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2. THE UNITED STATES AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:
DIFFERENCES AMONG ALLIES1
Drawing on interviews and writings by West Germans, this
section briefly summarizes --from the F.R.G.'s perspective-- _
major differences which have historically divided West Germany
from the U.S. in its attitudes towards CoCom. A review of these
factors is important since many of the respondents felt that the
F.R.G.'s position is often not adequately understood in the U.S.
More importantly, most of the current conflicts between the two
allies over how to respond to the recent developments in the East
have their roots in historical differences which have existed
almost since the inception of CoCom.
These differences between the U.S. and the F.R.~. reflect a
variety of factors, including fundamental dissimilarities in
their approaches to East- West relations; their divergent roles
in the international political arena; dissimilarities in their
external economic relations; and West Germany's unique situation
1 For more on these differences see for example, Heinrich
Vogel, East-West Trade and Technology Transfer Reconsidered,
Bundesinstitut fur ostwissenschafttiche und internationals
Studien, mimeo Spring 1990; Reinhard Rode, Sanktion und Geschaft
die OstwirtSchaftspolitik der USA unter Reagan, Frankfurt, 1986;
Hans - Di eter Jacobsen, D i e oat-west Wi rtschaf tsbe z i ehungen a ~ s
cleutsch-amerik~n~sches Problem, Baden Baden: Nomos, 1986; Claudia
Wormann, Osthandel, als Problem der Atiantischen Allianz, Bonn:
Europa Union veriag, 1986; Reinhard Rode and Hanns-D. Jacobsen
feds. ), I;s:onomic Warfare or Detente, Boulder: Westview Press,
1985; Enrich Vogel, "Alternative westliche Strategien in den
Wi rtscha f tsbe z i ehungen mit Osteuropa: die europa i sche
Perspektive," in: H.-H. Homann and Heinrich Vogel feds. I,
Osteuropas Wirtsca :~-sprc:,bleme und die Ost-West-Bez iehungen,
Ba~len-Baden: Nomo. 1984; Angela Stent, Technology Transf er to
the Soviet Unicorn ~ .-; challenge for the Cohesiveness of the Western
Alliance, Bonn: Europa Union Veriag, 1983.
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as a divided country in close proximity to the Warsaw Pact.
2.~. The Political Dimension
From a West German perspective, there have been two critical
political issues which have created discord within the alliance.
The first relates to each country's fundamental beliefs, both
with respect to the nature of the East-West conflict, and also
with regard to the policy responses which are required to contain
that conflict. A second divisive issue has been the question of
whether export controls should be used as foreign policy
instruments in the form of economic sanctions.
2.1.1. Nature of East-West Relations: Creative Cooperation vs.
Destructive Antagonism
The West German government has always shared the Americans'
conviction that the transfer of militarily critical goods and
technologies to the East should not be allowed. At the same
time, it has historically considered East-West economic
cooperation as an integral part of its overall relationship with
the East. This approach to East-West relations has its roots in
the two-track strategy first set forth in NATO's Harmel Report of
1967, and later reaffirmed in the CSCE process, which culminated
in Helsinki Final Act of 1975.2 This two-track strategy
2 The Basic formula of the Harmel report says: as much
cooperation as possible as much security as necessary; the
Helsinki Final Act and the final document of the Vienna follow up
conference in 1989 both state that technology can have a positive
influence on the future security of Europe and that a pan-
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emphasizes the importance of East-West economic cooperation
within the overall framework of alliance security. In the words
of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, foreign minister of the Federal
Republic, "We do not want a technological division of Europe. We
want to leave the option for technological cooperation open for
our Eastern neighbors. It goes without saying that this
cooperation must be conducted in full accordance with our
security interests "3
The West German government has always worked to develop a
network of economic relationships with the Eastern bloc, with the
aim of creating mutual dependencies which in turn would heighten
the interests of both blocs in improving their political
relations.4 Economic interdependence was considered to generate
spillover effects into the political realm of international
relations. These spillover effects were intended to reinforce
and deepen the po ~ iti ca ~ re ~ at i onshi ps between the two bI ocs, a nd
european technology program would be an appropriate contribution
to overcome the division of Europe.
3 Speech by Hans-Dietrich Genscher' September 20, 1989,
cited in Jurgen Notzold, "Technologie in den Ost-West
Beziahungen, dais Politik und Zei~geschichte, B2' January 1, 1986,
p.l7.
4Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Towards an Overall Strategy for
Peace, Freedom, and Progress," Foreign Affairs, ~lol.6l, No.1,
especially section IV (Fall 1982), pp.42-66; Richard v.
Weizsacker, "Nur Zusammenarbeit schafft Fr~eden' i' Die Zeit, No.
40, August 30, 1983.
6
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build confidence between previously antagonistic alliances.
5
This does not mean that trade was seen as ending all conflicts,
but that it was ~ necessary condition for the maintenance of
peace and the restraint of Soviet arms build up.
While most Europeans subscribed to this approach, it was
initiated and given special importance by the F.R.G.6 Of all
European countries, the F.R.G. has the largest political,
economic, and security stake in Eastern European developments.
Economic cooperation is seen as an instrument to alleviate the
negative consequences of Germany's division and to create a modus
vivendi with its Eastern neighbors.7 In the eyes of West German
policymakers, the economic dimension of East-West relations is an
important instrument in improving the Federal Republic's overall
5 This follows closely the functional approach to
international relations. See for example David Mitrany, "The
Functional Approach to World Organization," International
Affairs, Vol.48 (1948), pp.350-60; A.J.R. Groom, "The
Functionalist Approach and East/West Cooperation in Europe,"
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.13 (1975), pp.21-60.
6 An important watershed in this approach was the beginning
of Ostpolitik under chancellor Willy Brandt in 1969. Improved
economic relations had been a goal of the private sector long
before then. In 1952, for example, led by an initiative of the
CDU government the Committee on East West trade was formed and in
1958 the Adenauer government concluded its first trade agreement
with the USSR. For more on this see Angela Stent, From Embargo to
Ostpol itik : The Political Economy of West German-Soviet
Relations, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
7 West-Germany's special position became apparent when it
became a member of CoCom, five years before becoming a sovereign
state. It was much debated at the domestic level since
membership in such an organization could provide a definite end
to the prospects for unification. However the fear of the Soviet
threat (Berlin Blockade 48/49) was greater and the F.R.G. joined
the Gentlemen' Agreement, however, with the hope of getting its
view adequately represented.
7
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politico-military relations with the East, and can even
contribute to an increase in national security.8
The widespread consensus within the F.R.G. over this
strategy is reflected in its remarkable continuity for over two
decades, despite the changes in the West German governing
coalition and the substantial fluctuations in the international
climate between the superpowers.9 All in all, then, the West
German approach with respect to East-West economic relations is
probably best described by emphasizing its cooperative nature.
In light of the present changes underway in the Eastern bloc, the
F.R.G. is simply reaffirming its traditional approach of positive
linkage and is thus eager to take advantage of the opportunities
to support the political and economic transformation occurring in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
This strategy of positive economic linkage stands in stark
contrast to the U.S. approach. Contrary to the West German, the
U.S. strategy until 1989 was directed towards the international
isolation and the domestic destabilization of the Soviet system
of domination. As one West German scholar noted, "With the
8 Jurgen Notzold and Werner Beitel, "Die Bedeutung des
Technologie Transfers in den Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit der
Sowjetunion," Osteuroga, Vol. 5 (19831.
9 For more on West German Approach to East West economic
relations see for example, Angela Stent, "The Federal Republic of
Germany", in Reinhard Rode, Hans-Dieter Jacobsen, Economic
Warfare or Detente, Boulder: Westview Press, 1985; Hans-Dieter
Jacobsen, Die Os--West Wirtschaftsbeziehungen als deutsch-
amerikanisches r. olem, Baden Baden: Nomos, 1986; Hans-Dieter
Jacobsen, "East--- at Trade and Export Controls: The West German
Perspective," in. Mary K. Bertsch, ea., Controlling East-West
Technology Transfer, Durham: Duke University Press, 1988;
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exception of the Nixon-Kissinger and the early Carter periods,
U.S. East-West trade policy has been the opposite of the
F.R.G.'s-- destructive and antagonistic.''l° Thus, while U.S.
economic relations with the East Bloc are used to further
political goals, they are often not utilized to achieve positive
linkage through economic cooperation, but rather to apply
negative linkage through punitive economic sanctions.
The U.S. did on occasion utilize economic relations as a
form of positive linkage, extending trade benefits to selected
East European nations as a strategy of "differentiation". But
this positive economic linkage strategy was entirely different
form that pursued by the F.R.G. Unlike the F.R.G., the U.S. saw
the economic benefits it provided to the East as provisional and
revocable, to be extended only in return for good behavior and to
be withdrawn at the first sign of difficulty or friction in East
West relations. Thus while the U.S. traditionally saw economic
relations with the Eastern bloc as an instrument of reward or
punishment for specific actions, the F.R.G. pursued improved
economic relations with the Eastern bloc with little strings
attached and few qid pro quos. For the most part therefore, the
U.S. has not viewed East-West trade as mutually beneficial.
Instead Much trade has usually been portrayed as one-sided,
inherently concessional, and morally questionable.''ll
10See Jacobsen ( 1988 I, here p. 162 .
11 Angela E. Stent, Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union:
A Chal],enge for the Cohesiveness of the Western Alliance, Bonn,
Europa Union Veriag, ~ 98 3, here pp 10 7-8 .
9
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These differences over East-West trade are rooted in broader
disagreements between the two allies with regard to the purpose
of detente. As one respondent described it, "since the memoires
of Kissinger we know how deep seated the dissens was between them
The U.S. and the F.R.G.] as regards the nature of detente. For
us f the F.~.G.] detente was always the reduction of tensions
between East and West; for the Americans on the other hand
detente was the continuation of old policies with new means, and
the old policies meant the containment of the Soviet sphere of
influence.''l2
2.1.2. Cocoa AS An Instrument of Foreign Policy
The second dimension In the political sphere is the role of
economic sanctions. There is almost unanimous agreement in both
the public and the private sector in the F.R.G. that economic
sanctions against the Eastern bloc are ineffective.l3 The West
Germans view sanctions as ineffective partly because of the
relatively small degree of economic interdependence between the
Soviet Union and the Western alliance. In the words of one high
ranking West German official: "In light of the small involvement
12 Interview; another area where these differences have also
come to be ref lected in the different approaches of the two
allies to the CSCE and their valuation of these processes, see
for example Jurgen Notzold, 'iPolitische Vorausset~ungen der
Wirschaftsbezishungen zwischen West und Ost", .
13 For a discussion of the limits of American economic pod'?
as a political instrument, see Jorg Boltersdorf, Die Grenzen v=-
Wirtschaftsmacht, Berlin: Quorum Verlag, 1989; see also Jacobsen
(1988), pp.174-78.
10
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of the Soviet Union in overall East-West trade, East-West
economic relations are not a suitable mechanism to influence
important political questions such as expenditure for arms, third
world engagement and human rights by eliciting Soviet through
withdrawal or refusal.~14
Others have gone even further,
assert-in" that "the notion that the Soviet Union is dependent on
the West in the scientific and technological arena is absurd.~tiS
Moreover, since economic sanctions are mostly reactive --in the
sense that they respond to previous actions-- West German policy
makers contend that they do not provide any constructive impetus
for changing the future actions and attitudes of the Eastern bloc
countries.~6
Another contentious point is the U.S.'s handling of Peoples
14 Jurgen Ruhfus, "Die politische Dimension der
Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen Ost und West,'' Europa Archiv,
Vol.42, No.1 (1987), here p.5.
153uregen No~ziod and W. Beitel, "Die Bedeutung des
Technologietransfers in den Wirtschaftsbezishungen mit der
Sowjetunion," Europa Archly, No.2 (1983~; see also Heinrich
Vogel, "Die Embargo-Politik der USA gegenuber der Sowjetunion
nach Afghanistan. Erf ahrungen und SchiuBfolgerungen," Europa
A~chiv, No.20 (1981) and The Politics of East-West Economic
Relations Reconsidered: A German View, Koin: Bundesinstitut fur
ostwissenschaftliche und internationals Studien, 1982.
16Stent t1985) op. cit. note. Recent U.S. policy towards the
Soviets with regard to the Lithuanian economic embargo, however,
indicates the possible changes in the weight attached by previous
administrations to economic sanctions to enforce behavior. Three
Factors seem to have influenced U.S. decisions to forgo for the
time being any economic sanctions towards the Soviet Union: a
more long term outlook on the current political and economic
transformations occurring in the Eastern bloc; the
ineffectiveness of economic sanctions towards the Soviets; and
thirdly the position of its West European allies especially
France and the F.R.G.
l
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Republic of China (PRC) in CoCom.l7 West Germany has little
understanding for the U.S.'s position of continuing the
preferential treatment of China after the developments in June
1989, while at the same time not giving sufficient recognition to
the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
(see also 2.2. The Economic Dimension and 3.3. The Soviet
Union).18 As one official stated "where do you think China would
be an the control list if we made human rights --which the U.S.
always applies to the Soviet Union-- a criterion for China?''l9
By applying Cocom in such a selective manner, the U.S.
raises the suspicion that "U.S. policy is not anti-communist but
anti-Soviet, revealing a reductionist view of the systemic
conflict between East and west."20 In other words, the American
position reflects a limited view of the global balance of power,
rather than an enlightened leadership of the Western alliance.
17 For background on the Chinese role in U.S.-Soviet
relations,see Raimond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation
erican-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Washington, D.C..
The Brookings Institution, 1985; R.S. Ross, "International
Bargaining and Domestic Politics", World Politics, Vol.38, No.2
(1986), pp.256-87.
is The maintenance of the Status quo towards China has been
reaffirmed in the latest high level Cocom meeting in February.
Reasons given for such a policy include the good export
opportunities for the U.S. and Japan, "USA bleiben im Cocom
hart," Nachrichten fur Aussenhandel, October 30, 1989; "Neue Lage
fur Cocom," Handelsblatt, 10/3071989; "CoCom to update
restrictions," Financial Times, October 5, 1989.
19 Interview
20 Reinhard Rode, "US-Technologietransferpolitik gegenuber
der UdSSR und der V~ China: Weltmachtpolitik im Dreieck,"
Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, Vol.32, No.1 (1987), pp.60-84.
12
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The policy towards China clearly shows that the U.S. interprets
the Cocom principles as it sees it opportune, and pursues its own
geostrategic goals while disregarding the interests of its
allies 21
Eventually, U.S. policy towards the PRC likely to lead the
Europeans to respond by acting in a unilateral as well,
reflecting their own specific security interests even in
opposition to the U.S. Thus, while the U.S. policy might have
put pressure on the Soviets in the short run, in the long run it
increased the freedom of action for both China --which can now
produce many items on the CoCom list itself-- and for the
Europeans, who can justify unilateral action in the future.22
Finally, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. has not
overemphasized its relationship with China at the expense of its
relationship with the USSR.
2.2. The Economic Dimension
In the economic realm, three issues have been sources of
tension between the F.R.G. and the U.S. The first is whether and
to what degree the U.S. has used its hegemonial position in Cocom
as an instrument to further its commercial interests. The second
is the F.R.G.'s liberal attitude towards foreign trade as an
21Reinhard Rode, "Wiviel Exportkontrolle? COCOM auf dem
Prufstand?n, Osteuropa Wirtschaft, Vol.34, No.1 (1989), pp.l-23.
22 For example, contrary to the U.S. perspective as a world
power, Europeans have always had relatively limited, regional
political aspirations and expectation of detente which could lead
to a different assessment of Soviet policy.
13
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open, trade dependent economy. Final ly, there is the issue of
West Germany' s strong economic ties with the East, ties which
ref lect Germany's geographic location in the center of Europe .
2 . 2 .1. CoCom As An Instrument of Commercial Policy
The argument that export control s have also been used as an
instrument of commercial policy is not a new one, and has been
made by almost all members in Cocom.23 The most frequent charge
made by the F.R.G is that the U.S. is using its dominant role in
CoCom to advance its economic interests, and that the U.S. gives
its firms a competitive advantage by either denying or delaying
other Cocom members' requests for exceptions.24 This is
particularly evident with respect to the machine tool industry,
where "the embargo is applied in its most stringent form because
23 A study for the Ministry of Research and Technology lists
the major impediments for the technology transfer between the
United States and the western countries. The study emphas i zes
that the result of the restrictive practices of the U.S. with
respect to technology f lows to the Soviet Union can render the
access of western countries to U.S. technology more difficult, W.
Hein, Beschrankungen des internationalen Technologietransfers
durch die USA -- Auswirkungen auf die Innovationsentscheidungen
deutscher Unternehmen, Studie im Auf~rag des Bundesministeriums
fur Forschung und Technologie, Washington, D. C. 1984, cited in
Jacobsen (1986) op.cit., here p.280, note 54; see also the
statement by former Undersecretary of Commerce Lionel Olmer,
"Commerce international de haute technology: la menace
protect) one ste, " Europe, Samedi 1 5 f evri er, 19 8 6; " D1W: Osthande l
wire vom Protektionismus bedroht," VWD, November 13, 1985;
"Tindemans warns vor Beschneidung des Technologie-Transfers,"
LEWD, February 7' 1986.
24Michae] Mastanduno, "The Managment of Alliance Export
Control Policy: American Leadership and the Politics of CoCom,"
in Gary Bertsch (1988), op.cit., here p. 259 cons; see also Rene
Herrmann, Berichte cles Bundeinstituts fur ostwissenschaftI iche
unct internationals Studies, No. 32, 38 ,and 39, 1986.
14
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the U.S. cannot compete with the F.~.G.."25 This embargo
prevents the Federal Republic, whose machine tool industry is the
world's most competitive, from capturing the Eastern European and
Soviet market, and also allows the U.S. to limit the overall
world market position of the West German machine tool industry.26
Question about commercial policy were also raised in
conjunction with the establishment of the Chine green line, where
compared to other communist countries, the U.S. has a strong
market position. As one official from the current government
stated, "you really must raise suspicions that this is not a
CoCom issue but a commercial one. Take the Chinese case, where
security questions in the past and today are of a similar
relevance. The U.S. administration is proving very flexible if
commercial interests are involved.~27 And as another official
pointed out, "in comparing the U.S. policy in CoCom towards China
and the Soviet Union from a European perspective, you cannot
avoid asking the question, why the PRO, which represents a
considerable market for U.S. manufactured exports, finds itself
in category V of the [CoCom-] list, while the U.S. which is a
major exporter of agricultural but not industrial goods to the
Soviet Union, continues to unilaterally boycott any significant
25nCoCom-- ein Relikt des kalten Krieges zwischen 0st und
West,'' Frankfurter Rundschau, November 29, 1989; see also
"Expor~kontrollen fur PC in USA gelockert," Nachrichten fur
AuBenhandel' August 29, 1989.
26 Interview with government officials and representatives
fore the industry.
27 Interviews
15
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liberalization for the Soviets.
including those
was hurt by the
..28
Yet with the exception of these two cases, many respondents,
in the private sector, agreed that U.S. industry
Cocom lists as much as European firms.29 Most
respondents saw no indication that the U.S. has used CoCom in any
systematic way to further its own economic interests.
Considering the fact that the U.S. export control list is even
more restrictive than those of its partners, and that until
recently the U.S. was the worId's largest high technology
producer, it is likely that U.S. industry suffered even more than
fact that the U. S
However .
export control list is ever
ikely that U.S.
European firms in past years.30
However, this situation has changed in the last few years as
the U.S. has begun to loose its leading position in the high-
28 Interview; the value of trade between the US and PRC
increased dramatically during the decade from less than $1
billion in 1980 to 514 billion in 1988. High-tech exports
increased from a mere $100 million at the beginning of the decade
to more than S5 billion by 1988, with more than $l billion
commercial aircra f ~ and al rcra ft components becoming the third
leading export to the PRC after wheat and lumber. In addition the
progressive liberalization encouraged high technology companies
to establish joint ventures in China (Wang, HP, United Tech., and
McDonnell-Douglas). By the time of the Tiananmen Square massacre,
the PRO had developed the capacity to produce its own 32-bit
micro-computer (from Western Components) and manufacture
semiconductors down to an accuracy of 2 to 3 microns, Paul
Freedenberg, Technology Transfer Policy in Period of Change,
mimeo, 1990; see also "Cocom-Erisichterungen in China Handel,"
Neue Zuricher Zeitung, 3/4/1989.
29 Interviews.
30 Hans-Dieter Jacobsen, "Legitime Sicherheits Interessen
welt uberzogen," in: "Die Verf~uchte Cocom-liste," Blatter fur
Deutsche und Internationale Politick. ; see also the contributions
by Klaus Richter and Paul Zieber, both representatives of the
private sector, in the same issue.
16
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technology field.31 As one specialist on East-West economic
relations noted, "the declining performance of the U.S. as an
exporting and technological competitor reduces the weight of
security arguments tabled in Cocom by its negotiators, even
raising doubts with regard to the distribution of costs and
benefits for Western countries stemming from export controls
among their economies."32 This declining U.S. competitiveness in
the global market place is reflected in recent reports that
advocate the continuation of export controls in light of the fact
that the Soviet Union could be a potential economic competitor.33
But regardless of whether the U.S. has used its dominant
role in Cocom as an instrument of commercial policy, all
respondents insisted that there is little use in arguing over
past disputes, given the urgency of the challenges presented to
the allies in responding to the recent developments in the East.
In this context, many respondents expressed their concern that
the newly granted exceptions, and the accelerating liberalization
process which has been undertaken in response to the developments
in the East, be conducted in a manner which avoids discrimination
against particular countries and/or industrial sectors. Many
31 "USA verlieren Konkurrenzvermogen bet Hochtechnologie",
VWD, October 21, 1986.
32Heinrich Vogel, "East-West Trade and Technology Transfer
Reconsidered", Bundesinstitut fur ostwissenschaftliche und
internationale Studien, Koin, Spring 1990, mimeo.
33 Interviews; see also "Bush Policy on Eastern Europe:
'Prudent' or 'Timid'?, Washington Post, 10.29.1989.
~7
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respondents saw in both the recent granting of exceptions and the
liberalization measures a reflection of particular U.S.
interests.34 As evidence they cited the delay and eventual
approval in 1988 to deliver Airbus planes to the G.D.R. and the
Soviet Union only after Boeing had secured similar contracts with
Poland and Ruman~a.35 As one news report put it "after all, the
U.S. could not refuse to Airbus what they were about to grant to
Boeing."36 Finally, the January 1990 decision by the U.S. to
agree to the sales of some machine tools raised similar
complaints. As one official stated , "our machine too! industry
doesn't build these old-fashioned machines [anymore]."37
Thus both the government and the private sector in the
Federal Republic consider it essential that a major overhaul of
the list will not generate competitive disadvantages for a
particular industrial sector due to competitive concerns from
another country.38 As some commentators suggested, this could be
34 Interviews; see also 'West Prepares to loosen Strings on
High-Tech Exports to Eastlt, Washington Post' 2.1S.1990. These
charges come not only from the F.R.G. but also from other
European countries especially France.
35"Der Cocom Arger, " Die Welt, February 2, 1990; "Osthandel
kampf gegen Cocom, " Der Spiegel , No . 16 ( 4 . 16 . 1990 ), p . ll4 .
36 "CoCom ein Relikt des Kalten Krieges", Der S}; iegel,
August 22, 1988, p. 83.
37 Count Hagen Lambsdorff, economic minister at the West
German Embassy in Washington, t'East Bloc Pot of Gold, "National
Journal, 2.10.1990, here p.316.
38West-German a.. cials are aware of the possible
difficulties that th ~.S. defence industry might have in
adapting to a sudden 2 jor ~ iberal i Ration of the ~ ist and that
this wouic] leave them at a severe disadvantage to compete f or
18
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done by linking the liberalization in one industrial sector to
that of others. In fact, such a procedure is already being used
to some degree in the current review process in Cocom, as the
members have agreed that the working groups on computers,
telecommunications and machine tools will report back to the
Committee at the same time.39
2.2.2. External Trade: Basic Right vs. Privilege
Unlike in the United States, where external trade is a
privilege which is regulated through a licensing procedure, in
the Federal Republic foreign trade is a basic right, 40 and the
movement of goods t services/ capital/ and finance is generally
unrestricted.4i Export controls are therefore in stark
contradiction to the basic principles of the F.R.G.'s external
trade relations.
These principles have their roots in the importance of
these newly opened markets. However, they indicated that, if
there are real substantial changes made in the list that it is
entirely possible to.delay some of actual implementation to allow
U.S. industries to adapt.
39 One official went as far as saying that the F.R.G. will
no longer accept any liberalization measures in an individual
area but insist on "package deals" that provide equal benefits to
its own industry.
40 See Article 1 of the Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG) of
April 2S, 1961.
4\ Section 7 of that law provides qualifications to section
1. These include the guarantee of the security of the Federal
Republic, the prevention of the interference with the peaceful
coexistence of nations, and noninterference with the external
relations of the F.R.G.
19
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foreign trade to the F.R.G., whose economic prosperity depends
upon its exports. For example, between 1966 and 1986, the export
share in GDP in the F.R.G. rose from 17% to 27%,42 Unlike the
U.S., which has a large internal market and unfit recently did
not consider foreign trade as important, foreign trade has always
been considered a critical element in the economic security of
the F.R.G.43 Since the role of foreign trade in each nation's
economy differs significantly, it is not surprising that
governmental trade policies diverge as well. While intervention
by the F.R.G. government in foreign trade is considered an
exception and often challenged as an interference with a basic
right, the U.S. government's intervention in foreign trade is
much easier to justify, since trade is considered as a privilege
that can be withdrawn any time.
2.2.3. Economic Linkages: Close Ties vs. Goose Interests
The economic ties of the F.R.G. with Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union have been of much greater intensity and historical
duration than those of the U.S. Historically, the United States
has engaged in only limited trade with the Eastern bloc. Between
1985 and 1989 t for example/ U.S. imports from the East averaged
$2.1 billion yearly and exports averaged $3.3 billion per year.
42Reinhard Rode, "Handelstaat Bundesrepublik und
xportRontrol le", Spektrum der Wissenschaft, March 1990 .
4 3 There are increas i no s igns, however, that wi th the
continued g ~ obal i nation of industry and thus the divis ion of
labor, f ore in trade in the U . S . is gaining in importance .
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This accounts for 0.5% all imports and 1.17% of all exports
respectively (see Appendix A, Table 11.
By contrast, the F.R.G. has been engaged in uninterrupted
trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for centuries.44
These historical trade linkages are rooted in the F.R.G.'s unique
geographic and political position in Europe, as well as its
considerable dependence on energy imports.45 For example,
between 1985 and 1989 the F. R. G. imported goods worth $56 .1
billion that is $11. 2 bit lion per year ant] represents on average
5.1% of all imports. On the export side the Federal Republic
shipped goods worth $70 billion to the East which amounts to an
average of 5% of all West German exports during that period (see
Appendix A, Table 11. The importance of Eastern trade to the
West German economy is reflected in the fact that close
commercial relationships with the East have always had the
support of industry and the leadership in Bonn irrespective of
whether a conservative or social democratic government was in
power. This long-stancling commitment is demonstrated by the
4 4 The exception here was the period immediately after World
Wa r Two and! dur i ng the he i ght o f the co ~ ~ war, Germany was cut
off from its traditional sources for trade and industry and was
forced to orient its trading relationships to the West. As the
cold war is over these old trading links are likely to revived.
See Appendix A for comparative U.S. and F.R.G. trade data with
CMEA countries.
45 Given that about 60% of the F.R.G.'s energy demand are
covered by imports, West-Germany's interest in trade with the
Soviet Union concerns not only exports but imports as well as the
F.~.G. was determined to diversify it network of energy supply
since 1973.
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multitude of cooperative agreements between the F.R.G. and the
Eastern bloc which have been signed throughout the past quarter
century.
Apart from the intensity of trade with the East, there are
also differences in the structure of U.S. and West German trade
with the East--differences which encompass both the composition
of the exports and the industrial structure of the exporters.
With regard to the composition of trade, U.S. exports to the
Eastern bloc consist mostly of agricultural goods, while those of
the F.R.G. are largely industrial (see Appendix A, Table 2).46
Since agricultural goods are not included in Cocom's concept of
"strategic", the exports of the U.S. are much less affected by
the Cocom list than those of the F.~.G.
The second difference lies in the industrial structure of
U.S. and West German exporters to the East. Of the few U.S.
companies which do export industrial goods to the Eastern bloc,
most are large multinational corporations. Thus the share of
exports to the East in their overall production is negligible.
Any change in the Cocom list has little effect on their overall
business. The situation is very different in the F.~.G., where
many manufacturers that export to the Eastern bloc are small to
medium size businesses. Thus in many cases the exports to the
East make up a considerable share of their total production; and
46 In the case of machine tools for example, the F.~.G.
currently holds 45% of the East European market while the share
of the U.S. is 2%, see National Machine Tool Builders
Association, The Economic Handbook of the Machine Tool Industry,
1989-90.
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so businesses are severely affected by a tightening of the
list.47 Moreover, many respondents mentioned that "many
potential mutually beneficial business opportunities have never
been realized, since the risks are much too high of losing a
substantial part of your business because of a sudden change of
U.S. policy in CoCom".48
2.4. Summary
Throughout most of the postwar period, the F.R.G. has
attempted to reduce the confrontational aspects of the
relationship between East and West, and to emphasize common
interests so that cooperative relations between neighbors could
prevail. This policy matched with the F.R.G.'s longstanding
economic interests in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
While the encouragement of East-West economic relationships
have always been an integral part of the Federal Republic's
policy towards the Eastern bloc, these economic relationships
have always been a major point of contention between the U.S. and
the F.R.G. In previous years, the continued military threat of
the Soviet Union and the F.R.G.'s security dependence on the U.S.
often forced West Germany to comply with U.S. preferences. But
with the changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
47 For example in 1982 25% of steel pipes exports, 17% of
machine tool export, and 20% of rolled steel exports went to CMEA
countries, Der Bundesminister fur Wirtschaft, Der Deutsche
Osthandel 1982, Bonn: 1982.
48 Interviews.
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since the mid 1980s, the balance between the allies' perspectives
on East/West relations has clearly shifted in favor of the
F.R.G.49 West German officials are now becoming more assertive
in their long-standing demands for a reform of CoCom. While the
developments in the East have reinforced the necessity of even
deeper cuts in the current lists, the respondents point out that
this is not a new phenomenon that must f irst be studied caret ul Ty
before any action can be taken. Rather, it is a dramatic
reminder of the changes that have taken place in some Eastern
European countries long before the Fall of 3989, and of the
urgent need to reform an outdated control system that will
otherwise disintegrate. In the words of Hans Dietrich Genscher,
"it is our belief that the situation is ripe to engage in a new
effort for a broad-based longterm understanding between East and
West. This policy must be seen in the perspective of a European
peace order. This peace order cannot be reduced to military
problems alone but has to find it basis for interests and
confidence in close political, economic, environmental and
cultural cooperat~on."50
49 This leaves the question open as to why these changers
are occurring. Again the opinions differ sharply. While in the
U.S. the changes in the Eastern Europe and especially the Soviet
Union are often attributed to its hard line stance towards the
Eastern bloc in the early 1980s, West-Germans and Europeans in
general have a more differentiated view pointing to a series of
factors including the successful strategy of positive linkage
within the CSCE process.
50Hans Dietrich Genscher: "Wie gent es 1984 mit den West-Ost
Beziehungen weiter?", Mitteilugen fur die Presse, No.1046 A/84,
Bonn, 30. 3. 1984, p.8, 11, quoted in: Jurgen No~zold,
"Politische Voraussetzungen der Wirtschaftsbezi~hungen zwischen
24
Representative terms from entire chapter:
eastern bloc
