Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 1
ExEcutivE Summary
t he Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) 2005
round is fundamentally different from previous rounds. It concen-
trates tens of thousands of additional personnel at a number of bases,
some of which are located in metropolitan areas with already congested
transportation infrastructure. The time period by which BRAC decisions
must be fully implemented (September 2011) is far too short for some
bases and surrounding communities to avoid significant added traffic
congestion for military personnel and other commuters during peak travel
periods. The resulting traffic delays will impose substantial costs on
surrounding communities and may even be harmful to the military.
The existing funding mechanisms, through the U.S. Department
of Transportation and the Department of Defense (DoD), are incapable
of addressing the problems in terms of both the speed with which they
can be implemented and the resources they have available. Moreover,
base commanders lack incentives, guidance, and resources to address
the problems bases cause outside their gates.
In cases documented in this report, base growth due to BRAC and
other DoD policies outstrips communities’ abilities to respond. This prob-
lem is partly due to the controversy and difficulty of expanding capac-
ity in built-up areas in response to growing populations and travel and
partly due to severely constrained resources.
• The prescribed planning and decision-making processes that
metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) must follow often
require more than a decade to complete environmental assess-
ments, follow public participation requirements, and develop
political consensus on priorities. MPOs typically have far more
projects proposed for their capital plans than can be funded.
• Funding of surface transportation infrastructure depends heavily
on motor fuel tax revenues, which are declining in real terms
because of an aversion to higher taxes, improved fuel economy,
and new automotive fuels. The recent recession has reduced tax
revenues far below levels needed to expand, or even maintain,
capacity in response to normal demand, much less to address
rapid, large-scale increases.
1
OCR for page 2
FEdEral Funding oF tranSportation improvEmEntS in Brac caSES
DoD sees its responsibilities for off-base transportation facilities as
limited. The only DoD program available to assist in funding transportation
infrastructure off the base—the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program—is
inadequate for base expansion in built-up areas. Eligibility is determined
by the criterion of a doubling of traffic, which is impossible on already
congested facilities. Aside from DAR, DoD policy states that local and
state authorities are responsible for off-base transportation facilities even if
DoD decisions increase congestion; this policy is unrealistic for congested
metropolitan transportation networks. Moreover, off-base projects compete
poorly in the military construction (MILCON) budget, which also funds
the higher priorities of base commanders for on-base facilities. Finally, DAR
is limited to road projects, whereas transit is often necessary to serve some
travel demand in congested metropolitan areas.
Over the next few years, the specific problems caused by BRAC
2005 can be ameliorated by the committee’s recommendations, which are
briefly summarized in the following paragraphs and described in detail in
Chapter 5.
• DoD should accept more financial responsibility for problems it
causes on the transportation facilities serving military bases in
much the same way that private developers are assessed impact
fees for the costs they impose. The DAR program should be
revised to pay for the military’s share of road improvements and
a separate DoD program should be established to fund the transit
services necessary to meet military needs. These changes will
require increased funding and segregation of these funds within
the MILCON budget.
• Additional traffic in congested areas has a nonlinear effect; each
added vehicle causes a disproportionate delay on other users.
As a result, strategies to shift modes, change time of travel, and
encourage telework and carpools, while modest in appearance,
have substantial benefit. Increased funding and segregation of
base operating and maintenance accounts, as well as monetary
incentives for base commanders to prioritize and implement
transportation management measures, will also be needed.
• In some cases, the facilities affected by base expansion are part
of a dense network where the bottlenecks caused by increased
military-related traffic may occur miles from where the base is
located. The military cost responsibility should be based on a
detailed analysis of how expanded base traffic affects delay and
the cost of improving facilities to accommodate traffic growth
attributed to the military.
2
OCR for page 3
ExEcutivE Summary
• Communities that benefit economically from the presence of
military bases should pay their share of needed transportation
improvements, relying on normal transportation resources.
Metropolitan areas may need to shift priorities in their capital
plans accordingly.
• Bases and metropolitan areas should greatly improve commu-
nication and coordination concerning base demands on the
infrastructure of their surrounding communities. DoD should
provide base commanders guidance and resources to expand
military base master plans to include necessary infrastructure
off the base. This should be accomplished by expanding
services provided by DoD’s Office of Economic Adjustment.
Federal surface transportation-planning regulations should
be revised to require MPOs to include base officials in their
decision-making processes.
• The recommendations made above will not be sufficient to
address the immediate impacts of BRAC 2005, which may be
severe in some areas. Congress should consider a special appro-
priation or reallocation of stimulus funds to pay for near-term
improvements in the most adversely affected communities. The
cost of these improvements should be estimated by the Secretary
of Transportation, who should also award funding to projects
that will provide the most near-term relief to the most severe
problems.
Resolving metropolitan area transportation congestion problems is
a complex, expensive, and ongoing effort. The additional travel demand
caused by BRAC 2005 on congested routes serving bases cannot be
accommodated in a matter of a few months or years. Over time, delays
can be eased, but greater DoD funding, realigned metropolitan area
priorities, and better communication between base commanders and
civilian authorities will be required. Adoption of the committee’s recom-
mendations to improve base–community communication and planning
will help avoid future problems caused by rapid growth in personnel at
military bases.
3
OCR for page 4
