With this in mind, the panel makes the following recommendations:

  • Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons is a U.S. national security concern and should be treated as such in U.S. law and policy.

  • The principal focus should be on those proliferation problems—nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and missile delivery systems—that, in combination, have the potential to create expanded negative impacts.

  • Control regimes should be tailored to the particular circumstances of specific proliferation threats and, to be effective, should be as fully multilateral (i.e., involve the maximum number of suppliers) as possible. Some of these regimes are likely to rely, at least in part, on properly fashioned export controls. Such controls should be targeted only on those technologies or products directly essential to the development and/or manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.

NOTES

1.  

"Final Declaration of NATO Summit Leaders," Associated Press, London, July 6, 1990.

2.  

See, for example, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Holding the Edge: Maintaining the Defense Technology Base (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989); U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Making Things Better: Competing in Manufacturing (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990); Michael L. Dertouzos, Richard K. Lester, and Robert M. Solow, Made in America: Regaining the Productive Edge (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1989); U.S. Department of Defense, Bolstering Defense Industrial Competitiveness (Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) (Washington, D.C., 1988); National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, and National Research Council, Industrial R&D and U.S. Technological Leadership (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988); Richard M. Cyert and David C. Mowery (eds.), The Impact of Technological Change on Employment and Economic Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988); and Council on Competitiveness, America's Competitiveness Crisis: Confronting the New Reality (Washington, D.C., 1987).

3.  

U.S. Department of Defense, Critical Technologies Plan (Report to the Committees on Armed Services, U.S. Congress) (Washington, D.C., 1989).

4.  

"The World's One Hundred Largest Banks," Wall Street Journal, September 21, 1990, p. R29.

5.  

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Arming Our Allies: Competition and Cooperation in Defense Technology (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990).

6.  

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), Defense Science Board, Task Force Report on Defense Semiconductor Dependency (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987).

7.  

U.S. Department of Defense, Critical Technologies Plan.

8.  

Data from International Trade Administration and Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990.



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