|
Items in cart [1] |
Questions? Call 888-624-8373 |
PAPERBACK PDF BOOK Free Resources |
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Copyright © 2009. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Terms of Use and Privacy Statement |
Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 187
-
Residential Segregation, Job Proximit:y'
and Black Job Opportunities
CHRISTOPHER JENCKS AND SUSAN E. MAYER
In 1968 John Kain published a seminal paper in which he argued that
the high level of joblessness among urban blacks was partly attributable
to the fact that a growing fraction of urban jobs-especially blue-collar
manufacturing jobs had moved to the suburbs while exclusionary housing
practices had kept blacks penned up in central cities. Kain argued that the
resulting "spatial mismatch" reduced both employers' willingness to hire
black workers and black workers' ability to find jobs that were in principle
open to them.
In assessing these arguments it is important to draw a sharp distinction
between Kain's demand-side and supply-side stories. On the demand side,
Kain argued that suburbanization of jobs was likely to reduce employers'
willingness to hire black workers because many suburban firms feared
that bringing black workers into an all-white suburb would offend white
residents. Yet Kain also noted the possibility that residential segregation
might benefit blacks, since employers in all-black areas might be more
willing to hire blacks than employers in the mixed areas that would come
into existence if cities were not segregated.
Kain's demand-side analysis of the way residential segregation and
the suburbanization of blue-collar employment affected demand for black
workers rested on social considerations, many of which appear to have
changed since 1968. Perhaps for this reason, subsequent research has
seldom tried lo test the validity of Kain's demand-side argument. Yet for
those interested in explaining aggregate black employment or earnings,
this part of his argument is probably more important than his supply-side
argument. .
On the supply side, Kain argued that even when suburban employers
were willing to hire blacks, the fact that blacks lived farther than whites from
187
OCR for page 188
188
INNER-CITY POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
suburban jobs meant that blacks were less likely to hear about suburban job
vacancies before they were filled. In addition, he argued that even when
blacks could get suburban jobs, the fact that they had to spend more time
and money than whites on commuting was likely to result in lower rates
of labor force participation among blacks, who would more often conclude
that working was not worth the bother.
Unlike Kain's demand-side argument, his analysis of the way distance
cut the supply of black workers available to suburban firms was based largely
on geographic considerations that have not changed in any fundamental
way since 1968. Most blacks still live in the central city, and there are
probably even fewer good blue-collar jobs available in the central city today
than in the late 1960s. Central-city jobs are increasingly likely to require
high levels of education (Kasarda, 1989), and while the educational gap
between young black and young white workers has narrowed dramatically,
there are still substantial disparities in academic skill.t As a result, many
scholars, political leaders, and journalists still view the spatial mismatch
hypothesis as a plausible explanation of rising black joblessness.2
This chapter reviews the currently available evidence regarding Kain's
major hypotheses. The first section looks at Kain's demand-side arguments,
reviewing both the theoretical reasons for thinking that residential segrega-
tion might reduce demand for black workers and the empirical evidence for
this hypothesis. The second section turns to Kain's supply-side arguments,
discussing the effects of living far from major centers of employment on
workers' job prospects. The third section reviews evidence on the closely
related question of whether black workers who live in the suburbs find
better jobs than those who live in the central city. The fourth section com-
pares the earnings of central-ci~ blacks who commute to the suburbs to
the earnings of similar blacks who work in the central-city ghetto. The clos-
ing section discusses the implications of the findings and pressing research
needs.
We do not take up the question of whether a neighborhood's mean
socioeconomic status (SES) affects adult black workers' economic prospects.
Wilson (1987) and others have suggested that living in an urban ghetto
where few adults have steady jobs may sap an individuals motivation to
work In addition, Wilson and others have suggested that living in a
neighborhood where nobody has a good job makes it harder to find such a
~ lbe proportion of 25- to 29-year-old nonwhites without a high school diploma fell from 41.6
percent in 1970 to 15.7 percent in 1986. Among whites, the proportion declined from 22.2 to
13.5 percent. The National Assessment of Educational Progress shows that the disparity in test
performance between black and white 17-year-olds who were enrolled in school also narrowed
after 1970, though not as much as the disparity in years of school completed (National Center
for Education Statistics, 1988, Tables 8 and 81-87.)
2 Wilson (1987) and Kasarda (1989) both endorse variants of this hypothesis.
OCR for page 189
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND BLACK JOB OPPORTUNITIES
189
job even if you try. These hypotheses strike us as plausible, but we have not
been able to find any empirical studies that assess their validity for adults.
The absence of such research reflects the complexity of the problem.
An indiv~dual'.s employment status and earnings can correlate with the
mean SES of his or her neighborhood for two different reasons. Living
in a high-SES neighborhood can increase your chances of finding a good
job, but finding a good job can also enable you to move to a high-
SES neighborhood. As a result, individuals in low-SES neighborhoods
would be less likely to hold steady, well-paid jobs even if their place of
residence had no effect whatever on their job prospects. We would need
longitudinal data to estimate the contribution of selective migration to the
correlation between earnings and community characteristics. No such data
were available when we did this review, so there was no way to estimate
the effect of a neighborhood's mean SES on adults' job opportunities.3
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND DEMAND
FOR BLACK WORKERS
Theoretical Issues
Kain argued that a firm's attitude toward hiring black workers was
likely to vary with the racial mix of the neighborhood in which it was
located. Following economic convention, we refer to such variations in
firms' attitudes toward hiring blacks as variations in the demand for black
labor. Noneconomists should bear in mind that this usage refers to more
than whether firms prefer a black or white worker for a given job. A
firm's demand for black labor is highest when it prefers black workers
to equally competent white workers, somewhat lower when it is neutral
between equally competent blacks and whites, still lower when it prefers
whites to equally competent blacks, and lowest of all when it refuses to hire
blacks at all.
A firm can express its demand for black or white workers in several
ways. Firms that prefer white to black workers must set wages high enough
to attract white workers, and they must then devise plausible criteria
for hiring white rather than black applicants. ~ minimize the cost of
preferring whites, these firms are also likely to locate where white workers
are relatively cheap and black workers are relatively scarce. Firms that
prefer white workers therefore tend to locate either in white rural areas or
on the fringes of major metropolitan areas. Firms with a weaker preference
3Because of increased interest in neighborhood effects, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
has been adding data to its files on the characteristics of the census tracts in which respondents
lived.
OCR for page 190
190
INNER-C~ BERM IN THE UNFED STATES
for white workers are more likely to locate in the central city, where a large
pool of cheap black labor is readily available.
Kain did not discuss the effect of firms' racial preferences on their
location decisions. Instead, he assumed that location decisions were exoge-
nous and discussed their effect on a firm's demand for black workers. He
argued that since local whites might resent the firm's bringing black workers
into their all-white neighborhood, firms in such neighborhoods would try
to avoid hiring blacks.
Kain was mainly concerned with black workers' access to manufacturing
jobs. The argument that manufacturing firms in white areas would avoid
hiring blacks to avoid local resentment does not strike us as very plausible.
Blue-collar workers who commute to large suburban manufacturing plants
typically drive to the plant's parking lot, go to their job, put in their time,
go back to the parking lot, and drive home. They are unlikely to have
much contact with the community in which they work especially if they are
black and the community is entirely white. Local resentment is therefore
likely to be minimal. Furthermore, suburban whites who do resent the fact
that a local plant hires blacks have few effective mechanisms for expressing
their displeasure unless they resort to violence, which is rare. (Whites who
work in a plant have many effective ways of expressing racial resentment,
but they can do this no matter where the plant is located.)
Kain's argument seems more plausible when applied to the service
sector than when applied to manufacturing, and it seems especially plausible
when applied to small firms that deal directly with the public. It is easy to
imagine suburban restaurants, grocery stores, gas stations, dry cleaners, and
repair services refusing to hire blacks because they think their customers
prefer dealing with whites and will take their trade elsewhere if the firm
does not cater to their prejudices.
Kain did not discuss the likely behavior of firms in racially mixed
areas. His arguments imply, however, that manufacturing firms in mixed
areas would be indifferent between equally competent black and white
workers, since they would not be worried about bringing blacks into mixed
areas. The picture is more complicated for retail firms. If both blacks and
whites preferred doing business with retail firms that hired people of their
own race, and if blacks and whites who lived in mixed neighborhoods had
roughly equal incomes, retail firms in mixed areas would presumably try to
hire a mix of employees similar to the mix of local residents. If whites were
quite averse to firms that hired blacks while blacks were not so averse to
firms that hired only whites, or if whites had far more money than blacks,
most retail firms in mixed areas might end up discriminating against blacks.
Finally, Kain noted that firms in all-black areas might hire more blacks
than an average firm. This could occur for two reasons. First, ghetto firms
OCR for page 191
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND BLACK JOB OPPORlUNITIES
191
would hire disproportionate numbers of blacks if white workers were un-
willing to work in the ghetto or demanded "combat pay" for working there.4
Second, retail firms in the ghetto would hire disproportionate numbers of
blacks if black customers preferred dealing with blacks.
If these general hypotheses are correct, the persistence of all-black
neighborhoods can either increase or decrease aggregate demand for black
workers. The net effect of a residential ghetto on demand for black workers
will depend on whether the increase in demand within the ghetto offsets
the decline elsewhere. The balance between the gains in black employment
within the ghetto and the losses elsewhere should depend on two factors:
the absolute number of jobs inside and outside the ghetto, and the relative
strength of ghetto firms' preference for blacks compared to nonghetto firms'
preference for whites.
All the factors that influence the costs and benefits of residential
segregation are likely to have changed over the past 30 years. Thus even
if we were to accept Kain's claim that residential segregation reduced
aggregate demand for black workers in Chicago and Detroit in the l950s,
we could not assume segregation had the same effect today. The effects of
residential segregation are also likely to vary from one part of the country
to another. Finding that residential segregation lowers demand for black
workers in Chicago and Detroit may not, therefore, imply that it has the
same effect in California. Finally, residential segregation is likely to have
different effects on different ethnic groups. Thus even if we found that
Chinese immigrants did better when they moved to highly segregated cities,
the same might not hold for Mexican immigrants, much less for blacks.
Empirical Evidence
Kain's analysis of Chicago and Detroit employment patterns in the
l950s convinced him that blacks would have gotten a larger share of all
jobs if there were no ghetto, but this was not because his model implied
that residential desegregation would increase demand for black workers.
Kain's model implied that residential desegregation would have no effect
whatever on overall demand for black workers. Residential desegregation
increased black employment only because it brought black workers closer
to most jobs and thereby increased the supply of black workers available
to fill these jobs at any given wage.
4A downward shift in the local supply of white worked does not necessarily lead to an upward
shift in local demand for black worked. When the local supply of white worked available at a
given price falls, firms may move elsewhere rather than hiring more blacks. We return to this
point below.
OCR for page 192
192
INNER-CITY POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
Kain used the proportion of nonwhites in a neighborhood (R) as a
proxy for demand and used the number of miles from a neighborhood to the
edge of a city's major ghetto (dm) as a proxy for supply. He assumed that
both these measures had linear effects on blacks' share of neighborhood
employment. Using these two measures to predict nonwhites' share of total
employment (W1 in a Chicago neighborhood in 1956, Kain's best estimate
was that:
W = 9.28 + .456R-.409dm
(1)
Since this model assumes that the effects of R and Dm are linear, it implies
that the fraction of all Chicago-area jobs held by blacks (W) depends
entirely on the areawide means of R and dm. The dispersion of R (an
indicator of the level of segregation) is irrelevant. Segregation will, of
course, increase demand for black workers in black neighborhoods and
lower demand in white neighborhoods, but the two changes will exactly
offset one another, leaving aggregate demand unchanged. Since residential
desegregation does not alter the total number of blacks or whites, at least
in the short run, it does not change the overall mean of R. Using Kain's
assumptions, therefore, residential segregation only affects blacks' share of
total employment indirectly, that is, by affecting their average proximity to
jobs (d ).
While Kain implicitly assumed that desegregation would leave overall
demand for black workers unchanged, he did not try to test this assumption.
In order to do so we need to ask whether, when all else is equal, demand
for black workers in neighborhoods whose racial mix mirrors that of the
metropolitan area as a whole is higher or lower than demand in the
metropolitan area as a whole. So far as we can discover, only one study
has investigated this issue.
Offner and Saks (1971) reanalyzed Kain's Chicago data and found
that blacks fared quite badly in racially mixed areas. Employers in all-black
neighborhoods hired a lot of blacks. Employers in all-white areas hired very
few blacks. Employers in racially mixed areas acted like employers in all-
white areas, hiring very few blacks. As a result, blacks' share of employment
was lower in racially mixed neighborhoods than in the Chicago area as a
whole.
Offner and Saks's statistical results cannot tell us why employers in
mixed neighborhoods hired so few blacks, but several possible explanations
come to mind. If white Chicago residents were reluctant to trade with firms
that hired blacks in the 1950s, while Chicago blacks were willing to trade
with firms that hired only whites, blacks would not have gotten many retail
jobs in racially mixed areas. And if white workers were willing to work in
racially mixed areas for the same wages as in all-white areas in the 1950s,
OCR for page 193
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND BLACK JOB OPPORTUNITIES
193
firms in racially mixed areas would have had no more incentive to hire
blacks than firms in all-white areas.
These conjectures all assume that a firm's employment practices de-
pend on the racial mix of its neighborhood. In the racially mixed Chicago
neighborhoods with which we are familiar, however, residential mix is a
by-product of local employment patterns, as well as the other way round.
The areas around the University of Chicago and Michael Reese Hospital,
for example, were located in the path of black residential growth. Ordinar-
ily, these areas would have become entirely black. They remained racially
mixed because firms employing white professionals remained in the area,
and many of these white workers wanted to live near their workplace.
Whatever the explanation, Offner and Saks's results show that if resi-
dential desegregation had led all Chicago firms to act like those in racially
mixed neighborhoods, job opportunities for blacks would have contracted,
not expanded. Luring blacks and whites to the same neighborhoods would
have reduced blacks' chances of getting jobs in what had once been ghetto
firms without opening up an equivalent number of new jobs in firms outside
the old ghetto.
In the long run, of course, residential desegregation might have re-
duced white prejudice against blacks, increasing demand for black workers.
One way to test the validity of this hypothesis is to ask whether blacks do
better economically In relatively desegregated cities. The evidence on this
point, while hardly conclusive, suggests that residential segregation has very
little effect on blacks' economic success.
Masters (1974) studied the ratio of nonwhite to white earnings in 65
large Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) in 1959. Contrary
to what we would expect if residential segregation reduced demand for
nonwhite workers, the ratio of nonwhite to white incomes was slightly
higher in highly segregated SMSAs. This relationship was not reliably
different from zero, but the fact remains that Masters's findings offer no
support for the contention that desegregation increases demand for black
workers.5 Masters (1975) replicated this result using 1969 data from 77
SMSAs with large black populations. Unfortunately, Masters's 1969 results
changed when he excluded SMSAs with substantial amounts of agricultural
employment. Once he dropped these SMSAs, there was some evidence that
both black men's chances of having a job and their relative earnings were
5Kain (1974) argues that Masters's results are inconclusive, since they do not take account of
city-to-city differences in the degree to which jobs are suburbanized, the relative tightness of ur-
ban and suburban labor markets, or the distance from the black ghetto to centers of employment.
But Kain offers neither theoretical arguments nor empirical evidence that including these omit-
ted variables would make the coefficients of Masters's segregation measures negative instead of
positive.
OCR for page 194
194
INNER-C1IY POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
more favorable in less segregated SMSAs.6 Thus we cannot say with any
confidence whether residential segregation raised or lowered demand for
black workers in the 1960s. Nor can we rule out the possibility that the level
of residential segregation depended on the relative earnings of blacks and
whites rather than the other way round. A]1 we can say with confidence is
that the relationship between residential segregation and relative earnings
is weak.
In any event, the effects of residential segregation on a firm's demand
for black workers are likely to change over time. Kain's data described
Chicago in the 1950s, when employers were under no legal or social pressure
to hire blacks and when hiring blacks for nonmenial jobs often caused firms
a lot of trouble. Masters's data describe the world of 1959 and 1969, before
affirmative action programs had much impact. Much has changed since
then, both outside and inside the ghetto.
Outside the ghetto, white customers, appear to have become more
confortable seeing blacks in nontraditional roles. Political and social pres-
sures have led many managers, especially in large firms, to open up new
kinds of jobs to blacks and to make more aggressive recruiting efforts.
All these efforts have, however, focused largely on blacks who act more
or less like whites. At the same time, some black workers have become
more assertive in their dealings with whites, increasing employers' fears
that blacks will cause "trouble." The net effect of these trends on demand
for black workers Is not obv~ous.7
6 Masters presents bivariate results for 77 SMSAs and multivariate results for 65 of these SMSAs.
The 12 excluded SMSAs had high levels of agricultural employment in their more remote sub-
urbs and low black-white income ratios. Almost all coefficients change sign in his multivanate
model, so trimming the sample makes a big difference. Unfortunately, he presents no bivanate
results for the trimmed sample, and his multivariate results include four separate measures of
residential segregation, along with two control variables designed to measure job dispersion and
accessibility. With these controls, the Taeubem' measure of residential segregation raised blacks'
income relative to whites (t = 2.4) but lowered blacks' relative likelihood of having a job (t = .6~.
The multivariate model is hard to interpret, however, because Masters's measure of central-
city blacks' access to suburban jobs (A) is (JgClJgt)/(JNgc/JNgt)' where JB is the number of
jobs held lay blacks in a given area, JNB is the number of jobs held lay nonblacks, the subscript c
denotes jobs in the central city, and the subscript t denotes all jobs in the SMSA. Unfortunately,
this ratio measures not only the relative accessibility of suburban jobs to blacks and whites but the
relative willingness of suburban employers to hire blacks rather than whites ("demand"~. Kain's
argument implies that A is at least partly endogenous and should not be controlled when estimat-
ing the effects of residential segregation. The use of four different segregation measures, which
may well be quite collinear, also makes Mastem's results hard to interpret. Bivariate statistics
for the trimmed sample would have made his findings more instinctive.
7Kirschenman and Neckerman (forthcoming) describe a survey of Chicago employers that shows
very high levels of prejudice against unskilled black males, but they do not relate these attitudes
to the actual numbers of blacks hired in a given firm.
OCR for page 195
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND BLACK JOB OPPORTUNITIES
195
Predicting changes in demand for black workers inside the ghetto is
as hard as predicting changes outside the ghetto. Black ghetto residents
may have grown less willing to patronize firms that hire only whites, but we
know of no evidence on this point. The wage premium that whites demand
for working in the ghetto has probably risen since 1969, because crime has
increased even more in the ghetto than elsewhere,8 but again, we know of
no hard evidence on this point.
If whites do, in fact, demand higher premiums for working in the
ghetto, this is likely to have had two contradictory effects on job opportu-
nities for blacks. On the one hand, we would expect firms that remained
In the ghetto to have substituted cheap black workers for more expensive
white workers. On the other hand, we would expect firms that wanted to
retain significant numbers of whites to have left the ghetto. Ken together,
these trends would lead to an increase In the fraction of ghetto jobs going
to blacks, combined with a decrease in the fraction of all jobs located in
ghetto areas.9 Again, the net effect on the number of jobs available to
blacks in the ghetto is not obvious.
The only data we have found that speak to this issue come from
Leonard's (1987) study of Chicago and Los Angeles firms' payrolls in 1974
and 1980.~° Leonard's data do not, of course, measure changes In firms'
demand for black workers. Rather, they measure changes In the actual
level of black employment inside and outside the ghetto. Such changes
depend on the supply of black and white workers available to different
sorts of firms as well as on firms' demand for such workers.
Leonard's data suggest that blacks' share of blue-collar jobs In the
ghetto Increased slightly in both Chicago and Los Angeles between 1974
and 1980, which Is what we would expect if whites were less willing to work
In the ghetto. Blacks' share of blue-collar jobs outside the ghetto rose In
Q
Thepercentage increase in crime since the mid-1960s has been greater among whites than among
blacks, but the absolute increase has been greater among blacks than among whites. From the
viewpoint of the potential victim, it is the absolute increase that matters, so the wage premium
required to lure people to all-black areas is likely to have risen.
9 Most ghettos occupy a larger fraction of the metropolitan area in which they are located today
than they did in 1960. As a result, the fraction of all jobs located in the ghetto has often grown,
even when the number of jobs per square block has fallen. For analytic purposes, however, the
crucial issue is not the fraction of all jobs located in the ghetto but the ratio of this fraction to
the fraction of all persons living in the ghetto. The argument in the text reflects conventional
wisdom in assuming that this ratio has fallen, but we have not seen any hard data supporting that
view.
i°Leonard's sample covem 1,911 Chicago firms and 2,389 Los Angeles firms surveyed by the Of-
fice of Federal Contract Compliance in both 1974 and 1980. Since the sample excludes firms that
came into existence or went out of existence between 1974 and 1980, it is not fully representative
of all firms surveyed in either year. Nor are firms surveyed by the OFCC fully representative of
all firms.
OCR for page 196
196
INNER-CI-IY POVERTY IN THE UNllED STATES
Los Angeles but fell in Chicago. As a result, the jobs held by black male
Chicagoans were more likely to be in the ghetto in 1980 than in 1974, even
though ghetto firms accounted for a smaller fraction of all Chicago-area
jobs. In Los Angeles, in contrast, the jobs held by black men were less
likely to be in the ghetto in 1980 than in 1974, even though ghetto firms
were growing faster than those in mixed areas.
The difference between Chicago and Los Angeles may well reflect
differences in the two cities' racial climates, which in turn affect firms'
location decisions. The main conclusion we draw from Leonard's findings
is that generalizing from a single city to the nation as a whole would be
very dangerous.
Taking all the evidence together, the effect of residential segregation
on firms' overall demand for black workers remains almost as uncertain as
it was 20 years ago. If we rely on Masters's findings for 1959 and 1969,
the safest conclusion would be that at that time residential segregation
had no consistent effect on firms' interest in hiring blacks. It is important
to emphasize, however, that Masters' findings reflect the combined effects
of supply and demand, and that they describe employment patterns 20 to
30 years ago, not today. It is also important to emphasize that we know
nothing whatever about how residential segregation along economic lines
affects demand for black workers.
EFFECTS OF JOB PROXIMITY ON LABOR SUPPLY
Kain showed that as a neighborhood's distance from the central-city
ghetto increased the proportion of neighborhood jobs held by nonwhites
declined. This was true even with the neighborhood's own racial mix
controlled (see equation 1, above), and it was true in Detroit as well as
in Chicago. Leonard (1987) found the same pattern for Chicago and Los
Angeles in 1974 and 1980.
Kain argued that distance from the central-city ghetto affected the
racial mix of a neighborhood's labor force by affecting the supply of black
workers available to firms in different neighborhoods. Distance affected
labor supply in two ways. First, it increased the effort prospective workers
had to make in order to learn about jobs before they were filled. Sec-
ond, distance raised workers' commuting costs, making remote jobs less
attractive.
The argument that information and commuting costs encourage pro-
spective workers to choose jobs near where they live is not controversial.
The controversial part of Kain's supply-side argument was his suggestion
that workers who could not find jobs near home were likely to stop looking
and withdraw from the labor force. If this were true, the high rate of
joblessness among urban blacks could be reduced either by discouraging the
OCR for page 197
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND BLACK JOB OPPORTUNITIES
197
movement of jobs from the central city to remote suburbs or by encouraging
black residential movement from the central city to the suburbs. 1b test
this part of Kain's argument, we need to investigate two questions:
1. Do blacks fare better economically when they live in neighbor-
hoods that are near a lot of blue-collar jobs?
2. Do blacks fare better when they live in metropolitan areas where
blue-collar jobs are still mainly located in the central city rather than in the
suburbs?
We take up these questions in turn.
Neighborhood Comparisons
One way to estimate the effect of job proximity on black employment
is to measure how far different neighborhoods are from blue-collar jobs
and then ask whether blacks who live in neighborhoods with a lot of nearby
blue-collar jobs have unusually high rates of employment. In the 1950s,
for example, Chicago blacks were concentrated in two areas: the West
Side, which was a major center of manufacturing and warehousing, and
the South Side, which had relatively few jobs of this kind. One way of
testing Kain's arguments about the importance of job proximity would have
been to ask whether blacks on the West Side were more likely to have
jobs than blacks on the South Side. This strategy runs an obvious risk,
since employment influences residential choices as well as the other way
round. If Chicago's West Side firms had hired blacks in large numbers,
many blacks who worked for these firms would presumably have moved to
the West Side, even if they had lived on the South Side when they got their
jobs. If West Side firms had paid blacks better or offered them steadier
employment than other Chicago firms, as Kain's argument implied they
should, West Side blacks would have had higher rates of employment and
higher wages than other Chicago blacks. This would not have proved that
living on the West Side helped blacks get good jobs. It would only have
proved that blacks, like everyone else, prefer a short trip to wore
If we set aside this methodological hazard for the moment, it is still
important to ask whether a neighborhood's proximity to various kinds of
jobs is positively correlated with the fraction of adult residents who hold
jobs or negatively correlated with its unemployment rate. Two studies have
correlated job proximity with employment among adult males. Hutchinson
(1974) used a Pittsburgh traffic survey to construct an index of the number
of jobs located at various distances from each respondent's home. He
measured the distance between homes and jobs by estimating the time
required to reach the job by public transportation. His index of job
proximity had a modest positive effect on the probability that white males
OCR for page 212
212
INNER-CITY POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
using 1/1,000 census samples for 1960, 1970, and 1980. Ibble 5-3 summarizes
the results. Like Harrison, we find no significant difference in weekly
earnings between central-cit~, and suburban blacks in either 1959 or 1969
once we control education.24 By 1979, however, black males who had not
attended college were earning appreciably more if they lived in suburbs
rather than central cities. Table 5-3 is thus consistent with the view that by
1979 unskilled and semiskilled blacks could find better jobs if they lived in
suburbs than if they lived in central cities. But it is also consistent with the
view that highly paid blacks became more inclined to move to the suburbs
after 1970.
Price and Mills (1985) tell a similar story using data from the May 1978
Current Population Survey. They estimated the effect of suburban residence
on the earnings of 25- to 59-year-old full-time, year-round workers. With
both education and occupation controlled, black males earned 6 percent
more if they lived in suburbs rather than central cities, while white males
earned 8 percent more.25 Vrooman and Greenfield (1980) also estimated
the effect of suburban residence on black men and women's earnings in
the early 1970s, but their sample is so small and unrepresentative that we
cannot put much weight on their findings.26
24Table 5-3 shows no difference in weekly earnings between central-city and suburban blacks in
either 1959 or 1969, even when we do not control education. Table 5-1, in contrast, suggests that
regularly employed suburban blacks earned about 10 percent more than central-city blacks in
large SMSAs in 1969. We do not know whether the inconsistencies between the two tables are
due to differences in geographic coverage, differences in age coverage, or the inclusion of men
who did not work full-time, year-round, in Table 5-3.
25The small size of Price and Mills's black sample raises troubling questions about its represen-
tativeness. They took their data from the May 1978 CPS. At that time the CPS sampled roughly
0.7 percent of all households. The Bureau of the Census (1980) indicates that Z3 million black
men between the ages of 25 and 54 worked full-time, year-round in 1978, so the May CPS should
have included at least 1,600 such men. Yet after excluding men who provided less than half their
family's total income, Price and Mills ended up with a sample of only 500 such men. Dropping
men whose earnings constituted less than half their family's total income could hardly have elim-
inated 70 percent of all black men who worked full-time, year-round. Something else must be
going on here, but we cannot say what. Because the sample is small, the sampling error of the 6.0
percent difference between urban and suburban blacks is 3.6 percent. The 95 percent confidence
interval for the difference therefore ranges from a 13.2 percent advantage for suburbanites to a
1.2 percent advantage for central-city residents.
26Vrooman and Greenfield used a sample surveyed by the Opinion Research Corporation that
included 293 blacks. Almost two-fifths of the black sample lived in suburban areas, which is
considerably higher than we would expect on the basis of CPS data. Suburban black males earned
74 percent more than inner-city black males, while suburban black females earned 55 percent
more than inner-city black females. No census or CPS survey reports urban-suburban differences
of this magnitude. We therefore suspect that the Opinion Research Corporation's sampling
frame was unrepresentative for some reason. Assessing Vrooman and Greenfield's results is also
complicated by their obscure presentation and by arithmetic errors discussed in Reid (1984~.
OCR for page 213
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND BLACK JOB OPPORTUNITIES
213
Almost all these comparisons between central-city and suburban blacks
support two broad empirical conclusions:
1. In the 1960s, central-city blacks did no better economically than
comparable suburban blacks.
2. Since 1970 the economic gap between central-city and suburban
blacks has grown appreciably.27
These facts are compatible with two very different hypotheses:
1. The spatial mismatch between black job opportunities and black
housing options that Kain described in 1968, while exaggerated at
that time, has become quite important since then.
Because social conditions in black central-city neighborhoods de-
teriorated dramatically between 1965 and 1975, black migration
between central cities and suburbs became far more selective than
it had previously been.
We cannot choose between these two explanations without new data on
selective migration.
Comparing the studies of blacks who live in the suburbs with the studies
of blacks who work in the suburbs, discussed in the previous section, also
raises an important puzzle. Both Straszheim and Danziger and Weinstein
found that black ghetto residents earned slightly more if they worked in the
suburbs rather than the central city in 1965-1970. Yet Bell, Harrison, and
our Able 5-3 all indicate that blacks who lived in the suburbs in 1965-1970
.,
earned no more than blacks with the same amount of schooling who lived
in central cities. The difference between the two kinds of studies may be
due to the fact that they cover different cities or different kinds of workers.
But the difference may also mean that living in the suburbs is not strongly
associated with working in the suburbs.
This same paradox arises in opposite form in 1980. Most of the
evidence we have examined suggests that by 1980 blacks who lived in
suburbs earned more per week than blacks with the same amount of
education who lived in central cities. Yet Hughes and Madden found that,
with all else equal, Cleveland, Detroit, and Philadelphia blacks who worked
regularly in 1980 earned no more when they worked far from the center of
their SMSA than when they worked near its center. Once again, we need
simple descriptive data showing where blacks who live in different parts
of an SMSA work, and how much they earn, in order to reconcile these
superficially contradictory findings.
If we were to find that blacks could earn more by living in the suburbs,
we would also have to ask why so many of them continue to live in central
27The main apparent exception to this generalization is the data on earnings among full-time,
year-round, nonwhite male workers in large metropolitan areas, shown in Table 5-1.
OCR for page 214
214
.s
-
3
0\ C
'O
._
· _4
of ~
._
US ~
~3
., ~
D
~ _
.S ~
U' -
~ O
mod
0 ~
~ ^
a'
0
, ~ .
~ 0
6,P
04t~-
.S P
0
ID -
~ ._
o
O
U'
.= ~
106
0\
0\
-
0\
lo
0\
° 1 ~
~ .~
~ _
~33
~ .~
at ~
~ b.
o
Go~
CalCal
Cal
.~
o
o
· .
~ of ~ an ~ ~ ~ en -
~ - - -
~ - ~= ~ s
to
A
oN om ~ ~
to - lo
- ~ - - -
- ~ ~ ~ ~ A A ~ ~
- - ~4 ~- - ~ - - -
o So
.=
~ om to
Go
os ~
oo - oS
. . .
o - o
~- - ~-
` - c~) ~ t~) ~ ~ o -
~oo
o oo o ~oo ~o - c~ -
- - -
aS~ =0g =E
OCR for page 215
215
o ~o
~Cat of ~Cal
Go lo. ~of lo.
o _ o o _
_% _% _ _
~ Ha, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
o ~ ~o _
_ ~_ C'' _ Cal Cal -
~= ~_ - _
o_= ~no _
~ ~oo o oo o~
00 ~O _ In O
~_%
~oo
\4, _~ _
~ oo ~o ~
_ ~OS ~
o o X
o
o~
..
oo
_~o
_X
..
_o
'_ _
_ _% _ ~o
~ ~ ~ ~o, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
=~; -8- ~a ~ ~-
U,
C)
Ce 00
80~ =~
U)
C~ d"
)
Q)
.S pr:
C)
~ U,
et
U)
._ ~
._
,~ 3
CJ ~
3 6
C)
G) U
~ .5 c
~o . ~ . ~
~ _ ~
E =3 ~
~ ~ e~
C ~ C
_=
Cq
E
a~ ~ ~ O
~ ~ C _-
3.5: ~-
04 C ~
.5 ~ ~ ~
C, ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ C
C) ~ ~ V
365 =.
..-_ C.) ~
z~ ° °
OCR for page 216
216
INNER-CITY POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
cities. The conventional answer is that blacks cannot buy housing in all-
white suburbs, or that they do not feel comfortable in such suburbs. Racial
discrimination is certainly a real problem, both in the housing market
and in the social lives of black suburbanites. But for our purposes the
question is not why so few blacks live in white suburbs but why so few
live in black suburbs and black neighborhoods of racially mixed suburbs.
If job opportunities are better for blacks who live in black suburbs, blacks
should keep moving to these suburbs until local demand for black workers
is saturated and the suburban wage advantage disappears.
Whites have, of course, resisted the growth of black suburban neigh-
borhoods. But they have also resisted the growth of black urban neigh-
borhoods. Our question is therefore comparative: Has white resistance
to black residential growth been more effective in the suburbs than in the
central cities and, if so, why? The easiest way to answer this question
is to investigate whether the supply of black suburban housing has kept
pace with demand. If it has not, the price differential between housing in
black central-city and black suburban neighborhoods should be greater than
the price differential between comparable housing units in white central-
cib and suburban neighborhoods. The price of housing in black suburbs
should also have increased faster over the past 20 years than the price of
comparable housing in black central-city neighborhoods.
We have not reviewed the literature on housing prices, but our informal
inquiries uncovered no work on trends in the relative price of housing in
urban versus suburban black neighborhoods.28 Unless the price of black
suburban housing has risen faster than the price of comparable housing in
other areas, it is hard to argue that discrimination has discouraged blacks
from moving to black suburban areas although one can certainly argue
that discrimination has discouraged blacks from moving to white areas. If
discrimination has not discouraged black movement to the suburbs, the
basic premise of the spatial mismatch hypothesis needs to be reexamined.
28Using a 1/1,000 sample of census records, we found that among whites gross rent (i.e., rent
plus heat and utilities) in the suburbs exceeded gross rent in the central city by 9 percent in 1960,
10 percent in 1970, and 11 percent in 1980. Among blacks, gross rent averaged 20 percent less in
the suburbs than in the central city in 1960, 4 percent more in 1970, and 21 percent more in 1980.
If the figures for blacks covered the same housing units in all three Yeats, they would provide
strong support for the hypothesis that demand for suburban housing rose faster than supply
during this period. In fact, however, the housing stock rented by blacks in 1980 was much larger
and of much higher quality than that rented by blacks in 1960. Much of the apparent increase
in relative prices may, therefore, reflect improvement in housing quality rather than increased
demand for suburban locations. A convincing analysis of this issue would have to compare price
trends in specific black, white, and mixed neighborhoods throughout this period. A study of land
values in black and white areas would also be instructive.
OCR for page 217
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND BLACK JOB OPPORTUNITIES
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
We began with four questions:
217
How does residential segregation affect demand for black workers?
How does proximity to work affect the supply of black workers
available for employment?
Can black central-city residents earn more by commuting to the
suburbs?
Can black central-city residents earn more if they live in the sub-
urbs?
Our tentative answers to these questions are as follows.
Demand for Black Workers
Residential segregation is likely to reduce demand for black workers
in white areas and increase demand for black workers in black areas.
Whether the net result is to increase or decrease aggregate demand for
black workers depends on a number of factors: how strongly whites dislike
working in black areas, how strongly blacks dislike working in white areas,
whether black customers prefer trading with firms that discriminate in favor
of black workers, whether white customers prefer trading with firms that
discriminate in favor of white workers, whether firms that mainly hire blacks
are more or less productive than firms that mainly hire whites, and hence
whether firms prefer hiring relatively cheap labor in the ghetto or more
expensive labor in white areas. All these factors are likely to change over
time. They also vary from place to place. As a result, we cannot predict
the economic consequences of residential segregation by using deductive
logic.
When we turn from theory to evidence, we find that the level of
residential segregation in a metropolitan area had very little effect on
income differences between black and white men in either 1959 or 1969.
No one has investigated changes since 1969. Nor has anyone studied the
effect of residential segregation on the earnings of black women or black
teenagers. Based on what we now know, it is hard to draw any strong
conclusions about how residential segregation currently affects demand for
black workers. All we can say is that it did not appear to have much impact
in 1959 or 1969.
Job Proximity and Labor Supply
The supply of black workers available to a firm at any given wage rate
clearly diminishes as distance from black residential areas increases. But
it does not follow that moving black workers closer to major centers of
OCR for page 218
218
INNER-CITY POVE~IY IN THE UNITED STATES
employment would increase the number of blacks taking jobs at any given
wage rate.
Comparisons among Pittsburgh and Los Angeles neighborhoods sug-
gest that job proximity has little impact on black men's chances of holding
a job. Distance does have an effect on black teenagers' chances of working
in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Chicago, however, and in the best cur-
rently available study distance explains 30 to 50 percent of the racial gap
in teenage employment rates.
While job proximity does not appear very important for adults in
Pittsburgh or Los Angeles, blacks do seem to have done better economically
in both 1960 and 1980 when they lived in SMSAs where manufacturing,
trade, and service jobs were concentrated in the central city rather than in
the suburbs.
Suburban Versus Central-City Wages
In 1965-1970, ghetto blacks who worked in the suburbs of Cleveland,
Detroit, St. Louis, and San Francisco earned about 10 percent more than
those who worked in the ghetto. This wage premium was roughly sufficient
to cover the extra cost of commuting to the suburbs. In 1980, however,
Hughes and Madden found that the overall wage level for all black workers
was no higher near the periphery of the Cleveland and Philadelphia SMSAs
than near the center, and it was slightly lower near the periphery of the
Detroit SMSA The most likely explanation of this apparent contradiction
is that for blacks suburban wages were roughly equal to central-city wages
in both 1970 and 1980, but that inner-city black workers only commute to
the suburbs if they happen to find a job that pays more than they think
they could earn nearer home.
Blacks Who Live in the Suburbs
We found no evidence that suburban blacks fared better than compa-
rable central-city blacks in 1966-1970, when Kain first advanced the spatial
isolation hypothesis. Since 1970, however, joblessness has risen faster
among central-city blacks than among suburban blacks. We do not know
whether this was because of selective migration or because demand for
black workers fell more in central cities than in the suburbs.
Policy Implications
Taken together, these findings tell a very mixed story. They provide
no direct support for the hypothesis that residential segregation affects the
aggregate level of demand for black workers. They provide some support
OCR for page 219
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND BLACK JOB OPPORTUNITIES
219
for the idea that job proximity increases the supply of black workers, but
the support is so mixed that no prudent policy analyst should rely on it.
Those who argue that moving blacks to the suburbs would improve their
job prospects, or that improving public transportation to the suburbs would
reduce unemployment in the central-city ghetto, must recognize that there
is as much evidence against such claims as for them.
Future Research
Because of its intuitive appeal, the spatial mismatch hypothesis is
unlikely to go away, no matter what the evidence shows. When the evidence
is mixed, as it is now, those who find the theory appealing will continue to
defend it, and policymakers who find it appealing will continue to listen.
Under these circumstances we ought to make a serious effort to improve
the quality of the available evidence. Four steps seem especially pressing.
First, since theory suggests that the effects of living in the central-city
ghetto are likely to have changed over time, since the available descriptive
statistics also point to such changes, and since much of the most widely
cited evidence in this debate is now more than 20 years old, we need to
use the census, the CPS, and the PSID to assemble time series comparing:
· blacks who live in suburbs to blacks who live in central cities;
blacks who work in suburbs to blacks who work in central cities;
blacks who live in very large cities, where the spatial mismatch
hypothesis seems likely to have its strongest effect, to blacks who
live in smaller cities, where travel time to suburban jobs is likely to
be modest;
blacks who live in cities where most blue-collar jobs are far from
the central-city ghetto to blacks who live in cities where most
blue-collar jobs are close to the central-city ghetto; and
blacks who live in highly segregated SMSAs to blacks who live in
less segregated SMSAs.
All these tabulations should be broken down by sex, educational level, and
age. Having descriptive material of this kind readily available in a Census
Bureau publication would do more than almost any piece of primary
research to raise the level of both public understanding and scholarly
argument about these issues.
Second, we need more fine-grained descriptions of specific cities, in-
cluding maps that show where workers with specified characteristics earn
the most and the least, which neighborhoods have major centers of blue-
collar employment, and which neighborhoods have the highest and lowest
rates of labor force participation. This is a field where a picture is worth
considerably more than a thousand words.
OCR for page 220
220
INNER-CITY POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
Third, we need to look more carefully at the effects of changes over
time in cities' residential and employment patterns. Cross-sectional com-
parisons among SMSAs can sometimes be instructive, but they have severe
limitations. If any one city pursues policies that benefit blacks, its reward
will be to attract new black migrants, whose presence will drive up black
unemployment and drive down black wages. This means that no city can
expect to keep demand for black labor much tighter than the national
average for a protracted period (e.g., more than 20 years). It follows that
if we want to estimate the erects of naiwnal policies aimed at keeping
manufacturing near the central-city ghetto or at helping central-city blacks
move to the suburbs, city-to-city comparisons may lead us badly astray,
seriously underestimating the benefits of the policies in question. In order
to do better, we need dynamic models that take account of intercity as well
as intracity migration.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, we need to investigate the deter-
minants of residential movements between central cities and suburbs. We
then need to estimate the contribution of selective migration to employ-
ment and earning differences between central~ity and suburban blacks.
Social scientists' collective failure to take account of selective migration is
probably the single most important reason why we have learned so little
about this subject in the two decades since Kain first advanced the spatial
mismatch hypothesis.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are indebted to Bennett Harrison, Harry Holzer, Jonathan Leonard,
and Michael Wiseman for comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. The
Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research at Northwestern University
provided financial assistance.
REFERENCES
Bell, Duran, Jr.
1974 Residential location, economic performance, and public employment. Pp. 55-
75 in Patterns of Racial Discrunination, Vol. 1, George M. Von Furstenberg,
Bennett Harrison, and Ann R. Horowitz, eds. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books.
Bureau of the Census
1%9 Income in 1967 of Persons in the United States. Current Population Reports,
Series P 60, No. 60. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce.
Money Income of Families and Persons in the United States: 1978.
Current Population Reports, Series P 60, No. 123. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Commerce.
1983 Financial Characteristics of the Housing Inventory for the United States
and Regions: 1983. Annual Housing Survey: 1983, Part C. Current Housing
Reports, Series H-150-83. Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of Commerce.
1gS0
OCR for page 221
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND BLACK JOB OPPORTUNITIES
1988
221
Money Income of Families and Persons in the United States: 1986.
Current Population Reports, Series P 60, No. 159. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Commerce.
Byrne, James J.
1975 Occupational mobility of workers. Special Labor Force Report, No. 176.
Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Danziger, Sheldon, and Michael Weinstein
1976 Employment location and wage rates of poverty-area residents. Joumal of
Urban Economics 3:127-145.
Ellwood, David ~
1986 The spatial mismatch hypothesis. Are there teen-age jobs missing in the
ghetto? Pp. 147-190 in We Black Youth Emp~rnent Crisis, Richard B.
Freeman and Harry J. Holzer, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Barley, John E.
1987 Disproportionate black and Hispanic unemployment in US metropolitan
areas. American Journal of Economics and Sociology' 46:129-150.
Harrison, Bennett
1972 The intrametropolitan distribution of minority economic welfare. Joumal of
Regional Science 12:23~3.
Discrimination in space: Suburbanization and black unemployment in cities.
Pp. 21-53 in Patterns of Racial Discrimination, Vol. 1, George M. Von
Gutenberg, Bennett Harrison, and Ann R. Horowitz, eds. ~ "ington,
Mass.: Lexington Books.
Hughes, Mark Alan
1987 Moving up and moving out: Confusing ends and means about ghetto
dispersal. Urban Studies 24:50~517.
Hughes, Mark Alan, and Janice Fanning Madden
Forth- Residential segregation and the economic status of black workers: New
coming evidence for an old debate. Joumal of Urban Economics.
Hutchinson, Peter M.
1g74 1be effects of accessibility and segregation on the employment of the urban
poor. Pp. 77-96 in Pattems of Racial Discrimination, Vol. 1, George M.
Von Gutenberg, Bennett Harrison, and Ann R. Horowitz, eds. Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books.
Ihlanfeldt, Keith R.
1988 Intra-metropolitan variation in earnings and labor market discrimination:
An economic analysis of the Atlanta labor market. Southern Economic
Joumal 55:123-140.
Ihlanfeldt, Keith R., and David L Sjoquist
1989 The impact of pb decentralization on the economic welfare of central city
blacks. Journal of Urban Economics 26:110-130.
1990 Job accessibility and racial differences in youth employment rates. American
Economic Review 80:267-276.
1974
Kain, John F.
1968 Housing segregation, Negro employment, and metropolitan decentralization.
The Quarter) Journal of Economics 82:175-197.
1974 Reply to Stanley Masters' comment on "Housing Segregation, Negro Employ
ment, and Metropolitan Decentralization." Quarterly Joumal of Economics
88:511-519.
OCR for page 222
222
INNER-CITY POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
Kasarda, John
1989 Urban industrial transition and the underclass. 17'e Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 501:26-47.
Kimchenman, Joleen, and Kathryn Neckerman
Forth- We'd love to hire them, but . . .: The meaning of race for employers.
coming In Christopher Jencks and Paul Peterson, eds. 17'e Urban Ur~erc~*s.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Leonard, Jonathan S.
1986 Space, Time, and Unemployment: Los Angeles 1980. Unpublished paper,
School of Business Administration, University of California, Berkeley.
1987 The interaction of residential segregation and employment discrimination.
Journal of Urban Economics 21:323 346.
Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton
1988 Suburbanization and segregation in U.S. metropolitan statistical areas. AmeT-
ican Journal of Sociology 94~3):592-626.
Massey, Douglas S., and Mitchell Lo Eggers
1989 The ecology of inequality: Minorities and the concentration of poverty
1970-1980. National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago.
Mastem, Stanley H.
1974 A note on John Kain's "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and
Metropolitan Decentralization." Quarterly Journal of Economics 88:505-519.
Black-White Income Differentials: Empirical Studies and Policy Implications.
New York: Academic Press.
Mooney, Joseph D.
1969 Housing segregation, Negro employment, and metropolitan decentralization:
An alternative perspective. Quarterly Journal of Economics 83:299-311.
National Center for Educational Statistics
1988 Digest ofEducational Statistics. Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
Odner, Paul, and Daniel H. Saks
1971 A note on John Kain's "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and
Metropolitan Decentralization." Me Quarterly Joumal of Economies 191:147-
160.
Price, R., and E. S. Mills
1985 Race and residence in earnings determination. Joumal of Urban Economics
17:1-18.
Reid, Clifford
1984 Are blacks making it in the suburbs? Joumal of Urban Econonucs 16:357-359.
Straszheim, Mahlon R.
1980 Discrimination and the spatial characteristics of the urban labor market for
black workers. Journal of Urban Economics 7:119-140.
Vrooman, John, and Stuart Greenfield
1980 Are blacks making it in the suburbs? Some new evidence on intrametropoli-
tan spatial segmentation. Journal of Urban Economics 7:155-167.
Wilson, William Julius
1987 The Truly Disadvantaged. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1~75
Representative terms from entire chapter:
residential segregation
