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Overview
H
ighly enriched uranium (HEU) is used for two major civilian pur-
poses: as fuel for research reactors and as targets for medical
isotope production. This material can be dangerous in the wrong
hands. Stolen or diverted HEU can be used—in conjunction with some
knowledge of physics—to build nuclear explosive devices. Thus, the con-
tinued civilian use of HEU is of concern particularly because this material
may not be uniformly well-protected.
This report focuses on the civilian use of HEU for research reactor
fuel. It summarizes the proceedings of a joint symposium organized by the
National Research Council of the U.S. National Academies and Russian
Academy of Sciences (RAS) to address progress, challenges, and opportu-
nities for converting U.S. and Russian research reactors from HEU to low
enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This symposium—held in Moscow on June
8-10, 2011—was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy–National
Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation.
This report provides a summary of the symposium presentations and
discussions; it does not represent a consensus of the symposium participants
or the authoring committees.1 Many important points were made by indi-
vidual participants during the symposium,2 particularly regarding possible
future actions for reducing or managing the proliferation risks posed by
1 This report was authored by committees of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and
RAS. These committees are responsible for the report’s quality and accuracy.
2 No effort was made in this report to attribute statements of fact to individual participants.
1
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2 CONVERTING U.S. AND RUSSIAN RESEARCH REACTORS
HEU-fueled U.S. and Russian research reactors. These points include but
are not limited to the following:
• Many symposium participants from both the United States and
Russia emphasized the importance of reducing and, where possible, elimi-
nating the use of HEU in research reactor fuel. Participants noted that
conversion of research reactors to LEU fuel provides for permanent threat
reduction and may reduce the requirements for (and potentially the costs
of) facility security.
• Research reactors currently serve important purposes for research
and industry, and they will continue to serve important purposes into the
future. Prominent examples include medical isotope production and re-
search associated with the design of next-generation nuclear plants.
• The United States and other nations have been able to convert
research reactors to LEU fuel while maintaining their performance for key
missions. In fact conversions of research reactors in the United States have
resulted in improved understanding of their operating characteristics and,
in some cases, improved performance. In the United States, all reactors
that can be readily converted with existing LEU fuels have been converted.
Many symposium participants observed that conversion studies of research
reactors in Russia has started but conversion is lagging behind the United
States.
• The economic and performance challenges associated with conver-
sion are likely to be surmountable in many cases, particularly with govern-
ment assistance and the involvement of reactor operators and customers.
The development of higher-uranium-density LEU fuels could reduce fears
of loss of performance by reactor customers.
• Collaboration between the United States and Russia on conver-
sion of research reactors has been and is likely to continue to be valuable.
Several participants noted that collaborative U.S.-Russian work on fuel
development has provided opportunities to advance conversion of both
countries’ reactors. Additionally, the United States has already confronted
regulatory challenges associated with conversion. This experience could be
useful to Russia.
• Some facilities may not be easily convertible to LEU fuel, includ-
ing fast spectrum reactors, fast critical assemblies, reactors with small core
volumes, and reactors with high specific power per unit volume of active
core. The feasibility of conversion depends to some extent on policy choices
by host nation governments. Several workshop participants suggested that
one way of minimizing the use of HEU for essential or unique missions
would be to create major international nuclear centers to house these reac-
tors and to ensure that those facilities have strong security and safeguards
protections.
