Important Points Highlighted by the Individual Speakers
• The undervaluation of tumor biomarkers reduces the use of diagnostic tests as well as incentives to develop evidence about their effectiveness.
• Eliminating the LDT pathway and submitting all genomic tests to a rigorous regulatory process could result in the generation of high-quality evidence regarding the analytical validity and clinical utility of all such tests.
• Venture capital companies are no longer investing in the development of molecular diagnostic tests because of the complexity in and lack of clarity for both regulatory and reimbursement pathways.
• A predictable and efficient pathway, not necessarily an easier one, from regulatory approval to reimbursement could help attract further venture capital investment in this space.
• Standards for molecular diagnostics could help establish widely accepted regulatory and reimbursement pathways that test developers can follow.
While reflecting their own viewpoints, two speakers framed much of the day’s discussion. Daniel Hayes, from the University of Michigan Comprehensive Cancer Center, challenged the workshop participants to consider
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2
Calls for Change
Important Points Highlighted by the Individual Speakers
• The undervaluation of tumor biomarkers reduces the use of
diagnostic tests as well as incentives to develop evidence about
their effectiveness.
• Eliminating the LDT pathway and submitting all genomic tests
to a rigorous regulatory process could result in the generation
of high-quality evidence regarding the analytical validity and
clinical utility of all such tests.
• Venture capital companies are no longer investing in the devel-
opment of molecular diagnostic tests because of the complexity
in and lack of clarity for both regulatory and reimbursement
pathways.
• A predictable and efficient pathway, not necessarily an easier
one, from regulatory approval to reimbursement could help
attract further venture capital investment in this space.
• Standards for molecular diagnostics could help establish widely
accepted regulatory and reimbursement pathways that test
developers can follow.
While reflecting their own viewpoints, two speakers framed much of
the day’s discussion. Daniel Hayes, from the University of Michigan Com-
prehensive Cancer Center, challenged the workshop participants to consider
5
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6 GENOME-BASED DIAGNOSTICS
a system in which all genomic diagnostic tests are approved through FDA
rather than going through the LDT pathway. Sue Siegel, with the venture
capital firm Mohr Davidow, said that venture capital funds are currently
reluctant to invest in life sciences and health care start-ups, including
molecular diagnostics, because of the continued lack of clarity surrounding
the regulatory and reimbursement areas. Both speakers called for major
changes in the regulation of genomic diagnostic tests to ensure that the field
continues to move forward.
A CONSOLIDATED SYSTEM OF REVIEW AND
APPROVAL FOR GENOMIC DIAGNOSTIC TESTS
Oncologists overtreat probably 75 percent of their patients, accord-
ing to Hayes, because they often do not know which patients are going to
benefit from which therapies. “We treat everybody in the hopes that we’ll
hit the ones that need it and will benefit. I tell my post-docs that luck is
not a good strategy in golf or science. It’s nice to have when you get it, but
it’d be really nice if we could focus our treatment on patients and not just
hope that we get lucky.”
A bad diagnostic test for a tumor biomarker is as harmful as a bad drug,
Hayes pointed out. He asked whether physicians would use a drug if they
were not sure how it was mixed or what its concentration was, if they did
not have clinical data about how the drug might be used, and if they did not
have reliable clinical research data to determine how much efficacy it might
have. “Of course not, but every day of the week we see patients whose treat-
ment is being altered by tumor biomarkers in the absence of really good data
to support that.”
The basic problem is that there has been relatively little consistency
regarding which biomarkers have been introduced into clinical practice.
Very few cancer biomarkers with demonstrated clinical utility have been
introduced over the past 30 years. Even among those tests that have
been integrated into practice, their use in certain settings has not always
been supported by evidence of benefit, such as the use of prostate-specific
antigen (PSA) as a screening test (Andriole et al., 2009), said Hayes. This
has helped to create what Hayes has termed a “vicious cycle” in which
tumor biomarkers are systematically undervalued (Figure 2-1). This under-
valuation has led to limited use of these diagnostics by health care providers
and poor reimbursement when a marker has been able to navigate the regu-
latory environment to be brought to market. Lack of use and reimburse-
ment in turn leads to limited funding for biomarker research because the
return on investment is low. The perception that markers have little utility
has also led to an environment of lower academic recognition for develop-
ing biomarker-based tests. The overall result is reduced ability and incen-
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7
CALLS FOR CHANGE
Marker Utility Is Poorly Valued
Poor Weak Regulatory
Reimbursement Environment
Reduced Data Certainty;
Higher Scrutiny and
Skepticism;
Few Recommendations
for Clinical Use Low Funding/Investment for
Tumor Marker Research
Lower Academic
Prestige
Lower Level of Lower Ability and Incentive to Conduct
Evidence Properly Designed Clinical Studies
FIGURE 2-1 Undervaluation of tumor markers leads to a vicious cycle in which
incentives do not exist to increase the valuation.
SOURCE: Hayes, IOM workshop presentation on November 15, 2011.
Figure 2-1
tive to conduct properly designed clinical trials to generate high-quality
evidence of clinical utility. In return, there is reduced data certainty, higher
skepticism, and few recommendations for clinical use, said Hayes, which
completes the cycle by contributing to the poor valuation of marker utility.
Hayes focused his recommendations for breaking the “vicious cycle” of
undervalued tumor biomarkers on two areas: the regulatory environment
and marker reimbursement.
Requiring FDA Approval of Laboratory Developed Tests
LDTs can currently be introduced into clinical practice while only
meeting Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) labora-
tory standards (see Box 1-1). Such tests do not undergo formal reviews of
analytical validity, clinical validity, or clinical utility (Box 2-1 and Table
2-1). Hayes recommended elimination of this pathway for market entrance
and, instead, would require all diagnostic tests to undergo FDA review and
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8 GENOME-BASED DIAGNOSTICS
BOX 2-1
Definitions of Validity and Utility
During his presentation, Hayes offered definitions of analytical validity, clinical
validity, and clinical utility adapted from Teutsch et al. (2009)
• nalytical validity: The assay accurately and reproducibly measures what it
A
intends to.
• linical validity: The assay identifies a biological difference that may or may
C
not be clinically useful.
• linical utility: Results of the assay lead to a clinical decision that has been
C
shown with a high level of evidence to improve outcomes.
approval. Many commonly used tests would be removed if this were to
occur, noted Hayes, especially in situ tissue-based tests, but it is not clear
how many of these tests have analytical validity, clinical validity, or clinical
utility, he said. While Hayes acknowledged that elimination of the CLIA
pathway may be met with opposition from various groups and individuals,
he also observed that “I can’t come up with a new drug in my [laboratory]
as long as I only give it to my patients. That’s against the law, and I think
it should be against the law to develop a new assay and use it to treat my
patients differently without having had it vetted by some regulatory body.”
TABLE 2-1 Comparison of CLIA and FDA Regulatory Pathways
CLIA FDA
Research Phase No Yes
Analytical Validation Post hoc sampling Yes
Clinical Validation No Yes
Report Adverse Events No requirement; no system Yes
Transparent Results No public information Published review summary
NOTE: CLIA, Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments; FDA, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration.
SOURCE: Gutierrez, IOM workshop presentation on November 15, 2011.
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9
CALLS FOR CHANGE
A New Basis for FDA Approval
FDA approval of diagnostic tests is currently based on evaluation of
intended use, analytical validity, and clinical validity. In advocating that
FDA review and approve all diagnostics before they can be introduced
into clinical practice, Hayes also recommended that a higher evidentiary
threshold be met for diagnostic tests. Instead of including clinical validity
and intended use in their assessment, he suggested that FDA should review
diagnostics for analytic validity and clinical utility. While he acknowledged
this will increase the time and resources needed to get FDA approval, tests
will have demonstrated clinical value for patients upon entrance to clinical
practice.
This change would require following one of three pathways for gen-
erating high-quality evidence of clinical utility, Hayes said (Figure 2-2).
One is through a prospective-retrospective study using archived specimens
from a clinical trial that can be used to specifically address the question
being studied (IOM, 2011b; Simon et al., 2009). If archived specimens do
Evaluation for Clinical Utility and Use Stage
Three Potential Pathways (IRB Approval and FDA Consultation)
Prospective/ Prospective Prospective
Retrospective Clinical Trial; Clinical Trial;
Study with Test Does NOT Test Directs
Direct Patient Patient
Archived
Management Management
Specimens
IDE Needed?
No No Yes
FDA Approval/Clearance or LDT Process for Clinical Test
Additional High-Quality Evidence to Evaluate Clinical Utility of the Test
Practice Guidelines and Reimbursement
Clinical Use
FIGURE 2-2 Three pathways for generating high-quality evidence of clinical utility.
SOURCE: As adapted from IOM, 2012.
Figure 2-2
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10 GENOME-BASED DIAGNOSTICS
not exist, evidence could be generated either through a prospective clinical
trial where the marker does not direct patient management or through a
prospective clinical trial where the marker does direct patient management.
These three approaches would each generate high-quality evidence for the
intended clinical use of a tumor biomarker test upon which FDA could base
its review and approval or disapproval. This same evidence could then be
used by technology assessment groups, practice guideline developers, and
payers for decision-making purposes.
Hayes admitted that determining clinical utility is still somewhat like
art: “I don’t know what it is, but I know it when I see it.” The results of
the assay will need to lead to a clinical decision that has been shown with
a high degree of evidence to improve outcomes. “For each circumstance,
for each disease and for each assay, one needs to decide if it reaches what
a group of clinicians would call clinical utility.”
Consolidate Reviews Within FDA
Currently, drugs are evaluated for safety and effectiveness in the FDA
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) while devices that
are not linked to specific therapeutics are evaluated in the FDA Center
for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH). While CDER has estab-
lished a standing Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee (ODAC) made
up of experts in oncology and statistics, patient advocates, and other
representatives to help review marketed and investigational cancer drug
products, a similar approach has not been adopted by CDRH, according
to Hayes. The center has enormous analytical expertise but weaker onco-
logic expertise. Instead of a standing board, ad hoc committees of experts
without a “corporate memory” review devices, which means that “there
is no consistent approach toward how one device is approved versus the
other.” Hayes did note that while the ODAC has significant oncologic
expertise it lacks analytical expertise and proposed combining the review
of all oncologic products into a single FDA Oncology Office. Combining
all oncologic products into a single office would require a fundamental
reorganization of FDA, Hayes observed, which is a substantial obstacle
to moving forward on this recommendation.
Basis for Reimbursement
Hayes recommended that reimbursement be based on the value that a
tumor biomarker provides for clinical decision making as opposed to the
cost of performing the assay. Cost-effectiveness analyses and comparative
effectiveness research would be needed to demonstrate that the benefit to
patients, society, and payers far outweighs the cost of a tumor biomarker
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11
CALLS FOR CHANGE
with demonstrated clinical utility. Third-party payers would need to pro-
vide reimbursements that recoup the increased costs associated with gen-
erating high-quality evidence of clinical utility. However, Hayes noted that
health care providers also need to reform their practices and ensure they
are properly using and ordering tests. “Third-party payers should have to
pay for a test that has clinical utility, but shouldn’t have to pay for a test
that is used in the wrong way.”
Overcoming Barriers
Overcoming the barriers to these recommendations will involve many
stakeholders, including regulatory agencies, third-party payers, pharma-
ceutical companies and other commercial entities, physicians and other
caregivers, patients and patient advocates, clinical guideline and technology
assessment panels, academic centers and investigators, and research fund-
ing entities. These groups need to be “in the room talking to each other
and working out the problems,” said Hayes. Together they could break the
vicious cycle of undervaluation and create a virtuous cycle by introducing
tumor biomarkers with high clinical utility (Figure 2-3), Hayes concluded.
PERSPECTIVE FROM VENTURE CAPITAL
Because of the complexity and uncertainty that currently surrounds
regulation and reimbursement, the venture capital community is reluctant
to invest in the development of molecular diagnostics, said Siegel. “We will
continue to invest in the companies and their products that we currently
are invested in, but the money is fleeing. Venture takes the early risk. Who
is going to fill in when . . . venture capital is fleeing?”
Many earlier tests were developed with support from venture capital,
including the Oncotype DX breast cancer assay for predicting chemothera-
peutic benefit and metastasis risk, the MammaPrint assay for the risk of
metastasis following breast cancer surgery, and the HER-2/neu test for
directing Herceptin treatment of women with metastatic breast cancer.
More broadly, Siegel observed, the venture capital community plays a
crucial role in the economy, spurring innovation that benefits the quality
and efficiency of the health care system. From 1970 to 2010, the amount
of revenue generated by venture-backed companies was 21 percent of the
U.S. gross domestic product. Approximately 12 million jobs in venture-
backed companies led to $3.1 trillion in revenue. About three-quarters
of biotechnology jobs are within companies that were originally venture-
backed, and 80 percent of the revenue in biotechnology is generated from
these companies.
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12 GENOME-BASED DIAGNOSTICS
Marker Utility Is Highly Valued
Commensurate Strong/Predictable
Level of Regulatory
Reimbursement Environment
Strong Data Certainty;
Transparent Clinical Utility;
Many Recommendations
for Clinical Use
Adequate Funding/Investment
for Tumor Marker Research
High Academic
Prestige
High Level of Strong Ability and Incentive to Conduct
Evidence Properly Designed Clinical Studies
FIGURE 2-3 Highly valued tumor biomarkers lead to a virtuous cycle in which
markers are continually improved.
SOURCE: Hayes, IOM workshop presentation on November 15, 2011.
Figure 2-3
The Venture Capital Process
Siegel gave a brief overview of the venture capital process. It begins
with limited partners (LPs), who manage pools of money such as pension
funds, retirement funds, endowments, or private wealth. LPs deploy these
funds into different asset classes, of which venture capital is one. Venture
capital tends to take the highest risk but in doing so also tends to get the
highest rewards.
LPs fund general partners (GPs) who are investing in particular areas.
The GPs deploy that money into entrepreneurs and companies, which
provide products and services (Figure 2-4). As these companies grow, they
generate assets that can be returned to the LPs. In this way, the LPs recoup
their investments.
Siegel used her own firm as a more specific example. Mohr Davidow
is a Silicon Valley venture firm that has existed for about three decades.
It invests in three areas: information technology, clean technology, and
personalized medicine. The firm bases its investment decisions on markets,
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13
CALLS FOR CHANGE
people, and technology, among other criteria, said Siegel. It tends to favor
big problems that need solutions in big markets. As an early stage investor,
the firm expects a life science or health care company to have a capital-
efficient business model, to produce a product, and to be generating revenue
within 3 to 5 years. It also prefers the company to have a strong intellectual
property position, limited regulatory risks, a clear path toward reimburse-
ment, and a convincing health economics model (a strong rationale for
why a product could help the whole system of health care decrease costs).
With molecular diagnostics that are developed and brought to market
under CLIA, venture capitalists can understand the risks and timelines
required to grow a company and develop the tests as well as be able to
predict with some confidence the potential returns, according to Siegel. Cre-
ating a company from inception with the purpose of developing and fully
commercializing an LDT can take up to $100 million plus to get to a break-
even point, though some companies have managed to do it for $60 million
to $70 million, “but they are more the exception than they are the rule.”
To found a company with the purpose of developing an FDA-approved test
would require somewhere between $100 million and $150 million of total
capital invested to get the company to a breakeven point. Venture capital-
ists consider a return of only three times their investment into a company
to be an unexceptional return. Therefore, a start-up company requiring
$100M of total capital invested from its inception to develop and fully
FIGURE 2-4 Venture capital investments in U.S. companies from 1970 to 2010.
SOURCE: NVCA, 2011a.
Figure 2-4
Bitmapped
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14 GENOME-BASED DIAGNOSTICS
commercialize a test needs to return at least $300 million within a fairly
short timeframe to even meet what would be considered a modest return.
The Need for Clarity
The venture capital community is not asking for less stringent regula-
tions. “We’re not here, as venture capitalists, to tell you don’t make it hard.
We all want safe products,” Siegel said. “We’re here to ask you to make it
clear, because without clarity we can’t assess the risk of knowing when to
invest or when not to invest.”
Regulatory and reimbursement uncertainty has contributed to a pre-
cipitous decline in venture capital investments in the life sciences and health
care (Figure 2-5) and current trends point to future declines. In a survey
of 156 venture capitalists about investing in the life sciences, 40 percent
reported decreasing their life science investments over the past 3 years
with an additional 40 percent planning to decrease their investments over
the next 3 years (NVCA, 2011b). Sixty percent indicated that regulatory
challenges are having the most impact on their investment decisions. Forty
percent said that they planned to invest more in Asia and Europe. “Even
though some regulations might be tougher [there], they’re clearer and [com-
panies] know how to get reimbursed,” Siegel said. “Here in the [United]
States, it’s not clear that we can get reimbursed for molecular diagnostic
tests. So better predictability and increased efficiency [is needed].”
6 120
Health Care VC Investment (Billions)
5 100
Total VC Investment (Billions)
4 80
3 60
2 40
1 20
0 0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Biotechnology Medical Devices Health Care Services Total
FIGURE 2-5 Venture capital investments in the life sciences and health care have
declined significantly in recent years.
Figure 2-5
SOURCE: As adapted from NVCA, 2011c.
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15
CALLS FOR CHANGE
Reimbursement is currently a tougher obstacle than regulation, said
Siegel. Companies cannot be sure whether their products will be reim-
bursed. Reimbursement has become “a truly Sisyphean effort,” and getting
coverage decisions whether regional or national can be difficult, said Siegel.
When drugs get through Phase III development, the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS) generally approves their reimbursement, but
currently no such process exists for molecular diagnostics.
FDA and CMS also need to define the reimbursement pathway for
molecular diagnostics. “What we’re asking for is a predictable and efficient
roadmap from FDA to CMS. This allows private payers to then have a
baseline to benchmark against,” said Siegel.
People in other industries such as the semiconductor industry have
worked hard to develop standards to enable their products to move forward;
the same needs to happen with molecular diagnostics. New approaches
with companion diagnostics have been helpful, but much more progress is
needed. In particular, said Siegel, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology should be developing biological standards.
Siegel also pointed to the value of biological samples.1 She urged that a
national repository with guidelines be put in place to allow for the accessing
of biological samples so that studies can be done in a more standardized
way.
The Consequences of Inaction
Without greater clarity, funding for innovation will dry up, job growth
will slow, the transition of the health care system toward prevention and
lower costs will not take hold, and national competitiveness will be eroded.
“People are going elsewhere in the world to launch products or set up
companies. It’s happening today. It’s happening pretty aggressively.” Even if
patient advocate groups organize funding for the development of diagnos-
tics, who will coach the entrepreneurs and help them develop their business
plans and build their companies, asked Siegel.
Siegel urged that venture capitalists continue to be included at meet-
ings on molecular diagnostics. “The more you educate us about what the
decision process will be, the better the investment decisions we can make.
This will allow venture capital firms to continue to support health care
entrepreneurs who bring innovative ideas and business models that can
help transform our current health care system into one that offers improved
quality of care and increased access at lower costs.”
1 The Roundtable on Translating Genomic-Based Research for Health held a prior workshop
on July 22, 2010, titled Establishing Precompetitive Collaborations to Stimulate Genomics-
Driven Product Development, which examined the value, utility, and ethical challenges in using
biospecimens in developing medical products, including diagnostics (IOM, 2011a).
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