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OCR for page 207
A:~1?=NDI X ~
OCR for page 208
Japanese officials are quick to point out that while political
events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have greatly altered
the strategic scene in Europe, the picture in the Eastern parts of
the Soviet Union and the Pacific have not been changed
significantly.
In the strategic context, Japanese officials continue to view
the Soviet Union as a potent military threat in the Pacific. There
have been no reductions on Soviet naval forces nor have there been
any indications of troop withdrawals from Soviet bases.
From the political perspective, there remain major outstanding
questions of Japan's relations with the USSR. First and foremost
is the continuing question of Japan's Northern Territories which
the Soviets have thus far refused to discuss with Tokyo.
Continuing Soviet intransigence on this issue is a convincing
signal to most Japanese political and business leaders that Soviet
strategic objectives in the Pacific remain unchanged. Furthermore,
a Soviet crackdown by force of arms in the Baltic or other
dissident states would only reassure outside observers that the
Soviet military is alive and capable of defending and perpetuating
Soviet territorial claims. Nonetheless, a breakthrough on the
Northern Territories issue is also possible, especially given
Gorbachev's flair for the dramatic. We doubt, however, whether
Gorbachev is prepared to meet Japanese expectations completely with
an unconditional return of the islands. Instead, any moves by
28
OCR for page 209
APPENDIX A
Principal Laws and Implementing Ordinances Governing
Export Control in Japan
A Law ~ * ~ is passed by the full Diet ~ Japan ' s Parliament) and
cannot be overruled by an administrative or ministerial ordinance e
Laws usually provide authority tc, the Cabinet to make necessary
decisions regarding interpretations of the law.
An Administrative ordinance ~ ** ~ is an executive order. It: is
issued by the Cabinet under the Prime Minister's direction. It
usually provides authority to the various ministries to issue
supporting legislation to enact laws.
A Ministerial Ordinance ~ *** ~ is a directive ordered by specific
cabinet ministers. It may not overrule an Administrative
Ordinance. Ministerial Ordinances often describe the specif ic
regulations governing procedures set forth in Administrative
Ordinances and Laws.
O Foreign Exchange & Foreign Trade Control Law ~ Control
Law ~ ~ Law No . 2 2 8, December ~ , ~ 9 4 9 ~ *
( Gaikoku Kawase Futatabi Gaikoku Boeki Kanri Ho
This is the principal law governing export controls. It
is the basic law on security trade control, and covers
all facets of export control.
O Export Trade Control Order (Export Order) (Cabinet Order
No. 37S, December I, 1949 ~ **
~ hut-
This Order contains the Japanese control list, called
Appendix ~ by the law.
a
Export Trade Control Regulation ( Export Rule ) (MITI
Ministerial Ordinance No. 64, December I, 1949 ~ ***
Yushutsu Boeki Kanri Kisoku
This Rule contains provisions to enact the Control Law
and other export control legislation.
O Foreign Exchange Control Order (Exchange Order) (Cabinet
Order No. 260, October Il. 1980 ~ **
Gaikoku Kawase Kanri Eli
This Order enacts the Control Law and specif finally
governs matters necessary for implementing control or
ad justment of foreign exchange. Article ~ ~ of this Order
governs service transactions and technology transfer that
are deemed as hindering maintenance of international
peace and security.
OCR for page 210
Outlook
In the wake of the Toshiba Machine episode, Japan's moves to
improve its system of strategic trade controls have had far-
reaching implications for future Japanese positions in both the
domestic and international arenas.
First' and most obvious, is Japan's emergence as a more
prominent player in multilateral policy issues. Through the almost
complete renovation of its export control and export licensing
system, Japan has taken a major step in demonstrating its
willingness to accept both the responsibility for safeguarding
Western strategic interests along with the economic benefits of
its technological and industrial development. Japan can now boast
of a system of strategic trade controls in which greater
accountability and more extensive and thorough administration place
it on a par with export control regimes in any COCOM-member
country. Through the improvements in licensing and enforcement and
its commitment to a more active role in COCOM, Japan has
demonstrated that it can and will be an active, responsible and
responsive member of the Western industrial alliance.
Secondl y , Japan has established a strong foundation on which
to build independent positions on strategic trade control issues.
Formation of industry groups such as CIS.TEC, and the increased
30
OCR for page 211
o
Ministerial Ordinance Concerning Control of Invisible
Trade Transactions Relating to Foreign Trade (MITI
Ministerial Ordinance No. 64, November 27, 1980 ~ ***
Boeki gan`kei Boeki Gal Torihiki TO no Kanri Hi Fansuru
Sho Rei
This Order also contains provisions to enact the Control
Law, and regulates trade in services.
OCR for page 212
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OCR for page 214
Representative terms from entire chapter:
trade control