5
Technology Management Strategy

INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses the second point in the STAR request. It suggests a technology management strategy to realize the potential offered by the technology applications discussed in the previous three chapters. In preparing this strategy, the STAR Committee drew extensively on the report by the STAR Technology Management and Development Planning (TMDP) Subcommittee; the complete report is available as a separate volume. Some of the reports of the systems panels and technology groups also contain discussion and recommendations on issues of technology management. The discussion here draws selectively on these reports, which the STAR Committee interpreted within its own perspective. Interested readers are urged to consult the separate reports for additional detail and, in some instances, different emphases and opinions.

The STAR Committee's suggestions to the Army on technology management are organized here under five headings:

  • a general implementation strategy to move new technology into Army systems;

  • a set of recommended focal values for technology implementation, which apply across the major combat and support functions and can serve as key elements of a strategic focus on advanced technology applications;

  • technology management recommendations specific to each of the high-impact functions discussed in Chapter 2;



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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century 5 Technology Management Strategy INTRODUCTION This chapter addresses the second point in the STAR request. It suggests a technology management strategy to realize the potential offered by the technology applications discussed in the previous three chapters. In preparing this strategy, the STAR Committee drew extensively on the report by the STAR Technology Management and Development Planning (TMDP) Subcommittee; the complete report is available as a separate volume. Some of the reports of the systems panels and technology groups also contain discussion and recommendations on issues of technology management. The discussion here draws selectively on these reports, which the STAR Committee interpreted within its own perspective. Interested readers are urged to consult the separate reports for additional detail and, in some instances, different emphases and opinions. The STAR Committee's suggestions to the Army on technology management are organized here under five headings: a general implementation strategy to move new technology into Army systems; a set of recommended focal values for technology implementation, which apply across the major combat and support functions and can serve as key elements of a strategic focus on advanced technology applications; technology management recommendations specific to each of the high-impact functions discussed in Chapter 2;

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century recommendations for enhancing the Army's in-house R&D infrastructure ; and an evaluation of the current Army requirements process as it affects technology management, with recommendations on how to improve it. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY Figure 5-1 illustrates how an implementation policy can be used to achieve a strategic focus for technology management. This section begins with a general implementation policy and a general statement of the basis for focal interests. The remainder of the section recommends specific actions to carry out the implementation policy. These implementation actions are summarized in the list on the left side of Figure 5-1. The next major section, Focal Values, recommends seven aspects of systems that should be emphasized as part of the Army's strategic focus on technology management. The third section, High-Impact Functions, applies the implementation strategy and the focal values to technology management issues within each of the principal combat and support functions discussed in Chapter 2. The focal values and major topics discussed in the third section are listed on the right side of Figure 5-1. General Statements Implementation Policy. The STAR Committee recommends that the Army direct most of its available resources toward those technologies and applications that are not receiving sufficient private sector investment to meet anticipated Army interest. The high-payoff technologies identified in Chapter 4 and the high-payoff systems listed in Chapter 2 represent the Committee's nominations for initial lists of such technologies and systems. Furthermore, the Army should, wherever possible, increase its reliance on the private sector for technological progress and products. After the Army has considered the implementation actions and focal interests recommended below, it will probably revise or delete some of them, while adding others of its own choosing. Although the STAR Committee believes each of its recommendations to be well justified, more important than any specific recommendation is a focused implementation strategy. That strategy must have a clear set of focal interests, and these must be implemented through actions that can be communicated throughout the organization.

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century FIGURE 5-1 A focused implementation strategy for technology management. Basis for Focal Interests. The Army should focus its technology development toward explicit Army system interests as a means of exploiting advanced technology more fully and of transferring new technology more rapidly to the field. These Army focal interests should fit within the larger defense policy architecture of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). They should be explicitly supportable by reference to that architecture. Some of these focal interests will apply across many systems, like the seven focal values recommended in the next section. Other focal interests will be specific to a systems concept, such as those recom-

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century mended in the third section of this chapter. The Army's implementation of technology will progress more rapidly and cost-effectively if those responsible for it can envision an important application requiring that technology. In Army-sponsored research and exploratory development, whether performed at universities or in Army laboratories, a reasonable balance must be struck between unrestricted freedom to explore and the discipline imposed by specific applications. To have its acquisition funding requirements understood and accepted at higher levels, the Army must articulate its focal interests by reference to the larger priorities set forth by OSD. Two key issues must be addressed with more consistency and depth than has sometimes occurred in the past: Is the Army in fact working on technologies and systems that fit into the wider architecture of OSD priorities? Where the Army is working within that architecture, are the arguments for support being couched in the context of OSD priorities or are they tied solely to Army-specific interests? Implementation Actions Nine of the recommendations from the TMDP Subcommittee are presented here as key elements of an implementation strategy for technology management. The TMDP Subcommittee report amplifies the summary account of these implementation elements given here. Commit to using commercial technologies, products, and production capabilities wherever they can be adapted to meet Army needs. The STAR Committee concurs with the argument made by the Defense Science Board and endorsed by the TMDP Subcommittee that the issue here is not essentially one of cost. Rather, DOD will have neither the resources nor the production volume to support on its own an expensive, dynamic infrastructure for advanced technology manufacturing. A commitment to use commercial products lets the Army benefit from market-driven and market-financed technological developments. It also provides timely surge capacity from existing private sector manufacturing facilities; surge capacity will almost certainly be required in future contingency operations, as it was in Desert Storm. Focus the Army's internal technology R&D in areas where strong private sector interest is not anticipated. A special section of this chapter (see below) deals specifically with Army R&D infrastructure;

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century there is additional valuable comment in the TMDP Subcommittee report. These STAR discussions are directed not at what the Army should be researching and developing in-house but at how internal R&D can be managed to achieve long-term results in whatever technological or systems areas are selected. Stimulate university research in technologies important to the Army that are not likely to receive adequate support either from the private sector or through other grant mechanisms. Balance technology funding between the exploration of new concepts made possible by scientific advances and the specific technological applications needed for Army systems. In striking this balance, the Army should consider whether commercially developed technologies and products that meet military needs will be available. To encourage leap-frog technological solutions, innovative research and design must be encouraged. Still, a clear focus on the functional characteristics of a system can help guide this innovation. It is also important to foster an environment of intellectual freedom and challenge in the Army's laboratories and research centers, even while R&D managers are held accountable for productivity. Overall, the STAR Committee concludes that a strategic focus on Army interests ought to be maintained. This conclusion is embodied in the general statement on strategic focus. To modernize the current inventory, the Army should pay more attention to the subsystem level. Technology development, operational demonstration, and production proofing can be applied to subsystems; these can be upgraded if the larger system or platform has been designed for change. The TMDP Subcommittee has presented cogent arguments for combining an increased focus on subsystems with new approaches to platform development. This six-point plan could significantly shorten the platform development cycle and reduce costs. The same points were made in the 1984 Defense Science Board Summer Study on upgrading current equipment. Design systems to accommodate change during the design life of a system. As a consequence of both budget constraints and increasing technical complexity, major platforms are likely to have longer generational cycles (as opposed to the development cycle discussed above). To maintain a technological advantage, the Army must be able to modernize without waiting for the next generation of an entire system. However, successful retrofitting of an integrated system requires that it be designed initially for modular replacement of components and subsystems as they are upgraded.

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century Seek to become the DOD lead agent for technologies of prime interest to the Army; consider taking on roles in other DOD programs as a means of ensuring DOD activity in areas of broadly useful technology. Technologies for theater-level command and control and for training individuals or units are good examples. Revise Army procedures and practices to provide incentives for entrepreneurial small businesses to contract with the Army. The TMDP Subcommittee has graphically portrayed the alienation of this innovative segment of the private sector from the Army market. To recover the situation, changes are needed in progress payments, cost of competitive procurements, intellectual property rights, and other areas. Improve incentives for the private sector to invest in DOD-unique technologies, applications, and specialized facilities. Profit policies and amortization requirements are examples of areas where the Army could press for changes in legislation or DOD directives. FOCAL VALUES As noted in the introduction to Chapter 2, the STAR Committee found a number of key values that were cited repeatedly by the STAR systems panels and technology groups as potential benefits of many emerging technologies or systems concepts. These same characteristics were selected by senior military leaders or advisers as important to the success of the Army in its anticipated future roles. The STAR Committee has selected the seven most pervasive and potentially beneficial of these attributes to recommend as focal values for the Army's technology implementation strategy (Figure 5-2). How technology can contribute to each of these values will, of course, differ from system to system. Affordability The STAR Committee believes that the traditional Army Technology Base Program puts far too little emphasis on the application of technology expressly to achieve affordability. Individual short-term product acquisition programs cannot be expected to invest heavily in technology-based affordability initiatives if, because of development cycle timing, the savings attained cannot accrue benefits for that program. The Army should allocate a significant portion of its research, exploratory development, and advanced development resources1 for 1   These three areas correspond to budget lines 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a, respectively.

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century FIGURE 5-2 These seven technology management values apply across Army  systems and technology development efforts in all mission areas. a sustained program focus on cost reduction opportunities from advanced technologies. Furthermore, the Army should pursue, through both its own laboratory system and the private sector, a broad investigation of technology options that show potential for major cost reductions. Several Army laboratories are already leading DOD in this important area of a technology focus on affordability. This effort should be substantially expanded, in light of the budget restrictions anticipated during the next decades. The Army should consider ways to stimulate industry investment in flexible manufacturing systems. These systems have promise as a means of economical production even at low and fluctuating rates, which is likely to be the pattern of much future defense manufacturing demand. Similar manufacturing technology will be needed in the Army's own facilities, most importantly its depots. Reliability More reliable systems can achieve improved performance and reduce costs at the same time (Figure 5-3). In the field, reliability becomes essential to maintaining and exercising technological advantage. While these benefits of more reliable systems are undisputed,

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century the means of improving reliability are not always obvious. The STAR Committee sees a number of technology developments, driven by competition in private sector markets for more reliable products and services, that should be tapped for exploitation by the Army. Two such areas are low-failure electronic and electromechanical systems and improved software producibility. FIGURE 5-3 Experience with the Navy's Sparrow missile shows that reliability can be increased over a system's lifecycle, even while unit costs are decreased. (SOURCE: China Lake Naval Air Station.)

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century Low-Failure Electronic and Electromechanical Systems Production management with the goal of improving product reliability is becoming increasingly important in highly competitive commercial markets, including consumer electronics (televisions, video cassette recorders, and personal computers), automobiles, and other areas where the consumer buys high-tech goods. The technology to improve product reliability includes manufacturing methods, failure-mode sensing techniques, and new materials that wear gradually with observable symptoms (''graceful'' failure) rather than failing all at once (catastrophic failure). In electronics, new semiconductor materials, new device formation techniques, and electronic design automation are all contributing to improved reliability. For applications ranging from micro-devices to large-scale mechanical systems—such as engines and bearings—and structural components, advanced materials can now be designed, produced, and fabricated to address sources of failure inherent in older materials or production methods. One way for the Army to exploit this "reliability revolution" in the marketplace is to rely more on proven commercial products and components. In other instances the techniques, materials, or methods can be adapted for use in Army-unique products. Improved Software Producibility Software engineers have begun to codify software development principles and practices that are essential when computer programs contain millions of lines of code. They already use practices such as structured programming, rapid prototyping, and software reuse, with the aim of helping software performance keep up with advances in computer hardware performance. However, the large software systems made possible by future hardware will require software engineering techniques far more advanced than the current state of the art. In particular, the verification and validation of mammoth software systems present a daunting challenge, for which an integrated software technology program is necessary. To participate in this evolving field, the Army should institute a programwide focus on software producibility aimed at tracking progress in software development methodologies and applying them to Army systems. The STAR working groups found that considerable research on software tools and environments is being sponsored by DARPA, the Office of Naval Research, and the National Science Foundation. In addition, the DOD Software Engineering Institute and most

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century universities have active software research programs. So do many private companies, including consortia formed by hardware manufacturers. There is an extraordinary level of activity in the private sector, both domestic and foreign, which can the Army can use if it organizes to do so. Deployability In a future where the Army must be prepared to respond quickly to sudden contingencies anywhere in the world with forces based primarily in the continental United States, deployability takes on new meanings and new urgency. It introduces new constraints on the formulation of requirements and the design of systems; one can no longer divorce the military effectiveness of a system from the time and manner in which it can be transported halfway around the globe. In addition to long-distance transport into theater, mobility within theater also must be considered. The existence of a modern infrastructure of highways, railroads, and airfields cannot be assumed. In addition to the transport and battle zone mobility of combat troops and their systems, deployability also applies to the logistical support of forces once they are in the field. Fortunately, the technologies investigated by the STAR panels offer myriad possibilities for enhancing deployability in each of these aspects. More compact systems can be developed, using lighter materials. Equal or greater lethal power can be "packaged" in smaller, lighter systems. New materials, custom designed for specific applications, offer more strength and toughness in lighter, thinner formulations. Smart munitions in small quantities can achieve the same destructive effect as tons of conventionally delivered explosives. The challenge will be to ferret out the best options for a given requirement and test them adequately to make the right choice, within the limited resources available. Joint Operability Although multiservice combat operations have been the norm in the past, in future contingencies the complexities of such operations will increase. At a systems level, future Army weapon and information systems will need to work together with the analogous systems of the other services. During Desert Storm the services managed coordinated operation of systems that had been designed for use by each service operating independently. However, to achieve systems that will later work well together, decisions on a multiservice archi-

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century tecture and standardized key components will have to be made by each service early in the development cycle of its systems. Army management of the technology programs must maintain a focus on this joint operability environment. In particular, the Army will need to cooperate closely with the other services on programs for the interoperable systems with high payoff, such as air and ballistic missile defense or C3I/RISTA (command, control, communication, and intelligence or reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition) systems. Specific examples of technology in these areas that will require close cooperation are jamming and IFFN (identification of friend, foe, or neutral). Special consideration must be given to the selection of time and frequency domains, power levels, and interfaces for both voice and data interchange. Stealth and Counterstealth Capability In addition to applying low-observable (LO) technologies to its weapon systems and its airborne and ground vehicles, the Army should apply stealth technologies to its logistical support facilities and equipment. The application of stealth technologies to these facilities and equipment can make them much more difficult for the enemy to locate, target, and attack. In the contingency environment of the future, these additional means of protecting logistics bases could become critically important to mission success. The STAR working groups identified a variety of promising technologies for advanced materials and for the reduction of electronic, optical, and sound signatures. The STAR Committee suggests a managed focus on systems applications to integrate and direct these still-emerging technologies. The Army is not yet totally prepared to defend itself against stealth weapons. As these technologies become more widely available, countermeasures to them will gain in importance. Particularly in rapid-deployment contingency operations, fixed concentrations of forces and logistic lodgements are likely to be far more vulnerable to the level of stealth technology available to an adversary than they have been in recent operations. At present, U.S. forces enjoy an overwhelming advantage in air superiority and the use of stand-off ground weapons. This important technological advantage could be eroded if an adversary can threaten U.S. forces, even if to only a limited degree. The detection of unfriendly stealthy systems by means of advanced radar and other sensor technologies appears plausible. The STAR Committee recommends that the Army take the lead in an extensive

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century plishing them appear to differ in detail from the model conceived earlier by the STAR group. The STAR Committee has not had the opportunity to study in detail the Army 21 mechanism for basic research. Nevertheless, it commends Army 21 in general as a strong move toward ensuring a major Army research capability. The Committee supports the concept of an integrated, flagship laboratory but cautions that the existing laboratory structure is fragile; care must be taken in the timing and method of formulation of this flagship laboratory. From a wider perspective, the STAR Committee believes it is also necessary to modify the Army's current requirements process, in part so that all the Army's research managers will have clear direction on areas where the future military needs will be greatest. This and other issues related to the requirements process are discussed later in this chapter. Improved In-House Laboratory Environment The STAR TMDP Subcommittee reported that it had detected a significant increase in the Army R&D community's general sense of dissatisfaction with the work environment. Although this malaise is not entirely the Army's doing, the Army will nonetheless bear the brunt of its effects. If the dissatisfaction truly exists, it bodes poorly for the future of the in-house technical work force, just at the time when the Army will experience its greatest dependence on technological progress. The widely discussed causes of this dissatisfaction include constraints in contracting procedures and work authorizations, unusually large funding fluctuations, numerous outside reviews, delays in equipment availability, inspections and audits, personnel ceilings, and salary caps. The STAR Committee urges the Army to continue its efforts to assess these and other possible causes of this dissatisfaction and address them in a way that demonstrates to its scientists and engineers that the Army values their work. The creation of an environment of freedom and technical challenge within its laboratories and centers may be the single most effective antidote to this dissatisfaction. The Army has already done much of what it can do on its own to improve its technology work environment. The STAR Committee suggests, however, that the Army may need to lead a multiservice and DOD effort to convince the Congress of the importance of committing to a broad program of improvement. The Committee also encourages the Army to look within itself for examples of actions that have worked to relieve the frustrations

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century of the current government work environment and to consider the experiences of the laboratories within other services and within the national laboratory structure. Exchanging R&D Information with Industry Faced with the prospect of tightened defense budgets, the Army will continue to seek the most effective uses for the R&D resources available to it. To avoid duplication of effort and ensure timely application of new basic research, the Army's in-house R&D programs must be carefully coordinated with similar programs conducted by its sister services, the national laboratories, other federal agencies, U.S. industry, and even the R&D establishments of our allies. The Army is to be commended for its leadership in programs like Project Reliance. However, emotions are likely to run high when preservation of long-established capability is at stake; it will not be easy to consolidate in a way that may seem obviously correct from an abstract conceptual view. Still, the Committee hopes that the Army will persevere toward full implementation of Project Reliance, because preservation of a deep and well-equipped technology base will require substantial further focus of resources within the government community. In addition, the Committee believes that more attention should be given to achieving the best long-term use of the limited discretionary resources of the defense industry. Much of the relevant industrial R&D is conducted by defense contractors under the Independent Research and Development (IR&D) Program. While the Army receives extensive information from the IR&D participants via these IR&D reviews, there should be more emphasis on an Army effort to provide this defense industry base with a greater level of detail on its own in-house R&D programs. The pilot programs to achieve this interchange, which were recently initiated, should be expanded, and the pressure for mutual government-industry sharing should be maintained. Also, cooperative programs between government and private industry, like those being pursued at the Electronic Technology and Devices Laboratories, seem especially promising. The STAR Committee believes that these programs should become the model for a similar but much broader effort throughout the Army technology community and, for that matter, within the whole of DOD. The Army has consistently been a leader in advocating legislative reforms to remove the legal obstacles to closer cooperation between industry and government. Still, an even stronger emphasis on such

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century reforms seems necessary. We hope that the Army continues to spearhead that interest. Attracting and Retaining Technological Talent As the Army incorporates more and more advanced technology into its war-fighting capabilities, officers and enlisted personnel who understand these technologies will become increasingly valuable. The Army will also have to contend with demographic trends that forecast a smaller pool of well-trained young people to recruit. Furthermore, other studies project an increasing demand from all sectors of the economy for scientists and engineers at all degree levels. Thus, the Army will be competing with the civilian sector in attracting and retaining qualified engineers and scientists in its civilian and military ranks. A successful Army R&D program will depend on attracting technical professionals even before they receive their advanced degrees. And for all its R&D personnel, the Army must offer innovative incentives to retain those with the most valuable skills. For enlisted personnel, the Army will have little alternative but to accept the responsibility for developing technical skills through expanded training; it has already begun to do so, with considerable success. The Army now has a particular opportunity to establish the kind of career education and assignment program necessary for it to cope with the technology forecasts described in Chapter 3 and in the STAR working group reports. The Mavroules Amendment to the 1991 Military Appropriations Bill can become the vehicle for such a program. The STAR Committee encourages the Army to pursue the opportunity this amendment provides. In particular, STAR suggests that the Army acquaint itself with the results of the apparently very successful Laboratory Demonstration Program conducted at the Naval Weapons Station, China Lake, and at the Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego. In these decade-long "demonstrations," remarkable improvements in both the quality of scientific talent recruited and retention of the best of that talent have been achieved. These centers have clearly retained reputations for producing relevant military technology of the highest quality. Rapid Austere Prototyping Rapid prototyping is the development, on a compressed time scale, of preliminary versions of the new components in an advanced system design. The prototype should include all of the unproven (hence

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century risky) elements of the design. However, it needs to include only as many of the low-risk elements as are essential to prove the new concepts. For the latter reason, it is also called austere prototyping . Often, however, military prototyping programs aim not at an austere prototype suitable for testing risky concepts early in the design phase but at something closer to a preproduction version of the system. Properly used, rapid austere prototyping can reduce the time between system concept and production by proving design concepts and pinpointing flaws in need of redesign early in the development cycle. It also lets the prospective user see what is possible while reducing or delineating the development risks. User input based on exercising a prototype is far more valid than requirements definition based on experience with old technology. In an era of explosive technology growth, it can assist the Army in fielding new technology while it is novel enough to give a distinct tactical advantage. The Army's Technology Base Master Plan already incorporates significant opportunities for rapid prototyping methodology in its specific technology demonstrations and the Advanced Technology Transition Demonstrations (ATTDs). A specific technology demonstration is usually conducted in a laboratory environment during the 6.2 to 6.3A phases of development. It is used to provide information that will reduce uncertainties and engineering cost. The ATTD, which is conducted in an operational rather than a laboratory environment, is intended to provide an integrated proof-of-principle demonstration at the 6.3A phase, so that near-term system development can satisfy specific operational requirements. For either type of demonstration, the major thrust of rapid prototyping methodology is lost if the test results, negative and positive, cannot feed back into redesign and even concept revision. In addition, the rapid prototyping approach needs to be diffused through all levels from components and subassemblies to systems. Ideally, the dozen or so current ATTDs would each represent a final, large-scale prototype test following on the lessons learned during multiple lower-level prototyping events, perhaps along the lines of the current specific technology demonstrations. Aside from these reservations, the STAR Committee endorses the attempt being made through the ATTD program and other test and demonstration procedures to define the objectives of the Army's prototyping programs. It is not enough to carry out a technology demonstration program if its fruits do not arrive in the field in time to assure the technological superiority of U.S. forces in combat. From the STAR Committee's perspective, a prerequisite of any prototyping program must be the preservation of continuity in the technological

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century advantage of U.S. Army forces at any time those forces may be asked to engage in combat. The STAR Committee encourages the Army to think through how best to preserve continuously the technological supremacy it now enjoys. Global emergencies may well demand action against sophisticated and able enemies faster than technology can be fielded by any program that does not begin until the need arises. Worldwide Technology Watch The advances in technology occurring worldwide will be available to our potential adversaries as well as to U.S. defense forces. In this changing world, the Army will need technical and management preeminence to maintain tactical superiority. Achieving this preeminence in a period of budget pressure is a considerable challenge. At the least, the Army will have to maintain a worldwide technology watch over advances in various areas of science and technology. This will require an understanding and sensitivity to the potential applicability of technology at all levels in the Army. There should probably be specific responsibility for this function designated within the Army technical community. The STAR Committee suggests that the Army consider how to implement this military technology watch and then commit appropriate personnel and funds. TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT AND THE ARMY'S REQUIREMENTS PROCESS Late in August 1990, a special panel composed of members from the larger STAR panel met to consider the Army's requirements process as it applies to advanced technology utilization and force modernization. Despite the diversity of the participants' experience, they were able to achieve considerable consensus. The STAR Committee has adopted portions of the panel's analysis and conclusions and presents them in abbreviated form in the first four subsections below. The last subsection ties this assessment of the requirements process to the technology management strategies presented earlier in this chapter. Implications of the New Environment for the Requirements Process As the Army progresses into the last years of the twentieth century, it finds itself subject to external circumstances that inevitably will strongly influence its force structure and the equipment it pro-

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century cures. This portion of the STAR main report examines whether the current Army requirements process can deal efficiently with these new external environments. The current requirements process has evolved over several decades to set priorities for the Army's response to a scenario of Soviet confrontation that changed only slowly. Also, this requirements process evolved while resource levels were reasonably stable and while the Army expected to support combat operations primarily from its own resources. As the current system evolved within this reasonably stable fiscal and threat environment, efficiency was achieved by parceling out the work of developing detailed requirements to the individual combat arms centers. The detailed knowledge and enthusiasm of the individuals at these centers was thereby fully utilized. The participants shared a fairly clearly understood, overall concept of operations, and this concept changed infrequently. Because the top-down policy constraints remained so stable, the Army Concept-Based Requirements System (CBRS) became, in appearance and substance, a bottom-up requirements system. However, the external environments that now weigh heavily on future Army acquisition decisions are far less stable than previously. The STAR Committee finds the principal destabilizing factors to include the following: severe overall DOD budgetary limitations, leading to severe force structure reductions within the Army (shared also by its sister services) and significantly reduced Army acquisition budgets; a rapidly evolving and highly uncertain set of future threat scenarios, particularly when compared with the scenario of mid-European Soviet confrontation from prior decades; and the likelihood of far more intense, joint (multiservice) contingency operations than were previously required by mid-European scenarios. The STAR Committee concludes that these new circumstances would probably stress the present Army requirements process in three ways discussed below. For some considerable time into the future, a more top-down requirements process will be needed. In the severely limited fiscal environment postulated for the next decades, a higher degree of selectivity in approaches to be implemented will be required than before. The design of any one combat system will be more dependent than formerly on the characteristics of other systems with which it interacts. This ap-

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century plies not just to intersystem relations within the Army's domain but also to the fit of Army systems with those of other services and with the overall OSD architecture. Definition of elements of the future U.S. military force structure will require more active and continuing top-down guidance than has been the case. From the Army's standpoint, this factor is compounded by the clear implication of substantially greater joint service interactions and interdependence. As future scenarios unfold, greater land-sea-air interfaces can be expected because of contingency geography, extended battle ranges of both our own and our adversaries' weapons, and the concentrated nature of our expected lodgements. As the three services become a more integrated set of combat forces, the weapon systems that each service projects for the future must become part of a common combat system architecture. The analyses to support new directions in technology or systems must show how those changes fit with the overall architecture of OSD priorities. Otherwise the Army will continue to lose out in the allocation of resources. A greater requirements emphasis on cost/performance balance will be needed, both at the beginning of a program and through its lifetime. In an environment of limited procurement, it becomes crucial to strike a balance between the capability required and the cost of that capability. During the last few years, all the services have been encouraged to seek optimum performance, knowing that inventories would eventually be built out to sufficient size. That assurance of eventual inventory build-out can no longer be taken for granted. Further, even if inventories can eventually be filled, the time frame of build-out may well be so extended that the service cannot wait for the capability. The STAR Committee perceives a need for a requirements process with substantially more iterations than at present for balancing the military's needs against the cost of meeting them. The balance will need to be reconsidered both at the onset of each program and at intervals throughout the development phase of the program, while the state of the technology is still not demonstrated. More exploration of feasible alternatives should be done before a requirement us specified. As budget pressures extend the time between fielding of model changes, more frequent opportunities will arise to explore by experimental, prototype demonstrations the real operational advantages of capabilities that previously were only imputed by simulation or computation. The STAR Committee foresees a greater opportunity in the future requirements process for feasibility demonstrations oriented toward

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century a generally acknowledged need, before convergence upon a formal requirement. The ATTD program (discussed above under Rapid Austere Prototyping) is an excellent start in this direction. The requirements process should expand on this start by using prototype testing to better evaluate what is needed and to take advantage of the extended time necessitated by longer design lifetimes. For this more iterated technology / capability process, the STAR Committee envisions a far tighter cooperation between the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), representing the users, and the development community. Changing the Requirements Process The STAR Committee recommends six changes to the process by which requirements are generated and incorporated into the Army's program. Keep the CBRS; alter the process. The essential intent of the CBRS should be retained; the implementation must be radically altered. The next five recommendations pertain to specific alterations. The Army may already be initiating some of these changes. In December 1990 TRADOC and the Army staff began a reassessment of the CBRS to make it more relevant in generating future Army requirements. As the STAR study was drawing to a close, this internal reassessment was just beginning; it was too early for the STAR Committee to determine how this initiative would affect the technology management problems described above. Open up the front end. The ''concept" input to the requirements process should be opened up to technology exploration and to concepts built on advanced systems concepts and likely threat scenarios. The input to the process should also allow for broadly defined capability issues, such as force projection, force employment, and sustaining deployed force. Advanced systems concepts could aid in capturing these broad issues for consideration. Ease up on Phase 1 specificity. The current approach to delineating qualitative requirements, Required Operational Capability, presumes too much specificity too early. It should be replaced with something closer to the "materiel need" approach used in the early 1970s. The latter identified "must haves" and "wants'' early in the requirements process, but it deferred final selection until data gathered during development could be factored into the decision process. Winnow as you go. The present understanding of accepting a concept-based requirement into the program is that anything put into

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century Phase 1 research is destined for eventual Phase 4 development. To encourage innovation, it is better to let Phase 1 be accessible to more players. Instead, increasingly stringent winnowing decisions should occur as part of the move to each subsequent phase. Thus, many Phase 1 research concepts will never move forward. Some Phase 2, and even Phase 3, systems will suffer similar fates. Test, evaluate, and redesign. Testing and evaluation are now often used to justify a program's legitimacy to the Army or Congress. They also become captive to the need to check compliance with contract specifications. The roles of test and evaluation need to be rethought in terms of subjecting systems to field conditions, learning from both the successes and failures during testing, and applying test results that capture design flaws in need of redesign. As just one example, the methodology called rapid prototyping, which was discussed earlier in this chapter, is one approach to pulling aspects of test and evaluation forward into the design process itself. Provide a vision from the top. If the concepts going into the CBRS are opened up to technology exploration and the standard of specific Required Operational Capability is relaxed, then control over program building must be exerted from another quarter, preferably from the top down. But heavy-handed management from the top (micro-management) can be as disastrous for innovative technology as narrowly conceived requirements definition from the bottom. By communicating a strategic vision from the top down, technology managers can guide the CBRS process while leaving individual "concept" origination open to an array of participants. In addition, the top of the organization must ensure that the rationale for each part of the program has been clearly linked to the defense policy architecture and priorities of OSD. Organizational Realignments The STAR Committee suggests three areas in which the Army organization will need realignments, if the process changes recommended above are to revitalize the CBRS. Reassign control over requirements. The combat arms centers should no longer drive the process by controlling the definition of requirements. Neither should they be excluded from the process. Instead, they should be active participants whose input includes their views on mission and system requirements. But the process must be controlled from the top and must be open to other contributions as well.

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century Broaden the contributor base. Opening up the front end of the CBRS to more contributors must be accompanied by "invitations to participate." It will be necessary to cultivate organizations inside and outside the Army that can provide the kinds of concept inputs the combat arms centers cannot. The invitation should not be totally unconstrained. The technology assessments, threat analyses, systems concepts, etc., that are contributed to the CBRS must have clear links to the strategic vision. The presence of such a link would not guarantee adoption into the program or eventual advance beyond Phase 1; it does set a minimum requirement for legitimacy. Reconsideration of the linkage, in light of research results and changes in external factors, should be an integral part of the decision whether to promote a concept or system beyond Phase 1 and at each further step along the way to final fielding. Assign a process manager. The first organizational recommendation above leads immediately to the question of who, or what organization, should manage the Army's requirements process and program building. Another way to ask this question is: Who should be the keeper of the vision? An Army Management Review that was issued in October 1989 and instituted during the subsequent year has resulted in a three-tier organization headed by the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE). The AAE is to be the integrator of all acquisition action. The organizations reporting to the AAE are intended to support not only systems acquisition but also technology assessment and development. This recent realignment may well decide who manages the process. The STAR Committee could not, however, assess the effects of the new organizational structure on technology development. The Requirements Process and Technology Management Strategies To conclude its assessment of the requirements process, the STAR Committee offers a few final reflections on the relation it sees between strategic thinking about technology management and the preceding recommendations for the requirements process. The strategic focus presented at the beginning of this chapter, fleshed out with its focal values and function-specific focal interests, exemplifies the kind of strategic vision that could guide the CBRS when it has been opened to innovative technology concepts at its front end. The primary concern is that this strategic vision must in-

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STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century clude technological judgment; it must express what can be accomplished if the available technical knowledge is applied. The STAR Committee has suggested that the process of building a program out of the inputs to the CBRS should be more than requirements-driven, more than a distribution of the resource pie among competing internal interests. The practical content of this "more than" is an implementation strategy. A focused strategy can provide implementation guidelines for whatever organization is assigned the task of building the program. The particular focal interests or implementation elements suggested by the STAR Committee are certainly not the only plausible content for a strategic vision and an implementation strategy. Some may prove worthy of adoption by the Army; others may not. Still, the Army needs a vision to guide a revitalized CBRS from the top. And it needs a concrete implementation strategy to counteract implementation by consensus.