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CHAPTER 1 Introduction To address safety-related rule noncompliance by transit operators, the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) adopted a voluntary standard for compliance testing in light and heavy rail transit systems. While this standard is an important step toward achieving safe operating practices in the public transportation industry, more remains to be done. Recent incidents resulting from violations of safety-related rules have called into question the safety of public transportation. Most notable was the September 2008 commuter rail crash in Chatsworth, California, that killed 25 and injured 135 others. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that "the probable cause . . . was the failure of the Metrolink engineer to observe and appropriately respond to the red signal . . . because he was engaged in prohibited use of a wireless device . . . that distracted him from his duties." (NTSB 2010). Texting has also been implicated in a subsequent collision on the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Green Line in May 2009. Most recently, NTSB's report on the June 2009 collision of two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) trains recommended that the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) facilitate the development of a nonpunitive safety report- ing system at all public transit agencies. The purpose of such a system would be to collect reports from all employees regarding near-misses and unsafe conditions. Under TCRP Project A-34, this project had the objective to develop a resource for improving safety-related rule compli- ance in the public transportation industry because of the potentially serious consequences of safety-related rule noncompliance. Intended Report Usage The information, methods, and techniques in this report are designed to be administered by the public transit professional who plays a role in a transit agency's rules compliance program. This might be the safety director, rules program officials, training director, or supervisors involved in daily oversight of transit operations and maintenance. Not all tools and strategies will work at a particular transit agency because of cultural and operational differences. With few exceptions, the practices described in Chapter 4 are applicable to all public transit modes and are scalable to the size of the transit agency. Transit agencies should view the practices as ideas for consideration when looking for ways to improve an existing rules compliance program or when designing a program for a new operation. Safety-related rules apply to employees involved in the operation and maintenance of the tran- sit system. This includes vehicle operators, dispatchers, and other operations personnel, as well as those who maintain the vehicles and track infrastructure. The scope of this report is primarily on safety-related rules that are designed to prevent high consequence events, especially those where the public is affected or where there may be harm to transit agency employees. 1