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CHAPTER TWO
Community Characteristics
and Improving Community
Resilience
Chapter 1 briefly describes the dam and levee community as the individuals, groups,
and institutions affected by the physical impacts of inundation, as well as those that experi-
ence indirect consequences such as financial burden or loss of public services. A community
includes but is not limited to those who live or work near dam or levee infrastructure (e.g.,
in a floodplain). Major floods can affect investors and financial institutions, commercial
risk managers, the insurance market, and organizations such as the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) itself, that operate far from the infrastructure or flooding.
Community members and other stakeholders are those who bear flood-related risk and can
benefit from increased resilience.
FEMA’s National Disaster Recovery Framework describes community as a “network
of individuals and families, business, governmental and nongovernmental organizations
and other civic organizations that reside or operate within a shared geographical boundary
and may be represented by a common political leadership at a regional, county, municipal
or neighborhood level” (FEMA, 2011a, p. 79). This definition is incomplete in the context
of resilience to dam or levee failure. Floods and their direct and indirect consequences
recognize no municipal or political boundaries. A distinctly different definition of a com-
munity describes its members as having common interests (e.g., NRC, 2011a)—in this
case, the continued safe functioning of dam and levee infrastructure. They may also share
broad development goals and their social behavior and relationships governed by common
specific social norms (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999).
This chapter expands on the definition of community and defines what makes a com-
munity resilient.
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DAM AND LEVEE SAFETY AND COMMMUNITY RESILIENCE
CHARACTERISTICS OF A RESILIENT COMMUNITY
The committee identifies three key features of resilient communities. First, a resilient
community is able to assess and minimize potential threats. Second, a resilient commu-
nity uses its social and physical infrastructures and lifeline systems effectively to com-
municate and coordinate activities to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from
disasters. Third, a resilient community has the capacity to adapt and learn from change and
adversity—its own and those of others.
Capacity to Assess and Minimize Potential Threats
A resilient community has the capacity to understand the benefits of dam and levee
infrastructure and the ability to assess, anticipate, and minimize potential threats over the
short and long terms while retaining its basic structures and functions. Resilient communi-
ties are able to assess and manage risks, are generally well informed of threats, are clear about
the roles and responsibilities of individuals and organizations in the community with respect
to risk, and maintain safety programs and—in this case—water management programs in
ways that strengthen the community’s ability to mitigate potential infrastructure failures.
Many solutions may be available to community members and stakeholders to minimize
the effects of floods, including risk reduction and mitigation, financial planning, and insur-
ance. Without a clear understanding of the limitations of flood mitigation infrastructure,
community members and stakeholders are likely to be ill-prepared for emergencies that
might place lives and livelihoods at risk. When a community fails to appreciate its exposure
to floods and their consequences, there may be little support for investment in the mainte-
nance and upgrading of infrastructure, such as dams and levees.
W hen there is limited availability of dam and levee flood hazard and consequence
information, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, it is difficult or impossible for communities
and stakeholders to identify vulnerable regions, people, or institutions. Many, therefore,
are unaware of the community’s exposure to physical (casualties and damage) and social
(economic, psychosocial, sociodemographic, and political) risks (e.g., see Lindell et al.,
2006, for a description the social impacts of disaster). They may have inadequate means
of identifying risk scenarios or quantifying their risk, and have little reason to consider
risk in hazard mitigation or emergency planning. Uninformed community members and
stakeholders may not fully appreciate the benefits or limits of protection offered by dams
and levees, nor will they adequately understand the commitment required to maintain the
benefits over the long term.
Understanding personal, financial, and other types of risk associated with the variety
of potential dam and levee failure scenarios is a starting point for enhancing community
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Community Characteristics and Improving Community Resilience
resilience. In the case of investors and financial institutions, flood-related financial risk may
not always be recognized or understood, especially if the institutions are managed from out-
side the immediate region of the dam or levee infrastructure. A major dam or levee failure
in one location can have repercussions for commercial risk managers, and enterprise- and
supply-chain risk management anywhere in the world.
The public faces numerous and competing risks related to natural hazards. Focusing
public attention on risks that are relatively low from a probability perspective (e.g., the
risk of dam failure) is difficult, even if the consequences are very high. It is important that
decision makers understand and appreciate the nature of potential flood hazards and the
range of potential outcomes so that they can assess the effects on livelihood and the options
available to reduce risk through avoidance, mitigation, or risk transfer (such as through
insurance).
Effective Communication and Coordination
Disaster preparedness—including efforts to inform the public of risks and of response
options—occurs before infrastructure failure. A resilient community is able to communi-
cate and coordinate effectively among those with important roles in community disaster
mitigation, emergency preparedness and response, and in recovery, as well as with civic,
business, and other community leaders. Resilience is largely dependent on trust—building
trusted relationships between community leaders, members, and stakeholders. If community
members trust their leaders, they are more likely to be responsive to the information their
leaders disseminate. Stakeholders more broadly may not have the same kind of relationship
with local community leaders, and therefore communication with them must be purposeful
and targeted to build trust. In addition to the ability to prepare for disaster, a resilient com-
munity has the ability to respond rapidly when failure occurs; this may involve, for example,
arrangements for rapid mobilization of coping resources to facilitate effective and timely
restoration of services and a rapid return to normal functioning.
Capacity to Adapt
A resilient community has the ability to learn from disastrous events that occur locally
or elsewhere, and is able to institute measures to safeguard the community from future
events. A community may learn that the former status quo may not be in its best interest
if that way of functioning could be sustained as a result of a disaster. A “new normal” that
is resilient to known hazards might be more appropriate. Resilient communities take ad-
vantage of opportunities to increase community security and robustness, resulting in even
greater resilience.
37
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DAM AND LEVEE SAFETY AND COMMMUNITY RESILIENCE
ENGAGING ALL ELEMENTS OF A COMMUNITY FOR RESILIENCE
Legal authority is the regional or local formal leadership structure, including elected,
appointed, and statutory authorities that make up an area’s regulatory framework. Repre-
sentatives of this group have primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and well-being
of citizens (e.g., WMO, 2006) and include local administrative units responsible for emer-
gency planning, risk and emergency management, mayors, governors, and legislators. Deci-
sion making, however, is complex and sometimes politically charged, as might be expected
in the case of multijurisdictional regions, or where decisions regarding resilience are driven
by special districts, the private sector, or citizen interests. In many cases, mayors or city
managers may be primary representatives of the authority in communities; in others, it may
be emergency management personnel. Authority may overlap or be ill-defined. Decisions
related to safety and well-being are also made by many others in the community, including
dam and levee professionals and members of the wider economy. In some cases, the frame-
work that drives disaster resilience-related decisions may be in the form of private–public
collaboration (see NRC, 2011a).
Community engagement, such as private–public collaboration, is an effective means
of enhancing community disaster resilience if all those engaged are equally vested in the
outcomes (e.g., NRC, 2011a). However, community-wide resilience will be enhanced only
when all elements of the community are considered. Deciding whom to engage requires
careful examination of community elements. A community, as broadly defined in this report,
can be divided into four major elements:
• Dam and levee professionals
• Persons and property owners at direct risk
• Members of the wider economy
• Social–ecological systems
Those elements, the communication links among them, and their roles in enhancing
community resilience are described in the next sections and in Table 2.1. All groups repre-
sented in Table 2.1 are functionally interdependent in some way. Resilient communities are
able to recognize those interdependences and capitalize on them to increase the capacity
to assess and minimize disaster risk; to communicate and coordinate effectively to enhance
resilience among all elements of the community; and to develop the capacity to adapt to
change as warranted. The committee, however, acknowledges that such interdependences
are often better defined for communities influenced by dams than for those influenced by
levees.
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Community Characteristics and Improving Community Resilience
Dam and Levee Professionals
Dam and levee professionals are the individuals and organizations concerned with the
planning, design, construction, maintenance, operation, and regulation of physical modifica-
tions of river or coastal systems. This includes what is conventionally considered the “dam
safety community” and its counterpart for levees and other flood-protection infrastructure.
Members of this sector are defined by their occupation or organizational responsibility,
not by proximity to flood control works or exposure to risk. Table 2.1 shows that this ele-
ment is responsible for a wide variety of activities. Its activities and responsibilities differ
substantially between times of normal operations and times of unusual events.
Persons and Property Owners at Direct Risk
People who live, work, or own property in an inundation zone experience a different
kind of risk from others in the community: possible loss of life, limb, property, or workplace
as a direct result of inundation. The effects are on them or their real or personal property.
Potential damages derived from the inundation itself and associated water quality issues
exist whether or not people participate in the regional economy or any social–ecological
networks. Table 2.1 lists representative losses for this element of the community. Under
normal conditions, members of this element are likely to have little flood-risk–related com-
munication with dam and levee professionals or with agents of the wider economy.
Members of the Wider Economy
Many individuals and organizations may experience flood-related consequences as a
result of their participation in the area economy, either as producers of goods and services
for a region at risk of flooding, or as consumers of goods and services exported from those
areas. Small businesses, financial institutions, and any other locally significant business that
may be forced to close can affect local economies. Examples of the type of individuals and
organizations in this group in the private and public sectors are listed in Table 2.1. Those
with input regarding funding for dam and levee infrastructure development, operation, and
safety are also members of this category.
Direct effects on private- and public-sector entities can be related to, for example, flood
damage of highways, power lines, telecommunication services, pipelines, water services,
and other utilities; loss or deterioration of fisheries habitat; and changes in water quality.
Firms and government agencies directly affected include ones that suffer physical damage,
lose complete or partial capacity to move materials or employees, and are unable to operate
because of flood-related labor-force dislocation. Indirect effects can result in lost market
for goods and services, supply-chain disruptions, or loss of demand for goods and services.
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DAM AND LEVEE SAFETY AND COMMMUNITY RESILIENCE
TABLE 2.1 Elements of the Dam and Levee Safety Community
Element Example Components
Dam and levee Dam and levee owners, operators, and regulators; water-related service agencies
professionals and organizations, including
• Federal and state regulatory agencies
• Regulation enforcement and oversight agencies
• Municipal water supply utilities
• Hydropower generating facilities
• Agricultural irrigation districts
• Water-based recreation providers and suppliers
Individuals and organizations activated in the event of failure or threat of failure:
• Emergency management agencies
• First responders and law enforcement
• Key political leaders
• Some large employers
Persons and Individuals or organizations at risk, due to flooding or water-quality issues,
property owners for direct consequences to themselves or property such as loss of life or limb;
at direct risk damaged or lost real or personal property; costs of short- and long-term
evacuation and recovery (including social capital); lost employment or wages due
to evacuation, transportation disruption, etc.; closed schools and childcare; and
lost government infrastructure (e.g., police, fire, transportation, water, and sewer).
Members of the Individuals and organizations at risk for economic consequences directly or
wider economy indirectly related to flooding or water quality issues, including
• Private-sector manufacturing, warehousing, and retailing firms
• Large and small locally significant businesses
• Real estate developers
• Utility companies
• Shareholders
• Banks and other mortgage holders
• Insurance companies
• ublic and private agencies providing services, such as health care,
P
education, personal services, and recreational services
• Floodplain management organizations
• Land-use planning and zoning agencies
• overnment officials engaged in economic development and related subjects
G
• overnment and private individuals involved in dam and levee
G
infrastructure development and operation funding decisions
continued
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Community Characteristics and Improving Community Resilience
TABLE 2.1 Continued
Element Example Components
Social–ecological Institutions and organizations that may serve as advocates, contribute to
system community involvement and mobilization, and have political influence, including
• Institutions involved in governance (including water quality regulation)
• ongovernment and not-for-profit organizations (e.g., American Red
N
Cross)
• Political networks
• Social networks, such as indigenous and other populations or groups
• Communication networks
• ass media entities that, for example, can raise awareness, communicate
M
risks, expose and cover floods, and disseminate post-disaster performance
reviews
• Social support networks
• Neighborhood or citizen corps networks
• Family networks
• Religious networks and other faith-based organizations
• Environmental organizations and cultural resources
• Biodiversity
• Natural resources
• Cultural heritage sites and resources
• Private volunteer organizations
• Chambers of commerce
The firms and agencies that suffer indirect effects are not necessarily in or near the potential
inundation area. Recent flooding in Thailand, for example, has highlighted how complex
manufacturers’ supply chains can be and how the overall effect of localized flooding can
easily be underestimated. According to A.M. Best,1 “given the floods’ impact on manufac-
turing in Thailand’s industrial estates, one of the major uncertainties will come from the
difficulties in calculating contingent business interruption losses” (A.M. Best, 2012, p. 1). If
the corporate governance process does not anticipate the effects of flooding, the institutions
might not be able to meet financial obligations. Similarly those with decision-making power
related to the funding of dam and levee infrastructure itself may not be fully informed of
risks and what is necessary to make such infrastructure “safe.” Long-term funding, whether
by executive budget management agencies or independent entities, may not be part of dam
or levee safety decision processes.
The A.M. Best Company is a credit-rating organization that serves the insurance industry.
1
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DAM AND LEVEE SAFETY AND COMMMUNITY RESILIENCE
The Social–Ecological System
Social systems are structures created by interacting individuals and organizations for
the purpose of achieving common goals (see, e.g., Parsons, 1951). In dealing with resil-
ience associated with dam and levee infrastructure, social systems noted in this report focus
largely on governance issues, such as property rights and access to resources, the dynamics
of environment and resource use, and world views and ethics that address human–nature
relationships. Ecological systems are self-regulating communities of organisms that interact
with each other and their environment. Social and ecological systems are closely linked, and
changes in one inevitably have reverberations in the other (e.g., Milestad and Hadatsch,
2003). The concept of a social–ecological system is useful in this report for considering the
actions of humans in nature and for human management of surface water and groundwater.
Networks of various kinds exist in these systems, including, in the case of this report, aquatic
animals and plants, institutions and organizations involved in governance, and networks of
people and their values that make up the community. Of concern in current analysis and
management is the ability of social–ecological systems to adapt to novel challenges without
compromising sustainability (the topic of several papers found in Berkes et al., 2003).
The social–ecological system is complex, dynamic, and subject to continuous evolution and
adaptation. A sustainable system requires continuing interactions between nature and people,
interactions on multiple scales (local to global) within the social, economic, and governmental
domains, and a basic concern with resilience—the capacity of the system to withstand change
and disturbances and adapt by incorporating input information and assessing feedback result-
ing from prior changes. It also includes people and institutions not in the proximate inundation
zone. Explicitly addressing risk, uncertainty, equity, ambiguity, ignorance, and surprise by those
with a common interest in a specific dam or levee safety situation can help to define affected
networks. Of concern in current analysis and management is the ability of the social–ecological
system to adapt to novel or emerging challenges without compromising sustainability.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ENHANCING RESILIENCE
Resilient communities are ones that develop long-term strategies with an “all-hazards
approach” to disaster management—consideration of all manner of threats to the health,
economy, and proper functioning of the community—rather than strategies focused on a
single emergency action plan.2 Building and maintaining infrastructure critical for the long-
An all-hazards approach has long been encouraged for disaster preparation nationwide as reflected and reinforced
2
in such recent documents as the Stafford Act (see www.fema.gov/about/stafact.shtm, accessed December 20, 2011), the
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (see frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_
bills&docid=f:s3721is.txt.pdf, accessed December 20, 2011), and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5: Management
of Domestic Incidents (see www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1214592333605.shtm#1, accessed December 20, 2011).
42
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Community Characteristics and Improving Community Resilience
term prosperity of a region, including dam and levee infrastructure, are elements of those
strategies. However, the benefits provided by such infrastructure may be taken for granted,
and risks overlooked. The community could suffer for not having recognized potential risks
before a disastrous failure.
General Benefits of a Fully Engaged and Informed Community
In the case of community resilience with respect to dam and levee safety, improved
communication before, during, and after controlled or uncontrolled flow resulting in flood-
ing is part of holistic planning that makes timely mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery more successful. In many communities today, dam and levee owners and operators,
emergency managers, financial risk managers, and other decision makers are uninformed of
the potential risks associated with dam or levee failure. Their decisions, then, will probably
not be the most beneficial for themselves or their communities, and may place their com-
munities in grave danger if a dam or levee failure occurs. As part of an engaged community
whose elements (as described in Table 2.1) collectively agree to enhance dam and levee
safety and community resilience, decision makers—including dam and levee owners and
operators—should be informed and aware of the benefits and hazards associated with the
dams and levees that support their livelihood. Their decisions may allow communities to
• Obtain sufficient resources to maintain dam and levee infrastructure. Collaborative engage-
ment between dam and levee professionals and the broader community may lead to
improvements that minimize risks identified collectively as most consequential. A
community’s awareness of flood infrastructure encourages its financial participation
in ongoing maintenance and upkeep of dams and levees, which leads to more com-
prehensive advanced planning for likely floods. Box 2.1 provides an example of how
community awareness can facilitate procurement of needed maintenance resources.
• Enhance preparedness. All planning for potential scenarios and emergency response—
whether focused on primary life and safety concerns, the preservation of property, or
preservation of physical and social infrastructure—require understanding of poten-
tial emergency scenarios by all community elements. The community, including
dam and levee owners, can collectively identify dam and levee infrastructure and
associated flood risks. They can then identify other community risks and resources,
and enhance preparedness by collectively prioritizing preparedness goals and choos-
ing appropriate mitigation and preparedness activities.
• Improve regional emergency response. Effective disaster response depends on already
having open lines of communication with those in and outside the community
able to provide information and resources during times of need (see, e.g., NRC,
2011a), whether local, regional, or federal emergency support personnel or through
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DAM AND LEVEE SAFETY AND COMMMUNITY RESILIENCE
BOX 2.1
Building Community Awareness
The Miami Conservancy District in southwest Ohioa (see Figure) is engaged in efforts to build commu-
nity awareness and improve the understanding of the benefits brought by the locally designed, constructed,
operated, and maintained surface-water management system that includes five “dry dams and 55 miles of
levees in 11 cities” (Rinehart, 2011) The conservancy was created to manage flood protection in the Great
Miami River after the disastrous floods of 1913. It has received no federal or state funding and relies entirely
on local funds, assessed annually, from about 48,000 households and businesses—the beneficiaries of the
flood protection system. The Conservancy is an example of a comprehensive systems-based holistic approach
with a well-established governance process. The key message to stakeholders is the concept of sustainability
linking economic, quality-of-life, and environmental benefits of the work of the district.
Miami Conservancy District, Ohio. SOURCE: Rinehart (2011). Reprinted with permission from the author, copyright 2011.
Figure 1 in box 2-1
See www.miamiconservancy.org/ (accessed December 20, 2011).
a
financial planning. Engagement builds familiarity and trust. If a decision maker
trusts the person with whom he or she is engaged, decisions will be made quickly
and with more confidence during an emergency situation. Strategies to strengthen
community resilience include building and maintaining such relationships with
interested parties in and outside the immediate community; all involved need to
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Community Characteristics and Improving Community Resilience
be aware of their roles and prepared to respond. This includes early engagement
with regional and federal emergency support entities and personnel. For regional
emergency response to be effective and sustainable, critical individuals need to be
aware of their roles and prepared with adequate resources ranging from personnel,
to supplies, to financial support.
With fewer disruptions to community functions, recovery can be expected to occur
more quickly. Understanding the interdependencies among community elements promotes
recovery of individual elements. Established communication networks will facilitate the
difficult tasks of assessing and relaying the status of major and minor community func-
tions following an event, and resources can be directed to restore function where needed.
New operational norms can be adopted quickly if necessary. Benefits of engagement are
described more fully in Chapter 4, including benefits to dam and levee safety professionals
and benefits to other members of the community.
Information-Related Barriers to Effective Resilience-Focused Engagement
There are challenges to effective resilience-focused engagement, many of which are re-
lated to access to or understanding of inundation-related data and a community’s flood-risk
profile. Incomplete understanding of the benefits, hazards, and risks associated with dams and
levees hampers effective community engagement and decision making. Below are some of the
major information-related barriers to effective engagement and informed decision making.
• Information regarding the locations of dams and levees and the areas they protect is not
consistently available in the public domain. After the events of September 11, 2001,
the public is not granted routine access to inundation maps (USACE, 2008; DOI,
2011; see Box 2.2 for response to similar directives abroad), although recent ini-
tiatives make some inundations maps more accessible.3 Without the most basic
information, communities engaged in resilience-focused collaboration cannot make
informed decisions. FEMA itself can be affected by the lack of data, as can, for
example, the private insurance industry.4 Resources allocated to support emergency
responders may also be affected.
For example, see geo.usace.army.mil/egis/cm2.cm26.map?map=mvd_ows (accessed May 21, 2012).
3
The private insurance market that provides property insurance to those seeking additional coverage beyond that pro-
4
vided by the National Flood Insurance Program relies on FEMA flood maps to identify flood hazard domains. The amount
of coverage provided depends on the size of the entity purchasing insurance—larger institutions and industrial companies may
purchase in excess of $100 million of flood insurance. Insurers typically manage their own known flood risk conservatively by
applying larger deductibles, by using insurance limits, or by purchasing reinsurance. Where flood maps are unavailable, private
insurers rely on historical claims data to make actuarially based decisions; such decision-making occurs without knowledge
of potential flood hazard (C. Goodwin, personal communication, February 11, 2011).
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DAM AND LEVEE SAFETY AND COMMMUNITY RESILIENCE
BOX 2.2
Response to the 2007 Floods in the United Kingdom: Make Data Available
Countries in different parts of the world have responded to national security threats by withholding
information from the public that potentially could be used to plan terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure.
There is growing recognition, however, of the advantages of having data regarding flood hazards accessible
to the public. An investigation of the 2007 floods in the United Kingdom resulted in the Pitt Review (DEFRA,
2008) and included 92 recommendations for building community resilience to flood hazards. The report
describes that “large-scale natural events are more probable and have higher consequences than terror” and
it welcomes an approach to risk management that balances the risks of terrorism against natural hazards
“in a single plan” (p. 245). The report also includes this statement:
The Government should provide Local Resilience Forums with the inundation maps for both large and
small reservoirs to enable them to assess risks and plan for contingency, warning and evacuation and
the outline maps be made available to the public online as part of wider flood risk information. (p. 306)
In its response to the Pitt Review (DEFRA, 2008), the government of the United Kingdom indicated that
it supported this recommendation, and it began providing basic-level inundation maps to local resilience
forums while preparing more detailed maps of higher-risk reservoirs. As of December 2009, the government
had completed protocols for sharing the maps developed (DEFRA, 2009). Web-based search tools were also
being developed for the public.
• FEMA flood maps are easily misunderstood. FEMA flood maps prepared to support
the National Flood Insurance Program5 show the areal extents of flooding for what
are termed 100-year flood events,6 and, when information is available, the eleva-
tion of the base flood. Those maps often represent the best technical information
available to communities. Those who seek flood hazard maps may use FEMA flood
insurance rate maps, perhaps mistakenly believing these maps detail a full range
of flood hazards. Dams and levees designed to control water flows of magnitudes
greater than a 100-year flood event are routinely not shown on FEMA flood maps.
Communities may be unaware of the existence of local or upstream dams and le-
vees and their related risks. Because readers uninformed of the intent of the flood
insurance maps may draw erroneous conclusions regarding safety, the result may
be misinformed personal or community- level decisions.
For example, see msc.fema.gov/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/FemaWelcomeView?storeId=10001&catalogId=10001&l
5
angId=-1 (accessed December 21, 2011).
A 100-year event, also called a once-in-a-100-years event, is one with an annual exceedance probability of 0.01 (1.0%).
6
A 100-year event can occur at any time; the probability of occurrence in any given year is 0.01 (1.0%).
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Community Characteristics and Improving Community Resilience
BOX 2.3
An Unwarranted Sense of Safety?
A 2001 study conducted by Pfister (2002) of the evacuation of Grafton, New South Wales, Australia,
before a flood event addressed perceptions of flood risk. A local river was expected to rise to a height
0.13 m below the expected height of protection offered by local levees. Because of uncertainties inherent in
river-crest predictions, the town was ordered to evacuate, but fewer than 10 percent of the population are
estimated to have evacuated (Pfister, 2002). Pfister noted that “the residents of Grafton, having experienced
few direct effects of flooding since the construction of the levees, are likely to have developed a relatively
low consciousness of the flood threat, and are therefore less ready to act” (Pfister, 2002, p. 24).
• Available data can lead to an unwarranted sense of safety. Those living or working in a
region protected by a levee may consider themselves immune to flooding, especially
given a lack of data, incorrect data, or misinterpretation of available data. Box 2.3
is an example of a community that largely failed to adhere to a flood evacuation
order, apparently because it lacked awareness of the flood threat. Communities
behind levees and dams may believe they are “safe,” and may not fully understand
the value of the infrastructure, the need to maintain it, or the actions to be taken
in the event of failure.
BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL FOR COMMUNITY RESILIENCE
Social capital refers to the connections among social networks that can be used, through
collaboration, to obtain societal goals—in this case, community resilience. The concept of
social capital has been in the sociologic, economic, and political science literature for several
decades; one of the earliest uses of the term was by Hanifan (1916). Political scientist Robert
Putnam and coauthors developed the concept in Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in
Modern Italy (Putnam et al., 1993). Putnam et al. explain the dilemmas of collective action
and how they can be overcome by a stock of social capital, by the existence of networks of
civil engagement, and through norms of reciprocity—the expectation that people will treat
or serve others as they themselves have been treated or served. He attributes the emergence
of democratic institutions, behavior, and social trust to the growth of participation in vol-
untary organizations in which people acquire skills and develop expectations with respect
to social behaviors. These skills include the ability to negotiate, compromise, work together,
and provide leadership. They are assets, sometimes described as moral resources, that may
be useful for building community resilience because people learn to cope together to solve
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DAM AND LEVEE SAFETY AND COMMMUNITY RESILIENCE
problems and deal with common stressors. Putnam developed the notion of social capital
further in his later work, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community
(Putnam, 2000), in which he explores how and why Americans have become disconnected
from one another and how social structures and institutions have atrophied. He concludes
that social capital is best built by a dense network of voluntary organizations and widespread
public participation in them.
The concept of social capital has been broadened by including it in a larger framework
that also includes natural capital, human capital, and financial capital. The framework has
been used by development agencies, such as the United Kingdom’s Department for Inter-
national Development, to assess a country’s development potential and its actual or potential
vulnerability to stresses and perturbations. Social capital has been described as the foun-
dation for community adaptation (see, e.g., Norris et al., 2008; NRC, 2011a) with “the
formation of effective and productive social networks as the key element in [its] develop-
ment” (NRC, 2011a; p. 106). Social capital and therefore community resilience could be
enhanced via
• dense community social networks that build communication and social interactions
in a community or among people and organizations that have a common interest;
• widespread voluntary organizations that afford community members opportunities
for participation and collaboration;
• development of community members’ skills in negotiation, compromise, and leader-
ship as a result of participation in voluntary organizations and social networks;
• widespread access to and use of social media;
• development of a network of private and public partnerships in the community.
The development of social capital, in turn, fosters higher social trust in the community,
unquestionably a valued resource for effective risk management and decision making with
respect to dam and levee safety. Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive discussion of how it
is applied specifically to the dam and levee safety community.
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