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Summary
In May 2010, the National Research Council (NRC) was asked by NASA to address several questions related
to the Astronaut Corps. The NRC’s Committee on Human Spaceflight Crew Operations was tasked to answer
several questions:
1. How should the role and size of the activities managed by the Johnson Space Center Flight Crew Opera -
tions Directorate change after space shuttle retirement and completion of the assembly of the International Space
Station (ISS)?
2. What are the requirements for crew-related ground-based facilities after the Space Shuttle program ends?
3. Is the fleet of aircraft used for training the Astronaut Corps a cost-effective means of preparing astronauts
to meet the requirements of NASA’s human spaceflight program? Are there more cost-effective means of meeting
these training requirements?
Although the future of NASA’s human spaceflight program has garnered considerable discussion in recent years
and there is considerable uncertainty about what the program will involve in the coming years, the committee was
not tasked to address whether human spaceflight should continue or what form it should take. The committee’s
task restricted it to studying activities managed by the Flight Crew Operations Directorate or those closely related
to its activities, such as crew-related ground-based facilities and the training aircraft.
COMMITTEE APPROACH
To conduct this study, the committee visited NASA’s Johnson Space Center (JSC) and sought information
from the center’s Flight Crew Operations Directorate (FCOD), which is responsible for selecting and training
astronauts for future missions, and from the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD), which is responsible for
facilities and mission-specific training for flight and ground crews. The committee did not address ground-based
human spaceflight facilities or activities that did not directly support ground-based training, such as astronaut
exercises and the flight surgeon’s office.
The committee was briefed by a former astronaut who held senior management positions in NASA and by
NASA Headquarters officials who had responsibility for human spaceflight, including the associate administrator
for safety and mission assurance, who explained the role of crew training in NASA’s overall approach to safety
1
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2 PREPARING FOR THE HIGH FRONTIER
and mission assurance. In addition, the committee sought input from potential providers of future commercially
procured human spacecraft, such as SpaceX and Sierra Nevada Corp., and from the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA), which is responsible for licensing commercial launch vehicles in the United States and is expected to
play a role in licensing future commercial human spacecraft. And it received briefings on training practices of the
Naval Reactors Program and the commercial airline industry.
The committee received substantial cooperation and assistance from the Flight Crew Operations Directorate,
including the chief of the Astronaut Office and members of her staff. The committee assessed the information
provided to it by FCOD in presentations and the planning tools used by FCOD and the Astronaut Office. That
cooperation made it possible for the committee to explore all aspects of its task. Taking into consideration questions
posed by the committee during its meetings and questions submitted directly to the Astronaut Office, in March
2011 the Astronaut Office produced a white paper containing substantial amounts of information directly relevant
to the committee’s task.1 Throughout this report, the committee uses graphics provided by NASA in that white
paper, which is referred to in the report as “NASA Astronaut Office 2011 White Paper.”
SUMMARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Question 1—Role and Size of the Flight Crew Operations Activities
NASA’s Astronaut Office, which is part of FCOD at JSC, is responsible for managing NASA’s Astronaut
Corps, which the committee defines as the set of astronauts qualified to fly into space, excluding astronauts who
have transitioned to management positions in the agency and are no longer eligible to fly space missions. The
Astronaut Corps has been reduced substantially since it reached a peak of nearly 150 in 2000. In May 2011,
the Astronaut Corps consisted of 61 persons, and NASA has projected a minimum required Astronaut Corps
of 55-60 astronauts through 2016. In 2009, the agency selected a new class of nine astronaut candidates for
addition to the Astronaut Corps in 2011. It is expected that the new class will compensate for any attrition and
help to ensure long-term sustainment of a skilled U.S. Astronaut Corps.
Although NASA’s human spaceflight program and its post-shuttle crew requirements have not been well
defined except in terms of the ISS, the committee concluded that the sizing of the Astronaut Corps to meet ISS
crew requirements has been well modeled by using as input ISS crew selection, training and flight recovery times,
and a post-shuttle force reduction plan. NASA uses a model to predict the minimum staffing requirements and
then applies an arbitrary management margin to the result (Figure S.1).
According to a presentation by the chief of the Astronaut Office to the committee during its first meeting,
the model produces a theoretical minimum and does not include several real-world constraints, such as mission-
required skills mix, temporary or permanent medical disqualification, inability of astronauts returning from a long-
duration mission to fly another long-duration mission at the end of the normal 1.5-year recovery period, and the
desired pairing of inexperienced and experienced astronauts on new assignments. In light of those unpredictable
constraints, a 25 percent margin, as shown in Figure S.1, is factored into the model used to determine the size of
the Astronaut Corps that will meet the minimum manifest requirement.
The committee notes that in addition to substantially reducing the size of the Astronaut Corps recently, NASA
has reduced the management margin that it applies to its model. The margin, which was 50 percent, was reduced in
2010 to 25 percent, apparently because of budget pressures. According to the chief of the Astronaut Office, “The
corps requirements will always be greater than the manifest analysis, and 25 percent may not be enough margin.” 2
The committee notes that new sources of uncertainty have been identified in the human spaceflight program.
For example, a relatively new medical condition has been observed among astronauts returning from long-duration
space missions: papilledema, a swelling of the optic disk. The condition has led to several Astronaut Corps mem-
1
NASA Astronaut Office, “Ensuring the Readiness of the Astronaut Corps: A White Paper,” NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, Tex.,
March 25, 2011.
2 P.A. Whitson, Astronaut Office, “Presentation to the NRC Committee on Human Spaceflight Crew Operations,” presentation to the Com-
mittee on Human Spaceflight Crew Operations, January 6, National Research Council, Washington, D.C., 2011, p. 36.
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SUMMARY
FIGURE S.1 NASA’s formula for determining minimum manifest requirements for staffing. SOURCE: NASA Astronaut Of -
fice, “Ensuring the Readiness of the Astronaut Corps: A White Paper,” NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, Tex., March
25, 2011.
bers’ being medically disqualified from flying again until the condition improves. In the past, attrition rates for
the Astronaut Corps were based on rates for both space shuttle and ISS missions. As NASA transitions to only
long-duration ISS missions, it is difficult to predict attrition rates. After their first long-duration ISS mission,
members of the Astronaut Corps might choose to leave the corps rather than fly another long-duration mission
with its attendant stresses on family and home life.
The development of future spacecraft also involves programmatic uncertainties. NASA has traditionally
assigned astronauts roles in the development of new vehicles to benefit from their insight regarding design and
for reasons of safety and mission assurance. According to NASA, those roles need to be filled by members of the
Astronaut Corps who will ultimately fly in the vehicles, not by management astronauts (former astronauts who
are no longer eligible for flight assignment and who do not use NASA aircraft or other training facilities except
as instructors, evaluators, mentors, or providers of expertise).3 However, as presented to the committee, NASA’s
calculations for sizing the Astronaut Corps focused on preparing for planned missions and did not provide for
filling those additional roles.
Viewed as a supply chain, astronaut selection and training are sensitive to critical shortfalls because of the
long lead times and long recovery time between missions and because astronauts, trained for specific roles and
missions, cannot be easily interchanged.
On the basis of its assessment of known and potential needs, the committee concluded that the currently
projected minimum target size for the active Astronaut Corps poses a risk to the U.S. investment in human space -
flight capabilities; in particular, the committee notes that the planned Astronaut Corps, sized only to meet ISS
crew requirements, would not have the flexibility to accommodate unexpected increases in attrition or commercial,
exploration, and new mission development tasks. Because of various sources of uncertainty and because multiple
factors are involved in the training of members of the Astronaut Corps and the operation of spacecraft in orbit, it
is not possible to quantify the risk posed by tight margins or size or to provide a confidence level of risk. Never-
theless, the committee concluded that the Astronaut Corps is vital to the safe and successful operation of the ISS
and that reducing its size too much can create shortages of key skills.
It currently takes 2 years to train a new astronaut in the full range of ISS skills and the fundamentals of space-
flight, aviation, and NASA programs. A newly hired astronaut is not given a technical assignment until about a year
after being hired, and training continues. But that new hire will not generally be credible in representing NASA
and the Astronaut Corps in, for example, commercial spaceflight, development of beyond-low-Earth-orbit (LEO)
spacecraft, or supporting complex ISS operations or emergencies. (New astronauts are, however, highly skilled
in their own fields from the outset and could provide immediate expertise in those fields, such as test-piloting,
research, and engineering development.)
NASA would be able to respond to long-term programmatic commitments by hiring new classes oriented
to them, but the most valuable personnel to retain are those with spaceflight experience and long experience in
3 Management astronauts can serve as instructors, evaluators, mentors, or providers of expertise and in most cases do not use “additional”
training assets. These training assets are being used in the normal course of the event that the astronaut, or whoever would act in that role, is
supporting. (In a very small number of cases, additional resources may be required for the astronaut instructor to keep current, but, again, this
would be required of any instructor.)
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NASA’s operations and development programs. FCOD will not have the luxury of hiring new people to deal with
a serious failure aboard the ISS or in the early stages of the development and oversight of commercial spacecraft
and spacecraft beyond LEO.
NASA’s Astronaut Office, which includes both the Astronaut Corps and such additional personnel as manage-
ment astronauts no longer qualified to fly on space missions, supports several tasks. During its study, the committee
noted that the Astronaut Office did not explicitly identify providing operational knowledge and corporate memory
of human spaceflight as among its tasks, although this responsibility is implicit in the work that the Astronaut
Office does. As a result, the committee specifically identified provision of operational knowledge and corporate
memory of human spaceflight as one of the Astronaut Office’s tasks, but it notes that maintaining this capability
does not drive the minimum manifest requirement for members of the Astronaut Corps.
NASA plans to make periodic selections of a relatively small number of new astronaut candidates over the
next few years. The committee believes that that is appropriate and that it is up to NASA to determine how often
to make such selections; the committee’s recommendation concerns only the model for calculating requirements.
Findings and Recommendations on the Role and Size of the Activities Managed by FCOD 4
Finding 2.1a. NASA’s current Astronaut Office’s role is to support six tasks (in priority order): 5
1. Provide well-trained spaceflight operators to support the NASA flight manifest.
2. Provide ground support personnel for tasks required specifically to support the NASA flight
manifest.
3. Provide support for new program development, ranging from development of relatively small pay -
loads and equipment to development of whole new spacecraft designs.
4. Provide operational knowledge and corporate memory of human spaceflight.
5. Provide for collaboration with other government and private organizations as needed and directed
by NASA.
6. Provide support for public and educational outreach to society.
The first task is the one in FCOD’s model that drives the size of the Astronaut Corps—the number of astronauts
qualified to fly in space. But the demands of tasks 2 through 6 add to the workload. The committee supports these
roles as a proper use of an important core capability both now and into the future.
Management (inactive) astronauts serving in civil service positions in the Astronaut Office provide supple-
mental support for tasks 2 through 6. They do not use training assets except as instructors, evaluators, mentors,
or providers of expertise; are ineligible for flight; and do not provide a reserve capacity for flight assignments.
Finding 2.1b. Although NASA’s human spaceflight program and its post-shuttle crew requirements have
not been well defined beyond operation of the ISS, the sizing of the Astronaut Corps to meet ISS crew
requirements has been well modeled by using ISS crew selection, training and flight recovery times, and
a plan for post-shuttle force reduction.
Finding 2.1c. Astronaut anthropometric (physical size) limitations for flying in the Soyuz limit flexibility
in crew assignments in response to contingencies.
Conclusion 2.1. On the basis of its assessment of known and potential needs, the committee concluded
that the currently projected minimum staffing target size for the active Astronaut Corps poses a risk to
the U.S. investment in human spaceflight capabilities. The committee concluded that given the array of
potential crew assignment constraints and uncertainty in future requirements, the Astronaut Corps appears
4 The numbering of the findings and recommendations mirrors their numbering in Chapters 2 and 3.
5 NASA identified tasks 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6; the committee has added task 4.
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SUMMARY
to be sized below the minimum required. The committee notes that the current plan for the size of the
Astronaut Corps does not have the flexibility to accommodate commercial, exploration, and new mission
development tasks or unexpected increases in attrition.
Recommendation 2.1.
• The committee recommends that the factor for uncertainty used by the Astronaut Office in its model
to determine minimum staffing requirements for the Astronaut Corps be increased above the current 25
percent, which is inadequate to provide sufficient flexibility to meet the current flight manifest require-
ments reliably.
• In addition to task 1, the Astronaut Office should maintain the staff required to accomplish tasks 2
through 6 as listed in Finding 2.1a.
Finding 2.2. In addition to the need to meet NASA requirements, there is an expectation on the part of
commercial crew providers and the Federal Aviation Administration that FCOD expertise and capabilities
will be available in the future.
Recommendation 2.2. NASA’s Flight Crew Operations Directorate should continue to serve as a national
resource for U.S. human spaceflight experience and knowledge. This resource should be
• Maintained to ensure appropriate staffing and training of the Astronaut Corps in support of the Inter-
national Space Station manifest;
• Applied to the future development of NASA human spaceflight and exploration activities;
• Available to the emerging commercial space industry and the FAA; and
• Applied to support authorized agreements with international partners.
Question 2—Ground-Based Training Facilities
The committee assessed the requirements for ground-based training and simulation facilities, such as the
Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory, the ISS part-task trainers, and the shuttle simulators. It found that the NASA plan
for the size and tasks of the Astronaut Corps to support the on-orbit and ground requirements for the ISS will use
both high-performance aircraft maintained by the JSC FCOD and ISS mission-specific ground facilities main-
tained by the JSC MOD. The committee found that after space shuttle retirement the mission-specific spaceflight
operations requirements for crew will shift from shuttle operations and ISS assembly to Soyuz and ISS operations,
ISS maintenance, and emergency response. The committee believes that to accomplish training for those tasks,
more specifically to be able to respond to on-orbit problems safely and successfully, NASA will need to maintain
the current ISS training facilities. As the requirements for commercial crew support and the future human space
exploration program become clearer, there may be a need for additional astronauts and new flight or ground-based
training facilities.
Findings and Recommendations on Ground-Based Facilities
Finding 3.1. The NASA plan for post-shuttle retirement of shuttle-specific training facilities is gener-
ally appropriate. However, the Shuttle Engineering Simulator Dome may be useful in training for future
activities, such as rendezvous and docking operations during commercial transportation of ISS crew.
Recommendation 3.1. NASA should evaluate potential future requirements for the Shuttle Engineering
Simulator Dome and, if it will be needed, should preserve this facility.
Finding 3.2a. Now that the shuttle is retired, the specific spaceflight crew operations shift from shuttle
operations and ISS assembly to Soyuz and ISS nominal and emergency operations, ISS payload opera-
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tions, and ISS maintenance. The requirements for training of flight crews for those ISS operations include
emergency response training, extravehicular activity operations, and the full suite of nominal operations
for U.S. and international partner ISS elements, including Soyuz. Thus, the ISS ground-based training
facilities are required for the support of crew training for future operations and maintenance of the ISS.
Finding 3.2b. The requirements for U.S. astronaut training include international partner ISS element
operations at international partner facilities and Soyuz operations in Russia. The U.S. international partner
agreements also require that the United States provide for enhancing skill proficiency and training for
the international partner astronauts.
Recommendation 3.2. NASA should retain the capability and training facilities to conduct International
Space Station (ISS) mission-specific training after retirement of the space shuttle to ensure the continued
safety and mission success of ISS operations.
Question 3—Aircraft Training
Ground-based simulators for spaceflight missions are used for approximately 90 percent of crew training.
Only a small part of the training, designated by NASA as spaceflight readiness training (SFRT), puts the crew into
operational environments in which they share some aspects of the fast dynamics, physical stress, and risk found
in spaceflight. This kind of training is currently accomplished primarily by using a T-38N Talon two-person jet,
a high-performance training aircraft that was originally purchased by the Air Force as a fighter pilot trainer more
than 50 years ago. (Flight in the T-38N represents 10 percent of the training time for unassigned astronauts and 5
percent of the training time for those assigned to an upcoming mission. The most significant constraint on assigned
astronauts’ acquiring flight time is that they are training overseas for a great deal of time.)
It is important to emphasize that SFRT is not just about flying the T-38N as the pilot in command. Instead, it is
about developing the skills and ability to work together in an environment that is fast-paced, is physically stressful,
and carries potentially severe penalties for failure. SFRT involves both the pilot in command of the aircraft and the
person in the backseat, dividing responsibilities. For example, the backseat flyer frequently handles navigation,
communications, and crew resource management duties during flight and must coordinate with the pilot, who is
actually flying the aircraft. Hands-on control of the aircraft by backseaters is a big part of SFRT. SFRT is useful
for many aspects of spaceflight—not only for operation of a spacecraft, such as Soyuz, but for operations onboard
the International Space Station.
NASA currently has a fleet of 21 T-38s for astronaut training and intends to reduce this number to 16 in
2013 because of a planned reduction in the size of the Astronaut Corps. Small “environmental” additions to flight
training include exposure to hypoxia in the JSC high-altitude chamber, a one-time run in the Russian centrifuge
at Star City6 (for a medical evaluation during exposure to ballistic re-entry), and survival training (for water and
land). SFRT is designed to provide evaluation of training and crew performance in an environment that most
closely replicates the physical and psychological stresses of the high-speed dynamic environment of spaceflight.
The committee assessed the value of using high-performance training aircraft, the basis of the projected size
of the current T-38N fleet and alternative aircraft, and the potential for using high-fidelity simulators for SFRT.
The committee also was provided input from the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program regarding its training tools
and experiences and from the commercial aviation industry.
Findings and Recommendations on Spaceflight Readiness Training
Finding 3.3a. The spaceflight readiness training requirement is derived from safety and mission success
requirements, not tied to any specific mission. Although the requirement is not expressly documented
at the NASA Headquarters program level, it was developed by the Flight Crew Operations Directorate
6 The most accurate translation of the Russian name is “Starry Town,” but “Star City” is the common usage at NASA.
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SUMMARY
in response to NASA Headquarters-controlled safety and mission success requirements and embedded
at the level of the NASA JSC Certificate of Flight Readiness for safe operations of flight, which is then
provided to NASA Headquarters. Any changes in spaceflight readiness training need to be made with
great care because changes can result in increased risk to safety and mission success.
Finding 3.3b. Spaceflight readiness training using high-performance aircraft has been demonstrated and
documented to prepare crews for successful and safe spaceflight, dating back 50 years, from the incep-
tion of the Mercury program to the current International Space Station program. SFRT is more than just
flying—the full spectrum of experiences gained is not restricted to the operation of high-performance
aircraft but extrapolates to crew resource management and performance under stress. SFRT is used effec-
tively internationally to produce qualified members of the Astronaut Corps who are independent of crew
position or vehicle design.
Recommendation 3.3. To ensure continued safety and mission success, NASA should maintain a space-
flight readiness training program that includes high-performance aircraft.
Finding 3.4a. FCOD maintains the Astronaut Corps and provides the capability to conduct SFRT.
Finding 3.4b. High-performance aircraft present conditions, including crew disorientation and rapid
fluctuation in G-forces, under which the flight crew must carry out complex tasks in a stressful and poten-
tially life-threatening environment. That combination of unique environments, demand for rapid, critical
decision making, and historical evidence convinced the committee that SFRT provides experience-based
training that cannot be duplicated by current or, to the best of the committee’s knowledge, projected
alternative techniques or technologies.
Finding 3.4c. Given the current investment in the existing T-38N fleet, this fleet is the most cost-effective
means of providing SFRT in the near term. In the long term, new technology that may be a more cost-
effective means of providing SFRT might be demonstrated and proved.
Finding 3.4d. The size of the T-38N SFRT fleet is projected to fall to 16 aircraft in 2013.
Recommendation 3.4. NASA should retain the T-38N fleet for spaceflight readiness training and should
fund the fleet at a level commensurate with the projected required size of the post-shuttle Astronaut Corps.
Finding and Recommendation on Learning from Other Occupations
Finding 3.5. Substantial research is being undertaken on selection and training of personnel in related
high-stress occupations. Some of that work is leading to continually improving methods and technologies
for training for team and individual performance in stressful high-risk situations.
Recommendation 3.5. NASA should continue to monitor training methods and technologies in related
fields for possible ways to enhance the astronaut selection and training process.
ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
Chapter 1 of this report explains the evolution of the U.S. astronaut program, detailing how the Astronaut
Corps has grown and shrunk over time, why it has done so, and how its composition has changed. It also describes
the evolution of the ground training facilities. Finally, it explains how and why spaceflight readiness training that
requires an aircraft training capability was introduced to the program and how that capability has evolved.
Chapter 2 responds to the committee’s first task. It explains the current status of NASA’s FCOD, its Astronaut
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Office, and the Astronaut Corps. It also explains new situations that the human spaceflight program is facing, such
as the introduction of new spacecraft. It provides findings and recommendations concerning the role and size of
the FCOD’s activities and the size of the Astronaut Corps.
Chapter 3 responds to the committee’s second and third tasks regarding ground-based training facilities and
the T-38N fleet. It explains the role of spaceflight readiness training, how it is served by the T-38N fleet of training
aircraft, and possibilities for future simulator-based training; it also notes that other occupations offer potential
lessons for NASA astronaut training. It provides findings and recommendations concerning ground-based training
facilities, the T-38N aircraft fleet, and simulators.
