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OCR for page 4
1
Introduction
In 1977, the Center for Disease Control (later named Centers for Disease
Control) reported that-a larger than expected number of leukemia case-e had
occurred among Camp Desert Rock soldiers present at the Nevada Test Site
during Shot SMOKY, a nuclear test event which included military maneuvers
during Operation PLUMB BOB in 1957. Meetings were held between Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE) and Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) representatives and
their contractors to determine if radiation exposure records for military partici-
pants in atmospheric nuclear tests were available for epidemiological studies. In
December 1977 and January 1978, the Department of Defense (DOD) named
DNA as the executive agency to conduct a Nuclear Test Personnel Review
FOUR); and DOE established an exposure records centralization project which
later was named the Dosimetry Research Project (DRP).
Hearings on Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation, were held by the House of
Representatives Rodgers Subcommittee in January and February 1978. DNA and
DOE representatives testified on radiation exposures of test participants and on
efforts to identify military participants. Veterans who participated in PLUMB-
BOB and who later became ill with leukemia testified on their requests to the
Veterans Administration (VA) for medical treatment and compensation for their
illnesses. Veterans Administration representatives testified on claims of these
and other "atomic veterans.', A Center for Disease Control representative asked
DNA for assistance in identifying all military SMOKY participants.
With this stimulus, the NTPR program increased its efforts to identify all
DOD-affiliated participants in atmospheric nuclear tests and determine their
4
OCR for page 5
1 INTRODUCTION
radiation exposure. DOE's DRP increased its activities to locate missing expo-
sure records, develop a nuclear testing radiation exposure data base, and provide
assistance to the NTPR program. Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Company,
Inc., (REECo), DOE's prime operating and support contractor at the Nevada Test
Site (NTS), had carried out the NTS radiological safety program since 1955 and
also conducted the DRP.
Hearings were conducted by the U.S. Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs
in June 1979. Representatives of both DNA and DOE were required to testify on
NTPR and on past nuclear testing activities. The VA and Veterans' groups also
testified (U.S. Senate 1979~.
In 1978, DNA and DOE commissioned the National Research Council (NRC)
to conduct an epidemiological study on military participants in atmospheric
nuclear testing (NAS 1985a). In studying some 46,000 of an estimated 205,000
military participants, the report concluded that there was no general increase in
the incidence of cancer in test participants. Only the incidence of leukemias in
military participants at NTS during SMOKY was higher than expected, with the
exception of a slight increase in prostate cancers for Operation REDWING
participants. Critics pointed out, however, that selection of cancer incidence in
the population at large for comparison biased the results because health screening
before entering military service assured that soldiers were healthier on average
than the population at large.
Upon request of DNA, the NRC in 1984 appointed a Committee on Dose
Assignment and Reconstruction for Service Personnel at Nuclear Weapons Tests
to review methods used by NTPR in determining radiation doses. That committee's
purpose was to advise DNA on whether or not the methods used by NTPR to
assign doses of radiation were comprehensive and scientifically sound and to
recommend improvements if needed. The charge to that committee did not
require it to make judgements about the biological significance of the radiation
exposures of participants at the atmospheric weapons tests, nor did it direct that
committee to conduct audits of dose assignments or reconstructions of specific
individuals.
The committee, which was chaired by Merril Eisenbud of the Institute of
Environmental Medicine of the New York University Medical Center, reported
on its study in a 1985 NAS publication (NAS 1985b). The Eisenbud committee
found that the principal sources of information on external radiation exposure are
film badge records that were compiled into a master file by REECo. This file
contains more than 485,000 entries on both military and civilian participants in
the atmospheric test series and includes records of about 143,000 of the estimated
205,000 military-affiliated participants in atmospheric testing.
The Eisenbud committee found that the design of film badges, methods of film
processing, and densitometric techniques and calibration were relatively crude
OCR for page 6
6
FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY IN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS
during World War II, but improved substantially during the 18-year period during
which atmospheric weapons tests were conducted. The committee estimated that
fUm badge data on gamma radiation exposure have a positive bias of about 45
percent and a random uncertainty of about + 100 percent between minimum
detection levels and 100 mR and about + 40 percent above 100 mR. The
committee reported that film badge measurement of beta radiation exposure were
nonexistent or of uncertain quality during the period. The committee concluded
that the methods used by the NTPR teams to assign external gamma doses were
generally reasonable and made appropriate use of available data. Committee
members further concluded that the methods employed provide a data base and a
system of dose assignment for estimating the external doses received by persons
who participated in atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons.
NTPR efforts and the above referenced NRC committee review were followed
by two General Accounting Office (GAO) investigations and reports on specific
segments of the atmospheric weapons testing program.
The first was entitled "Operation CROSSROADS - Personnel Radiation Expo
sure Estimates Should Be Improved" (GAO 1985~. Regarding CROSSROADS
film badges only, this report concluded in part that they were not reliable for
measuring external gamma or beta radiation and measured only a limited expo-
sure range. This report recommended that DNA assign some gamma exposure to
each zero film badge result reported, develop an error range recognizing film and
processing inaccuracies for each film badge reading, and reassess the accuracy of
film badge beta readings. Also recommended was providing the Veterans Ad-
ministration (VA) with error ranges associated with all individual film badge
readings reported to the VA (all atmospheric test series).
The second report was titled "Nuclear Health and Safety - Radiation Exposures
for Some Cloud-Sampling Personnel Need to be Reexamined" (GAO 1987~. This
report covered investigation of film badge dosimetry for cloud-sampling, cloud-
penetrating, and cloud-tracking air crews, in addition to supporting ground crews,
who participated in Operations TUMBLER-SNAPPER, REDWING, and DOM-
INIC I. Report conclusions regarding film badges were that badge readings for
pilots were sometimes half the readings indicated by radiation monitoring instru-
ments installed in cockpits, inaccuracies resulted because measurement ranges of
two films in the badges did not sufficiently overlap, and records of film badge
exposures and cumulative exposures contained recording mistakes or omissions.
Recommendations of this second GAO report were that records of each Air
Force participant in any atmospheric nuclear weapons test should be reviewed for
similar errors, and cockpit-installed instruments should be used in conjunction
with film badge readings to better define exposures received by aircraft crews
during all atmospheric tests.
As a result of these GAO conclusions and recommendations, DNA commis
OCR for page 7
1 INTRODUCTION
stoned the National Research Council to organize a committee on Film Badge
Dosimetry in Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. The basic charge of the committee was
to make an insteps, detailed evaluation of uncertainties in the determination of
radiation doses with personnel film badge dosimeters. In addition to its basic
charge, the committee made an attempt to address each of the GAO conclusions
and recommendations relative to personnel film badge dosimetry. As a useful
product of its study, the committee produced most probable doses and dose ranges
for use by DNA in interpreting film badge exposures for each test series. It is
pointed out that the results of the study are applicable to both military and civilian
participants. The following "Statement of Task" was assigned to this project from
its inception.
STATEMENT OF TASK
The Committee's task is to evaluate certainties in the determination of
radiation doses with personnelfilm badge dosimeters. This study shallfocus, as
follows, on methodologyfor dose determination with specific types of film badges
employed at different times and in different environments during atmospheric
testing of nuclear weapons, based on published data and documentation that are
available for analysis:
1. Review kinds of radiation and their energies that personnel film badges
were used to monitor during the different testing series.
2. Characterize capabilities and limitations of film badge dosimeters used
during the 18-year period of testing (1945-1962) in terms of evolving designs,
films, and responses to relevant radiations and energies.
3. Categorize uncertainties in personnelfilm badge dosimetry, as introduced
during calibration, storage, and processing of films in the laboratory, and in the
use of film badges in the field. Evaluate ranges of uncertainty for specific
dosimeter designs, environmental conditions, and procedures employed.
4. Define reasonable and optimum procedures for reporting radiation doses
from film badge data, including uncertainty levels, for tile various parameters
encountered, e.g., for Pacific and continental environments, anclfor major differ-
ences infirm badge construction and components.
5. Develop reasonable and prudent methods for analyzing and reporting
radiation doses that may have been experienced during the various series of
atmospheric tests but that may have fallen below minimum detectable levels.
This Committee's charge does not extend to attempts at dose reconstruction for
persons with only partial film badge records, nor does it include internal dose
OCR for page 8
8
FILM BADGE DOSIMETRY 11V ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTS
assessments. Results of this study should not be used to infer doses received by
individuals to whom film badges were not issued.
The legal recourse of veterans who suspect that their health has been adversely
affected by radiation exposure received as a result of their involvement in the
weapons tests has undergone significant change in recent years. A brief overview
of the relevant law follows.
Since 1950, when the Supreme Court decided Feres v. United States (340 U.S.
135, 1950), military personnel (including veterans) have been barred from seek-
ing compensation from the federal government for injuries "aristing] out of or...
in the course of activity incident to service." Instead, veterans have been author-
ized to seek compensation for disabilities connected to their service pursuant to a
comprehensive claims system operated by the Veterans Administration (See 38
United States Code Sections 310-314~.
In 1988, Congress adopted and President Reagan signed into law the Radia-
tion-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988 (Pub. Law 100-321~. The law
amends Section 312 of Title 38 of the United States Code by establishing that
veterans who, while serving on active duty, participated onsite in a test involving
the atmospheric detonation of a nuclear device (or in the occupation of Hiroshima
or Nagasaki, Japan, between August 6, 1945, and July 1, 1946, or were interred as
prisoners of war in Japan) and who develop within forty years any of a specific
list of radiogenic cancers, will be presumptively entitled to disability compensa-
tion from the Department of Veterans Affairs. The Act thus enables veterans who
manifest one of the listed diseases within the requisite time period to obtain
compensation without proving that radiation exposure caused the cancer in ques-
tion. In proposing this legislation to the Senate, Senator Cranston, its sponsor,
noted that compensation had been awarded in less than 40 of the over 6,000
radiation claims filed with the VA (Cong. Rec. S4638, April 25, 1988~.
Veterans who develop a cancer not on the list set forth in the Radiation-
Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988 must still prove that their cancer
was caused by exposure to ionizing radiation from atmospheric tests if they are to
win disability benefits.
Civilians exposed to radiation Mom atmospheric tests have recourse only
through the Federal Tort Claims Act.2 Such claims were upheld at the trial court
level in Allen v. United States (588 F. Supp. 247, D.Utah 1984), where Judge
~ In the case of leukemia, the cancer must manifest within a thirty year period freon the last date of
exposure.
2 Civilian employees of the United States generally may not obtain compensation for work-related
injuries pursuant to the Federal Tort Maims Act. Instead, they may seek compensation pursuant to the
Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. 8101-8193, which authorizes recovery of
lost wages and medical costs for "personal injury sustained while in the performance of...duty."
OCR for page 9
1 INTRODUCTION
9
Bruce Jenkins ruled in favor of nine plaintiffs alleging injury or death from fallout
from atmospheric tests in Nevada in the 1950s and 1960s. On April 20, 1987,
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the
lower court decision in Allen v. United States on the grounds that the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) in planning and conducting its monitoring and infor-
mation programs concerning the testing was making the kind of policy judge-
ments which are immune from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act (816
F.2d 1417, 10th Cir. 1987~. The Supreme Court in January of 1988 declined to
hear an appeal in the case (108 S.Ct. 694), thereby letting stand the ruling of the
Tenth Circuit Court. Civilians are thus unlikely to succeed in suits brought
against the government for exposure to radiation from atmospheric tests unless
Congress changes the relevant law.
In 198B, Congress adopted legislation that turned the Veterans Administration
into the fourteenth Cabinet department of the United States in March, 1989
(Department of Veterans Affairs Act, Pub. Law 100-527~. Of more significance
for those seeking disability claims, Congress also authorized veterans to appeal
denials of benefits to a new United States Court of Veterans Appeals, and from
there to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Veterans
Judicial Review Action, Pub. Law 100-687~. Previously, benefit denials were not
appealable beyond the Veterans Administration.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
film badges
