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OCR for page 25
3. HE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN lisle EAST AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR COCOH
This section discusses the F.R.G. 's perspectives on how
Cocom shout d adapt to the current political and economic changes
under way in the Eastern bloc. The anal ysis begins by
considering the potential impact of German unit ication upon
Cocom. Subsequently, the implications of German unif ication for
CoCom's approach to the other Eastern European countries
t Hungary, Poland, Czechosiovakia) are discussed. Finally, the
F.R.G.'s perspective on the future of CoCom and the Soviet Union
is examined.
3.1. The German Democratic Republic, Cocoa, and German
Unification
3.1.1 . Cocoa and the Unified Germany
While still a matter of some speculation, it is probably
correct to assume that political unification between the two
Germanies is likely to happen in 1991. The East German election
of March 18, 1990 represented the first formal step in this
process, as the population of East Germany voted for unification
via Article 23.51 As unification occurs according to the
provisions of Article 23, and when the G.D.R. ceases to exist as
an independent state/ so will its def inition as a target country
West und Ost, op.cit.
51 The COU, which has advocated unification according to
Article 23 won an overwhelming, though not absolute majority.
.'
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in CoCom. At this time, the West German foreign trade law or
Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (A~G) and its export control system --
including the F.R.G.'s membership in Cocom--will be extended to
the Oder-NeiSe line. In other words, the territory of the G.D.R.
will become part of Cocom, and none of the current controls will
apply.52
This section is divided into two parts. The first part
discusses the short and medium term situation, characterized by
economic unity In the context of continued political division.
The second part examines three aspects of unification which pose
a challenge to CoCom: the changes necessary in the Cocom list to
address problems of nuclear safety and environmental clan-up;
and the fact that even after unification Soviet troops are likely
to remain in East Germany for some time.
3.1.2. Short and Medium Run: Economic Unity and Political
Division --Implications for Cocom
While the eventual merging of the two German states poses no
significant problems for Cocom, the situation in the short and
medium run is far more complicated. The legal framework for an
economic union of the two Germanies will be implemented with a
treaty between the two Germanies by the first of July. As
mentioned above, however, political unification will not be
realized before 1991. As a consequence there will be an interim
S2 Interviews; this would include the munitions as well as
nuclear lists.
26
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period of at least several months possibly a year during which
the two Germanies will be economically unified but politically
divided. In other words while there will be a single German
economy with a single currency, tax, social, and legal system,
Germany as a political unit will continue to be defined by two
separate states.53
The implications of this situation for Cocom are
considerable. The G.D.R. will continue to exist as a sovereign
state and thus theoretically remains a CoCom target country until
political unification is completed. Yet the same country will
have lost its economic sovereignty to another country
--the F.R.G.-- that is a member of CoCom. As a consequence CoCom
would have to apply export controls to part of an economy that
belongs to one of its own members states. In fact, the F.R.G.
itself would have to implement CoCom restrictions against a
section of its economy.
There is a broad consensus in both the F.R.G. and the G.D.R.
that such a policy would be extremely difficult to implement.54
The continued application of export controls to the G... would
severely hamper the process of economic union. First, part of
the ~ ega ~ f r amework o f the economic union could not be
implemented since the AWG would not be extended to East German
53 This does not exclude the possibility that a whole series
of special regulations apply to the Eastern part of the new
German economy. For example it is likely that East germany's
membership in the EC will require a series of interim agreements
that apply only to that part of the economy.
54 Interviews.
27
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territory. This would create considerable competitive
asymmetries and would lead to distortions in the allocaticn of
resources, as industries would export and import under the system
which was most conducive to their own interests, and might well
relocate some of their production facilities to suit their
particular trading interests.
Second, if the G.D.R. remains a Cocom target country, it
would be forced to maintain all border and custom controls. Yet
effective regulation of the sharply increased flow of goods and
people would simply not be feasible along an inner German
border.55 Realistically, goods that can be purchased over the
counter in the F.R.G. or even in other European countries and fit
in a passenger car can no longer be controlled between the two
Germanies. As one official acknowledged, the borders between
West Germany and the G.D.R. and its Eastern European neighbors
are virtually open, with no real controls on technology
shipments. The same is true for technical expertise and know how
which cannot be controlled at all. Finally, technology is not
only transported through hardware but also through software. When
an integrated communications system is set up between the two
Germanies, the flow of software can no longer be controlled.
Third, the continued maintenance of export controls would
cause a negative private sector reaction. Current estimates of
the costs to integrate the East German into the West German
55 In fact both governments have already pledged to abandon
border controls before the beginning of the summer vacations in
Early July.
28
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economy range from OM 65 billion to DM 85 billion per year for
approximately 8-10 years. Probably 50% of that cost will be paid
by the West German government (state and federal). The rest will
have to be covered by private sector investment from the F.R.G.
and other industrial countries.56 In fact, the success of
economic union hinges on the active participation of the
industrial countries in the form of capital investment, including
the transfer of technology and knowledge. Without this
investment, the risk of renewed waves of East German emigration
to the F.R.G. would be high, and the entire process of
unification would come under severe strain. Yet if export
controls remain after the second of July, the investment
necessary to restructure the East German economy would not be
made.57 According to West German and other European executives,
56 According to one high ranking advisor to the East German
government "75% of the G.D.R. 's industry is not even subsidizable
and has to be rebuilt entirely . ", Prof essor Albert Jugel,
Department for Information Technology, Technical University of
Dresden, "Basic Problems of the East German E<:onomy't, American
Institute for Contemporary German Studies, April 24, 1990 . While
all estimates on the. East German economy have to be taken with
care since there is total lac3< of data it gives at ~ east an
indication of the extent of the investment required. Contrary to
the other Eastern European countries, the G.D.R. 's economy will
be backed up by the DM and thus the West German economy which
should make it easier to raise investment capital in global
capital markets.
57 "Foderungen nach Kurzung der Cocom-Liste,t' Frankfurter
Aligemeine, 1.21.1990; Friedrich Wokurka from the VEB Kombinat
Robotron stated that the G.D.R. computer industry cannot improve
unless the CoCom barriers fall, see "Japaner schon in Wohnzimmer.
DDR Computerindustrie will 'Geld fliessen sehen'," Handelsblatt,
3.23.1990; "COCOM: Probleme nach der Wiedervereinigung --
Verflixte Liste," Wirtschaftswoche, No.15, 4.6.1990, p.27;
"Cocom-Liste verhindert Fax mit der DDR," Frankfurter Aligemeine,
3.18.1990; "Hilfe fur die DOR soil nicht an Cocom scheitern,i'
29
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it is inconceivable t..at investors would agree to equip the East
German economy, which within a year or two will be part of a
European economy that competes heavily in global markets, with
anything but the latest technology.58 Furthermore, many planned
joint ventures that have already been agreed upon would not take
place.59 The attractiveness of lower wage rates could never
outweigh the disadvantages that would accrue to a company if it
could not utilize the most modern technology available.
Fourth, another important consideration is that the social
and economic cost of unification will be high for both Germanies.
For example, current studies project the short run unemployment
rate in East Germany to be as high as 3S% of the entire work
force. These workers will require unemployment benefits and
retraining programs, which for the most part have to be paid for
by the F.R.G. Lack of investment in the East German economy
could substantially worsen this situation by raising unemployment
even more and thus requiring more resources. Yet the F.~.G.
government cannot accept such an additional burden. As one high
Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2.1.1990.
58 Interviews; some have suggested that one could presumable
have two production lines that would produce goods such as
machine tools and computers with different technologies. This
would be very costly since you would have to maintain an entire
second the servicing system. Moreover contrary top the Japanese
and American producers German machine tolls producers are rather
small and it would not be economically feasible to maintain two
separate production lines. See also "Wirtschaftswoche-
Technologieforum. Geanderte Fronten," Wirtschaftswoche, 3.30.1990.
59 ''Osthandel: Kampf dem CoCom," D~x Spiegel, 4.16.1990,
p.114.
30
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ranking official in Bonn stated, ''do you really think we can
justify an additional tax increase in West Germany to finance
even higher unemployment and an even larger productivity gap --
which is already between one third and one half-- just because
the East Germans can't use the most advanced technology available
on the world market. How do you expect them t the East Germans]
to compete in world markets, if you don't give them this
technology?".60
It must also be emphasized that economic union can only
succeed if the G.D.R.'s economy can maintain its traditional
economic links with the Soviet Union, which is a major importer
of East German industrial goods. However, the trade payments
among the CMEA countries will likely be converted to a dollar
basis in the near future.61 Since under these circumstances the
Soviet Union will no longer have to purchase its imports from
within the CMEA but can choose from the global market place, the
G.D.R. will have to compete for Soviet orders with the
industrialized countries and the NICs.
Fifth, West German businesses and politicians argue that a
continued application of Cocom principles to East Germany will
lead to charges that the U.S. is using its dominant role within
CoCom to further its commercial interests. Industries engaged in
the modernization of the (East) German economy resent the fact
60 Interview; in this context it must also be remembered
that there are federal elections in the F.R.G. on December 2, 1990.
61 This has been requested by the Soviets at the last CMEA
meeting in Sofia.
31
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that the U.S. is trying to place limitations on the technological
sophistication of one of its major competitors.
Finally, the symbolic character of re-erecting an "economic
wall" would be a political impossibility. In fact, West German
policy makers are concerned that there would be a very strong
ant'-American backlash in the German population if it became
known that the source of all the difficulties and costs arising
from a continued application of export controls to East Germany
lay not in Bonn but in Washington. Government officials in Bonn
who are currently developing ideas for new cooperative structures
in the post-cold war world order consider these strains as
undermining an already very difficult task.
- The F.R.G. is receiving considerable support from its
European partners not just on an individual country basis but
also from various European organizations such as the European
Community (EC) and the West European Union (WEU) for its
position.62 For example, in a recommendation to the Council of
ministers, the the assembly of the WEU has asked for a drastic
62 For more on the EC see section 4. below. For statements
by individual countries, see "Washington Stellt
Meistbegunstigung fur Moskau in AUSSiCht," Fankfurter
Aligemeine, 11.18.1989; "Mitterand will Frankreichs Platz im
Osten sichern," Frankfurter Aligemeine, 3.13.1990; "Cossiga:
COCOM-Regein sind uberholtes Dogma," Neues Deutschiand,
10.14./15.1989; "Italien will Cocom andern," Nachrichten fur den
Aussenhande1, 10.16~1989; "Rom fordert Cocom Revision,"
Handelsblatt, 10.25.1989; "Gegen Handelserisichterungen fur
strategische Guter, ~t Tagesspiegel, 26.10.1989; "Kein
Wirtschaftsfulihorn fur Moskau," Frankfurter Aligemeine,
12.1.1989.
32
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reduction in the CoCom list.63 In the words of the author of the
report "one has to rid oneself of this product of the Cold
War.~64 The formation of a common front among the Europeans in
Cocom is being fostered in two ways. First, in many projects,
especially in the field of telecommunications, European
industries are working together increasingly in the form of
consortia, joint ventures, common R&D facilities, and so forth.65
Secondly if only the F.R.G. stopped applying Cocom restrictions
to the G.D.R., West German industry would obtain a major
competitive advantage, since in many of the most profitable
business opportunities in the G.D.R. they would have no
competitors. As one EC official said, "Nobody can have an
interest that state monopolies will be replaced by private
ones. Other European governments would come under severe
63 Note that there are eight members of NATO and the EC in
the WEU.
64 "WEU fur Striche an COCOM-Praxis," Neues Deutschiand,
12.7.1989; see also "Reformer in Mittel- und Osteuropa zwingen
die WEU in eine neue Rolie," Die Welt, 12.4.1989.
65 For example the recent contract between Alcatel and the
G.D.~. to supply '5 digital telephone exchanges , including
34,000 lines, to East Germany was signed by Mr.Gerhard Zeidler,
director of Alcatel's West German subsidiary, "Cocom close to
high-tech sales agreement," Financial Times, 2.16.1990; Siemens
and Alactel are currently awaiting approval from CoCom to
manufacture digital exchanges in the Soviet Union, see "Moscow to
launch giant telecoms satellites," Financial Times, 4.3.1990; the
trend towards a European position was also apparent during the
recent international computer trade fair CeBIT in Hannover, see
for example, "Sturm auf die Bastion Cocom," Suddeutsche Zeitung,
3.22.1990; "Computerbranche macht gegen die Cocom-Liste Front,"
Frankfurter Rundschau, 3.21.1990.
66 "Durch Die Hintertur," Der Spiegel, No.17 (1990), p.35-6.
33
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pressure from their own industries to grant unrestricted access
to the East German market, since they would not want the Germans
to monopolize the G.D.R. economy. Under such circumstances it is
likely that CoCom --at least with regard to the G.D.R.-- would
disintegrate rather quickly as a consequence of unilateral exits
by other European countries.67
In light of the above considerations, it is clear that CoCom
must turn to the task of determining a special status for the
G.D.R.68 One possibility would be to give the G.D.R. the same
status as the neutral countries like Switzerland or Sweden.69
However, there are at least three reasons why this would not be a
good solution. First, the G.D.R. is not neutral but still
formally a member of the Warsaw Pact.70 Secondly, the G.D.R. has
no experience in export controls, nor does it have the
bureaucratic structure to effectively duplicate the Swiss modei.
Finally, a central element of the Swiss model is based on the
distinguishability of domestic and foreign technology. Given the
67Interviews.
68 This status should not be determined by S-Com, the
committee usually dealing with issues regarding the G.~.R. but by
all members. The S-com members are: United States, Britain,
France, Danemark and Holland.
69 For a discussion of the Swiss case see Jurg Martin
Gabriel, Schweizer Neutralitat im West-Ost Handel, Bern: Haupt,
~ 9 8 7 . For a recent dispute between the U.S. and Switzerland over
CoCom, see "Schweizer Exporte zwingen Washington zur Entrumpelung
der CoCom-Liste,tt Handelsblatt' 1.24.1990.
70 The Soviets will not give up their rights over East
Germany prematurely in return for the G.D.R. to take on a "Swiss"
status in Cocom unless it is of any benefit to them.
34
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degree of economic integration of the German~es after July 2,
this would be impossible.71
According to Bonn, the most effective and least costly
solution would entail a common foreign trade and export control
law for the two portions of the-united German economy. This
solution would avoid the development of cumbersome new
regulations for all Cocom members and the establishment of a
separate, East-German export control bureaucracy. The common
foreign trade law could be either the F.R.G.'s AWG, or a new
system negotiated between the German states.72 Given the time
frame of the economic union and East Germany's inexperience with
export controls, an extension of the AWG would be more feasible.
From an operational standpoint, this option would be feasible as
early as July 2, since by that date all 11,000 East German custom
officers will be fully trained in West-Ge~man custom laws.
If the AWG were extended to East Germany, exports from the
G.D.R. would come under West German law including the F.R.G.'s
export control system and its commitments to CoCom.73 For
71 This problematic is also more and more apparent in the
Swiss case as the global division of labor and the globalization
of production advances blurring the distinction between national
centers of production.
72 Such a new law would be structured around the three
following elements: (a) the list of controlled goods; (b) the
nature of the institution --currently the BAW-- that controls the
exports of restricted goods; and (c) the execution of the export
controls.
73 This does not imply that border controls between the
Germanies will disappear entirely. In fact given the degree of
differentiation between the two economies it is likely that some
invisible borders will remain between them until productivity
35
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This would have similar repercussions on economic unification as
the continued application of CoCom regulations to G.D.R.
territory discussed above.
In addition to these private sector cost considerations, it
is important to remember that the Soviet Union is the G3R's most
important export market. It will not be easy to find alternative
markets for these exports. Many of the Western high-tech goods
markets are already crowded, and it would be very difficult for
East Germany to create a niche sufficiently large to compensate
for the losses in the Soviet market. Besides, it is not
necessarily in the interest of the other EC members to have their
markets flooded with new products from a revitalized East-German
economy.149 A further motivation for maintaining the flow of
(East) German exports to the Soviet Union is that a breakdown in
this flow would have severe repercussions upon the East German
employment level. Currently, 480.000 people are employed in the
export sector that produces for the Soviet Union.l50 This
amounts to 20% of the entire workforce in the industrial
~ .
sectOr.15~
149 TO the contrary the EC hopes that the opening of markets
in Eastern Europe will allow the F.R.G. to divert some of its
exports to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and reduce the
F.R.G.'s overall B.o.P. surplus that exists with almost all of
its partner countries.
150 See Machowski (19901.
lS1 In 1988 the workforce employed in the industrial sector
was 2. 4 million. see Statistical Pocket Book of the GOR, 1989,
here pp.34-35. In some cases this ratio is even higher. For
example the industrial Kombinat Robotron that manufactures
computers and other electronic equipment exports 80% of its goods
64
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As a consequence of all these political and economic
considerations, it is clear that neither option discussed above
provides a realistic solution to the problem of (East) German
exports to the Soviet Union. As an alternative to these options,
the F.R.G. has suggested extensive liberalization of the Cocom
industrial list for the Soviet Union, along with measures to
ensure that the technology that is exported is applied to its
proscribed use.l52 In other words, rather than establishing a
new regime that not only continues to be based on technology
denial but also develops complicated mechanisms of
differentiation among the various Eastern bloc countries, the
F.R.G. advocates a regime based on safeguards in the form of end
use certificates and on site inspection.l53 Officials in Bonn
argue that this system should satisfy those that continue to be
concerned about the Soviet military capability, as well as those
who wish to support the process of economic reform in the Soviet
Union.
The Soviet Union has reacted positively to such a plan, and
to the Soviet Union.
152 Interview
153 This has also been recommended by the WEU. The
recommendation calls for "negotiations with the Soviet bloc for
the introduction of on-site verification procedures to accompany
all future sales of western strategic technology where
appropriate in return for the further liberalization of the Cocom
list," see West European Union, Co-Oridinating Committee For
Multilateral Export Controls {COCOM), Report submitted on behalf
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological ens Aerospace
Questions by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur, A/WEU/STA ~ 89 ~ 3, Paris,
1989.
65
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has offered on numerous occasions to establish a system of
safeguards. In November 1989, deputy minister president Abalkin,
during a visit to the EC proposed the establishment of a system
of export safeguards to ensure that dual use technology will be
utilized only for civilian purposes.l54 This offer was repeated
by Foreign Minister Eduard Schewardnaze during a visit to Belgium
in December 1989.155 More recently, Vice Premier Stepan Sitar jan
reiterated the Soviet offer to allow Western officers to control
the end use of dual use technology in the Soviet Union.l56
The F.R.G. argues that such offers by the Soviet Union must
be taken seriously. As one respondent stated, "You can't refuse
to talk them and you can't deny the worthiness of an
international agreement. After all, the superpowers trust each
other in disarmament talks and conclude agreements on nuclear
weapons.~157 As to exact nature of the regime, one respondent
suggested that it could be based on or even embedded in the
verification scheme currently negotiated in Geneva or Vienna. "If
you find an agreement for the verification of missile launchers
and silos it must be possible to do the same thing for machine
154 "UdSSR will eine Alternative zu Cocom," Nachrichten fur
Aussenhandel, 11.24.89.
155 nAussenwirtschaftsbezishungen der UdSSR," ECOTASS,
4.9.1990.
156 "Osthandel: Kampf dem CoCom," Der Spiegel t 4.16.1990;
"Moscow Seeks New Technology Export Rules," Journal of Commerce,
4.11.1990.
157 Interview.
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tools and computers," he said.158 Others suggested that the
private sector should have a role in such a regime. Their
technical expertise would be indispensible in safeguarding the
proper application of high technology.
One area where a safeguard regime is indispensible, is for
the export of those items on the atomic energy list that enhance
the safety of nuclear reactors. As the Chernobyl accident
demonstrated, Western Europe is vulnerable to nuclear accidents
in the Soviet Union, and thus has a great interest in improving
the safety standards of Soviet nuclear reactors. The economic
spokesman of the COU/CSU parliamentary group stated that
"especially in the areas of the environment and reactor safety a
liberalization is necessary to solve t the Soviet Union's]
pressing problems. It is of little use if reactor safety is
improved only in Hungary and Czechoslovakia but not in the
USSR.~159
Before concluding, a further consideration which has
influenced the West German government's perspective on the issue
158 Interviews
159 See Statement by the economic spokesman of the CDU/CSU
parliamentary group, Matthias Wissmann, 1.21.1990, 7842h;
"COU/CSU begruBt COCOM-Erieichterungen," Deutschiand-Union-
Dienst, Vol.44, No.39 (2.23.90), p.4; in fact the F.R.G. and the
Soviet Union have already established close cooperation in the
filed of nuclear energy and safety. For example, during his last
visit to Moscow in October of 1988, Chancellor Kohl and President
Gorbatchev signed an agreement to deliver nuclear safety
surveillance equipment and to train specialists that can handle
this equipment. During that same visit the West German company
Siemens and the Swiss/Swedish company Asea Brown Boveri signed a
contract to built a high temperature reactor in the Soviet Union.
~7
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of CoCom has been the pressure from the opposition and the
business community. This pressure has both reinforced the
preexisting inclination to liberalize CoCom and has given the
government little room to maneuver in negotiating with the U.S.
in CoCom. Turning first to the opposition, the Social Democrats
have demanded the unilateral exit of the F.R e G. from Cocom unless
rapid and decisive action is taken by the government.l60 As one
official stated, "It is time that we forget Cocom''.16l However,
this does not mean that the F.R.G. would stop administering
export controls. Rather the SPD supports a bilateral approach to
export controls. To support their demands the party has long
demanded a full review and substantial tightening of the West
German foreign trade law.
The reason for the SPD's position does not so much derive
from differences in their position towards the Eastern bloc. To
the contrary as mentioned previously their is a considerable
agreement among all political parties on the need to support the
Eastern European and Soviet economies.162 Rather the SPD does
160 "Hilfen fur die DDR erforctern tief~reifencle COCOM-
Revisionen," Die SPD im Bundestag, 1.30.1990; "Erneuerung der
ODR-Wirtschaft: Die COCOM-Liste muB weg," Die SPD im Deutschen
Bundestag, 2.~.1990.
161 "'Radikal' gegen Cocom-Liste vorgehen," VWD, 2.1.199O
162 t'Debatte im Bundestag dokumentiert Konsens der Parteien.
Initiative zur Kurzang der CoCom-Liste," Handlesblatt,
12.18.1989. For various reasons this might not always be
expressed in public but the interviews also ref lected this . For
a public ctebate that reflects some broader differences see for
example Deutscher Bundestag, 186. Sitzung, Ost-West-Hancie] mit
Hochtechnc>logiegutern, 12 . 15.1989, Plenarprotokoll 11/186 .
68
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not believe that the CoCom, given its internal operational
structure can respond fast enough and that the U.S. does not want
to respond fast enough to the current situation in the Eastern
bloc.163 As one parliamentarian said "according to the US it
would like to replace the Iron curtain with a CoCom curtaintl.164
Some respondents suggested that the Social Democrats "had to
advocate such a position as an opposition party"; if in power
they would not support such a drastic position.''165 This is
supported by the fact that a recent motion for a resolution that
the party introduced into parliament does not contain the demand
for unilateral exit.166 Finally, the SPD has also repeatedly
drawn attention to the losses that have accrued to German
industry and has publicly encouraged the private sector to
disregard Cocom with respect to dual use technology if no
progress were to be made at the Paris meeting in February.167
But the Social Democrats were not the only party that
demanded more drastic action. The Greens too have demanded to
163 Interviews; "Differenzen um Abbau der Cocom-Kontrolle",
Handelsblatt, 3.23.1990.
164 Joseph Vosen, DDR und COCOM, 1.29.1990.
165 Interviews.
166See EntschlieBungsantrag der Fraktion der SPD, Ost-West-
Handel Wit Hochtechnologiegutern t Deutscher Bundestag' 11.
Wahiperiode, Drucksache ll/6085, 12.13.1989.
167 ''Milliarden-Auf~rage durch Cocom behindert," E~3n8LYEter
Aligemeine, 12.16.1989; "SPD veriangt eine vollige Neufassung der
Cocom-Liste," Die Welt, 2.2.1990.
69
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cut the dual use list.l68 Finally, even the CDU's coalition
partner, the Free Democrats (FDP) are not satisfied with the slow
progress currently under way. As one member of the FDP's
parliamentary group stated "I expect from the government that it
continues to work with increased vigor towards a substantial
reduction in the Cocom regulations; the mere preparation of
initiatives in not enough.~169
Turning to the private sector, it has been known for a long
time that German industry just like the West German government
has always supported the central purpose of CoCom. At the same
it time resented both the extent of export controls in the dual
use area as well as the cumbersome administrative structure of
CoCom.170 In general, however, the business community has
avoided to speak up in public against CoCom or the U.S. Many
executives fear the possible repercussions of their actions which
might result in the loss of lucrative export markets or access to
indispensable technology from the U.S.
With the changes in the Eastern bloc this acquiescence has
ended. Industry officials and industrial organizations are now
'~. "Okologisches Europa im Thick", Frankfurter Rundschau,
3.22.1990.
169 "Laermann: Cocom-Vorschriften behindern Zusammenarbeit,i'
FOP, tagesdienst, No.273, 2.28.1990.
170 In 1988, the Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft a
research institution with close ties to the Federation of German
Industry called the CoCom list "inexpedient, not up to date, and
unfair'', see "Export-Hurden im Osthandel," iwd,
Informationsdienst des Instituts der deutschen Wirtschaft, N0.14,
4.7.1988, p.3.
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calling publicly for a drastic reduction of the industrial list
and the total overhaul of the CoCom concept --but not its
abolition.l7l For example the Central Federation of the
Electronic Industry has issued a seven point position paper on
Cocom which calls for a shortening of the lists which must
include a review of all items on the industrial list and should
lead to the elimination of "numerous items"; it also rejects a
differentiation among the Warsaw Pact countries. "Equal
treatment of target countries on a substantially lower level" has
become possible the paper argues, because of the lessened tension
in East West relations as well the reorientation of the defense
industry in the target countries.172 Similarly, during a recent
international trade fair the ind ustry assoc i ation for the
electronic, chemical, and machine tool industries all demanded a
drastically reduced CoCom list.173 Many in the private sector
agreed that the longer the current system stays in operation in
light of the changes in the Eastern bloc, the more likely it is
that CoCom will be considered an instrument of commercial policy
171 See for example "Cocom-Arger," Wirtschaftswoche,
3.16.1990; "Wirtschaftswoche-Technologieforum--Geanderte
Fronten,i' Wirtschaftswoche, 3.30.1990; see also the comments by
Hans-~laf Henkel, head of IBM Europe in, "Neue Chancen im Osten,"
Frankfurter Aligemeine, 3.20.1990.
172 ZVEI-Positionspapier zur COCOM-Politik, 2 .13. 1990 ; "ZVEI
fordert zugige COCOM Reform," Z9EI Mitteilungen, No.4 (1990~.
173 "Rasche Lockerug der Cocom-Ausfuhrbeschrankungen
gefordert," Frankfurter Aligemeine, 3.21.1990; "Warum das
Tauwetter einige Cocom Anhanger frostein laBt," Frankfurter
Rundschau, 6.10.1989.
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and not as a measure that enhances national security.174
The private sector is also exerting increased pressure on
the government to act more determined on behalf of West German
industry. As one official in Bonn stated, "we get letters from
the industry which lead to the conclusion that if there are no
rapid changes --I mean fundamental changes-- Lin CoCom3, a
situation will develop where we can no longer defend CoCom.''l75
Another official put it even stronger "from a domestic policy
perspective it must be stated very clearly that the acceptance
level of both industry and the public with regard to U.S.
attitudes and interpretations of the current Eastern reform
efforts is falling rapidly and is approaching the point where the
United States has to begin to think about balancing their own
strategic concerns with the aim to maintain the very institution
[CoCom3 itselfl~l76
3.4. Summary
To sum up, this section has outlined the F.R.G.'s
perspective on the changes needed to adapt Cocom to the political
and economic transformations currently occurring in the Eastern
bloc. In general terms, the F.R.G.'s perspective is based upon
the conviction that the U.S. cannot consider this review of Cocom
i74 "Cocom -- ein Relikt des kalten Krieges zwischen 0st und
Westt', Frankfurter Rundschau, 11.29.1989.
175 Interview.
176 Interview.
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as "yet another set of technical arguments by bureaucrats over
parameter specifications for computers and machine tools.''177
Rather, the current revisions of CoCom require that the member
countries commit themselves to political decisions that reflect
the end of the cold war and the beginning transformation of the
post War European economic and security order. More
specifically, the West German perspective reflects a combination
of three factors that have been discussed above:
a) the reform efforts currently underway in the East
vindicate the traditional West German approach to East-West
relations, in which economic cooperation is seen as a means to
improve relations between the two blocs. According to the West
Germans, the degree of CoCom liberalization is thus not only a
function of the political and economic reforms already achieved.
To the contrary, liberalization should be part of a broad
strategy to further encourage the process of economic and
political reform in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, and
to strengthen international stability and security;
b) the "structural realities" of the impending unification
of the two Germanies limit the range of policy responses which
could be undertaken without undermining both the unification
process and the progress of economic and political renewal in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; and
c) strong political pressure by both the opposition as well
as the private sector which has strengthened the preexisting
177 Interview
~3
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policy position to streamline CoCom and has given the authorities
little freedom in negotiating with the U. S . in CoCom.
74
Representative terms from entire chapter:
east german
