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IV. Broken Relationship
The National Nuclear Security Agency’s (NNSA) stated mission is to “enhance
global security through nuclear deterrence, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, naval
nuclear propulsion, and national leadership in science, technology, and engineering.”25 At
the very core of the mission responsibility of the Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos and
Sandia National Laboratories is the maintenance of a safe, secure and effective nuclear
arsenal. In the post-Cold War period – in the absence of nuclear-explosion testing and the
production of new weapons – the responsibility to maintain an enduring stockpile requires
advanced science, technology and engineering competencies.
NNSA headquarters elements provide “policy, priority, and program funding
guidance, along with oversight and programs toward defined strategic goals.”26 NNSA Site
Offices are located in proximity to the Laboratories to provide “direct budget, regulatory and
contract oversight, and administrative authority for these Laboratories.”27 The NNSA
management approach seeks to integrate “leadership, people, and processes to better
accomplish [the] goals of a unified National Security Enterprise.”28
This approach has resulted in an increased centralization of science and technology
planning and direction, in which the Laboratories have lost some of their historic
independence and self-initiative, and which has resulted in top-down tasking to the
Laboratories. For example, in the weapons area, detailed surveillance and life extension
programs of specific weapons systems dictate which of the Laboratories does what and when
to maintain the safety, security and reliability of the stockpile. If left unchecked, this
management approach increasingly takes initiative and control out of the hands of working
scientists and engineers, and places it in less expert hands in Washington. While many
NNSA officials are experienced scientists with relevant Laboratory experience, their
headquarters jobs remove them from day-to-day research activity.
A parallel trend has been toward a contractual relationship that is increasingly
focused on non-scientific operational matters, such as security, safety, administration,
facilities management, financial management, and other such functions. For example, in
defining specific criteria for the determination of award fee and award term (in the
Performance Evaluation Plans), more of the award depends on meeting operational goals
than depends on meeting goals associated with the quality of science and engineering (and
other mission-related goals)
The management relationship between the Department of Energy, NNSA, and its
national security Laboratories is defined by detailed contracts focused on assuring that the
work of the Laboratory is conducted in an environmentally responsible, safe and secure
manner, and that operations of the Laboratory maintain fiscal integrity. The current
management contracts award substantial financial rewards for contract performance in these
areas. At LANL and LLNL, roughly 30 percent of the fee is fixed, and 70 percent is at risk in
25
NNSA 2011 strategic plan
26
NNSA 2011 strategic plan
27
NNSA 2011 strategic plan
28
NNSA 2011 strategic plan
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yearly performance evaluations (6-10 percent of the at-risk fee is based directly on quality of
science and engineering at LANL and LLNL: Appendix 5).29 30 This formula is designed to
provide incentives for a high degree of management performance, which can be constructive
in many environments. However, in an environment of broken trust, it carries a high risk that
management will focus almost entirely on those contractual scoring criteria that account for
the majority of the award fee, to the detriment of the science and engineering components of
the mission.
A senior staff member at LANL provided some written comments to the study
committee that captures the situation very well:
“When I started as a young postdoc and then later in my career as university
professor and also here at the Lab, there was a social contract, which basically
said ‘You will never get rich in science, but we treat you as adults, respect you
for your commitment, and in turn you can pursue science and have fun.’ Today,
this contract is badly broken . . . an atmosphere of distrust . . . rigorous control
and checks.
“How else could one explain the fact that today the signatures of [3-4 people] are
required if I want to take my laptop home to work from home? I also need to
write a half page justification why I want to work from home. If I want to attend
the meeting of the division of nuclear physics of the APS, I need signature of
[five people] . . . Where academic freedom once reigned . . . we have today a Lab
totally driven by risk averseness. We are drowning in paperwork and
regulations. I know of three world-class scientists just in my group, who left . . .
because they could not work in this environment anymore. Many more in other
groups and divisions also left.”
An LLNL employee with over three decades of experience explained the effect that
this environment has on high-quality S&E:
“I have seen our efficiency drop by at least a factor of two over the last two
decades, and the inefficiency accelerated after the contract change from UC to
LLNS. The Lab is being micro-managed by DOE, and now the new contractor,
to the detriment of this country. I worked hard, and I'm sometimes frustrated by
the bureaucracy that does not have a long-term view of the Lab. It seems that
concern about risks overrides scientific progress constantly. Often times, I will
not initiate or take on difficult R&D assignments because of the unfunded hoops
I have to jump through . . .”
An erosion of trust on both sides of the relationship shapes the oversight and
operation of the Laboratories. This in turn has resulted in excessive reliance on operational
29
At Sandia, where the at-risk fee is much smaller (although the fixed fee is roughly the same), the ratio is
reversed.
30
For example, over $54 million of fee was at risk to performance assessments in FY 2010 at LANL, of which
$44 million was granted.
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formality in important aspects of Laboratory operations, including the conduct of science and
engineering at the Laboratories. Operational formality is the application of specific rules and
predetermined procedures to the accomplishment of tasks. This approach derives from
industrial practices, where it is often important to assure goals such as safety by specifying
exactly how tasks are to be done and then taking measures to ensure that these steps are
strictly followed. 31 While the application of “follow the numbers” to ensure safety in
selected tasks seems obvious, so does the mismatch of this approach to creative activities
such as S&E. This erosion of the trust relationship is prominent with respect to LANL,
where past failures attracted much national attention and public criticism. But it has also
spilled over to LLNL and SNL, where management relationships also have acquired
considerable operational formality.
While some Lab S&E staff believes the excessive use of operational formality is a
choice imposed by the M&O contractors, or by the contracts, the study committee did not see
evidence of that. When Laboratory employees were questioned about heavy-handed
bureaucratic processes, they could not point to their origin; that was true even for managers.
The contracts and their incentives do not seem to encourage or mandate this. One senior
SNL employee suggested that conservatism can accrete when there are layers of rules and
processes, with little trust about who is going to take on risk.
Trust can be considered in two different ways: one concerning reliance, and the other
confidence. Reliance means believing in the other party’s character and ability: can the other
party be believed? Does the other party know what he/she is talking about? Do I have faith
in the other party’s knowledge and expertise? Confidence means believing that I can depend
on something in the future regarding another individual or group. Can I rely on the other
person to do what they said they would do? Based on extensive discussions, the study
committee thinks that if it were to ask NNSA, the Laboratory managers, or the scientists and
engineers at the Laboratories these questions, none would answer in the affirmative. There is
a persistent level of mistrust. While some progress has been made in recent years under current
NNSA and Laboratory leadership, much more is needed to repair the damage that has been done.
Finding 4-1:
There is evidence of poor communications and lack of transparency at the highest
levels, as illustrated by NNSA and Lab leadership reporting significantly different
assessments of the current management and operational relationship. The degradation of
trust—whether confidence or reliance—is frequently accelerated in an environment of poor
communication and lack of transparency. Discussions at study committee meetings indicated
a persistent level of mistrust between NNSA staff and the Laboratory scientists, particularly
at LANL and LLNL.
31
See, for example, OPERATIONAL FORMALITY FOR DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR
FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Technical Report DNFSB/TECH-
15, March 1997
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Finding 4-2:
The Los Alamos and Livermore Site Offices are organized and staffed largely for
monitoring compliance of the Laboratories with extant DOE and other operational
regulations. This reflects mistrust of Laboratory management and staff to execute its mission
responsibilities effectively and with reliable commitment to safety, security, and
environmental concerns.
The study committee recognizes the responsibility to follow federal regulations about
environment health, safety, and security, but also argues for a balanced approach that
maximizes scientific flexibility within those requirements.
The Effect of Operational Formality on Experimental Work at the Laboratories
Experimental science is at the very heart of the scientific method, which relies on
gathering empirical and measurable evidence subject to specific principles of reasoning
tested through experimentation. Experimentation leads to discovery, and also provides
essential validation for modeling and simulation.
The study committee observes that operational formality, which has been the by-product
of the loss of trust in the Laboratories’ ability to maintain fiscal integrity and the safety and
security of its work, is not a good basis on which to conduct productive, creative
experimental work. Its checklist-based methods are demonstrably valuable for high-risk
tasks, but onerous when nimble thinking and innovation are required. S&E staff and some
managers at all three Labs told the study committee that experimentation is becoming more
difficult to pursue, and therefore less common, because of burdensome steps that must be
completed associated with purchasing, safety checks and certifications, and so on. Thus,
there is already some evidence that science and engineering at the Laboratories are relying
less on experimentation, which has worrisome implications for the S&E.
Finding 4-3:
Increasing operational formality contributes to a bias against experimental work.
Without a strong experimental program, the quality of scientific and engineering at the
Laboratories will be at risk, as will the core mission of these Laboratories.
NNSA needs to reexamine the roles and responsibilities of federal oversight officials
and Laboratory management, and a mechanism needs to be devised to resolve differences
that occur in executing roles and responsibilities in Laboratory operations and programs.
Excellent science and engineering is at risk when Laboratory scientists and engineers do not
perceive that they are in a partnership that encourages them to bring forth their creative ideas
to solve problems vital to our national security. In the broader science environment, such
conflicts are typically settled through peer review and open discussion. Resolution through
back channels sows mistrust. By the very nature of the Laboratories’ mission, much of the
work is done in a closed, classified environment. This adds complexity when trying to
resolve scientific conflicts, but does not remove the necessity for doing so.
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Successful partnerships, like successful societies, depend upon a high level of trust.
Like barnacles on the bottom of a boat, mistrust accretes and accumulates over time until it
compromises performance. Broken trust requires repair if the long-term performance of the
Laboratory missions is not to suffer. Due to the degree of mistrust that has encrusted over
time, repairing that broken trust will require considerable time and effort. Mistrust is a
highly stable phenomenon and can last for years if not decades. Therefore, attempting to fix
things all at once and quickly is naïve and likely to fail.
Recommendation 4-1:
The study committee recommends that NNSA and each of the Laboratories commit
to the goal of rebalancing the managerial and governance relationship to build in a
higher level of trust in program execution and Laboratory operations in general.
Recommendation 4-2:
The study committee recommends that NNSA and the Laboratories agree on a set of
principles that clearly lay out the boundaries and roles of each management structure,
and also that program managers at headquarters, the Site Offices, and in the
Laboratories be directed to abide by these principles.
For example, the Site Manager and the Director and/or Deputy Director of each
Laboratory could establish, in consultation with other Lab staff, a process to identify and
agree on eliminating certain oversight procedures that are not necessary or related to the
overall goals of the Laboratory. Similarly, some mechanism could be established to filter
program tasking at both the headquarters level and at the Laboratory senior management
level to assure that each tasking is necessary and consistent with the agreed management
principles.
Recommendation 4-3:
The study committee recommends that the goal of rebalancing the relationship
and the set of principles laying out the boundaries and roles of each management
structure be memorialized in memoranda of understanding between NNSA and its
Laboratories. Performance against these understandings should be assessed on an
annual basis over a five-year period, and reported to Congress. 32
One sign of broken trust reported to the study is that mid-level issues were elevated to
the Laboratory director level because there was no clarity about how to resolve disputes
between a Laboratory and an NNSA Site Office. Another example was a recent instance in
32
The committee observes that it is important to design this approach to be self-correcting and to avoid
problems such as: (1) adding to a check-list approach to management; (2) enforcing measures that annual
assessment shows to be unworkable; and (3) requiring Congressional intervention when not needed.
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which NNSA HQ tried to overrule a Laboratory’s best scientific judgment about how to carry
out a scientific task. Subsequently, language appeared in a Congressional report opposing
that NNSA order.
Finding 4-4:
There is no apparent mechanism by which the NNSA and its National Security
Laboratories can negotiate a balance between competing policy, programmatic, and technical
demands. In an environment that lacks trust, lack of an effective process for resolving such
conflicts leads to situations that can be viewed either as NNSA inserting itself in an
inappropriate operational role or the Laboratories inappropriately challenging NNSA’s role.
A better mechanism could be established for resolving technical disputes, without
elevating them to top NNSA management and congressional levels. A technical advisory
committee, established at the NNSA level, would be a helpful mechanism for filling this gap
in S&E management. More generally, such an advisory committee could monitor progress
on other aspects of roles and responsibilities described in this chapter.
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