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OCR for page 102
5. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF COCOM CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
In order to understand the implications of the revolutionary
events during the Fall of 1989 and 1990 for the future of CoCom
is necessary to go back to its original ob jective . Accordingly
"the purpose of the embargo is to restrict the export of only
those goods and technologies conf arming with three strategic
criteria" that were designed to ensure that exports to the
Eastern bloc would not have "an adverse effect on the security of
the [CoCom] member states" . The discussion of the West German
and European perspectives on CoCom lead to the conclusion that
the very notion of strategic as defined in CoCom must be
reconsidered. The F.R.G., other European nations and the
European Community leave no doubt that given the radically
transformed political and military situation in Europe it is in
their security interest not to continue to restrict the flow of
high technology in the dual use area to Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, but to promote and to enhance it. In other words,
the strategic criteria that outline the aspects of Western
security must be geared not only towards the military aspects of
national security but must encompass a broader definition of
security that includes among other things
a) the stabilization of the economic and political reform
efforts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; and
by the avoidance of a nuclear disaster caused by inadequate
safety standards in nuclear reactors and the drastic reduction of
pollution in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
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OCR for page 103
Given the improved relations between East and West, such
variations in national interests among the allies that were long
suppressed because of the military threat from the East are now
coming to the fore. While difficult, this plurality has to be
taken into account when devising a scheme for the future of
export controls. As one respondent stated, "the perception of
common interests in the Alliance is not automatic, it requires
constant redefinltion.''236 Thus, any attempt at reform of the
export control system must reflect these concerns by the
Europeans. If they are not taken into account there is a real
danger that continued multilateral efforts to control those
exports that do remain vital to Western security will fail.
Unilateral control mechanisms would undermine these security
interests. In an integrated and highly competitive global
market, national export controls that differ across countries
amount to competitive asymmetries. As the experience in other
areas of the global economy has shown, such asymmetries are
likely to lead a process of competitive deregulation that would
undermine the real purpose of export controls.
However, the redef Ignition of Western strategic criteria and
the subsequent streaml ining of the CoCom ~ ist, is only a
necessary condition for successful reform, but not a suf f icient
one. Two additional considerations must inform the reform
process . First, the urgent need to reconsider the West' s
traditional concept of export controls comes as an immediate
236 Interview.
103
OCR for page 104
result of the revolutionary changes currently under way in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Thus any new control scheme
must be embedded in and be a part of the new security structure
that is currently emerging in Europe.
The CSCE process, whose objective is the establishment of a
system of cooperative security, is likely to provide the basis of
such a new European security structure as it embodies the mutual
interests of both East and West.237 However, to be fully
operational and to become the basis for an effective partnership
between East and West, the CSCE must be strengthened and
institutionalized. In this context a center for the settlement
of regional conflicts in Europe has recently been proposed.
Another component of this newly institutionalized collective
security structure would be the creation of a technology transfer
agency. This agency which controls the exports of goods and
technologies that affect the security interests of all CSCE
members and verifies their end use would both reflect the new
realities of East-West relations and at the same time avoid some
of the flaws characteristic of CoCom. With respect to the
latter, CoCom has long been criticized as a secret club in which
individual countries wield disproportionate power. A
237 This is also supported by the EC; "the Helsinki process
is expected to assist in overcoming the divisions in Europe which
prevented the development of normal pol itical and economic ~ inks
with the Community, its member States and other Western
countries, " Commission of the European Communities, Communication
from the Commission to the Council: implications c: f the recent
changes in central and eastern Europe for the Commuity' s
relations with the countries concerned, op . cit .
104
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multilateral export regime that embodies mutuaiTy binding rules,
which are transparent and openly accessible to the private sector
could avoid such criticisms. With respect to the new
relationship between East and West, an export verification agency
in the CSCE framework can provide substance to the calls of
policy makers to develop new political tasks for the
disintegrating military al fiances in both East and West. If
created under the COCK umbrel la this agency would include the
countries from Eastern Europe as well as the Soviet Union. Such
an interlocking institution which is structured around openness,
transparency, and the capacity to judge each other creates mutual
trust and thus becomes is an important part of the new European
security partnership.238
The joint membership of East and West in a control and
verification agency also addresses the second element that must
be part of a reform effort. CoCom has failed to respond to the
new security threats both from potential military powers
elsewhere in the world as well as new technologies and weapons
that have surfaced during the last decade. 80th East and West
have a common interest to halt the proliferation of these
technologies that for the most part are geared towards the
production of A, B. and C weapons which are exported to areas of
regional conflict or other countries. Since unilateral controls
have been proven ineffective time and again only a global
238 Several European countries have been approached by the
Soviets to establish such a regime.
105
OCR for page 106
solution will be able to control and monitor the proliferation of
sensitive technology.
The need for a new multilateral overarching export control
agency raises serious doubts about the future of CoCom. CoCom
neither-has the capability to cope with the challenges from new
technologies and third countries nor can it take advantage of the
new opportunities that have emerged from the changing East-West
relationship. This should not cause any fear. To the contrary,
CoCom is both the product and the reflection of the Cold War and
the uniquely dominant role of the United States in the Western
Alliance. Both these characteristics of the international system
have come to an end which will improve the overall relationships
among nations states. First, with respect to the Western
Alliance a more balanced distribution of power will cause less
strain among the allies and opens the opportunity for a new phase
in the transatlantic partnership. Second, as to the new era in
East-West relations, the dramatically reduced military tension
will allow the two superpowers to free resources in order to
address the problems that each faces in their own country and
both confront in the global political economy.
106
Representative terms from entire chapter:
export controls
