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1
The Evolution of the U.S. Astronaut Program
In the half century since the flight of Yuri Gagarin, more than 500 people have orbited Earth, of which 24
traveled to the Moon. Approximately 61 percent have been Americans.
With the exception of a handful of self-funded spaceflight participants, Soviet Union guest cosmonauts, and
U.S. shuttle-era payload specialists, those astronauts have all traveled a relatively common road through the mission
selection process. Each was subjected to rigorous medical and psychological screening, basic training in common
academic classroom technical subjects, systems training in the spacecraft being flown, integrated emergency
procedures, and crew-related team building exercises. They also transferred their technical knowledge and train-
ing into the design of the vehicles they flew and into the orbital operation of complex scientific and engineering
research equipment and experiments. They have been considered not just operators but integral participants in the
development and testing of new technologies and vehicles. In addition, they were exposed to both psychologically
and physically stressful environments during training and in the flight environment. Before venturing to the launch
pad, each professional would-be astronaut or cosmonaut endured survival training—the jungles, mountains, or
water—and some mastered the art of parachute jumping or logged hundreds of hours of flight in high-performance
aircraft, all with the goal of being able to perform in highly stressful and unusual environments.
Since 1961, U.S. astronauts have trained on and flown seven spacecraft systems, walked on the Moon, assem-
bled a space station, retrieved satellites, launched and repaired the Hubble Space Telescope and other satellites,
and trained on and executed thousands of scientific and engineering research experiments. Now, with the end of
the Space Shuttle program and its unique training requirements, the NASA Johnson Space Center FCOD and the
Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) Training Division are reviewing astronaut staffing and training facilities
for the future. Future requirements for support of the International Space Station (ISS) are being coordinated with
the ISS international partners, but commercial spaceflight and space exploration beyond low Earth orbit remain
undefined. This transitional period creates uncertainty and challenges for NASA in determining the best staffing
size for the Astronaut Corps.
HISTORY OF THE SIZE OF THE NASA ASTRONAUT CORPS
The number of astronauts qualified to fly in space as part of the Astronaut Corps has varied primarily as a
function of the active flight program flight rate and vehicle crew size capability (Table 1.1). In the early 1960s,
the Astronaut Corps started with seven astronauts during the Mercury program and grew to a high of nearly 150
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TABLE 1.1 U.S. Human Spaceflight Programs
Program Name Vehicle Development Flight Operations Number of Flights Crew Size
Mercury 1958-1961 1961-1963 6 1
Gemini 1958-1965 1965-1966 10 2
Apollo 1960-1968 1968-1975 12 3
Skylab Space Stationa 1966-1973 1973-1974 3 3
Space shuttle 1972-1981 1981-2011 135 2-8
shuttle-Mirb
Space 1995-1998 9 7+
Stationc
International Space 1993-2011 1998-TBD 27 3-6
Constellation Explorationd 2004-2011 Canceled 0
Orion/multipurpose crew vehicle 2005-? NLT 2016? 0 4
aFirst long-duration missions for the United States. Longest of 84 days set world record and established high standard of biomedical data
for long-duration missions.
b Docking between the space shuttle and the Russian Space Station, Mir. Flight of U.S. astronauts on Russian Soyuz to Mir and Russian
cosmonauts onboard the space shuttle. Seven astronauts were left on the Mir for long-duration missions (greater than 90 days). Program used
existing Astronaut Corps (no new selections) but required new vehicle training on Russian Soyuz and Mir Space Station and Russian language
training. In addition, shuttle crews were trained in docking operations with Mir. All Russian vehicle training was executed at Gagarin Cosmo-
naut Training Center in Star City, Russia.
c Flight is defined as “increment,” which is a multimonth mission and separated from the vehicle used to reach or return from the ISS.
d The Exploration Program to the Moon and Mars was canceled in 2010, but the Astronaut Office had been closely involved in requirements
and design.
at the peak of space shuttle flights and preparation for the ISS in 2000. Vehicle habitable volume and flight rate
also increased. The Mercury capsule flew with a crew of one, and the later space shuttle could accommodate a
maximum crew of eight. The ISS hosts an international crew of six. The current size of the active U.S. Astronaut
Corps is 61, and an additional nine astronauts are in training (astronaut candidates, referred to as ASCANs). NASA
has projected a minimum required Astronaut Corps size of 55 to 60 astronauts through 2016.
The size of the Astronaut Corps has historically been aligned not just with the spacecraft being flown at the
time but with future human spaceflight programs in development but not yet flying. Because of the lead time
required to train an astronaut through a basic and then a mission-specific training syllabus—often up to 4 years
for the ISS—the Astronaut Office and the Mission Operations Training Division were required to develop reliable
forecasting algorithms for personnel and facilities. The forecasts also typically tried to accommodate anticipated
astronaut attrition due, for example, to retirements, large gaps in flight opportunities, health issues, and, more
recently, lifetime radiation limits and Russian anthropometric size requirements.
The U.S. human spaceflight program history, from program development to flight operations, is summarized
in Table 1.1. The table does not reflect the current dependence on the Russian Soyuz capsule (three cosmonauts)
to reach the International Space Station after shuttle retirement. With retirement of the space shuttle, flights of
U.S. astronauts to the ISS will decrease from about 28 a year to fewer than 6. However, the time to train for a
mission increases from approximately 1 year for a shuttle to 3-4 years for the ISS. Furthermore, individual astro-
nauts will not be able to fly as frequently on the ISS as on the space shuttle, because of lifetime radiation dose
limits currently imposed on them.
CREW REDUNDANCY AND BACKUPS
The Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs required that a full backup crew be trained for each flight. The
backup astronauts were required when medical problems, or even death, affected the crew manifest. The early
schedules were driven by the Cold War space race, so resources were available to support the missions fully.
Backup crew members were used in the early flights of the space shuttle (STS-1 through STS-4), when the
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ASTRONAUT PROGRAM
crew was limited to two. However, when the flights expanded to four and later to five and then eight, it was decided
to cross-train on the same flight for many of the functions because there were not enough astronauts and training
resources to fully provide for backup crews. Two pilots with dual shuttle controls provided redundancy in space
shuttle landing, which turned out not to have been needed. Mission specialists were generally cross-trained for
on-orbit operations, with two notable exceptions: the flight engineer position (MS2) and for extravehicular activity
(EVA), which required suits of a particular size. Each space shuttle flight required at least two astronauts qualified
for EVA. EVA is also a requirement on the ISS. During this period, if an astronaut had to be replaced, it was assumed
that an astronaut who had flown would be drawn from those awaiting their next flight assignment (Figure 1.1).
In addition, the composition of the Astronaut Corps has evolved substantially as well, and the current corps is
a technically diverse group of people who have widely varied backgrounds and experience. The astronaut program
began with only military test pilots, progressed to include scientist-astronauts during Apollo and Skylab, and now
is composed of test pilots and mission specialists (engineers, scientists, and physicians) and educators and inter-
national partner astronauts sent by their home agencies to train alongside their U.S. colleagues.
The major changes in the professional Astronaut Corps have corresponded with the introduction of new space-
craft designs, with the addition of research to the mission objectives, and with the adoption of new policy goals
for the nation’s human spaceflight programs. The Space Shuttle program, by design, was opened to women and
a more technically diverse set of engineers and scientists (mission specialist astronauts and payload specialists).
FIGURE 1.1 The first U.S. spacewalk was performed by Ed White during the Gemini 4 mission on June 3, 1965. The addition
of new tasks, such as spacewalks, increased astronaut training requirements. SOURCE: Courtesy of NASA.
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12 PREPARING FOR THE HIGH FRONTIER
The space shuttle also opened up the anthropometric limitations for all potential astronaut applicants and allowed
larger men (95th percentile) and smaller women (5th percentile) to be qualified for selection.
Beginning with the Space Shuttle program, additional crew members have trained with the professional astro-
nauts. They included payload specialists—career scientists and engineers who typically flew only once and then
returned to their home laboratories or companies. They were often principal investigators and trained typically
for more than 18 months on the mission research manifested with the Spacelab but for only 6 months with the
crew and space shuttle systems. Some were corporate researchers. Eventually, this category would be expanded
to include spaceflight participants, who were general observers of the spaceflight experience. Approximately 60
payload specialists have flown with the Space Shuttle program.
Table 1.2 shows 20 selected and announced classes of astronauts from 1959 to 2009, a span of 50 years: 148
pilots, 17 scientist-astronauts (Apollo era), 163 mission specialists (space shuttle to present), 35 international
partner astronauts (Japan, Europe, and Canada), and three educators. All were trained in the training facilities at
the NASA Johnson Space Center.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the historical Astronaut Corps size and trends from 1959 to the present. Several trends
TABLE 1.2 Astronaut Class Composition from 1959 to 2009
Apollo
and Skylab Mission International
Year Class # Pilots Scientists Specialists Partners Educators Total
1959 1 7 0 0 0 0 7
1962 2 9 0 0 0 0 9
14a
1963 3 14
6b
1965 4 6
19c
1966 5 19
11d
1967 6 11
1969 7 7 7
1978 8 13 22 35
21e
1980 9 8 11 2
1984 10 7 10 17
14f
1985 11 6 8
1987 12 7 8 15
1990 13 7 16 23
24g
1992 14 4 15 5
1995 15 10 9 4 23
1996 16 10 25 9 44
1998 17 8 17 7 32
2000 18 7 10 17
14h
2004 19 2 6 3 3
2009 20 3 6 5 14
Total 148 17 163 35 3 366
aFour died in training accidents before they could fly.
bFour had prior military experience. Two left NASA without having flown in space. All had delayed flight assignments because of the
requirement that they spend a year at U.S. Air Force (USAF) Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) to be jet pilot qualified.
c All with military experience. One died in an accident before flight, one left because of illness before flight.
d All had delayed flight assignments because of the requirement that they spend a year at USAF UPT to be jet pilot qualified. Seven
remained after Apollo and formed the core of the space shuttle mission specialists before the 1978 astronaut selection. Four did not complete
training for flight.
e First two European Space Agency (ESA) astronauts to be assigned to train as mission specialists. Trained for first year and then returned
to ESA for payload training. One was professional commercial and military pilot.
f First teacher in place, Christa McAuliffe, assigned but trained in “payload specialist” curricula, which generally started 6 months before
launch. Number not counted in total.
g International partner astronauts announced with NASA classes. Participated as mission specialists, including T-38N training, before flight.
h Educators trained as full mission specialists, including T-38N spaceflight readiness training. Does not include the Russian cosmonauts,
who announce their own classes, even though they are part of future joint ISS and Soyuz crews.
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ASTRONAUT PROGRAM
FIGURE 1.2 Historic Astronaut Corps population, December 15, 2010. SOURCE: NASA Astronaut Office, “Ensuring the
Readiness of the Astronaut Corps: A White Paper,” NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, Tex., March 25, 2011.
are notable: (1) the decrease in office size during the flight gap between Apollo and the space shuttle, (2) the
increase in size with the advent of the shuttle and the ISS, (3) the decrease after the Challenger accident with its
flight gap, and (4) the steady decline starting in 2000 as a result of policy decisions and an understanding that the
ISS would require fewer astronauts over longer periods.
HISTORY OF ASTRONAUT CORPS SELECTION CRITERIA AND AVIATION EXPERIENCE
When they began their human spaceflight programs, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China all initially
selected crews from their aviation populations, primarily high-performance jet aircraft. They initially did that for
skill screening reasons, and all three countries then sought to maintain that proficiency for a variety of skill and
safety reasons. The United States and Russia, however, have substantially expanded the population from which they
select astronauts or cosmonauts to include those who have little or no aviation experience. Russian cosmonauts
now include design engineers from Energia, the primary contractor for its spacecraft. The U.S. program includes
a wide variety of scientists, engineers, and physicians.
Before Apollo, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his advisers considered many occupations for the first
astronauts, including mountain climbers, deep sea divers, and other physically risky occupations. Test pilots were
chosen because their operationally fast-paced flight environment (requiring rapid and critical decision making
skills) and man-machine interface skills (working in an enclosed multitasking environment) were most applicable to
the rigors anticipated in spaceflight. Test pilots were also researchers who provided more than piloting skills: they
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could analytically assess the performance of new vehicles. It was also determined that psychologically and from
a skill point of view they had already been evaluated by the military, and this would shorten the overall training
time. To a large extent, those selected to become astronauts had already been screened to determine whether they
could perform in an intense and hazardous flight environment. The final determination to select military test pilots
was made by President Eisenhower, notably in large part because of potential classified aspects of the program. 1
Mercury
The first members of the NASA Astronaut Corps (Group I, Mercury 7) were all active-duty military test pilots
or graduates of the Air Force or Navy test pilot school who had at least 1,500 hours of flying time. The Mercury
astronaut training program was divided into six major topic sections:
The primary requirement, of course, is to train the astronaut to operate the vehicle. In addition, it is desirable that he
have good background knowledge of such scientific areas related to space flight as propulsion, trajectories, astrono-
my, and astrophysics. He must be exposed to and familiarized with the conditions of space flight such as acceleration,
weightlessness, heat, vibration, noise, and disorientation. He must prepare himself physically for those stresses which
he will encounter in space flight. . . . An aspect of the training which might be overlooked is the maintenance of the
flying skill which was an important factor in his original selection for the Mercury program. 2
The Mercury astronauts, in addition to classroom training and travel to all the spacecraft development sites,
participated in centrifuge training, flew on the parabolic aircraft, and flew high-performance aircraft. In the ver-
nacular of the time, “high performance” was defined as jet powered and capable of supersonic speeds, aerobatics,
and high-G loads or variable acceleration. Mercury astronauts also helped to test their own pressure suits in various
thermal environments and under reduced pressure. (See Figures 1.3 and 1.4.)
In 1960, Lieutenant Robert Voas, a U.S. Navy Medical Service Corps officer assigned to NASA’s Space Task
Group during the Mercury program, explained the aviation requirements for astronaut training in the early years
of NASA’s human spaceflight program:
One of the continuing problems in training for space flight is the limited opportunity for actual flight practice and
proficiency training. The total flight time in the Mercury capsule will be no more than 4 to 5 hours over a period of
3 years for each astronaut. The question arises as to whether all the skills required in operating the Mercury vehicle
can be maintained purely through ground simulation. One problem with ground simulation relates to its primary
benefit. Flying a ground simulator never results in injury to the occupant or damage to the equipment. The penalty
for failure is merely the requirement to repeat the exercise. In actual flight operations, failures are penalized far more
severely. A major portion of the astronaut’s tasks involves high level decision making. It seems questionable whether
skill in making such decisions can be maintained under radically altered motivational conditions. Under the assump-
tion that vigilant decision making is best maintained by experience in flight operations, the Mercury astronauts have
been provided with the opportunity to fly high-performance aircraft. The program in this area is a result of their own
interest and initiative and is made possible by the loan and maintenance of two F-102 aircraft by the Air Force. . . .
Finally, it seems important to reiterate the requirements for reproducing adequate motivational conditions in the
training program. The basic task of the astronaut is to make critical decisions under adverse conditions. The results
of the decisions he makes involve not just minor discomforts or annoyances, but major loss of equipment and even
survival. Performance of this task requires a vigilance and decision making capability difficult to achieve under the
1 “The inherent riskiness of space flight and the potential national security implications of the program, pointed toward the use of military
personnel. It also narrowed and refined the candidate pool, giving NASA a reasonable starting point for selection. It also made good sense in
that NASA envisioned the Astronaut Corps first as pilots operating experimental flying machines, and only later as working scientists.” John
Logsdon and Roger Launius, eds., Exploring the Unknown, Volume VII, Human Spaceflight: Projects Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo , NASA,
2008, p. 13.
2 J. Logsdon and R. Launius, eds., Exploring the Unknown, Volume VII, Human Spaceflight: Projects Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo , NASA,
Washington, D.C., 2008.
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ASTRONAUT PROGRAM
FIGURE 1.3 Mercury capsule 2 pictured at what was formerly Lewis Hangar (now Glenn Research Center) in Cleveland, Ohio.
Mercury required only a single astronaut. Later spacecraft could carry more astronauts and increased the need for astronauts.
SOURCE: Great Images in NASA; GPN-2000-000382; courtesy of NASA.
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16 PREPARING FOR THE HIGH FRONTIER
FIGURE 1.4 The Mercury 7 astronauts pose beside an F-106B Delta Dart. SOURCE: Courtesy of NASA; GPN-2000-001286,
available at http://grin.hq.nasa.gov/.
artificial conditions of ground simulation. It appears probable that training in ground devices should be augmented
with flight operations to provide realistic operational conditions. 3
When the Astronaut Corps reached 24 active pilots, the Manned Spacecraft Center recognized the need for a
regular squadron of planes to keep the crew flying skills sharp. 4 Astronauts were flying in a limited fleet of T-33s
and F-102s, but NASA finally narrowed down the selection of permanent aircraft to the F-4 Phantom and the T-38
Talon. They decided on the T-38 because of cost and the fact that it was a well-supported U.S. Air Force (USAF)
trainer. The Air Force loaned NASA 5 T-38s in early 1964, but NASA quickly purchased a fleet of 25 T-38s.
The fleet of T-38 aircraft was maintained by NASA at the former Ellington Air Force Base near Johnson Space
Center. The aircraft were eventually used by both the professional pilot astronauts and the scientist-astronauts to
introduce and maintain skills deemed necessary for successful and safe spaceflight; this activity became known
as spaceflight readiness training (SFRT).
3 R.B. Voas, NASA Space Task Group, “Project Mercury Astronaut Training Program,” May 30, 1960, Document I-31, pp. 161-172, in
Exploring the Unknown, Volume VII, Human Spaceflight: Projects Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo (J. Logsdon and R. Launius, eds.), NASA,
Washington, D.C., 2008.
4 D. Slayton and M. Cassutt, Deke!, Forge Books, Tom Doherty, Inc., New York, N.Y., 1995, p. 142.
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ASTRONAUT PROGRAM
FIGURE 1.5 The Gemini program not only increased the number of astronauts that were required for each spacecraft but added
new operations, such as rendezvous, that increased training requirements. Here is a multiple exposure of the Gemini Rendezvous
Docking Simulator. SOURCE: Courtesy of NASA/William Salyer; GPN-2000-001278, available at http://grin.hq.nasa.gov/.
Gemini and Apollo
With the approval of the Apollo program in May 1961 and the projected need for astronauts who would fly
the missions (and play a lead role in hardware development and in the development of new procedures, such as
rendezvous and docking), the agency returned to the test pilot pool for its next selection; this time, however, civil-
ians, including NASA employees, were allowed to apply. Nine new astronauts were selected in September 1962
(Group II), bringing the total Astronaut Office size to 16. (See Figures 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8.)
NASA preferred to select experienced test pilots as astronauts, not just for their proven ability to operate in
high-stress environments but for their engineering expertise in high-tech development programs. Group II included
two civilians who had military test flying experience, four men from the Air Force, and three from the Navy. Three
had master’s degrees in engineering, four had bachelor’s degrees in engineering, and two had bachelor’s degrees
in science from the Naval Academy.
Believing that the program needed an Astronaut Corps of 24 to crew Gemini and Apollo, NASA management
conducted a new recruitment in 1963 (Group III) that gave preference to test pilots but allowed for the selection of
candidates with only 1,000 hours of high-performance jet flying time. Fourteen new astronauts were announced in
October 1963, bringing the total Astronaut Office head count to 30. Group III included eight holders of advanced
degrees and two civilians.
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18 PREPARING FOR THE HIGH FRONTIER
FIGURE 1.6 The Gemini 7 spacecraft as observed from the Gemini 6 spacecraft during rendezvous maneuvers. SOURCE:
Courtesy of NASA; GPN-2000-001049, available at http://grin.hq.nasa.gov/.
Scientist-Astronauts and the Apollo Applications Program
With encouragement from the National Academy of Sciences and other outside agencies, beginning in 1964,
NASA began to consider the selection of scientists as astronauts for Apollo lunar exploration and Earth orbital
missions. Candidates for the scientist-astronaut position could be but were not required to be pilots. The candidates
were required to hold a doctoral degree in medicine, engineering, or one of the natural sciences. The National Acad-
emy of Sciences screened and evaluated the applications for scientific criteria, and NASA made the final selection.
Of the six candidates selected in June 1965 (Group IV), two were experienced pilots. The other four, as planned,
were sent to USAF undergraduate pilot training for a year to qualify in the T-38, which NASA had adopted as its
primary aircraft. One candidate withdrew from the program during flight school.
In 1965 and 1966, NASA’s long-term schedule called for as many as 30 Apollo Extension Program (AEP) or
Apollo Applications Program (AAP) missions from 1969 to the middle 1970s. The agency therefore conducted a
new round of selections in two phases: First, a new group of pilot-astronauts were selected according to the same
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ASTRONAUT PROGRAM
FIGURE 1.7 Technicians make final inspections of the Gemini 3 spacecraft in the spacecraft preparation room at Kennedy
Space Center. SOURCE: Courtesy of NASA; GPN-2006-000016, available at http://grin.hq.nasa.gov/.
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26 PREPARING FOR THE HIGH FRONTIER
FIGURE 1.14 Astronaut Alan Bean speaking to engineers at Grumman, the manufacturer of the Lunar Module, in 1966. After
the January 1967 Apollo 1 fire, astronauts became more integrated into the design and development of the spacecraft that they
would fly. SOURCE: Courtesy of Northrop Grumman History Center.
FIGURE 1.15 T-38N jets in flight over NASA’s Dryden Flight Research Center in California. SOURCE: NASA/Jim Ross;
ED07-0222-06, available at http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/multimedia/.
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ASTRONAUT PROGRAM
to staff and support a shuttle flight rate of 8-10 missions per year and proposed space station missions. A new
selection was planned for 1986 when the Challenger accident occurred.
The Challenger Accident in 1986 and Implications for the Astronaut Corps
After Challenger, the Space Shuttle program was grounded until return to flight in 1988, and almost all
astronauts were assigned to various technical jobs to support the investigation and the recertification of the space
shuttle and all its components. The Teachers in Space program largely ended, but payload specialists were still
being selected. Anticipating the continuation of the Space Shuttle program and the space station, NASA continued
to recruit.
The investigation report made clear recommendations about including astronauts into more support roles in the
management structure to ensure mission safety. Some astronauts accepted temporary assignments into field center
and Headquarters positions, and others eventually left their flight careers to accept permanent civil service positions.
The Post-Challenger Shuttle Era: 1988-2011
In mid-1993, NASA and the newly formed Russian Space Agency (RSA) signed an agreement to initiate a
joint program to dock the space shuttle to the Mir space station in the expectation that RSA would join the Inter-
national Space Station. The new project also called for U.S. support astronauts in Star City who had to acquire
Russian language skills, and this eventually became a training opportunity for future Mir crew selection. The project
required more astronauts than had been anticipated in the staffing models, and Russian language was added to the
NASA astronaut training curricula. (See Figures 1.16, 1.17, and 1.18.)
The ISS Era
With the development of the International Space Station (an ISS training cycle could take 4 years for each
astronaut) came the expectation that astronauts would again be required and expected to support the new vehicle
design. The agency was flying four or five shuttle missions each year in addition to ISS expeditions, and the
Astronaut Office reached its peak staffing size of nearly 150 in 1999. Mission support was intense and geographi-
cally diverse. The planet-wide geographical spread of training strained crew time to support ISS design and safety
boards at the various NASA centers. (See Figure 1.18.)
By 2004, however, the Columbia accident and the planned end of the Space Shuttle program caused NASA to
slow and shrink astronaut candidate recruitments. Eleven were selected in June 2004; these were the first astronaut
candidates to be told that they might not fly on a shuttle (all did). An additional nine were selected in June 2009.
(See Figures 1.19 and 1.20.)
HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ROLE OF THE ASTRONAUT OFFICE
The Astronaut Office is a part of the Flight Crew Operations Directorate, which also includes Aircraft Opera-
tions. This structure has matured over the last 40 years but has varied little.
The Astronaut Office, like many other flight crews in “test and development” organizations, is internally orga-
nized to support both the ongoing missions with trained crew (this drives the office size) and mission development
and safety. Many of the roles would be considered normal operations in other flight test organizations, such as the
Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB, California, the Navy Flight Test Center at Patuxent River, Maryland,
and the commercial Boeing test flight program in Seattle, Washington. Astronauts are required to sign off on mul-
tiple steps of the safety process, including the Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR), before each spaceflight.
Although selected to support the mission manifest, the Astronaut Corps is also used as subject matter experts
in the development of future spacecraft and research payloads by providing design expertise and lessons learned.
Astronauts selected for specific engineering or scientific expertise (such as materials scientists, astronomers, and
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FIGURE 1.16 Russia’s Mir Space Station seen against a blue and white backdrop of Earth by the space shuttle Atlantis after
undocking in June 1995. SOURCE: Courtesy of NASA; available at http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/history/shuttle-mir/multimedia/
sts-71-photos/71p-021.htm.
physicians) were assigned to help in the design of payloads or experiments and engineering tests identified for
flight.
Astronauts are also responsible for evaluation, testing, and development of new vehicle designs, hardware, and
operations (such as the rapid prototyping laboratory). They formally sit on and are voting members of a number
of design and safety boards. They are integral to the development of flight procedures, which generally change
with each mission.
HISTORY OF NASA GROUND TRAINING FACILITIES AND
ALLOCATION FOR SPACEFLIGHT READINESS TRAINING
Astronaut training must cover a wide array of skills, which require a variety of training facilities. The definition,
design, and funding of ground-based simulators is the responsibility of an organization in the Mission Operations
Directorate (MOD). MOD is also the parent organization of the Mission Control Center (MCC) and its flight con-
trollers. MOD works with the Astronaut Office in the development of simulator and training requirements. Until
the late 1980s, MOD was also in FCOD.
Computer-driven simulators were first developed in support of the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs
(Figures 1.21 and 1.22). Many of the simulators, including the ones for the Lunar Module and the Lunar Rover,
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ASTRONAUT PROGRAM
FIGURE 1.17 Crew members from STS-71, Mir-18, and Mir-19 pose for an in-flight picture. SOURCE: Courtesy of NASA;
GPN-2002-000061, available at http://grin.hq.nasa.gov/.
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30 PREPARING FOR THE HIGH FRONTIER
FIGURE 1.18 The International Space Station orbiting Earth as seen from STS-102. SOURCE: Courtesy of NASA, available
at http://mix.msfc.nasa.gov/abstracts.php?p=1644.
were primarily mechanical emulators. Others, such as the capsules, were high-fidelity physical environments and
could cause instruments and surrounding environments to emulate both normal operations and emergency opera-
tions. The training organization strove to keep the trainers under configuration control so that there would be no
surprises for the crew when they operated the real vehicle.
The MOD Training Division works closely with FCOD to ensure that simulators and other trainers provide the
appropriate fidelity, and both MOD and FCOD are responsible for ensuring that crews pass training tests before
flight. The introduction of each new spacecraft and new tasks (such as EVAs and rendezvous and docking) led
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FIGURE 1.19 NASA astronaut candidates Christopher Cassidy (left), Jose Hernandez (middle), and Japan Aerospace Explora-
tion Agency astronaut Naoko Yamazaki (right) practice their navigation skills. SOURCE: Courtesy of NASA Johnson Space
Center Features; available at http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/jscfeatures/articles/000000255.html.
FIGURE 1.20 NASA astronaut candidates conduct an emergency egress drill during land survival training. SOURCE: Courtesy
of NASA Johnson Space Center Features; available at http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/jscfeatures/articles/000000255.html.
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32 PREPARING FOR THE HIGH FRONTIER
FIGURE 1.21 Astronaut John H. Glenn in the Mercury Procedures Trainer. SOURCE: Courtesy of NASA; GPN-2002-000044,
available at http://grin.hq.nasa.gov/.
to the introduction of new training equipment and facilities to support them. Many of the facilities were at the
Johnson Space Center; others were at NASA centers across the country (Figure 1.23). Over time, astronaut train-
ing facilities were consolidated at JSC, including the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory (NBL), the large swimming
pool used by astronauts to train for EVAs. The shuttle era introduced a large number of facilities and trainers to
train astronauts in such diverse tasks as flying and landing the shuttle, operating the RMS, conducting emergency
procedures, EVA preparation, operating the Spacelab, and using various shuttle systems.
The ISS era had a major impact on the requirements for training facilities. Each new ISS segment could, in
effect, be considered a new spacecraft. Astronauts needed to train for basic ISS tasks, such as stowing equipment,
and more advanced tasks, such as operating system and science software and maintaining complex ISS systems.
These different requirements resulted in the development of both low-fidelity and high-fidelity ISS simulators. ISS
training was also complicated by the introduction of international components, such as laboratory modules, and
new, non-U.S. spacecraft, such as the Soyuz. In general, NASA adopted a policy of having low-fidelity mockups
of international equipment at JSC and sending astronauts overseas to the international partners who possessed the
high-fidelity trainers and equipment (Figure 1.24).
Ground-based simulators for space fight missions are used for 90-95 percent of training. As little as 5 percent
of crew training time is spent with SFRT in preparing for a mission, but it is considered by FCOD to be a critical
part of crew training and the primary distinction between preparing for an Earth-based mission and one in space.
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ASTRONAUT PROGRAM
FIGURE 1.22 The Project Mercury altitude wind tunnel gimbaling rig. SOURCE: Courtesy of NASA/Bill Bowles; GPN-2000-
000385, available at http://grin.hq.nasa.gov/.
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34 PREPARING FOR THE HIGH FRONTIER
FIGURE 1.23 Two astronauts practice construction techniques to build a space station in the Neutral Buoyancy Simulator at
Marshall Space Center in 1985. In the 1990s, EVA training was consolidated at the Johnson Space Center. SOURCE: Courtesy
of NASA/Dennis Keim; GPN-2000-000057, available at http://grin.hq.nasa.gov/.
Apart from SFRT, small environmental additions to flight training include exposure to hypoxia in the JSC
high-altitude chamber, a one-time run in the Russian centrifuge at Star City (for medical evaluation after exposure
to ballistic re-entry), and survival training (water and land).
SUMMARY
The U.S. astronaut program has evolved over the decades to meet the needs of the new activities initiated by
NASA. But it has also adapted to new social and political realities. The program has incorporated non-test pilots,
scientists, a much broader demographic base, international participants, and other groups. Changes in training
have been driven not only by the introduction of new spacecraft and requirements but by the need to accommodate
astronauts whose experience is different from that of test pilots. Now, with the shuttle retired and the ISS having
entered its fully operational phase, the agency is undergoing a new, and uncertain, transformation, which will
also have implications for the Flight Crew Operations Directorate, the Astronaut Office, and the Astronaut Corps.
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ASTRONAUT PROGRAM
FIGURE 1.24 STS-131 preparing to dock with the International Space Station on April 7, 2010. SOURCE: Courtesy of NASA.
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