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10
The Federal Role
We now turn our attention to the role that the federal government can play in promoting
more developmentally appropriate juvenile justice policies and practices. We focus specifically
on the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), the congressionally
mandated lead agency for juvenile justice. Given the current state of the field with its receptivity
to change but need for assistance, two questions arise: Is OJJDP the appropriate federal agency
to guide and assist state, local, and tribal jurisdictions toward the goal of a developmentally
appropriate juvenile justice system? If so, how can its leadership role be strengthened? This
chapter reviews the history of OJJDP, its relevant portfolio, and its current status and presents
the committee's views about the agency's future role in promoting and facilitating juvenile
justice reform.
THE HISTORY OF OJJDP
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) is the only federal
agency specifically directed to develop and disseminate knowledge to the juvenile justice field
and to assist states in improving their systems. Established in 1974, the office has authority for
federal programs under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), as
amended. This legislation reflected basic understandings that delinquent behavior is preventable
and that juveniles involved in the juvenile justice system should receive individualized treatment.
It also acknowledged the deficiencies of juvenile courts and the services available to them,
particularly the "critically needed alternatives to institutionalization." (P.L. 93-415, Sec. 102).
OJJDP and its predecessor agencies1 came into operation during the due process reform
period of juvenile justice change described in Chapter 2 and reflected a new federal commitment
to help state and localities strengthen their juvenile justice systems to make them more fair and
effective (Matsuda and Foley, 1981). Congress established OJJDP to provide immediate and
comprehensive action by the federal government. OJJDP was given a broad mandate to provide
technical assistance and training, conduct a centralized research and evaluation effort, develop
national standards, and coordinate federal activities related to the treatment of juvenile offenders
and those at risk of entering the juvenile justice system. It was also given authority to provide
formula grants to participating states and territories to help them meet the goals of JJDPA and
develop their juvenile justice programs.
Although formula funds could be applied to a wide variety of delinquency prevention and
intervention programs, receipt of this funding was tied to compliance with core requirements.
The original JJDPA included two core protection requirements. Subsequent revisions to the
1
In 1912, the Children's Bureau was created to investigate and report on juvenile courts. The Division of Juvenile
Delinquency Services was created under the Children's Bureau forty years later. With the passing of the 1961
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act, the Office of Juvenile Delinquency was established with the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) of
1974 replaced previous legislation and established the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP) within the Department of Justice to oversee efforts in the United States to prevent juvenile delinquency and
improve the quality of juvenile justice (Matsuda and Foley, 1981).
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JJDPA expanded the list of core mandates to the four that exist today (see Box 10-1). In order to
receive formula funds from OJJDP, states must submit a plan every three years which guides the
development, implementation, and funding of programs to address the core requirements of
JJDPA and improve state juvenile justice systems. Demonstrating compliance with the
requirements necessitated the creation of adequate systems for monitoring jails, detention
facilities, and correctional facilities (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
2010). States receiving formula funds are required to distribute most of the monies to local
jurisdictions.
Total funding for OJJDP from 1974- 2010 is shown in constant 2010 dollars in Figure
10-1. In the early years, funds for the State Formula Grant Program (also known as Title II, Part
B) constituted about two-thirds of OJJDP's budget. These formula funds were awarded to states,
as mandated, to encourage the separation of juveniles from adult inmates, the diversion of
juveniles from the juvenile justice system to community-based alternatives to confinement, and
the development of new and effective approaches to the treatment of juvenile offenders.
In the 1980's and 1990's when state policies and programs were "getting tough" on
juveniles (see chapter 2), OJJDP continued to support states' efforts to comply with the
requirements of JJDPA and improve their juvenile justice programs. The office began to focus
on issues that affect the system as a whole, such as drugs and serious juvenile offending, and to
develop programs that would help coordinate system-wide responses. One of its training
programs, the Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program, called for the active
participation and coordination of all agencies in the juvenile justice system - police, prosecution,
courts, probation, corrections, aftercare, and human service agencies -to deal with serious
juvenile offenders. OJJDP started looking outside the bounds of the juvenile justice system and
in efforts to prevent juvenile delinquency, supported research and development on school
policies and family interventions (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1988).
One of its projects examined existing school disciplinary policies and developed and tested new
policies and procedures designed to reduce school crime and disorder. Another project reviewed
research and program evaluations and identified promising programs that would strengthen
families in ways shown to reduce delinquency (Alvarado and Kumpfer, 2000).
OJJDP was given additional authority to support programs relating to child victimization
and exploitation through the Missing Children's Assistance Act (MCAA) and the Victims of
Child Abuse Act (VOCA). These programs continue to receive support. Today, the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children as well as regional and local training for AMBER
Alert activities are funded under MCAA. The Children's Advocacy Centers are funded under
VOCA to provide assistance around the investigation, treatment, and prosecution of child abuse
cases.
In the 1992 reauthorization of JJDPA, reducing disproportionate minority contact
2
(DMC) was elevated to a fourth core requirement tied to formula and block funds. This
reauthorization also established the Community Prevention Grants program, also referred to as
the Incentive Grants for Local Delinquency Prevention, under Title V to encourage prevention
efforts at the local level. This Title V program was designed to encourage local leaders to assess
the risk factors in their neighborhoods and develop and implement data-driven delinquency
prevention strategies. It provided additional funds to states, supplementing the formula funds but
2
In 1992, the DMC acronym referred to disproportionate minority confinement, but the scope was changed to
disproportionate minority contact in the 2002 reauthorization after it was widely determined that disproportionally
extended to all parts of the system.
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specifically directed at delinquency prevention at the local level. During the period of the 1980's
and 1990's, the combination of Part B formula and Title V funds represented two-thirds of
OJJDP's budget.
The 1992 reauthorization also focused OJJDP's attention on the legal representation of
juveniles. It funded a study to examine problems facing public defenders and impeding legal
representation (Puritz et al., 1995), which led to the development of training and technical
assistance for defenders in local jurisdictions. In addition, new language in the reauthorization
directed states to use formula funds to identify gaps and biases in their systems in regard to
gender-specific services. The increasing involvement of young women in the juvenile justice
system was a significant concern at this time. OJJDP's mandate and available funding through
the formula grants as well as the new Challenge Grant program provided a vehicle for states to
address the needs of adolescent girls (Larance, 2009). 3
Public concerns about juvenile crime were intensified during this period. As such, OJJDP
was able to grow its portfolios on illegal drugs, gangs, and serious, violent offenders. At the
same time, OJJDP undertook several activities to assess the available evidence to determine the
most effective programs for preventing delinquency and strengthening juvenile justice systems.
The result of its efforts was a position paper entitled The Comprehensive Strategy on Serious,
Violent, and Chronic Youth Crime (Wilson and Howell, 1993) which refocused attention on
early intervention and prevention. Once youth entered the juvenile justice system, the strategy
called for jurisdictions to provide a continuum of graduated sanctions tailored for first time non-
serious offending through multiple offending and serious violent offending (Krisberg et al.,
2004). As interest and support for the strategy grew, OJJDP developed an implementation guide
(Howell, 1995a) and embarked on intensive training and technical assistance initiatives to pilot
and push forward the adoption of the Comprehensive Strategy by local and state-wide
jurisdictions.
The office also embarked on efforts to involve other child-serving systems that have
critical roles in delinquency prevention. It became an active supporter of the Blueprints for
Violence Prevention Project (Mihalic et al., 2004) and helped promote the adoption of research-
based prevention programs. It provided funding for training and technical assistance to
nationwide replications of Blueprint programs aimed at reducing adolescent violent crime,
aggression, delinquency, and substance abuse.
Its Safe Futures Initiative, launched at demonstration sites in 1996, brought family and
health services, education systems, and juvenile justice together in an effort to reduce juvenile
delinquency and violence. It sought to establish public-private partnerships to leverage resources
needed to provide a continuum of services appropriate for diverse needs of youth (Morley et al.,
2000). Three years later, OJJDP undertook other federal collaborative efforts in the school
violence and child victimization areas. The Safe Schools/ Healthy Students Initiative, cofunded
with the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services, provided federal funding to
communities to create an infrastructure that would link and integrate existing and new services
that promote student development, positive mental health, and prosocial behavior (Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2001b). OJJDP also partnered with the
Department of Health and Human Services to develop and support the Safe Start Initiative,
designed to address child victimization (primarily birth to age six). Again the initiative sought to
create comprehensive systems which incorporated community assessment and strategic planning
across services. (Kracke, 2001).
3
For a description of federal leadership on gender issues, see Sherman (2012), pp. 1586-1595.
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As pressure to "get tough" on youth mounted in the mid 1990's, OJJDP was authorized to
provide additional resources to states to build their juvenile justice system infrastructure through
the Juvenile Accountability Block Grant (JABG) program.4 A core mandate of JABG is that
states must show progress toward implementing a system of graduated sanctions in order to be
eligible for funding. For five years, monies appropriated through JABG represented a significant
boost to OJJDP's budget and, very importantly, was a source of funding states relied on to build
and strengthen their juvenile justice system infrastructure. Congressional support of this
program even in the face of opposition by the Clinton Administration 5 reflected Congress's
priorities, and its desire that support to the states for their juvenile justice system infrastructures
should receive precedence over prevention programming. The JABG program continues today
but its funding is about one-sixth of what it was when introduced. Refer to Figure 10-1.
Around the same time as the introduction of the JABG program, Congress began to direct
OJJDP to address other areas such as underage drinking and tribal youth justice. Congress
initiated the Enforcing Underage Drinking Laws (EUDL) program in FY1998 and has
appropriated $25 million annually to EUDL through FY2010. The Tribal Youth Program (TYP)
was established in FY1999 and awards funds to federally recognized tribal governments to
improve their juvenile justice systems. The program addresses the chronic underfunding of
juvenile justice systems and services in American Indian and Alaska Native communities and the
limited training and assistance available to law enforcement and justice personnel in these areas.
Both programs have been appropriated funds through carve-outs from Title V funding.6 An
example of carve-outs is illustrated in the 2009 appropriations language in Box 10-2.
During the late 1990s, OJJDP entered a new stage in its development. After 1998, its total
operating budget nearly tripled. See Figure 10-1. However, funds for its hallmark State Formula
Grant Program dropped to less than 20% of the agency's operating budget from 1998 to 2010.
As the number of appropriated carve-outs continued to rise, OJJDP's portfolio was increasingly
shaped by congressional priorities and its ability to support the agency's original mission
declined. See Figure 10-2. By 2008, the budget for its combined state formula and block grant
programs7 dropped to one-third of OJJDP's total budget.
JJDPA was last reauthorized in 2002 through the 21st Century Department of Justice
Appropriations Authorization Act (P.L. 107-273), and, as of the writing of this report, has yet to
be reauthorized. As a result, formal authorization for OJJDP's programs expired in FY2007 and
FY2008. However, many OJJDP's programs continue to receive support through appropriations.
The remainder of this chapter highlights several of OJJDP's programs that have had a major
impact on the juvenile justice field, then turns to discuss its current status.
4
JABG was originally known as the Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grant (JAIBG) program. JABG funds
can be spent on local programs in distinct purpose areas: graduated sanctions, corrections/detention facilities, court
staffing and pretrial services, prosecutors (staffing and/or funding equipment or training), training for law
enforcement and court personnel, juvenile gun courts, juvenile drug courts, juvenile records systems, information
sharing, accountability, risk and needs assessment, school safety, restorative justice, juvenile courts and probation,
corrections/detention personnel, and reentry (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2009c).
5
OMB did not include JABG in its annual budget submissions.
6
Carve-outs are programs Congress requires an agency to support and it usually specifies the budget category from
which the funds should come. For example, tribal youth justice and underage drinking programs are carve-outs and
the funds to support them come from the funds allocated to the delinquency prevention program area.
7
Combined state formula and block grant programs refers to the Title II Part B Formula Funds, Title V Incentive
Grants, EUDL, and the Challenge Grants (old Title II, Part E) under JJDPA as well as block grants authorized under
JABG.
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OJJDP'S PORTFOLIO
OJJDP's mandate is a broad one. Its responsibilities include collecting and documenting
data on juveniles in the system, guiding and assisting efforts to prevent delinquency or improve
state justice systems, ensuring states' compliance with the goals of the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) of 1974, and sponsoring relevant research. We highlight
some of its accomplishments in three areas: (1) data collection, (2) national standards, and (3) the
core requirements of the JJDPA. We also provide an example of OJJDP's capacity to link
research to practice.
Data Collection
Since its inception, OJJDP has worked with other agencies both inside and outside the
U.S. Department of Justice to develop a national statistics program that captures data on juvenile
arrests, court cases, and placements. All these data are updated annually or biennially and made
publicly available online through its Statistical Briefing Book (Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, 2011b). With OJJDP's continued support, the statistics readily
available to practitioners, policy makers, and researchers have steadily expanded to provide
information on juveniles and cases at multiple points in the juvenile justice system.
Arrest, Court and Placement Data
Drawing on the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports OJJDP produces the annual series
"Juvenile Arrests" to document rates, patterns, and trends of arrests involving youth under age
18. The latest data reflect the continuing decline of both juvenile arrests overall and juvenile
arrests for violent crime (Puzzanchera and Adams, 2011c).
OJJDP also funds the National Center for Juvenile Justice (NCJJ) to oversee the National
Juvenile Court Data Archive. This archive currently contains over 15 million automated case
records from U.S. courts with juvenile jurisdiction; the majority of these records are delinquency
and status offense records (National Center for Juvenile Justice, n.d.). The data archive produces
the annual report Juvenile Court Statistics and maintains data sets for use by researchers as well
as a web-based application tool for online access to analyze the databases from the report.
Finally, three OJJDP sponsored surveys provide data on youth in out of home placement.
The biennial Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement (CJRP) is a one-day census of all
youth in both private and public residential facilities. CJRP collects data on characteristics of
juveniles (age, race, gender, and most serious offense), court of jurisdiction (juvenile or
criminal), adjudicatory status (pre- or postadjudication), and the state or county with jurisdiction
(Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2001). The biennial Juvenile Residential
Facility Census (JRFC), first fielded in 2000, supplements the CJRP and captures facility-level
information about the residential environments and the services juveniles receive while in facility
placement. It requests data on facility ownership, security, capacity and crowding, as well as on
injuries and deaths in custody. (Hockenberry et al., 2011). Finally, the Survey of Youth in
Residential Placement (SYRP) complements these two censuses by collecting information
directly from youth through anonymous interviews. To date, the survey has been administered
only once, but it has provided valuable data regarding youth characteristics and backgrounds,
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conditions of confinement, youth needs and services, and the nature and risk of victimization
(Sedlak and Bruce, 2010; Sedlak and McPherson, 2010a, 2010b). It also provides information
previously unavailable, such as the overall prevalence of all offenses for which youth are
incarcerated as well as the characteristics (e.g., drug/alcohol use, accomplices) of these offenses
and insight into the backgrounds, expectations, and beliefs of juveniles in custody (Sedlak,
2010).
National Performance Standards for Juvenile Facilities
OJJDP's role in developing national performance standards for juvenile facilities has
been multifaceted, reflecting both its mission and its authority. It sponsored, at the request of
Congress, the research study that examined the conditions of confinement and demonstrated the
need for such standards (Parent et al., 1994). It provided the start-up funds for the development
of standards, outcome measures, and tools. It sponsored pilot sites to test the program and
provided incentives for participating facilities with funds for improvements identified by the
program (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2001).
The mandated study (Parent et al., 1994) found poor conditions at the turn of the 1990s --
increased injuries to staff and youth due to overcrowding, high rates of suicidal behavior, few
timely or professionally conducted health surveys, and high levels of staff turnover at detention
and correctional facilities (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2001). The
study also found that existing national procedural standards, those that focus on developing
policies and procedures and maintaining specific staff ratios, had no discernible effect on
conditions (Parent, 1993).
OJJDP responded to these findings by initiating the Performance-based Standards (PbS)
program through a grant to the Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators.8 In 1998, the
program was implemented in 20 facilities (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, 1999b). As of April 2011, 198 facilities in 27 states subscribe to the PbS process
(PbS Learning Institute, 2011). Although enrollment is increasing, current participation
represents about 10 percent of total facilities in the United States.
The effects of the PbS program have been promising. Facilities and jurisdictions that
participate in PbS are in a position to make data informed decisions and to monitor the progress
of their changes. To date, the database contains over 75,000 incident reports, over 30,000 youth
records, and over 70,000 youth and staff surveys (PbS Learning Institute, 2011). The large
volume of data allows the program to provide facilities with reliable averages and statistics for
comparison. It also can be used for research. For example, Kupchik and Snyder (2009) used the
PbS data to develop a model to predict victimization and fear among individual juvenile inmates.
Despite the fact that the PbS program has always been voluntary and its OJJDP support
has dwindled, it continues to expand. In 2004, the PbS program transitioned from a free,
federally supported program to an income-generating nonprofit, the PbS Learning Institute.
8
National performance standards were developed and tested in critical areas--safety, security, order, health and
mental health services, justice and legal rights, programming, and reintegration planning (PbS Learning Institute,
2011). In 2004, the Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators was a recipient of the Innovations in American
Government Award, bestowed by Harvard University's Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation
and the Council for Excellence in Government, in recognition of the PbS program as an effective government
program that inspires public confidence.
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Core Requirements
The JJDPA, as amended, lays out four requirements that states must comply with to
receive OJJDP's formula and block funds for improvements to their juvenile justice systems (see
Box 10-1). Each of the core requirements reflects a developmentally appropriate practice.
States must submit a comprehensive three-year plan for meeting the JJDPA core
requirements within the framework of their particular systems. Of the 56 eligible states and
territories, only Wyoming has chosen not to participate in the formula grants program.
Compliance with DSO, jail removal and separation is demonstrated through verified data from
secure juvenile and adult facilities provided in the state's annual compliance monitoring report
and a bi-annual monitoring audit. Determining compliance with the DMC requirement is less
straightforward. It involves submission of a three year DMC reduction plan, annual updates and
the annual submission of data, known as relative rate indices (RRI's) that measures
disproportionality at different stages of juvenile justice system processing (See Chapter 8 for an
explanation of RRI's.) In addition, states must also submit updated DMC data in their three
year plan for at least three jurisdictions with the highest minority concentrations or, preferably,
the localities with focused DMC reduction efforts. Failure to comply with each requirement
results in a 20 percent reduction in formula funds. Fifty percent of the remaining funds must then
be used to support efforts to bring the state into compliance.
Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders, Jail Removal, and Separation
OJJDP's greatest impact on the juvenile justice field has probably been its role in
ensuring compliance with the core requirements (Howell, 1997). The JJDPA requirements
spawned a permanent infrastructure for improvements (Howell, 1997): State advisory groups
(SAGs) appointed by governors were created to develop and oversee state plans and systems
were established to monitor compliance. In 2010, 80 percent of the participating states and
territories were in compliance with all four core requirements (Hornberger, 2010). Figure 10-3
shows the reduction in state violations of the deinstitutionalization of status offenders (DSO),
separation, and jail removal requirements between the baseline years9 and 1993. Percentage
reductions in violations for each mandate were 98 percent for DSO, 99 percent for separation,
and 96 percent for jail removal.
Figure 10-4 shows the dramatic decrease in detention of status offenders since OJJDP
was established. In 1975, 40 percent of status offense cases in juvenile court were detained; in
2008, only 5 percent of status offenders were detained. Throughout this period, about 20 percent
of delinquency cases were detained. The decline in detention of status offenders represents the
most significant change in the administration of juvenile justice brought about by the JJDPA.
These accomplishments are impressive especially when one considers that the amount of
federal funding states receive is a very small proportion of the overall state and local dollars
going to support juvenile justice system services and consequently does not pose much of a
financial incentive. Also, most states have maintained compliance with the core requirements
even during periods when punishment and deterrence were emphasized.
This picture is mixed, however. Many youth are not afforded these protections because
of exceptions in the legislation, new state laws since JJDPA's passage, and policy interpretations
that have narrowed the categories of offenses that are considered status offenses and have
9
The baseline year is 1975 for DSO and separation and 1980 for jail removal.
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changed the definition of an adult inmate thereby reducing the range of cases to which the
protections apply.
Reclassification as Delinquent. In 1980, six years after its enactment, the JJDPA was modified
because of pressure from judges to exclude youth who violated a valid court order (VCO) from
the deinstitutionalization provision.10 Today, although the federal legislation still excludes youth
with VCO violations from the DSO protection, state practices vary. A total of 25 states and
territories do not allow an exemption for a VCO violation, but 30 states do allow such an
exception. OJJDP estimates that these jurisdictions use the exception about 12,000 times per year
(Hornberger, 2010).
In the 2002 amendment of JJDPA, the provision was made to exclude juveniles held in
accordance with the interstate compact on juveniles as enacted by the state.11 It permits the
temporary detention of status offenders, particularly runaways, in order to secure their return to
the jurisdictions where they reside or where other appropriate custody exists while allowing
states to remain in compliance with the DSO requirement and eligible for federal funding. Under
interstate compact guidance, out-of-state youth placed in custody for a status offense can be
detained if they are determined to be a threat to themselves or others (Interstate Commission for
Juveniles, 2012; Montana Board of Crime Control, 2005).
Another factor that is affecting the detention of juveniles for status offenses is the passage
of new laws that make what was formerly a status offense a criminal offense. For example,
legislation passed in all 50 states and the District of Columbia classifying possession of alcohol
by adults ages 18-20 as a criminal offense (minor in possession or MIP) eliminates MIP as a
status offense because it is a criminal offense when committed by an adult.12 In its direction to
the states, OJJDP continues to maintain its policy that MIP offenders should not be securely
detained (as either adults or juveniles) and is working with Congress to amend the language of
the JJDPA.13
Furthermore, in the past two decades, the rise of domestic disputes charged as simple
assaults, rather than incorrigibility or unruliness, has occurred particularly for girls (Stahl,
Sickmund, and Snyder, 2004). Some researchers contend that the perceived increase in the
delinquency of girls may actually reflect a relabeling of status offenses (Feld, 2009). With
limited or nonexistent alternatives for girls who cannot or will not go back home, the juvenile
court may be pressured to process girls as delinquents. As noted many times, the committee
thinks confinement of noncriminal juveniles is not an acceptable solution and is likely to more
harmful.
10
For example, a youth who comes to the attention of the juvenile justice system because of truancy who then
violates the judge's order to attend school regularly can be brought back before the judge and sentenced to detention
even though truancy is considered a status offense.
11
The interstate compact on juveniles is "a multi-state agreement that provides procedural means to regulate the
movement across states lines of juveniles under court supervision" (Holloway, 2000).
12
Memorandum to the States from OJJDP Acting Administrator, Jeff Slowikowski regarding Status Offenders and
Non-Offenders and the Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act (October 20, 2010); Memorandum to States
from OJJDP Acting Administrator, Jeff Slowikowski, regarding Status Offenders and the Juvenile Justice
Delinquency Prevention Act, Follow-up on Data Reporting for Annual Core Requirements Determination (March
17, 2011).
13
Guidance for Data Collection and Reporting for Minors in Possession of Alcohol Transcript, April 28, 2011.
Available: http:www.ojjdp.gov/compliance/MIP_transcript.pdf [February 2012].
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Adult Inmate Label. In establishing the adult jail and lock-up removal requirement, the JJDPA
sought to promote the appropriate confinement of youth in juvenile facilities to provide for both
public safety and the specific evaluation and treatment of youth needs. Exceptions in the act
allow youth to be held in adult facilities for short periods of time; in these circumstances, the
sight and sound separation requirement is in place to protect them from emotional and physical
harm. However, currently these protections are afforded only to youth processed under the
juvenile justice system and do not apply to youth under the jurisdiction of adult criminal courts.
The JDDPA currently defines an adult inmate as "an individual who has reached the age
of full criminal responsibility under applicable State law; and has been arrested and is in custody
for or awaiting trial on a criminal charge, or is convicted of a criminal charge offense." Under
this definition, youth who are detained under criminal court jurisdiction are considered adult
inmates, even in situations when they are younger than 18 at the time of offense and even when
they are being held in juvenile facilities under progressive state laws. This classification has the
perverse effect of requiring states to separate youth prosecuted as adults from other youth in
juvenile facilities if they want to remain in compliance with the JJDPA.
Support for eliminating these exceptions to the JJDPA requirements continues to grow
(Campaign for Youth Justice, 2007a, 2007b; Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2009; Coalition for
Juvenile Justice, 2009a; Soler et al., 2009; National Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Coalition, 2010). Modifications to the JJDPA were previously considered in Senate bill S. 678
(111th Congress, 2009), that would (1) require all states participating in the formula grants
program to phase out the VCO exception; (2) extend the jail removal and sight and sound core
requirements to keep youth awaiting trial in criminal court out of adult lock-ups and to ensure
sight and sound separation in some limited circumstances in which they are held in adult
facilities; and (3) allow states to continue to serve youth tried in adult court in juvenile facilities
without jeopardizing federal funding. Groups like the National Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Coalition (2010) are calling for even stronger measures that would better serve all
youth under age 18, but they viewed Senate bill 678 as a good step toward more developmentally
appropriate policies. However, the bill failed to pass and the JJDPA has yet to be reauthorized.
Disproportionate Minority Contact
In comparison with the other three core requirements, the requirement regarding
disproportionate minority contact (DMC) has not had the desired impact. Although historically
few states have ever been out of compliance with this requirement, there is widespread
agreement that it is still a significant if not the most intractable characteristic of the juvenile
justice system (Pope and Feyerherm, 1990; Pope et al., 2002; Engen et al., 2002; Bishop, 2005;
Mendel, 2009). (For a detailed review of the research on racial/ethnic disparities in the juvenile
justice system, see Chapter 8.)
OJJDP's Strategy. OJJDP carries out its federal mandate by requiring states to identify the
extent to which DMC exists in their jurisdictions. Once its existence is verified, states must
assess the reasons for DMC and develop and implement intervention strategies. States are then
required to evaluate and monitor the effectiveness of chosen intervention strategies (Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2009b). These five activities--identification,
assessment, program implementation, evaluation, and monitoring--comprise OJJDP's DMC
reduction model (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2010).
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States are explicitly not held to any "numerical standard or quotas" (see Box 10-1)--that
is, states are not required to actually reduce DMC. Instead, compliance is measured by a state's
implementation of the DMC reduction model, which includes the annual submission of data
known as relative rate indices (RRIs)14 OJJDP also reviews each state's annual report that
describes its progress toward meeting the goals spelled out in its three-year DMC reduction plan.
Given that implementation of the model and progress toward carrying out the DMC
reduction plan can be broadly construed, it is not surprising that noncompliance with DMC is a
rare occurrence. Since 2007, only Mississippi and American Samoa have had their formula grant
allocation reduced by 20 percent for failing to comply with the core requirement.15 Each year
OJJDP also identifies states that are at risk for noncompliance16 and provides them a three-year
window to act on their deficiencies. OJJDP does not make public the information on the at-risk
states, but the numbers are not insignificant. In fiscal year (FY) 2011, 13 at-risk states were in
the process of trying to achieve compliance. OJJDP staff acknowledged that, in the past, the
agency provided considerable leeway to states in determining their compliance, but in recent
years it has been much stricter.17
To assist state, local, and tribal jurisdictions, OJJDP now employs a full-time senior-level
DMC coordinator and designated staff to review DMC plans and provide assistance and supports
a network of consultants for training and technical assistance. In addition, it has created a DMC
best practices database and a DMC virtual resource center website. The agency has sponsored
research on DMC measurement tools, state-of-the-art reviews of DMC research, and evaluated
DMC interventions. Recently, OJJDP made a sizeable investment from its limited research funds
to support three grants to identify successful programs and strategies to assist states and local
communities to achieve and maintain compliance with the DMC requirement.18
Impact of the DMC Core Requirement. By its own standards (Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, 2009a), the DMC initiative has had only limited success and, in fact,
OJJDP has conceded that "states and localities, except for a few jurisdictions, have not reduced
DMC" (Coleman, 2011, p. 28).
This lack of progress is not surprising given the nature and extent of disproportionality
(see Chapter 8).19 Nonetheless, OJJDP's efforts to ensure compliance with the DMC core
14
The RRI compares the rate of juvenile justice contact experienced by different groups of youth. See chapter 8 for
a fuller explanation.
15
www.ojjdp.gov/compliance/compliancedata.html [February 10, 2010].
16
Some of the reasons states are determined to be at risk include failing to submit annual reports, submitting
incomplete or nonverifiable RRIs for the different decision points, having fewer than three local jurisdictions in the
state addressing DMC, or failing to follow through on interventions outlined in their three-year plans.
17
Remarks of Andrea Coleman, OJJDP DMC coordinator, at the NRC Committee on Assessing Juvenile Justice
Reform meeting, October 11, 2010.
18
The grants were: 2009-JF-FX-0072 "Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative
to Decrease DMC and the Detention of Status Offenders, Chris Hartney, Principal Investigator, NCCD: 2009-JF-
FX-0103 "Expanding the Use of DMC Data: Analysis of Patters to Identify Best Practices, Marcia I. Cohen,
Principal Investigator, Development Services Group, Inc: 2009-JF-FX-0101 "An Impact Evaluation of Three
Strategies Created to Reduce Disproportionate Minority Contact in the Detention Population, Nancy Rodriquez,
Principal Investigator, Arizona State University,
19
This should be juxtaposed against the fact that there are 3,033 organized county or county-equivalents
governments in the United States according to 2007 Census of Governments. The OJJDP Disproportionate Minority
Contact (DMC) initiative requires each state and three local jurisdictions to report on how they are addressing
racial/ethnic disparities.
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requirement have had a positive impact on the states' willingness to address the problem.
Almost half the states use formula funds to support full-time state-level DMC coordinators, and
the remaining states (with one exception) have part-time or other state-level staff designated as
DMC coordinators. About three dozen states have ongoing committees under their state advisory
groups (SAGS) that give sustained attention to DMC (Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, 2009b), and some states support DMC initiatives with their own
dollars. Approximately 22 states submit RRI data to OJJDP for all contact points in their juvenile
justice systems, and 39 states submit data for six or more (out of nine) contact points (Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2009b).
Several jurisdictions appear to have been effective in reducing DMC. In a recent analysis
of three years of RRI data from more than 800 counties, Cohen and colleagues (2012) found that
three states and seven local jurisdictions showed improved and/or stable and low RRI values at
three of the five juvenile justice decision points (referral, diversion, detention, confinement, and
transfer). When the number of decision points was reduced to two, 15 additional jurisdictions
showed improvement and/or stable and low RRI values.
Obstacles to DMC Reduction. Several obstacles stand in the way of jurisdictions making greater
progress toward reducing DMC. First, as described in Chapter 8, insufficiency of data needed to
determine RRIs, especially data on ethnic groups, prevents jurisdictions from getting a clear
picture of the extent of racial/ethnic disparities and their impact on specific minority groups.
A second obstacle is the failure of many jurisdictions to complete the critical analytical
phase before initiating interventions (Coleman, 2011; Poulin et al., 2011). The only states that
OJJDP identifies as having conducted adequate assessments are Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa,
New Mexico, and Wisconsin. These assessments involve an investment of time, resources, and
expertise that many jurisdictions have been unwilling or unable to make.
A third obstacle is the lack of rigorous evaluations and scientific evidence regarding the
impact of interventions undertaken to reduce DMC (Poulin et al., 2011). While some
interventions at the detention stage show promise, studies to date are more likely to uncover the
limitations of states' efforts than the effects of their interventions. These limitations include gaps
in recordkeeping, misuse of RRI data, absence of assessments for the contributors to the RRI
findings, and selection of generic prevention programs without considering their own
jurisdiction's needs and the impact on racial/ethnic disparities (Coleman, 2010; 2011; Poulin et
al., 2011).20
OJJDP's Future Role in Addressing DMC. In the past four years, OJJDP has focused increased
attention and resources on its DMC core requirement. But the scope of the problem and the
complexities of addressing DMC call for a stronger federal policy and more intensive efforts.
The committee agrees with juvenile justice advocacy groups that the DMC core requirement in
OJJDP's authorizing legislation needs to be strengthened (Campaign for Youth Justice, 2007a;
20
OJJDP's DMC Best Practices Database may be contributing to the confusion regarding the selection of
interventions. The searchable database assists jurisdictions in "identifying both multi-component jurisdictional
DMC initiatives that have demonstrated a basic level of effectiveness in reducing DMC as well as single-component
programmatic interventions that were not necessarily developed to reduce DMC but may prove useful as a tool in
the arsenal against DMC." The Committee had difficulty understanding the overall rationale for the database itself
or the scientific basis for the interventions and questions whether the ease of conducting this kind of database search
discourages jurisdictions from pursuing a more careful and thoughtful review.
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BOX 10-2
Legislative Language from 2009 Appropriations (excerpt)
JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMS
For grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, and other assistance authorized by the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (``the 1974 Act'') . . . and other juvenile justice
programs, $374,000,000, to remain available until expended as follows....
(3) $80,000,000 for youth mentoring grants;
(4) $62,000,000 for delinquency prevention, as authorized by section 505 of the 1974 Act, of
which, pursuant to sections 261 and 262 thereof--
(A) $25,000,000 shall be for the Tribal Youth Program;
(B) $10,000,000 shall be for a gang resistance education and training program; and
(C) $25,000,000 shall be for grants of $360,000 to each State and $4,840,000 shall be
available for discretionary grants, for programs and activities to enforce State laws
prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors or the purchase or consumption of
alcoholic beverages by minors, for prevention and reduction of consumption of alcoholic
beverages by minors, and for technical assistance and training;
SOURCE: Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, H.R. 1105.
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BOX 10-3
Longitudinal Studies
The Research Program on the Causes and Correlates of Delinquency was begun in
1986 with three studies: the Denver Youth Survey, the Pittsburgh Youth Study, and the
Rochester Youth Development Study. For each project, in addition to data collection from
records, researchers conducted individual, face-to-face interviews with urban youth considered at
high risk for involvement in delinquency and drug abuse (Browning et al., 1999). The repeated
contact with youth during a substantial portion of their developmental years has generated
knowledge about pathways to delinquency, chronic offending, substance use, and neighborhood
influences, to name a few areas (Thornberry et al., 2004).
The Causes and Correlates research program reached great stature in part because it
constitutes the largest shared measurement approach ever achieved in delinquency research. The
three research teams worked together to ensure that certain core measures were identical across
the sites. OJJDP encouraged the collaborative analyses across the sites, which in turn has
advanced understanding of delinquency by replicating some findings across sites, distinguishing
why certain other findings apply to one site or population rather than other sites or populations,
and aggregating data across sites to study phenomena that otherwise could not be studied at one
site because of its low base rate (e.g., illicit drug use other than marijuana) (Loeber et al., 1996).
OJJDP initially funded the research program, but this longitudinal investigation is
ongoing because of its continued support as well as funding from other sources.42 This long-term
support has extended data collection on the samples into adulthood, allowing examination of the
transitions from adolescent to adult offending and desistance. From over two decades of
research, a huge data set is available on young individuals as they grow up in inner cities from
age 6 through their twenties (Loeber et al., 1996).
The following findings from the Causes and Correlates program, in conjunction with
statistical trends in juvenile crime and other research knowledge available at the time, guided the
development of OJJDP's Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile
Offenders:
Three pathways to chronic delinquency can be distinguished: (1) the overt pathway
from aggression to fighting then violence, (2) the covert pathway from minor covert
behavior to property damage then serious delinquency, and (3) the authority conflict
pathway from stubborn behavior to defiance then authority avoidance.
Most chronic juvenile offenders start their criminal career prior to age 12.
Early-onset offenders tend to come from poorer, inner-city disadvantaged
neighborhoods.
Gang members are responsible for a very large and disproportionate share of
delinquent acts, especially more serious and more violent acts.
Membership in adolescent street gangs facilitates involvement in serious and violent
delinquent behavior. That is, delinquent behavior is highest during periods of active
gang membership compared with either before or after such periods.
While relatively few in number, chronic violent delinquents self-report committing
the majority of violent offenses.
42
Other sources of funding include Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institute on Drug
Abuse, the National Institute of Mental Health, and the National Science Foundation.
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Any successful effort to reduce youth violence and juvenile delinquency must deal
with chronic offenders.
No current ability enables accurate prediction of who will be chronic offenders.
Chronic violent offenders tend to be less attached to and less monitored by their
parents; have less commitment to school and attachment to teachers; have more
delinquent peers and more apt to be gang members; and are more likely to reside in
poor, high-crime areas.
Coordination is often lacking among different agencies in their efforts to curtail the
emerging delinquent career of early-onset offenders.
SOURCE: Wilson and Howell, 1993; with findings from Huizinga et al., 1992.
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BOX 10-4
Program Framework of the Comprehensive Strategy
In the Comprehensive Strategy Framework, program interventions and sanctions move
from least to most restrictive.
Community primary prevention programs oriented toward reducing risk and
enhancing strengths for all youth.
Focused secondary prevention programs for youth in the community at greatest risk
but not involved with the juvenile justice system or perhaps diverted from the
juvenile justice system.
Intervention programs tailored to identified risk and need factors, if appropriate, for
first-time minor delinquent offenders provided under minimal sanctions, such as
diversion or administrative probation.
Intervention programs tailored to identified risk and need factors for nonserious
repeat offenders and moderately serious first-time offenders provided under
intermediate sanctions, such as regular probation.
Intensive intervention programs tailored to identified risk and need factors for first-
time serious or violent offenders provided under stringent sanctions, such as intensive
probation supervision or residential facilities.
Multicomponent intensive intervention programs in secure correctional facilities for
the most serious, violent, and chronic offenders.
Post-release supervision and transitional after-care programs for offenders released
from residential and correctional facilities.
SOURCE: Lipsey et al., 2010, p. 38.
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BOX 10-5
Act 4 Justice Recommendations for Reauthorization Legislation
1. Extend the jail removal and sight and sound separation core protections to all youth under
age 18 held pretrial, whether charged in juvenile or adult court.
2. Change the definition of "adult inmate" to allow certain states to continue to place youth
convicted in adult court into juvenile facilities rather than adult prisons without
jeopardizing federal funding.
3. Strengthen the disproportionate minority contact (DMC) core protection by requiring
states to take concrete steps to reduce racial/ethnic disparities in the juvenile justice
system.
4. Strengthen the deinstitutionalization of status offenders (DSO) core protection, which
prohibits the locked detention of status offenders, by removing the valid court order and
interstate compact exceptions.
5. Provide safe and humane conditions of confinement for youth in state and/or local
custody by restricting the use of JJDPA funds for dangerous practices and encouraging
states to promote adoption of best practices and standards.
6. Assist states in coming into compliance with the JJDPA and establish incentive grants to
encourage dates to adopt evidence-based or promising best practices that improve
outcomes for youth and their communities.
7. Enhance the partnership between states and the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) by expanding training, technical assistance, research
and evaluation, and the partnership between OJJDP and Congress by encouraging
transparency, timeliness, public notice, and communication.
8. Expand juvenile crime prevention efforts by reauthorizing and increasing funding for
JJDPA Title V and Mentoring.
SOURCE: National Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Coalition (n.d.), p. 1.
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800000
700000
600000
Annual Funding (in thousands of dollars)
500000 JJDPA
JABG
Other
400000 MCAA
VOCA
Recovery Act
300000 TOTAL
200000
100000
0
75
77
79
81
83
85
87
89
91
93
95
97
99
01
03
05
07
09
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
Year
FIGURE 10-1 OJJDP Annual funding 1975 to 2010 in constant 2010 dollars.
NOTE: Funding for Juvenile Accountability Block Grants, although it disappears in the graph
after FY2004, has remained at about $50 million.
SOURCE: Created from financial information provided by OJJDP.
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120000
Note: JABG funds actually 3x this -
about $300 million annually for
fiscal years 1999-2002
100000
Annual Funding to States (in thousands of dollars)
80000
Part II Formula Funds
JABG
60000
40000
Title V Incentive Grants
EUDL
20000
Challenge Grants
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
FIGURE 10-2 Trends in annual block/formula funding to states under JJDPA and JABG in
constant 2010 dollars. NOTE: In order to not distort the graph, JABG funding for fiscal years
1999-2002 is shown at one-third value.
SOURCE: Created from financial information provided by OJJDP.
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200
180
160 Baseline (1975 for
DSO and separation;
1980 for jail removal)
140
Violations (in thousands)
120 1993
100
80
60
40
20
0
DSO Separation Jail Removal
FIGURE 10-3 Violations of JJDPA mandates from baseline years to 1993.
NOTE: The baseline year is 1975 for DSO and separation and 1980 for jail removal.
SOURCE: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (1995a); Howell (1997).
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45%
40%
35%
30%
Year of Disposition
25%
% detained
20% Delinquency
15%
% detained
Status
10%
5%
0%
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Percent Detained
FIGURE 10-4 Trends in detention rates from court data for status cases and delinquency cases
1975-2008.
SOURCE: Adams, 2012.
Data Sources: Authors' adaptation NCJJ's National Juvenile Court Data Archive: Juvenile court
case records for the years 1985-2008 [machine-readable data files] (National Center for Juvenile
Justice, 2011) and National Juvenile Court Data Archive: Juvenile court case records for the
years 1975-1984 [machine-readable data files] as presented in Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (1995b).
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FIGURE 10-5 The Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile
Offenders
SOURCE: Howell, 1995a; 2011.
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250000
200000
Annual Funding (in thousands of dollars)
Funding for Part B
Formula Grants and
150000 Title V Incentive
Grants Combined
100000
Carve-outs for
mentoring and
earmarks combined
50000
0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
FIGURE 10-6 Trends in OJJDP Appropriations in constant 2010 dollars, Carve-outs for
Mentoring and Earmarks 2000-2010
SOURCE: Created from financial information supplied by OJJDP.
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