-disciplinary group of haz-
ards specialists, emergency managers, and community leaders to develop
a model disaster-resistant community program. This workshop was co-
sponsored by Federal Emergency Management Administation (FEMA),
Insurance Institute for Property Loss Reduction (IIPLR), and the Disaster
Recovery Business Alliance along with the cooperating organizations of
the American Red Cross, Risk Management Solutions, Inc., International
City and County Management Association, and Evansville community
leaders. Working groups developed a mitigation strategy and implemen -
tation plan that addressed the key elements of a DRC program: Education
and Public Outreach, Existing Development, New Development, Com -
OCR for page 40
40 NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE
and 5% reductions, respectively, in National Flood Insurance premiums
for local residents.
• Training sessions were conducted for professionals. These
included city-county building officials, architects and engineers, and fire
department personnel. The HAZUS initiative involved numerous partici -
pants. Data development involved University of Evansville students, the
Indiana Geological Survey, and the Disaster Recovery Business Alliance,
among others. Training workshops and a HAZUS Technical Subcommit-
tee were formed to develop and maintain the capacity to use HAZUS for
hazard and risk assessment.
• The DRC and its partners developed and disseminated disaster
preparedness and mitigation information to educate the general public.
Print materials included a disaster preparedness calendar and mitigation
tip sheets by the Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company and the Red
Cross. Fox 7 produced a documentary of the Project Impact initiative. The
DRC worked with local schools to incorporate K-12 educational programs
on disaster preparedness, response, and mitigation.
• Members of the DRC organized a number of community events—
including Earthquake Preparedness Week, Fire Prevention Week, Severe
Weather Week, and Building Safety Week—and participated in others,
such as CPR/Family Safety Day and a local hospital’s safety fair. These
events provided opportunities to educate local residents on preparedness
and mitigation.
Even at the end of 2009, with no funding, DRC participants continued
to perform walk-through inspections in schools and businesses for pre -
paredness, as well as make presentations to various groups and have a
presence at area fairs.
The Evansville plan is admirable for its attention to major concerns
of reducing the losses from earthquakes and for moving toward an all-
hazards approach. However, it focuses almost entirely on pre-event miti -
gation, and only three of its major tenets refer to post-disaster recovery
and reconstruction. The emphasis in theory and practice since the time
of the development of the Evansville plan has been much more focused
on post-disaster resilience as defined in this report—an emphasis on
maintaining function of the economy and broader society, as well as
hastening recovery. The San Francisco example described below is more
in accord with the concepts of resilience described in this report, with its
design of pre-disaster mitigation activities—utilizing a broad definition
of “performance”—which emphasizes not just a reduction in building
damage but also an emphasis on maintaining and restoring the services
that buildings provide.
OCR for page 41
41
WHAT IS NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE?
Example 2: Defining Resilience Goals and Measures in San Francisco
In 2006, as part of the activities surrounding the 100-year anniver-
sary of the 1906 Great San Francisco Earthquake, the Earthquake Engi-
neering Research Institute (EERI), Seismological Society of America
(SSA), California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA), and U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS) commissioned the development of a compre-
hensive simulation and analysis of potential losses if a repeat of the 1906
earthquake were to happen now. The report, When the Big One Strikes
Again (Kircher et al., 2006), estimated that many of Northern California’s
nearly 10 million residents would be affected. It would cost $90-$120
billion to repair or replace the more than 90,000 damaged buildings and
their contents, and as many as 10,000 commercial buildings would sus -
tain major structural damage. Between 160,000 and 250,000 households
would be displaced from damaged residences. Depending upon whether
the earthquake occurs during the day or night, building collapses would
cause 800 to 3,400 deaths, and a conflagration similar in scale to the 1906
fire is possible and could cause an immense loss. Damage to utilities and
transportation systems would increase losses by an additional 5% to 15%,
and economic disruption from prolonged lifeline outages and loss of func-
tional workspace would cost several times this amount. Considering all
loss components, the total price tag for a repeat of the 1906 earthquake is
likely to exceed $150 billion. In such a scenario, the city of San Francisco
might not be able to recover from the cascading consequences and might
lose its central place in the region.
Motivated to reverse this prognosis, earthquake professionals and
policy-makers in San Francisco joined forces soon after the conference
and began a two-year effort to prioritize policies and actions to help
ensure that San Francisco could rebound quickly from a major event.
Their efforts resulted in four major policy papers, summarized in “The
Resilient City,” a policy paper adopted by the Board of the San Francisco
Planning and Urban Research Association in 2008 (SPUR, 2009). The
panel of experts took a community-wide perspective, describing their
vision of resilience as:
Resilient communities have an ability to govern after a disaster strikes.
These communities adhere to building standards that allow the power,
water and communications networks to begin operating again shortly
after a disaster and that allow people to stay in their homes, travel to
where they need to be, and resume a fairly normal living routine within
weeks. They are able to return to a “new” normal within a few years . . .
(and the disaster) does not become a catastrophe that defies recovery
(SPUR, 2009; p. 1).
OCR for page 42
42 NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE
Key elements of this vision include:
• Establishment of performance objectives for buildings and lifeline
infrastructure systems, including power, gas, water, communications, and
transportation.
• Seismic retrofit of a sufficiently large number of homes so that the
vast majority of city residents are able to shelter in place (i.e., remain at
home) following an earthquake.
• Establishment of a Lifelines Council with influence over the
preparation of critical services. This council would ensure that the utility
services are restored within days of the earthquake.
• Establishment of a new voluntary rating system, designating Seis-
mic Silver and Seismic Gold buildings, which performs so well that these
standards quickly becomes a model for all new housing in the region.
• Ability of the entire city to get back on its feet in four months.
To achieve this vision, the panel established performance targets for
new and existing buildings and lifelines, at different phases in the recovery
process, for an “expected” earthquake (ATC, 2010). The panel chose to ana-
lyze an “expected” earthquake, rather than an “extreme” event, in order
to focus on a large event that can reasonably be expected to occur during
the useful life of a structure or lifeline system. It chose a scenario earth -
quake that was also being used by another seismic study under way in
the city, with the expected earthquake being a magnitude-7.2 earthquake
on the Peninsula segment of the San Andreas Fault. It also established
a series of transparent performance measures, based upon usability, for
both buildings and infrastructure after the expected event. For buildings,
there are three categories: safe and operational, safe and usable during
repairs, and safe and usable after moderate repairs. Relying on expert
input, the panel assessed the current status of expected performance of
buildings and infrastructure. It then set performance targets for four post-
earthquake time periods—immediately, 1 to 7 days, 7 days to 2 months,
and 2 to 36 months.
SPUR developed a series of near- and long-term recommendations for
existing and new buildings as well as infrastructure by considering: (1)
the goals for seismic resilience for each component of the city; (2) the gap
between current seismic performance and the goal; and (3) the general
level of cost to make the necessary improvements or retrofits. In all cases,
SPUR’s performance targets require a substantial improvement in seismic
performance compared to the current situation. However, SPUR did not
recommend that all buildings and infrastructure be upgraded to a level
that would make them “damage-proof,” as this was assessed to be cost-
prohibitive. Instead, by defining an acceptable level of damage for the
OCR for page 43
43
WHAT IS NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE?
expected earthquake, it focused its recommendations on those improve -
ments considered most likely to yield a quick recovery or level of resilience
desired for each phase of recovery. Recommendations were guided by the
recognition that two “missing pieces” needed to be addressed in dealing
with the earthquake problem—lifelines (critical infrastructure) and the
workforce.
The panel emphasized pre-disaster mitigation actions in its recom -
mendations, but some post-disaster actions would also be required to
achieve these performance targets. For example, ensuring that “95% of all
residences are deemed to be safe for occupancy within 36 hours after the
expected earthquake” would require that enough existing structures be
seismically retrofitted so that the vast majority of San Francisco residents
would be able to shelter in place. It also required substantial changes to
inspection procedures and post-earthquake occupancy standards, because
residents would need to be allowed to remain in superficially damaged
buildings even if utility services are not functioning.
Earthquakes other than the “expected” one are possible, of course, but,
in smaller earthquakes, better performance is expected. In larger, more
extreme events, lesser performance will have to be tolerated.
Figure 2.3 provides an example of specific resilience goals recom -
mended by SPUR in San Francisco. The figure indicates the expected
performance of buildings and infrastructure if the earthquake were to
occur today (marked as X’s), the post-earthquake performance targets for
each category (shaded boxes), and the gap between them. For example,
critical response facilities, such as hospitals, police and fire stations, and
emergency operations centers, are categorized as buildings that must be
“safe and operational” immediately after the expected earthquake. Cur-
rently, these buildings are more likely to be “safe and operational” within
24 hours or, as long as 36 months, after an expected earthquake. For resi -
dential housing, buildings must be “safe and usable during repairs” and
there is a target to have 95% of residents able to shelter-in-place within
24 hours after an expected earthquake. Currently, it is more likely to take
up to 36 months before 95% of San Francisco’s residents would be able to
re-inhabit their homes after an expected earthquake.
Other Examples of Resilience
The Evansville and San Francisco examples described above both
represent concerted public programs to improve earthquake resilience.
Such programs are needed because there is a lack of information and
awareness of the earthquake threat, and a lack of adequate incentives to
address it, when the rewards for the entity undertaking the investment
in resilience involve spillover effects to other segments of society. In the
OCR for page 44
44 NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE
latter case of a “public good,” the entity making the expenditure cannot
capture all of the broader gains, and hence an under-investment occurs
from the standpoint of society. Otherwise, in a predominantly market
economy like that of the United States, many individual decision-makers
and public institutions do make appropriate decisions regarding resilience
in response to market signals—the marketplace is an important resource
for developing resilience.
Prices reflect the value of economic resources, and price increases fol -
lowing a disaster are often characterized as gouging. Nevertheless, some
price increases are warranted and serve as indicators of the increased scar-
city of specific goods and services. When markets are working effectively,
these price signals need to be considered in making decisions regarding
the allocation of resources. When markets are not working effectively,
as when market institutions are destroyed or prone to various types of
market failure (including price gouging due to asymmetric information
or market power), it may be necessary for authorities to override market
signals and make decisions with other approaches, such as rationing. This
may be the case especially where equity, or fairness, is concerned. Free
markets are known to lead to the efficient allocation of resources, but are
effectively blind to equity concerns.
Individual decision-makers also capitalize on many types of resilience
embodied in the economic system, referred to as “inherent” sources of
resilience, including the marketplace itself (NRC, 2007; Rose, 2009). These
conditions include inventories of critical materials, the ability to substitute
other inputs for those in short supply (e.g., use of bottled or trucked water
for piped water serves), and excess productive capacity to be accessed
when facilities in use are damaged (e.g., relocating to empty office space or
factories). Although many of these types of resilience are taken for granted
because they are in place during the normal course of doing business,
there is still potential for enhancing them. They also have an advantage
in reducing losses over mitigation because they can be accessed at little or
no extra cost.
Another category of resilience refers to the ingenuity, or “adaptive
ability,” that often is inspired by necessity after an earthquake to keep
households, business, and government organizations going (e.g., Comfort,
1999; Mileti, 1999). Examples include making organizations more efficient,
finding new substitutes for critical materials, and establishing new social
networks. They are also part of the nation’s resilience capability. They may
not require large-scale programs as in the previous case study examples,
but they do merit attention and further nurturing. Not all decision-makers
are aware of these opportunities, and more generic programs, rather than
region-specific ones may be the preferable vehicle. For both inherent and
adaptive resilience, the dissemination of information on best practice
OCR for page 45
45
WHAT IS NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE?
methods has the potential to be a valuable national project to promote
resilience.
A new "business continuity industry" has arisen over the past 10 years,
consisting of private-sector professionals that help businesses prepare,
clean up, and recover from disasters (the majority of examples relate to
information technology backup and business relocation). Such services
are especially important to small business, which cannot take advantage
of economies of scale or otherwise afford their own in-house hazard
professionals.
Another reason for focusing on the role of the individual business or
household is the importance that self-reliance can provide. It helps reduce
dependence on government bailouts. Flynn (2008) has taken a profound
view of this by focusing on how resilience can be “empowering” to the
general citizenry.
This discussion of economic considerations and reliance practices is
related to the object of resilience—what types of losses are we really trying
to reduce. The focus of much of this report is on property damage. How-
ever, property damage from earthquakes and most other natural disasters
takes place at a given point or short period in time. It is, rather, the flow of
goods and services from the property (capital assets) that sustain people’s
lives. This reduction in the flow of goods and services (often referred to
as “business interruption,” or BI) starts at the point of the earthquake but
continues until recovery is complete. Resilience cannot do anything to
reduce the property damage after the event, but can reduce the BI by using
remaining resources as effectively as possible and recovering as quickly
as possible. When economists and policy-makers talk about indicators of
societal well-being, they focus on flow indices such as the BI, which in
the grander sense is really just a lay term for a decrease in gross national/
regional product.
Also, resilience can be defined narrowly or holistically. System resil-
ience is usually a good example of the former because it focuses on the
maintenance of the service flow. Economic resilience is more encompassing
because it focuses on the contribution these services make to the economy.
It includes not just the supply but also demand (i.e., both the provision of a
good or service and its utilization, and not just to the first line of customers
but to successive ones down the customer chain). An example of this
dichotomy would be transportation resilience in the aftermath of a natural
disaster or terrorist attack. It could begin with consideration of resilient
actions by providers of transportation services and then proceed to the
resilience of its customers through the alternative modes, telecommuting,
and greater reliance on existing inventories (as opposed to new shipments).
In the latter case, it is not only the number of trips that is important but also
the contribution they make to transportation customers’ production levels
OCR for page 46
46 NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE
or well-being. This way, telecommuting, would be viewed as a resilient
strategy, because it maintains production (reduces BI) even with fewer
trips; otherwise, its contribution might be overlooked (e.g., Cox et al., 2011).
In a similar vein, a recent study of the resilience of the New York City
Metropolitan Area economy in the aftermath of 9/11 found its resilience to
be very high—72% according to one if the definitions noted in the previous
section, because 95% of the 1,100 firms located in the World Trade Center
area were able to move to other locations, primarily in the metropolitan
area (72% is lower than 95% because of the lost production caused by
delays in relocation) (Rose et al., 2009). Thus, temporary locations, often
becoming permanent, saved more than $40 billion of gross regional prod -
uct. To use all of society’s resources effectively, such flexibility to use excess
building stock (if available) before reconstruction could take place needs
to be factored into programs such as the San Francisco example.
Resilience and Post-Earthquake Recovery
The Evansville and SPUR examples described above focused on
aspects of the built environment and on advance planning for recovery,
but they do not illustrate actions that can be taken after the event to pro-
mote resilience in terms of maintaining function of the broad set of societal
attributes and hastening recovery. Table 2.1 provides examples of resilient
actions at various stages of recovery and reconstruction in relation to a
broader set of societal attributes and indicators. The details of the table
provide only some of many examples of such actions. We illustrate their
usefulness and importance with respect to the last column "Economic
Resilience."
• Immediate (< 72 hours)—It is important to maintain a supply of
critical goods and services such as water, power, and food to support the
economy and social system.
• Emergency (3-7 days)—It is necessary for businesses, households,
government, and nongovernment organizations to prioritize the use of
resources, such as by the use of rationing. In many instances it is important
to find substitutes for key inputs and to conserve them as well.
• Very Short-run (7-30 days)—The marketplace is an important
inherent resource in addressing resilience. Prices reflect value and act as
indicators of the scarcity of goods and services. When markets are working
effectively, these price signals need to be considered in making decisions
regarding the allocation of resources. When markets are not working
effectively, as when market institutions are destroyed or prone to various
types of market failure (including price gouging), it may be necessary
for authorities to override market signals and make decisions with other
OCR for page 47
TABLE 2.1 Resilience Applications to Social, Ecological, Physical, and Economic Recovery by Time Period
Emergency Environmental/
Timescale Response Health & Safety Utilities Buildings Ecological Economic
Immediate Tactical Deal with Use of emergency Remove debris Limit further Maintain supply of
< 72 hours emergency casualties/ backup systems ecological critical goods and
response Reunite families damage services
Emergency Strategic Provide mass Begin service Provide shelter Remove debris Prioritize use
3-7 days emergency care restoration for homeless of resources/
response substitute inputs/
conserve
Very short Selective Fight infectious Continue Provide shelter Protect sensitive Shore up or over-
7-30 days response outbreaks restoration for homeless ecosystems ride markets
Short Assist in Deal with post- Complete service Provide Deal with Cope with small
1-6 months recovery traumatic stress restoration temporary ensuing problems business strain
housing and
business sites
Medium Reassess Deal with post- Reassess Provide Initiate Cope with large
6 months– for future traumatic stress for future temporary remediation business strain/
1 year emergencies emergencies housing and recapture lost
business sites production
Long N/A Reassess Mitigation for Rebuild and Mitigate for Cope with business
>1 year for future future events mitigate future events failures/mitigation
emergencies
47
OCR for page 48
48 NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE
approaches. This may be the case especially where equity, or fairness, is
concerned. Free markets are known to lead to the efficient allocation of
resources but are effectively blind to equity concerns.
• Short-run (1-6 months)—Small businesses are especially vulner-
able in the immediate aftermath of a major disaster, and require special
attention.
• Medium-run (6 months-1 year)—One of the major sources of
resilience is the ability to recapture lost revenue after the event; many
businesses have standing orders for their product production, and these
can be filled by working overtime or extra shifts at the relatively low cost
of overtime pay.
• Long-run (> l year)—It is important that mitigation be integrated
into the reconstruction effort to reduce losses from future events.
DIMENSIONS OF RESILIENCE
Many of the points of this chapter can be reiterated by summarizing
the many dimensions of resilience:
1. Multi-scale dimension. The concept of resilience is applicable at
multiple scales, from the resilience of an individual person (e.g., psycho -
logical, financial) to that of an organization, neighborhood, city, or nation.
2. Multi-hazard dimension. Resilience pertains to all hazards and not
just earthquakes. Moreover, resilience to other hazards can in many cases
be applied to earthquakes.
3. Stock (property damage) and flow (production of goods and ser-
vices) dimensions of assets, systems, economies, and communities. Property
damage takes place at a given point in time, but the service flows (to which
maintaining function applies) are disrupted until recovery is completed,
and are thus more central to the idea of rebounding after a disaster.
4. Behavioral and policy dimensions. The length of the recovery follow-
ing disasters is not some constant that can be known beforehand, but an
outcome that depends critically on decisions and activities undertaken by
private- and public-sector decision-makers.
5. Geophysical dimension. Resilience generally varies inversely to the
size of the shock to the system.
6. Bifurcation of temporal dimensions. Static resilience refers to the
ability of an entity or system to maintain function when shocked and
relates to how to efficiently allocate the resources remaining after the
disaster. Dynamic resilience refers to the speed at which an entity or
system recovers from a shock and is a relatively more complex problem
because it involves a long-term investment associated with repair and
reconstruction.
OCR for page 49
49
WHAT IS NATIONAL EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE?
7. Contextual dimension. The level of function of the system at a point
in time has to be compared to the level that would have existed had the
ability been absent, requiring that a reference point or worst-case outcome
be established first.
8. Capacity dimension. Inherent resilience refers to the ordinary ability
already in place to deal with crises. Adaptive resilience refers to ability in
crisis situations to maintain function on the basis of ingenuity or extra
effort.
9. Market dimension. This refers to the need to consider both the pro-
viders and customers of building and infrastructure services in moving
toward a holistic definition of resilience.
10. Cost dimension. Resilience essentially represents a measure of
benefits of various actions. However, the cost side cannot be neglected in
policy decisions.
11. Process dimension. Resilience is not just about actions and targets,
but the manner in which these are achieved is a critical aspect. This refers
to developing and applying a set of adaptive capacities.
12. Fairness dimension. Resilience should be applied in an equitable
manner, to be sensitive to the needs of the most disadvantaged groups in
society with care being taken to try to avoid having any group adversely
affected by its implementation.
OCR for page 50
