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Summary
The U.S. Air Force weapon system sustainment1 enterprise is extremely large
in terms of scope, workforce, and associated costs that amount to billions of dol-
lars annually. When other expenditures, such as selected personnel accounts, fuel,
facilities, and utilities are included, the total dollar amount expended is significantly
higher.2 As a point of reference for the reader, the Air Force total costs of sustain-
ment activities exceed the operating costs of such industry giants as American
Airlines and Delta Airlines.3 As demonstrated by the following comment by the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, sustainment
is a major component of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget:
About $100 billion is procurement of weapons systems—OK, acquisition—but remember
that 70 percent of the cost of a weapons system is not acquiring it; it is sustaining it. It’s not
buying it; it’s having it, where most of the money is. Said differently, most of the money in
1 Adopted from the 2009 report DoD Weapon System Acquisition Reform Product Support Assess-
ment. This report applies the following definition of weapon system or aircraft sustainment: System
sustainment is the package of support functions required to maintain the readiness and operational
capability of weapon systems, subsystems, software, and support systems. It encompasses materiel
management, distribution, technical data management, maintenance, training, cataloging, configu -
ration management, engineering support, repair parts management, failure reporting and analy-
sis, and reliability growth. Available at https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/328610/file/47489/DoD%20
Weapon%20System%20Acquisition%20Reform%20PSA_19%20NOV_Final.pdf. Accessed August
18, 2011.
2 Chapter 3 includes an in-depth discussion of the Air Force expenditures.
3 Chapter 6 includes a discussion of commercial best practices for sustainment.
1
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the budget is spent on sustaining weapons systems that were procured in the past rather than
on acquisition programs per se. And we can’t leave that much money out of the better buying
power equation [emphasis added].4
In May 2010, DoD introduced the Defense Efficiencies Initiative that seeks to
“increase efficiencies, reduce overhead costs, and eliminate redundant functions in
order to improve the effectiveness of the DoD enterprise. This effort is focused on
reprioritizing how DoD can use resources to more effectively support and sustain
the force [emphasis added].”5 The Defense Efficiencies Initiative recognizes the
need for improved efficiency and effectiveness to support and sustain the force.
This study highlights many sustainment issues and offers recommendations aimed
at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Air Force weapon system sus-
tainment enterprise.
The Air Force weapon system sustainment enterprise consists of a highly skilled
workforce but operates without modern enterprise resource planning tools and
with a supply chain that is not structured according to business best practices. In
fact, Air Force weapon system sustainment, including the demand to maintain
aircraft organically and by contractor logistics support, dwarfs that of commercial
airlines and other nations’ Air Forces. The sustainment posture is determined by
the number and variety of aircraft, the technology of the systems involved, and the
global deployment of the fleet. The fleet’s diversity, which ranges from aircraft de-
signed and deployed in the 1950s to the world’s most advanced high-performance
fighters, weighs on the enterprise’s operation. The enterprise has become more
complex over time not only because of the fleet’s increased growth and diversity,
but also because of global politics and regulations.
The Air Force has been operating on a wartime-like footing for the past 20
years. This extended period of intense operation has been further complicated by
multiple theaters of operation and by demand for more diverse and long-duration
fighter missions; worldwide airlift; long-range bomber sorties; diverse intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft; and extensive aerial refueling sorties re-
sulting from increasing geopolitical complexity.
Today, sustainment activities are undertaken by numerous offices and organi-
zations, including the Air Force Secretariat; the Air Force Air Staff; the Air Force
Materiel Command (AFMC) and its subordinate Product Centers; Air Logistics
4 Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 2011.
“Pentagon Efficiency Initiatives.” Remarks given at the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.,
April 20. Available at http://www.heritage.org/Events/2011/04/Pentagon-Efficiency?query=Pentagon+
Efficiency+Initiatives:+Are+They+Enough+to+Stave+Off+More+Defense+Cuts?. Accessed May 2,
2011.
5 DoD. 2010. Defense Efficiencies Initiative. Available at http://www.defense.gov/home/
features/2010/0810_effinit/. Accessed April 21, 2011.
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sUmmARy 3
Centers (ALCs); and Air Force operational commands. The activities of all of
these offices and organizations must be considered in studies of weapon system
sustainment. Sustainment is generally program-specific by weapon system. Al-
though policy is made by the Secretariat and Air Staff offices, it is broad and open
to interpretation. Sustainment activities may occur in the operating command, but
they are generally short-term in nature. The Product Centers and ALCs drive the
larger-scale and high-cost sustainment activities. Because of the broad nature of
sustainment policy and the number of organizations involved there is no “model”
weapon system sustainment program.
Air Force weapon system sustainment has functioned under a variety of con-
cepts and organizations, yet the system has repeatedly met national and global
threats, largely because of the dedication of the men and women responsible for
the detailed tasks of sustainment. Sustainment activities require significant coor-
dination and communication across a myriad of functions and organizations. At
present, this process is largely facilitated by interpersonal relationships rather than
clear, concise lines of authority and modern enterprise reporting and planning
tools, which results in escalating costs and inefficiencies.
The Air Force’s sustainment activities achieve the desired operational outcomes.
However, extraordinary management effort and attention are required to knock
down stovepipes that impede efficiencies. Senior officials are consistently frustrated
by weak or overly broad policies, minimal governance, and unnecessarily complex
organizational structures as they try to improve support postures resulting from
enterprise inefficiencies. These systemic shortcomings span the weapon system life
cycle—from initial concept development through retirement—for which there is a
lack of clear accountability. For the foreseeable future, the Air Force will continue
to operate at a high tempo but will face tremendous pressures on its sustainment
budget. The increasing costs of sustainment are a concern, because, as the pres-
ent systems continue to age, they will demand a greater proportion of the overall
defense budget. This may not be “sustainable” in the context of the downward
pressures on the overall defense budget, shown in Figure S-1.6
STUDY APPROACH
In response to a request from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Science, Technology, and Engineering, the National Research Council, under the
auspices of the Air Force Studies Board, formed the Committee on Examination
6 Blaise J. Durante, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Acquisition Integration, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. “Budgeting Considerations Related to Sustainment.” Pre -
sentation to the committee, October 21, 2010.
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4 in the
Defense Funding FY
FY2010 – FY2015
BaseGrowth % of G
(Current Dollars in Billions) 40%
Nominal Growth 3.0%
Real Growth 1.0%
$750 708
693 35% WWII (1945)
667 667 666 34.5%
33 648
632
616 50
601 159 50 30%
50
146 50
130
187
535
479 166 25%
468
$500 7
116
437
76
91 20%
3
72
345 8
3 KOREA (195
316 11.7%
15%
17 616
598
582
13 566
549
531
513
$250 6 480
432 10%
411
400
377
365
328
297
5%
0%
0%
$0
1945 1950 1955
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15
Notes:
Base Budget Position
Non-War Supplemental OCO
OCO Supplemental
Base
Base Budget OCO Funding *FY12-15 DoD fundin
*FY12
FY11-20 GDP and DoD
FY11
Federal Spending
100%
1969
1971
1973
90%
DoD Discre tiona ry 4%
80%
e ea u g t ec na e
Fd r l Bd e Pr e t g
70%
Non-DoD 2%
Discre tionary
60%
50% 0%
Net Inte re st
Surplus / Deficit as % of GDP
40%
-2%
30%
Ma nda tory
20%
-4%
10%
0%
-6%
3
5
7
9
1
3
5
7
9
1
3
5
7
9
1
3
5
7
9
1
3
5
7
9
1
3
5
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
9
9
9
9
9
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Fisca l Ye ar
FY65 FY15
FY05 -8%
6% 8% 13%
15%
19%
-10%
23%
48% 15%
19%
55%
-12%
23% 57%
Moun ng deficits, interest payments & en
FIGURE S-1
Economic realities will affect defense spending. OCO, Overseas Contingency Operations. SOURCE:
Blaise J. Durante, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Acquisition Integration, Office of the Assistant Secre-
tary of the Air Force for Acquisition. “Budgeting Considerations Related to Sustainment.” Presentation
to the committee, October 21, 2010.
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sUmmARy 5
Defense as a Percentage of GDP
0 – FY2015
eGrowth % of GDP GDP (TY $ in B)
40% $30,000
owth 3.0% (TY $ in B)
Projection
1.0% Key Summary
35% WWII (1945)
666 • FY11 (3.6% Base & 4.7% $25,000
34.5%
648 including OCO):
50
50 GDP: $14,624B (OMB est.)
30% ─
Base: $549B
─
$20,000
OCO: $159B
─
25%
20% $15,000
KOREA (1953)
FY11
11.7%
VIETNAM (1968) 4.7%
15%
616
598 8.9% REAGAN BUILD UP
$10,000
6.0%
FY15*
10%
3.5%
$5,000
GULF WAR (1991)
5% 4.4%
0%
0% $0
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
FY14 FY15
Notes:
*FY12-15 DoD funding includes $50B/year for OCO
*FY12
FY11-20 GDP and DoD % based on GDPand DoD % based on OMB Feb 10 projec ons
FY11
Federal Deficit/Surplus
2017
2019
1969
1971
1977
1973
1975
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
4%
9
40-year average FYDP average
(1969-2009): (2011-2015):
-2.6% -5.1%
2%
0%
Surplus / Deficit as % of GDP
-2%
-4%
-6%
1
3
5
1
1
1
20
20
Federal Surplus / Deficit
200
-8% 0
-200
-400
FY08 – $459B
TY $ in B
-600
-10% FY09 – $1413B
-800
FY10 – $1556B
% -1,000
FY11 – $1267B
-1,200
FY12 – $828B
-1,400
-12% -1,600
Projection
1940
1942
1944
1946
1948
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
terest payments c& en tlement
FIGURE S-1 ontinued
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of the U.S. Air Force’s Aircraft Sustainment Needs in the Future and Its Strategy to
Meet Those Needs to address the following terms of reference:7
• Assess current sustainment investments, infrastructure, and processes for
adequacy in sustaining aging legacy systems and their support equipment.
• Determine if any modifications in policy are required and, if so, identify
them and make recommendations for changes in Air Force regulations,
policies, and strategies to accomplish the sustainment goals of the Air Force.
• Determine if any modifications in technology efforts are required and, if so,
identify them and make recommendations regarding the technology efforts
that should be pursued because they could make positive impacts on the
sustainment of the current and future systems and equipment of the Air
Force.
• Determine if the Air Logistics Centers have the necessary resources (fund-
ing, manpower, skill sets, and technologies) and are equipped and organized
to sustain legacy systems and equipment and the Air Force of tomorrow.
• Identify and make recommendations regarding incorporating sustainability
into future aircraft designs.
During four data-gathering meetings, senior Air Force leaders, including rep-
resentatives of several Air Force Major Commands, representatives from the other
military departments, senior officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
professional staff members from key congressional oversight committees, and
senior industry executives provided input to the committee (see Appendix A for
biographical sketches of the committee members and Appendix B for meetings
and participating organizations). Additionally, the committee held smaller site
visits with Air Force and Navy officials, including visits to the three ALCs and the
Fleet Readiness Center Southwest. Finally, the committee held two 3-day meetings
to finalize its report and findings and recommendations.
The following “Big 7” themes continuously recurred throughout the study and
correspond to the recommendations cited: (1) the lack of Air Force processes for
sustainment as an enterprise (Recommendations 2-2, 2-3, 3-1, 4-5, 4-7, 4-8, 6-1,
6-3, 6-5, and 6-10); (2) ill-defined Air Force organizational structure for sustain-
7 Many of the presenters to the committee agreed that a budget “train wreck” with respect to sus -
tainment costs is looming. The committee engaged in considerable discussion on how to validate the
spontaneous comments regarding out-of-control sustainment costs. The terms of reference did not
require the committee to undertake business case analyses related to the report recommendations.
Likewise, the committee was purposely not composed to conduct business case analyses related to the
report recommendations. However, such analyses of selected recommendations are worthy of future
consideration by the Air Force because they would provide insight on whether implementation of
the selected recommendations would result in overall long-term reductions in sustainment costs.
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sUmmARy 7
ment (Recommendations 3-2, 4-1, and 4-6); (3) modest progress by the Air Force
on governance (Recommendations 2-6, 4-2, 4-4, 4-7, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8, and 6-9); (4)
lack of a single senior Air Force commander in charge of the entire sustainment
enterprise (Recommendation 2-4); (5) metrics that do not adequately measure
the key sustainment parameters (Recommendations 2-1, 2-5, 2-6, and 4-9); (6)
a spare parts chain that encumbers effective and efficient maintenance produc-
tion at all levels (Recommendation 4-3); and (7) ineffective processes to develop
and transition technology for sustainment (Recommendations 5-1, 6-2, 6-3, and
6-4). The recommendations provided in this report have the potential to (1) focus
management and leadership attention with commensurate authority; (2) relieve
the stressors of organizational conflicts; and (3) improve efficiencies across the
Air Force sustainment enterprise. Chapters 2 through 6 of this report present 45
related findings and 27 recommendations. Below are the key recommendations
from Chapters 2 through 6.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Impact of Regulations, Policies, and Strategies on Sustainment
The lack of clearly defined sustainment goals affects the entire Air Force. Im-
portantly, however, the Air Force can quickly develop a solution to this problem
and then refine it over the longer term. The Air Force challenges in the sustainment
process begin in the Air Force organizations—i.e., Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Acquisition) (SAF/AQ), Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations,
Environment and Logistics) (SAF/IE), and Air Staff Headquarters (AF/A4/7)—that
are responsible for the clarity of policy and process to the subordinate organiza-
tions. These headquarters offices should set the tone for Air Force sustainment. In
the absence of well-founded policy and instructions, field-level commanders and
directors take individual action to sustain their fleet; however, they deserve clear
guidance and should be held accountable for execution.
Recommendation 2-1. The Air Force should establish sustainment goals that
are specific and can be understood by all acquisition, contracting, engineering,
and sustainment professionals. The Air Force should then track these goals and
hold key individuals accountable for achieving them.
Recommendation 2-2. The Air Force should conduct a detailed holistic review
of all appropriate sustainment policies and directives and build a complemen-
tary suite of processes and actions. With regard to the Title 10 mandates, the Air
Force should take near- and long-term strategic actions to ensure maximum
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compliance. The Air Force should make long-term acquisition decisions and
should aggressively pursue opportunities for Centers of Industrial and Techni-
cal Excellence.8,9
Recommendation 2-3. The Air Force should select and deploy either a single
(preferred) or standard (by type of aircraft) collaborative engineering meth-
odology to determine the processes, procedures, tasks, and frequency of main-
tenance actions.
Recommendation 2-4. The Air Force should consider formally designating a
senior commander, such as the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Com-
mander, as the commander of the entire sustainment process, from concept
phase through system retirement, with the responsibility to advise the SAF/
IE, SAF/AQ, and AF/A4/7 on policy and then train, organize, equip, plan, and
execute the Air Force’s Integrated Life-Cycle Management (ILCM) processes.
Recommendation 2-5. The Air Force should develop and implement weapon
system-level metrics that set aircraft availability levels and the cost of provid-
ing that availability, as well as identify who is responsible for attaining both.
Furthermore, these measures should be at a level that reflects sustained imple-
8 Quoting, in part, 10 USC § 2466 entitled “Limitations on the Performance of Depot-level Main -
tenance of Materiel”: “(a) Percentage Limitation.— Not more than 50 percent of the funds made
available in a fiscal year to a military department or a Defense Agency for depot-level maintenance
and repair workload may be used to contract for the performance by non-Federal Government
personnel of such workload for the military department or the Defense Agency. Any such funds that
are not used for such a contract shall be used for the performance of depot-level maintenance and
repair workload by employees of the Department of Defense.” For additional information, see http://
www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00002466----000-.html. Accessed July 8, 2011.
9 Quoting, in part, 10 USC § 2474 entitled “Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence: Des -
ignation: Public-Private Partnerships” and enacted November 18, 1997, by Public Law 105-58: “(1)
The Secretary concerned, or the Secretary of Defense in the case of a Defense Agency, shall designate
each depot-level activity of the military departments and the Defense Agencies (other than facilities
approved for closure or major realignment under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of
1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note)) as a Center of Industrial
and Technical Excellence in the recognized core competencies of the designee. (2) The Secretary of
Defense shall establish a policy to encourage the Secretary of each military department and the head
of each Defense Agency to reengineer industrial processes and adopt best-business practices at their
Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence in connection with their core competency require-
ments, so as to serve as recognized leaders in their core competencies throughout the Department
of Defense and in the national technology and industrial base (as defined in section 2500(1) of this
title [10 USCS § 2500(1)]).” For additional information, see http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/
uscode10/usc_sec_10_00002474----000-.html. Accessed July 19, 2011.
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sUmmARy 9
mentation of process improvement initiatives such as cost-reduction incentives
and not just increasing sustainment costs driven by aircraft aging.
Recommendation 2-6. The Air Force should develop and direct a sustainment
execution model for weapon systems and major weapon systems modifications
that balances the needs of the individual weapon system with the performance
goals and cost constraints of the overall sustainment enterprise.
Assessment of Current Sustainment Investments, Infrastructure, and Processes
As noted above, the Air Force currently spends billions of dollars per year to
sustain legacy weapon systems. It is likely that the amount of money needed to
sustain legacy weapon systems will increase over time as weapon systems become
more complex. At the same time, current projections indicate that the Air Force
budget will decrease over the remaining life of the Future Years Defense Program.
These fiscal realities will lead to difficult choices for the Air Force in terms of sus-
taining the legacy fleet, recapitalizing the fleet, and modernizing the fleet. Although
the latter two efforts are not addressed in this report, the Air Force sustainment
enterprise does not, and will not, operate in a vacuum. The budget process must
recognize the need for some up-front investments in the sustainment enterprise
to increase efficiencies and effectiveness. Consequently, the sustainment of existing
weapon systems will demand careful attention and frequent readiness, availability,
and cost trade-offs.
Recommendation 3-1. The Air Force should continue funding depot plant
and capital equipment and, at the same time, be guided by focused analyses to
ensure that constrained funding is provided to the most critical sustainment
needs to avoid future support impacts and to meet Title 10 considerations.
Assessment of Air Force Air Logistics Centers
Evaluation of the ALCs considers funds allocation, workforce, skill sets, and
organizational structure. The flow of funds for depot maintenance and the Air
Force’s flying hour programs has been adequate; however, this might change in the
near future. Even though the Air Force considers the ALCs to be the single most
important and fundamental key to sustainment, their organizational structure is
not adequately resourced, and the executive leadership does not have full command
and control of the ALC enterprise. To a severe extent, the supply chain’s ability to
provide spare parts to the maintenance organizations is ineffective and disrupts
depot maintenance and parts repair. There are mismatches between direct sup-
port to production activities and the growth of requirements at the production
level. Importantly, a modern enterprise resource planning tool, although promised
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10 in the
as “forthcoming,” is not available, despite being desperately needed. Finally, and
disappointingly, despite repeated requests for key measures of effectiveness and
efficiency, the only well-defined metric supplied was for aircraft availability, and
many more organizations than just the ALCs impact aircraft availability. The ALCs
make the current situation work, but the full spectrum of resources needed to make
an effective and efficient organization is not available.
Recommendation 4-1. The Air Force should establish streamlined command
lines of accountability and authority to give the ALC commanders clear ex-
ecution authorities to direct process improvements on assigned programs,
maintenance activities, and supply support.
Recommendation 4-2. The Air Force should follow in a more timely manner
the statutes that require the depot maintenance industrial workforce to be
managed according to workload. The Air Force should also ensure that sup-
porting organizations are staffed to support the industrial workloads and that
flexible work rules are established to permit more workforce versatility.
Recommendation 4-4. The Air Force should continue its eLog 21 approach to
sustainment improvement and should aggressively continue to pursue incre-
mental fielding of the Expeditionary Combat Support System as an enterprise
resource planning solution. Strong advocacy for this program should reside
with the sustainment commander.10
Recommendation 4-5. The Air Force should focus the same, or arguably more,
attention and investment as that given to equipment in the actual weapon sys-
tem on the tools used for software maintenance. Maintaining currency between
test laboratories and actual weapon systems is fundamental for dealing with
timing, details of hardware interface behavior, and concurrency.
Recommendation 4-7. The Air Force should review its corporate oversight,
management, and support of embedded systems software development and
sustainment with foci on (1) greater risk identification and mitigation and
(2) enabling Air Force corporate, as opposed to command-specific, decision
making. In addition, given Air Force dependence on software to achieve mis-
10 Based on detailed information provided to the committee by the Air Force, the committee con-
cluded that there is a critical need for an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system to help address
Air Force sustainment issues. The Expeditionary Combat Support System is being developed with
ERP capabilities and will be implemented to meet the Air Force’s need. The committee did not at-
tempt to evaluate the process that selected the specific ERP system or the contractor(s) involved in
the development and implementation.
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sUmmARy 11
sion capabilities, the Air Force should strongly consider additional education
on software sustainment for senior leaders.
Recommendation 4-9. The Air Force should develop key metrics for sustain-
ment that flow to ALC commanders and that highlight the success or shortcom-
ings of ALC activities, drive appropriate behavior for the workforce, and allow
Air Force leadership to assess the health of the enterprise and the adequacy of
resourcing for the sustainment process regardless of organizational affiliation.
Technology Development and Insertion for Sustainment
The Air Force’s continued reliance on aging aircraft, such as the B-52, C-130H,
A-10, F-16, and C-5B, which will exceed their originally designed life spans, will
place an emphasis on the increasingly important role of new technologies related
to materials, inspection systems, and vehicle health monitoring.11 The Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL), under the AFMC, is responsible for developing new
technologies for Air Force weapon systems. AFRL can point to a long history of at-
tention to sustainment and to many successful transitions of technology to industry
and to the ALCs that increased aircraft availability and/or reduced maintenance
costs. In recent years, support for sustainment-focused technology has waned
because of increased attention to other technical priorities and opportunities, too
frequent changes in strategy and process, and reductions in funding for sustain-
ment technology, especially that for the transition process. There is capability
within AFRL development programs to affect sustainment costs on existing weapon
systems, and justification for increased AFRL investments and foci on sustainment.
At the time this report was being drafted, the Air Force began to implement
high-level processes for technology development and insertion. Specifically, it
was encouraging to learn that (1) sustainment is clearly identified in the recently
released Air Force science and technology plan; (2) a new program element has
been established for this area; and (3) the AFMC Commander has ownership of
technology development and transition. In addition, as the Air Force moves toward
the ILCM concept that is now beginning to appear in high-level plans and visions,
it will be necessary to broaden the common understanding of sustainment tech-
nologies and to adequately support their inclusion, development, and transition
into new weapon systems.
11 Steven H. Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and En -
gineering. “Co-Sponsor Discussion of Study Background and Task.” Presentation to the committee,
October 20, 2010.
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12 in the
Recommendation 5-1. The Air Force should develop a “technology for sustain-
ment” plan that identifies processes, technical agendas, workforce needs, and
required funding resources. Such a plan should be imbedded within the overall
ILCM strategy that is being developed by the Air Force.
Incorporating Sustainability into Future Designs
The Air Force and industry have unique capabilities for developing and matur-
ing technology, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. When specifically focused, these
capabilities can be applied to the incorporation of sustainment features into future
designs to complement the traditional focus on system performance. The successful
application of lessons learned from field experience is exemplified in some recent
designs, and there are evolving human factors techniques that provide tools for
integrating new maintenance functions and personnel capabilities. The experience
gained from the deployment of more recent weapon systems containing special
emphasis on low observable characteristics and significantly more use of software
also provides a wealth of data for incorporation of sustainment capabilities into
future designs. Discussions with contractors revealed that (1) in one case, much of
the activity that resulted in the incorporation of sustainment features into the sys-
tems was initiated by the contractor and (2) in the other case, detailed sustainment
requirements came from another Service. This again emphasizes the importance
of having strong sustainment involvement in all phases of Air Force procurements,
beginning with the concept and design phases. Incorporation of sustainment into
future designs requires a strong partnership between government and industry.
Sustainment professionals have not been fully involved in the Defense Ac-
quisition Management System (DAMS), from the Materiel Development Deci-
sion (MDD) to Production and Deployment (P&D), of recent weapon system
programs. As a result, sustainment needs, planning, and costs have not been fully
captured. A partnership between all sustainment stakeholders should be established
in the initial requirements statements, should continue with the original equip-
ment manufacturer at the earliest possible opportunity, and should drive future
sustainment planning and technology insertion. It is important to emphasize the
opportunities for government/contractor shared knowledge and alignment with
Air Force enterprise programs in this partnership.
Recommendation 6-1. The Air Force should involve its sustainment profes-
sionals throughout the DAMS, from MDD to P&D, in all future weapon system
development. Funding for sustainment planning and support should be given
the same visibility as that for the development of capabilities and performance.
Recommendation 6-3. The Air Force should establish an institutionalized
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sUmmARy 13
process for collecting and consistently incorporating desirable design features
or applying lessons learned from legacy programs into the requirements for
new systems or systems being modified in the support phase of the life cycle
and into the internal procedures involved in sustaining these systems.
Recommendation 6-4. The Air Force should place more emphasis and imple-
ment additional training for acquisition professionals on the need for, the how
to, and the pricing of proper data rights and domain knowledge related to the
weapon system.
Recommendation 6-5. The Air Force should commit to establishing processes
and resources that support consideration of a blended organic–contractor
partnership early in the program life cycle and throughout the deployment
and support phases.12
Recommendation 6-9. The Air Force should consider incorporating commer-
cial-like engineering models and data collection and analysis techniques into
the appropriate future platforms and contractually require that these efforts
be compatible with Air Force data systems.
SUSTAINMENT, RECAPITALIZATION, AND MODERNIZATION:
CAN THE AIR FORCE AFFORD TO DO EVERYTHING?
The short answer to this question is no. The high costs associated with Air
Force weapon system sustainment will continue to directly impact the procurement
of replacement and new systems unless significant numbers of legacy aircraft are
retired.13,14 To date, the Air Force sustainment enterprise has been largely success-
ful in meeting the requirements of a 20-year-long, high-operational-tempo period.
Going forward, however, high-level Air Force management, hopefully informed by
12 A blended organic–contractor partnership, as specified in the contract award for a weapon system,
assigns specific responsibilities for sustainment of a weapon system to both the industry contractor
and the organic ALC.
13 Steven Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineer-
ing. 2011. “2012 Budget Request for DoD Science and Technology.” Testimony to the House Armed
Services Committee, March 1. Available at http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings?
ContentRecord_id=b68a8831-3c7f-4ca2-a901-046b50eaa90d&Statement_id=7ea6c379-4499-4e88-
b064-37e7b4d3f2d2&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group_
id=13e47ffa-0753-47a7-ad5e-1ba7592015c9&MonthDisplay=3&YearDisplay=201. Accessed April
22, 2011.
14 Erin Conaton, Under Secretary of the United States Air Force. 2011. “The Future of the Air Force.”
Speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Military Strategy Forum, March 31.
Available at http://csis.org/event/future-air-force. Accessed April 24, 2011.
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U. s . A i R f o Rc e ’ s A i Rc R A f t s U s tA i n m e n t n e e d s fUtURe
14 in the
the recommendations in this report, will be called upon to effect organizational
and operational improvements to make the Air Force sustainment enterprise more
efficient. It cannot be known to what extent this report has been affected by not
having insight into internal Air Force deliberations on the Defense Efficiencies
Initiative. Even so, the findings and recommendations in this report stand on their
own and reflect the synthesis of a voluminous amount of information.
Finally, What if the Air Force were to fully implement the recommendations
in this report? Many of the recommendations will focus management and leadership
attention with commensurate authority, relieve the stress of organizational conflicts,
and improve efficiencies across the board and can be done without investment other
than that of personnel time. In addition, the actions recommended throughout the
report are expected to achieve long-term cost reductions that can help to produce
a strong and affordable Air Force sustainment enterprise. Some recommendations,
such as those for dramatically improving the supply of spare parts and implement-
ing an enterprise resource planning system, will require up-front investments but
can result in future cost savings. Other recommendations will require up-front
expenditures—for example, funding for the most pressing sustainment needs of
depot plant and capital equipment—to avoid future support impacts. In summary,
this report presents recommendations aimed at improving the effectiveness and
efficiency of the Air Force weapon system sustainment enterprise and at driving
cost reductions over the long term.
