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OCR for page 235
TlIE STATE OF PERESTROIKA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO WESTERN TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROLS:
A S1JR VET OF SPECIALISTS OR I~ SOYS UNION
A Wc~r~c~ng Paper Prepared for
The Panet on the Future Design and
Implementation of U.S. National
Security Export Controls,
National Academy of Sciences
by
Joel S. Bellman
Harriman Institute for the
Advanced Study of the Soviet Union
Columbia University
April 15. 1990
OCR for page 236
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This paper is based on interviews and/or written correspondence with the
following specialists on the Soviet Union:
Severyn Beater, Columbia University
3utian Cooper, University of Birmingham
Richard Ericson, Columbia University
Seymour Goodman' University of Arizona
Thane (;ustafson, Georgetown University
Philip Hanson, University of Birmingham
John BardI. impressional Research Service
Ed Hewett. The Brook~ngs Institution
Robert Legvold, Columbia University
Stephen Meyer. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
]aclc Snyder, Plumbs University
Edward Warner, The RAND Corporation
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OCR for page 239
The creation of COCOM and the post-war Western export control regime
was based on a clear policy rationale: Soviet military strength should not
benefit from the commercial transfer of Western technology. This rationale
was itself based on empirical evidence and certain widely held assumptions
about the nature of the Soviet military threats We structure and goals of its
political system, and the organization of and links between its civilian and
military-industrial economies. The current wave of reforms in the Soviet
Union, embodied In the broad policies of perestroika and glasnost, has
introduced a range of conceptual innovations and structural changes that has
begun to affect an these areas. Though the direction and permanence of the
course of change is still a matter for debate among specialists on the Soviet
Union, an agree that the fundamental assumptions about the Soviet system
upon which Western post-war policy has been bunt warrant a
comprehensive reezammation.
This working paper win present the results of an interview survey of 1 2
leading specialists on the Soviet system conducted ~ M=ch 1990. The
specialists were asked to provide general assessments of the course of
perestrai[a In their areas of expertise as well as a more specific analysis of
the effects of reform on the Soviet demand for high technology and on the
mechanisms of acquisition and assimilation of Western technology transfers.
In addition, they were asked to speculate about the influence that
alternative Western export control policies might have on the course of
reform. This paper will summarize the points of agreement among the
specialists while focusing more closely on the key debates among them
through the presentation of individual views.
OFFER VIE'
1
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-
:
Before analyzing specific questions ancl viewpom~s, it might be useful to
list a set of recurrent themes and observations that were pro mment
throughout ~ the interviews:
-The reforms ~ every sector of the Soviet system have
undermined standard operating patterns without adequately
replacing them with new mechanisms and procedures resuming In
extreme instability and Elusion ~ almost every area.
-The Soviet economy is on the brink of collapse with no hope of
improvement In the near term, even if a comprehensive market-
type reform is effectively implemented
-There is an Increasing radicalization of positions within the Swiet
political system with deterioration of support for the centrist view
-The Soviet military and defense-~ndustrial sector are "under
siege" from a combination of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, a
series of bold strategic and Format Dives from the top
political leadership, the nationalities crisis within Soviet borders, a
rapid growth of domestic anti-militarism, budget reductions, and
pressures to merease the proportion of civilian consumer and
producer goods manufactured by defense plants.
-The Soviet economy has not yet reached the stage of
development ~ which it could s~g~ficantly Agree and benefit
from the most advanced high technologies. Rather, it requires a
large dose of 1960s-1970s lease] technology.
-There has been ~ huge epsilon of the technology franker
interface between the Soviet Umon and the West as new,
institutions, rules, and economic incentives here widened the
mechanisms of technology transfer, but the initial results ~ terms
of economic development have been marginal.
-Technology transfer, while a key element of the original reform
program, has [aced to an issue of seconciary importance as the
leadership's focus has shifted to the provision of basic consumer
durables in an effort to assuage growing popular ~discontent.
2
OCR for page 241
Within these parameters of agreement, debates among the specialists
developed around a series of specific issues, mclud~ng:
-the potential for success of economic reform ~ the medium term
and a set of criteria with which to analyze the progress of reform;
-the potential for a return to the stylus quo ante, eepeciaBy a
recentralization of economic authority;
-the effects of refoŁ m -an the coherence and performance of the
military-industrial sector and its priority status ~ relation to the
civilian economy;
-the effects of reform on the acquisition and assimilation
capabilities of different sectors of the Soviet economy, melud~g
the new cooperatives and joint ventures;
-the potential beneficiaries, both ~ the Soviet Umon arid in the
West of active engagement In technology transfer In the near
term;
-the role that technology transfer and COCOM restrictions have
played and might play ~ Soviet technological development, and;
-the extent to which policy action in the West oouicl affect the
course of reform ~ the Soviet Union.
The positions that different specialists took within these debates became
the basis [or their competing policy recommendations on the issue of aller~g
Western export controls. As a result, this paper is organized thematically
around the debates. exploring the different viewers that emerged on each
question and linking them In a broader chain of argument about how the
demand side of technology transfer between the Soviet Union and West has
changed or might change in the course of economic, political, and social
reform.
3
OCR for page 242
Economic ~~u
There is a high degree of uncertainty In the analysis of the course of
economic reform ~ the Soviet Umoo, not only because of the conflicting
signals provided by the reformers themselves, but also because the path of
transition from a cer~traDy planned to a market-type economy (in its many
different forms) is a radically new phenomenon that has not been Worked
out theoretically in the East or the West. How one evaluates the progress of
economic reform depends upon one's projection of the endpoint of reform,
which is still a matter of controversy among Western specialists. AD the
specialists interviewed agreed that a reformed Soviet economy should
include a considerable decentralization of decision-making power to actors
who have sufficient information to make rational economic choices, a
radically reformed price-setting mechanism to link prices to the forces of
supply and demand, a well-defined set of property rights that transfers
ownership to independent groups or individuals, a monetary reform that can
restore value to the ruble, and measures to foster both entry into and exit
from the market in order to expand competition. But how such a reformed
economy might be structured is still an open question.
Do one point there was unanimity among the specialists: the Soviet
economy is currently in crisis. The root of the problem is that the economy
has been built on a highly irrational economic structure held together
his toricaDy by discipline and command. As the reform process begins to
disrupt the traditional patterns of command, economic activity has begun to
collapse. Though the economy has not yet reached a state of chaos, the
economists have observed some dangerous trends. According to Ed Hewett
of The Brook~gs Institution, ~ndustriat output has been declining steadily
4
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since mid-~89. Soviet statistics have reported a one percent dec ine ~
industrial output for each of the first two months of this year, which Hewett
believes is probably higher given the level of inflation. Hewett indicated
that the Soviet Union is "flirting with a decompression in industry similar to
the situation In Poland ~ the winter of ~ 980-S I." Richard Ericson of
Columbia University has observed a growth of autarky at the city level aIld
within economic branches as supply networks have broken down. He also
claimed that the ruble has lost much of its [unction as a store of value.
Seweryn Dialer, also of Columbia University, provided a stark picture of the
current economic situation:
The economy is totally destabilized and resistant to traditional
guidance. The supply system has collapsed. The market
imbalance has reached staggering proportions.... The wage and
medic discipline has been broken. The enormous resources frozen
~ unfinished ~nvesiments ooze growing at a more rapid pace
than the value of goods from finished investments.
Unpredictabilities and shortages have become a way of life for the
consumer to the extent that he yearns for the predicable
shortages and minimal certainties of the past.
If no decisive action is taken to address these problems, Bialer =d
Ericson both mentioned the possibility of "economic collapse" in the near
term. Such a scenario might include a plunge ~ industrial output by up to
30 percent in a span of 12-l 8 months, widespread closings of factories due
to lack of supplies, reductions ~ basic services such as heating and
electricity, regional autarky, soaring black market prices with few available
goods in state stores, and the collapse of the ruble. Hewett was not quite as
pessimistic, but agreed that 1 990 will be a "terrible year, no matter what
they do."
5
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The economists agreed that the economic effects of a truly radical,
market-type reform would make the current economic situation far worse In
the short term. A reform program that cut off ad state subsidies, freed the
price system from central control, anct established a system of market
competition ~ which inefficient firms went bankrupt would lead to soaring
prices especially for essential items, a freeze ~ wage growth, sharp declines
~ industrial output, and widespread, sustained unemployment. Thus, the
potential for extreme mstabiDly ~ the Sorrier economy, whether the political
leaders pursue truly radii reform or simply continue to implement half-
measures, seems rather high.
The basic problem, according to Ericson, is that an overwhelming portion
of the Soviet capital stock is "simply useless," having been built up over the
course of 70 years "with no economic rhyme or reason." He pointed to the
steel works In the city of Magm~agorsk as a prime example of a massive
complex that wastes resources and pollutes the environment in the process
of producing low quality goods that are unmarketable in the conditions of
oversupply ~ international steel maricets. 'You would do better to shut
down 30x of Soviet industry and save the wasted resources, but you can't,"
he argued. In the case of Magm~agorsk, entire cities have been built around
and depend upon the steel works. As Ericson asked, '~hat do you do if this
is over half your economy?"
Hewett was sightly more optimistic. Though he recognized the
nevitabdity of economic instability, he argued that 1990 is a critical year to
see if the Soviets wid take the measures necessary to turn the economy
around in ~ g9 ~ . "We must distinguish," he said, "between ins tab city that
comes from an inability to do anything (as in the current sieuseion) and
instability from measures that actuary do something (as ~ Poland)." He
6
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claimed that there might be the beg Or log of a turnaround in the economy
by the fourth quarter of this year, but that will very much depend on the
character of the presidential decrees on the economy.1 He pointed to some
encouraging signs in the Polish case that the original burst of inflation that
accompamed radical market reform is now berg to stabilize.
The criteria for evaluating Soviet economic reforms ~ this condition of
instability can be misleading. Hewett claimed that the most difficult task is
identifying those half-measures that seem to push the reform process
forward, while having built into them a logic that win lead ~ the reverse
direction. One example would be the introduction of flexible price formation
without accompanying reforms ~ the financial structure and ~ the
opportunities for market entry that would foster competition. This would
lead to disastrous inflation ~ a monopoly-dominated economy without
creating the competition that would stabilize prices and bring more goods on
the market. Ericson warned about potential illusory effects of a stabilization
program. By cutting down state expenditures, reducing money creation,
towering wages and controlling consumer goods, the situation could appear
to improve by putting more goods on consumer markets, but at the cost of
undercutting the thrust of the market reform and, as he said, "putting them
back at square one." A list of benchmarks that would indicate progress In
the course of reform includes the fodow~ measures:
-the abolition of industrial ministries;
~ Included In the recently established post of president Is the right to issue decrees,
similar ~ executive Avers. Reportedly, Gorbachev has been working on a set of radical
economic decrees Cat win oudine major transformations in the financial system. the
price-setting mechanism. the planning administrative structure, and the introduction
of market mechanisms. The decrees should be presenWd by Sepelmber 199O.
7
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-
would this affect Soviet economic development? The contending answers to
these questions were based on different understandings of the potential for
successful economic reform, the relationship between the mi itary and
civilian sectors, and the continued relevance of pre-reform economic and
administrative structures.
Ericson advanced an argument that framed the specialists' debate on
these questions. "The first order impact of abolishing technology controls,"
he e~plamed, ''would be a tremendous boon to the Soviet military and a
dramatic reduction ~ the costs for the military. One must remember that
the entire hierarchical structure is designed for bringing ~ technology and
making `t usable for the military sector. The technology will then be
available to the civilian economy' but the reform will have to go much
further before it arid be properly used ~ this sphere." Ericson based his
argument on three fundamental premises. First, since economic reform has
not yet reached the practical or conceptual stage at which the civilian
economy could effectively begin to acquire and assimilate a new range of
Western technology, he argued that civilian economic actors would probably
not benefit from the increased technology supply. Second, sunce the reform
has not abolished the old centralized administrative mechanisms, which
continue to coexist with and dominate the new mst~tutions, he claimed that
an opening in the flows of technology to the Soviet Union would continue to
be cha~elled through the VPE-VIM! network to privileged military end-
users. Third, since the military has maintained its comparative advantages,
he maintained it would be the only sector capable of assimilating the new
range of technologies, especially as the civi fan sector moves toward
economic instability. In Ericson's view, a lib eratization of Western export
controls could only benefit the Soviet economy as a whole if "the Soviets
40
OCR for page 279
ntrc,duce sufficient changes to be able to use that technology from the
perspective of generating economic development rather than military
development.' Yet as we have seen in other sections of this paper, Ericson s
basic premises were not shared by an the specialists. who cosequently
offered different scenarios of the beneficiaries of a more open technology
transfer.
Goodman claimed that there are isolated "islands" within the military R&D
sector that have the abitilv to assimilate advance c! Western technology and,
consequently, might be the immediate beneficiaries of decontroRed trade,
though this would not occur across the board. He felt that there is still a high
degree of uncertamtv about the probable results of a liberalized trade
regime: "We just don't know where these decontrolled technologies win go
and how they're going to come out." The military Will certainly be able to
take advantage of more open technology transfer, if they get first priority on
foreign currency reserves. Yet at the same time, Goodman said, the military
is finding it mcreas~ngly hard to preempt technology from others. In
addition, the joint ventures and cooperatives have the ability for the first
time to work out deals which might get some of the new technologoies into
their part of the economy. In the end, Goodman argued that the
beneficiaries of a more liberal trade regime would depend more precisely on
what types of technologies are decontroDecI.
Hewett dissented from the basic premise that the civilian and defense
economies could be distinguished as different targets of ~ more open Bade
regime. 'You can't trade exclusively with the civilian economy," he said.
"We must recognize that for any dual use technology, the potential is there
for dual use." As defense plants continue to become more integrated mto
civilian production and tate the lead ~ the formation of cooperatives and
41
OCR for page 280
this question. It has generally been regarded in the West that the process of
covert, passive technology transfer and the distribution of such technology
withm the Soviet Umon has been centrally coordinated by the Mititary-
Industrial Commission (VPE) under the USSR CouncH of Misters and the
All-Union Institute of InterBranch Information (VIMI). This administrative
hierarchy exists, according to Ericson, to acquire Western technology and
channel it towards military uses. Hewett and Meyer claimed that its role In
high technology transfer has generally been overstated by Western
analysts.7 Regardless of their understanding of the role of the YPK-VIM1
structure, none of the specialists could offer concrete evidence that it has
been substantially altered in the course of reform. Several pointed to a set
of [GB documents obtained ~ France (known as the "Farewell" papers)
which provided information on Soviet technology acquisition efforts from
1979-1981. Thane Gustafson of Georgetown Um~ersity analyzed the
documents and came to the conclusion that "it's business as usual" for the
VPL-VIMI network. Yet Hewett argued that the documents read "like a
classic bureaucracy-generated report, overstating achievements and hiding
weaknesses" and therefore gives an exaggerated picture of the network's
activity. While he admitted that the YPL-VIM! system is probably slid In
use, he claimed that it might be transformed Into a simple Industrial
espionage network.
The most significant Institutional change ~ technology transfer under
perestroi`a has been the vast expansion of overt, active technological
relationships between new Soviet actors and the West. As Seymour
7 It was the lIP[-YIM! network tom became the focus of increasing concern in the
early years of Me Reagan adminis~ion primarily for its covers acquisition efforts
34
OCR for page 281
happening. It would represent ~ / ~ 00 of ~ X of the variance of what is going
on right now.''l2 He found it difficult to imagine that any decontrolled duaI-
use technology, other than at the very highest end of the spectrum
(supercomputers, certain semi-conductors, etc.), could make a substantial
difference ~ the level of performance or innovation of the Soviet defense
sector. In fact, he argued that the opening of the Western export control
regime would have little effect on any of the significant economic actors
the Soviet Union until the larger internal problems of the economy are
adequately addressed.
CAN WESTERN POLICY AFFECT THE REFORM PROCESS ?
Regardless of they views on which groups ~ the Soviet Union would
benefit from a more open trade regime, many of the specialists agreed that
Western export Control poppy would have Httle or no effect on the
stabilization of the economy or on the general course of reform. Some
specialists focused on the ~nsig~ficance of the issue of export controls itself
in comparison with the enormous domestic problems within the Soviet Union
and the fundamental transformations ~ the international landscape. Meyer
illustrated this pout with an analogy:
Imagine that the United States had just puDed out of the Vietnam
War. Imagine that all the domestic and social turmoil Connected
with that was just reaching a peak. The people are angry, the
economy is a mess, and inflation is rampant. Then imagine that
Georgia, Alabama, and Florida decide to secede from the union and
~ ~ Though Legend and Barker did net fully support Meyer's line of argument' they did
agree that Ericson's position overstates the capacity of the defense sector ~ me
gremr advantage of expanded technology transfer opportunities than the civilian
economy.
43
OCR for page 282
go to war with each other at the same time. Then imagine that an
of Europe pulls out of NATO and joins the Warsaw Pact. And on
top of that, you decide to throw out the constitution and start ad
over again from scratch. In this situation, how significant could
the effects of opening high technology transfer possibly be? It s
just not that important.
Leg~old concurred, arguing that most of the technologies that are crucial
change in the Soviet Union are already available (with the exception of
certain computers). "High technology is lust not at the heart of the problems
they face," he said. Yet he did suggest that removing the technology barriers
might do some good in promoting economic development in certain areas.
Those who did assert that Western export control policy could have an
impact on Soviet development and reform admitted that this would occur
only at the margins. Julian Cooper claimed that ~ liberalization might
facilitate economic and social modernization in the Soviet Llmon by
contributing to the development of modern systems of commurucations,
computerization, and more efficient manufacturing technologies Hewett
suggested that increased technology transfer might draw the best Soviet
firms and cooperatives inn the World economy and, consequently, stengthen
their po~it~nn ~ the domestic Mono my. Yet these assessments were an laced
with cautious warn ngs against the tendency to overstate the potential of
Western policy on Soviet domestic developments.
Jack Snyder referred to other historical cases to make the strongest case
for the influence of Western economic actions on the reform process. "If you
took back historically at tentatively fibers ng states, he eta ned,
incipient liberal reforms ~ various countries have often depended to a
significant degree on the kind of international environment In which they
take place. An international economic situation ~ which social groups that
44
OCR for page 283
benefit from economic integration with democratic countries are supported
and encouraged to flourish and even to dominate domestic politics has been
an important factor in the success of liberal and democratizing forces in
other countries. To the extent that removing barriers on technology transfer
would be favorable to economic integration arid to the creation of such a
conducive international environment, Western economic control policy can
mate a difference In the course of liberalization. Snyder's argument was
based on an assumption that liberal forces would necessarily gain from an
opening of export controls, which, as we have seen, other specialists took
issue with.
Surprisingly, the different assessments of the role of export control policy
on Soviet domestic processes did not lead the specialists to offer competing
policy prescriptions. With one exception, all the analysts interviewed caned
for a comprehensive reform of COCOM guidelines that would reduce export
controls to a "reasonable, plausible minimum." In their common view, this
minimal test of controlled exports should include those items that are
exclusively for military-strategic use, as weD as the most advanced dual-use
technologies. 1 3 They overwhelmingly agreed that this list should not
include those items that could help the Soviet {Anton improve its basic
economic infrastructure and~ra~se the quality and quantity of its consumer
goods production. In justifying this position, many of the specialists looked
beyond the changes within the Soviet Union to the larger transformations in
the mternationa1 arena and ~ the nature of the technologies themselves.
One recurring line of argument throughout the interviews was summed
up by Ed Hewett: "The origins of COCOM are the origins of the cold war; it
Supereemputers were the most frequently mentioned simpler
~5
OCR for page 284
Hanson argued lbal it is also pIzus~le lbal we might see an immedlae
scat din ~ Spiel Jerseys lechnol~y acquisition efforts reflected the
degrade ~ both ~eslment and defense pros. He lbougb1 1bat
there would be a Dew empbash on the acqulshion ~ rectory for the
consumer sector and lo some extent on 1be acqul~tion ~ k~-b~ relaunch
1be =-erslon ~ military production f=~11es to Cowan outpuL
In addition to 1~ chimes OD 1~ "demand side" ~ levy transfer
{l.e, S~~1 lec~o~lca1 Weds Ed 1~ Vernal mecb~sms ~ acquisil~
and assimbaUon), the speciaUsls also Holed SigDifiCOdl1 developments in the
1~ ~ab~ 'supply" ~ 1e_.l° TV most obvious Rubles He
relied lo the uansform~lon ~ economy relations wh~ 1~ Wasp Pap.
~_ _~_
~a~ In~s~le~."
Meyer explabed1 the Souls bye ~S1 the secure 1ec~1c~ Ed
du~i~ base ~ Used Burope ~ ~ bad come ~ depend on
pr~ls~n ~ elects (Human' mac^e Paris (~chosl~~ls)$ optics
~ ~m~11 Ed ~ Adage ~ _ _ ~u~ ~
presses. Thumb 1be East BuropeaDs my so be willing 10 trade 1bese
Hems gab the 1be Sahel USA, 1be prigs w~ rise subset Ed 1be
~ m Pete mild ollber W estern m arkets for iluose good ~ es Eastern Europe
beglos prod using for llba m ore ~ m pelllize W esL
ID Tbls peer oat dews ~ cages ~ Me "guppy side" ~= ~ baked ~ we
reams current udders ~ Me Soviet Ualo" "d _= Europe. May of we
-~ ~ ~ Hem cage ~ ~= ~ =~ "d
~d~1~ ~~e
~cbook~ "d we ~c=^g up ~ cent ~cboo~g~ A ~D
desc~pHon of ~e. obiec~e chases quad be beyond We scope of ibis per
38
OCR for page 285
In addition, the political revolutions In Eastern Europe have deprived the
Soviets of an important source of they covert acquisition of Western
technology. Espionage networks that relied on East European contacts and
personnel have broken down. The ability that the Soviets once had to
mspect an technologies acquired, through covert or overt channels, by the
East Europeans has been eRectively undermined. Meyer argued that the
breakdown of this crucial source of technology flows win contribute to the
technological regression that he has predicted ~ the short term.
With a broader perspective, Hewett stated that the consequences of
restructuring the Warsaw Pact's economic ties may eventually result ~ a
technology boon for the Soviets. Though he admitted that the "doDarization-
of trade between the Soviets and East Europeans 1 I win lead to an initial
plunge ~ trade, he claimed that there should be a reestablishment of
economic relations on a joint venture basis which could secure a higher flow
of technological products and processes to the Soviet Union than under the
previous trade regime. In fact, Hewett believed that Eastern Europe could
even serve as a "cheap West" for the Soviets, creating a whole new channel
of technology flows.
While the specialists did not speculate about how changes in the COCOM
guidelines might alter the "supply side" of technology transfer, they did
claim that a comprehensive nbera Cation of Western export controls would
significantly expand the range and quantity of technological goods and
processes avaHable to Soviet users. Debate was focused on two questions:
who would benefit from this increased a~raHablitity of technology en c! how
Trade between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has traditionally been conducted
"transferable rubles."
39
OCR for page 286
-
would this affect Soviet economic development? The contending answers to
these questions were based on different understandings of the potential for
successful economic reform, the relationship between the mi itary and
civilian sectors, and the continued relevance of pre-reform economic and
administrative structures.
Ericson advanced an argument that framed the specialists' debate on
these questions. "The first order impact of abolishing technology controls,"
he e~plamed, ''would be a tremendous boon to the Soviet military and a
dramatic reduction ~ the Costs for the military. One must remember that
the entire hierarchical structure is designed for bringing ~ technology and
making `t usable for the military sector. The technology will then be
available to the civilian economy' but the reform will have to go much
further before it arid be properly used ~ this sphere." Ericson based his
argument on three fundamental premises. First, since economic reform has
not yet reached the practical or conceptual stage at which the civilian
economy could effectively begin to acquire and assimilate a new range of
Western technology, he argued that civilian economic actors would probably
not benefit from the increased technology supply. Second, sunce the reform
has not abolished the old centralized administrative mechanisms, which
continue to coexist with and dominate the new mst~tutions, he claimed that
an opening in the flows of technology to the Soviet Union would continue to
be cha~elled through the VPE-VIM! network to privileged military end-
users. Third, since the military has maintained its comparative advantages,
he maintained it would be the only sector capable of assimilating the new
range of technologies, especially as the civi fan sector moves toward
economic instability. In Ericson's view, a lib eratization of Western export
controls could only benefit the Soviet economy as a whole if "the Soviets
40
OCR for page 287
would realize that any mistakes we could make with regards to dun use
technology transfer "are just not going to matter that much."
Finally, Dialer argued, In a broader context, that though we may not know
what the future holds for the Soviet Union, we can say with some assurance
what they have left behind. Alluding to the revolutions of 1 9 17, he said,
"Russia is moving past its February. Whether it has a chance to avoid an
October, on a long road of evolutionary, spiritual and material rebirth, or
what kind of October it may have, we can hardly know. But it seems
increasingly probable that a point of no return is being reached and that we
are withes sing the passing of the Soviet order, not only as created by Stalin
but as modified by his successors." In his view, we can base our policy
decisions neither on a stability that cannot come soon nor on the fear of a
return lo an old order which, In an likelihood, no longer exists in the Soviet
Union. Instead, he argued that Western choices should be based on an
acceptance of the inherent instability involved In the process of transition, a
close analysis of the transition as it evolves, and an effort to contribute, even
if only on the margins, to the stabilization of the larger environment in
which this inherently unstable transition takes place.
CONCLUSION
In all the interviews, one theme was predominant: the Soviet order that
inspired the creation of the post-war Western export control regime has
been seriously undermined by the current wave of reforms. While few were
wiring to hazard a guess about the new order to come, an predicted with
assurance that instability win be the mam characteristic of the society,
economy, military, and the poetical system for the forseeable future. Some
49
OCR for page 288
-
r
A`
of the specialists felt that Western policymakers should react with caution to
the uncertain conditions; others viewed the instability as a challenge to the
West to take bold measures that might promote the stability of change. Yet
regardless of their differences, almost an of the specialists agreed that we
should more actively engage the Soviets in a broader expansion of
technology transfer. They consistently argued that COCOM restrictions need
comprehensive reexamination towards a more reasonable, plausible
minimum that does not impede the process of economic reform and the
development of a technological infrastructure for ~ more efficient, flexible
economy. Though they suggested alternative views on what such a
minimum set of restrictions should be, they agreed that the level of
technology transfer would not have a significant impact on Soviet
development until the domestic reforms cre ate c! an environment more
conducive to {arge-scale technology assimilation.
~0
