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4. COCON: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION
4.1. Introduction:
Like the F.~.G., the European Community (EC) rejects an
approach which utilizes economic strength as an instrument of
political confrontation with the Eastern bloc.178 This position
arises in part from the extensive economic relations and
significant industrial interests which have developed between the
two areas. Throughout the 1980s, about 7.5% of the Community's
entire external trade has been with CMEA countries.l79 Almost
two thirds of the CMEA's total exports to the West go to the EC,
while 50% of the CMEA countries' total imports from the West are
of EC origin, which makes the EC the CMEA's most important
trading partner (see Appendix A, Table 4).
The structure of trade is rather complementary. Energy and
raw materials, as well as semi-finished and agricultural
products, constitute the bulk of EC imports from Eastern Europe,
although the EC is also the largest Western customer for Eastern
bloc manufactured products. Meanwhile, machinery and capital
goods dominate the CMEA's imports from the EC. (see Appendix A,
Table 5).180 Thus, like the F.R.G., the Community is more
severely affected by restrictions on technology transfer than the
178 This was the unanimous position taken by the officials
interviewed in the European Parliament as well as the Commission.
179 European Parliament, Directorate General for Research,
Comecon in Figures, No.2 (January' 1990).
180 See European Parliament, Directorate General for
Research, Comecon in Figures, No.2 (January, 1990), here, p.6.
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U.S., whose main exports to the Eastern bloc consist of
agricultural products.181
But the EC's policy towards the Eastern bloc is not based
solely upon economic motivations. It also contains a vital
political element, in that the EC strongly advocates the dual
track approach embedded in the Helsinki Final Act and the CSCE
process. In a recent communication from the Commission to the
Council on the developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union the Commission states that ''by lending its full support to
the Helsinki process, while at the same time strengethening links
with all its participants, the Community can help manitain
stability and confidence which are essential conditions for peace
and prosperity throughout Europe. Thisd implies closer Community
coordination within the framework of the CSCE.~182 The support
for such a strategy arises from Western Europeans geographical
proximity to the Eastern bloc, its longstanding cultural and
historical ties to the East, and from the belief that "increased
economic, political, commercial and other contacts can create
step by step a community of common interests leading to increased
181 Ausschuss for Wirtschaft, Wahrung und Industriepolitik,
Stellungnahme zu den Beschrankungen des internationalen
Technologietransfers durch die USA und deren nachteiligen
Auswirkungen auf die industrielle Entwicklung der Gemeinschaft,
Doc . 2-721/84, April 25, 198S .
i82 Commission of the European Communities, Communication
from the Commission to the Council: Implications of the recent
changes in central and eastern Europe for the Co~uity's
relations with the countries concerned, 1. 23 . 1990, SEC( 90 ) 111
f inal, here p . 8 .
76
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rapprochement among the antagonistic blocs.~8183
In past years, the EC's approach has caused many conflicts
with the U.S. over the proper policy responses towards the
Eastern bloc. For example, unlike the U.S., the EC has denied
the effectiveness of economic sanctions, and has relied upon
political and diplomatic initiatives as its main instruments of
influencing Eastern bloc behavior.184 The EC's differences with
the U.S. were particularly evident in the case of the imposition
of martial law in Poland. Only three month after martial law was
declared, the European Council stated that the economic ties
between the EC and the CMEA countries constituted a stabilizing
factor in East West relations, and emphasized the need for the
continuation of this relationship.~85 In taking this position,
183 Europaisches Parliament' SitzungsdoRmentel Zweiter
Bericht im Namen des Ausschusses fur AuBenwirtschaftsbez iahungen
uber die Ausfuhrbeschr~nRungen fur strategische Erzeugnisse und
den Technologietransf fir zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten under
der Europaischen Gen~einschaft, Michael Toussaint, March 29, 1989,
Document A2-31/89Part-3; see also "Entschlie8ung zu den
Beziehungen zwischen der EWG und den osteuropfiischen
Staatshandelslandern sowie dem ~GW (Comecon), Doc. 1-531/82),
Official Journal, No. C 292, November 8, 1982, p.15 cont.;
Politischer AusschuB, Stellungnahme fur den AusschuB fur
AuBenwirtschaftsbezishungen zu den politischen Aspekten des
Technologietransfers, Doc. 2-721/84, October 31, 1985;
184 See for example "EntschlieBung zur Bedeutung und den
Auswirkungen von Wirtschaftssan~tionen, insbesondere des
Handelsembargos und des Boykotts auf die AuBenbezishungen der
E~G," Doc. 1-83782, Official Journal, No.C 292, November 9, 1982,
p.13 cont.
185 Agences Internationale d' Information Pour La Presse,
Gerneral Information, No.3341, March 31 1982; there were some
minor sanctions against the Sov~et Union which we designed to
show solidarity but in no way did they jeopardize the commercial
relationships.
77
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most EC members were motivated by a political interest in
maintaining strong diplomatic relations with the Eastern bloc, as
well as by an economic interest in avoiding the costs of economic
sanctions. The cost accruing from economic sanctions would have
been much larger for the EC than for the US; in addition,
according to one estimate, the EC actually would have suffered
greater economic damage than the Soviet Union itself.~86
4.2. Export Controls: A Common European Foreign Policy?
Turning specifically to CoCom, the Commission has been less
outspoken. The European Community is not a member of CoCom and
has so far expressed no public interest in becoming one. This
position conforms with the Community's established practice of
leaving matters of national security in the hands of national
governments. However, there are growing indications that further
political integration is an important item on the post-1992
European agenda. For example, the recent initiative by France
and the F.~.G.-to combine the initiative towards European
:86 See Mathias Jopp, "Friedensicherung durch
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit? Die europaisch-amerikanische
Kontroverse uber die Rolle des Handles in den ost-West-
Beziehungen," in: Wolfgang R. Logy, Streitfall Frieden,
Heidelberg: 1984. Another incident which revealed the fundamental
differences between the U.S. and the EC was the transatlantic
controversy over the natural gas pipeline. The EC protested the
use of extraterritorial ity against its members and stated that
the claims to extraterritorial jurisdiction of American law were
in violation of the basic principles of international trade and
an unacceptable interference in businesses which were located in
Europe and thus under the jurisdiction of European law. See for
example, Agence Internationale d' Information Pour La Presse,
Europe Documents, No.1216, August 12, 1982.
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monetary union with a move towards political union suggests that
the moves towards political integration might come sooner than
expected.187 This would force the EC to address the issue of a
common foreign and security policy, which would include the
question of a common policy on export controls.
Unlike the Commission, the European Parliament has already
proved quite outspoken on the issue of Cocom. In February of
1986 the Parliament passed a resolution188 which endorsed CoCom's
role in preventing the export of militarily critical technology,
yet strongly criticized the failure to liberalize CoCom
restrictions in other areas.189 A second resolution in 1989 was
equally critical of Cocom's administrative structure, the actual
content of the list, and the process by which the list is
reviewed (see Appendix 8, No. 1 & 2 for a copy of the
resolutions).190
187 It remains to be seen to what degree this joint
proposition by Francois Mitterand and Helmut Kohl to take a
decisive step towards political union by calling a second
intergovernmental conference that would decide on a timetable
towards political union was more a tactical maneuver motivated by
each politician's particular concerns or a genuine step towards
political integration.
i88 Resolution on Technology Transfer, Doc. A2-99/85,
February 21, 1986.
189 For a copy of the resolution see Appendix; see also
''US-Beschrankungen des Technologietransfers verurteilt," VWD,
21.2.1986; Wolfgang Hoffmann, ttSchwarze Liste -immer langer," Die
Zeit, 3.7.1986; 'tCocom. Ein Hauch van Inquisition," VOI-N,
S.2.1986.
190 Resolution on restrictions on strategic exports and US-
EC technology transfer, Doc.A2-31/89, April 14, 1989; for the
report see European Parliament, Session Documents, Second Report
drawn up on behalf of the Committee on External Economic
79
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To sum up, the EP has cr:ticizec:t CoCom on several occasions
and has urged the Commission to take a position on CoCom pol icy .
However, given that technology transfer falls into the realm of
national security, the Commission has until recently not
addressed the issue of export controls in terms of a common EC
secur ity po 1 i cy .
4. 3. Export Controls And Lee Mandate Of The Single Haricet
However, export controls af f ect the EC not only at the
foreign policy level . In fact, a more important aspect of CoCom
is its ef f ect on the EC ' s common commercial policy . In recent
years, CoCom has generated increas ing concern within the
Commission and the European Parliament, due to the potential
impact of export controls upon the process of creating a single
market by 1993. As the Community moves towards the completion of
this internal market, defined by an "area without internal
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services
and capital is ensured," two problems have emerged.191
The first relates to the barriers that continued export
controls on intra-EC trade would impose on the free movement of
goods after ~ ~992" . The second problem relates to the question
of national dif ferences in export control policies . If the
Relations on restrictions on strategic exports and US-EC
technology transfer, Doc A 2-31/89/A and B. for the text of the
resolution see Appendix.
19] Article 8A of the Single European Act, see '"Single
European Act, " Bulletin, of the European Communities, Supplement
2/86, here p. 11.
80
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mandate of the Single Market is to be fulfilled, it will be
necessary to harmonize export controls --if they exist-- at the
European level.
With "1992" approaching, the EP has become increasingly
concerned with the problem of continued export controls in a
barrier-free market. One recently-passed resolution ''draws
attention to the possible conflict between COCoM rules and the
provisions of the EEC Treaty; calls upon the Commission to
examine the compatibility of Member States' application of the
COCOM rules with the provisions of the Treaty, and to bring the
matter before the Court of Justice, if necessary.''l92 Similarl
the Toussaint resolution of 1989 mentioned above "warns that
Community integration in the areas most concerned, i.e. data
processing, computerization, biotechnology, aeronautics and
astronautics, new materials and telecommunications, must not be
obstructed by unilateral action by individual COCOM members.''193
Both resolutions also mention the need to develop a common
European export control system. For example, in the Toussaint
.
resolution the EP ''looks to the EEC to set up in parallel with
the abolition of internal borders, an effective system to control
exports from the Community which will clear the way for this
unlimited and information between the United States and the EEC
192 See Resolution on Technology Transfer, op.cit. note ,
here p.10. the Toussaint resolution also draws attention to the
conflict.
193 Resolution on restrictions on strategic exports.....
op.cit., section 12.
81
,Y,
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by banning any illegal transfer to prohibited countries of
products on the COCOM list.''l94 And the resolution continues by
calling "on the Commission to submit to Parliament proposals
concerning the principles that should govern transfers of
technology between the EEC and the countries to which the COCOM
list currently applies; these principles should be based upon the
real industrial interests of Community countries and firms.
The interviews conducted in Luxembourg with EP officials
confirmed that the Parliament was intent upon pressing the
Commission to resolve the basic contradiction between the Single
Market and the continuation of export controls. Officials ware
especially worried that individual members would use the
mechanism of export controls to "roll back" the achievements of
the internal market. As one official suggested, "if we continue
to apply export controls, we get a similar situation that exists
now between the Europeans and the U.S., and which has been
condemned by the Parliament and the Commission on numerous
occasions. Individual member countries just like the U.S. can
control and thus withhold the free flow of technology within the
EC.''196 Furthermore, given that member countries have different
restrictions on high-tech exports, national export control
policies would automatically become instruments of an industrial
194 Cite
195 Resolution on restrictions on strategic exports and US-
EC technology transfer, Doc.A2-31/89, April 14, 1989, here
sections 12 and 13.
196 Interview
~2
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policy by creating advantages or disadvantages for industries
trying to gain access to third country markets.
On top of the contradiction between export controls and the
Single Market, the recent developments in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union have reinforced the opinion of EP officials that the
entire CoCom export control system needs to be overhauled. As
one official stated, "Cocom needs to be reevaluated in light of
the economic and political reforms under way in the Eastern
bloc.''l97 All officials agreed that Cocom is getting "less and
less relevant," especially in the dual use area, which provides
the foundation for building the infrastructure vital to East
European and Soviet economic reconstruction. "We cannot possibly
pump billions into these countries and at the same time deny such
basic technologies that would enable them to built a modern
telecommunications system.''l98 These statements are confirmed by
a recently passed resolution in the EP that states "whereas there
is a need to support the process of political reform by measures
to modernize the economy of the Central and Eastern European
. · .
Countries" the EP "calls on the governments of member states and
the Council to take rapid action to repeal all COCOM rules for
Central and Eastern Europe and the USSR, which amount to a set of
restrictions on trade and cooperation which are ill-suited to the
present time and outmoded in light of the developments in Eastern
197 Interview
198 Interview.
83
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Europe." (see Appendix B. No.3 for a copy of the resolution)199
When asked about the need to differentiate between Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, respondents agreed that "politically
it would be the wrong signal; if you want to help Gorbachev you
cannot decouple him from Eastern Europe and the EC." But most
officials agreed that it might be necessary to establish a
safeguard regime that would monitor the end use of some of the
technology shipped to the -oviet Union.
The EP has also addressed the issue of nuclear safety and
environmental pollution. Officials from the Parliament consider
it in the vital interest of the EC to enhance the security of
nuclear reactors in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This
position is reflected in the cooperative agreements to enhance
nuclear rector safety that the EC --through Euratom-- has
concluded with all Eastern European nations and the Soviet Union.
Concerning the destruction of the environment, the most recent
resolution on CoCom that calls for its abolition "having regard
to the appalling state of the environment in the above countries,
caused primarily by the use of outdated technology, and aware of
the need for determined action to reduce toxic emissions in
Eastern Europe.' (see Appendix B' No.3 )200
Given the EP's limited political clout, the reports and
resolutions discussed above have had little influence on CoCom's
199 Resolution on C0COM, European Parliament, 4.6.1990, PE
139.833.
200 Resolution on COCOM, European Parliament, 4.6., 1990, PE
139.833.
84
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policy. In fact, when the EP's Committee on External Relations
requested a Cocom official to testify at one of its Hearings,
CoCom never responded to the invitation despite numerous attempts
to contact the Paris Bureau and despite the personal intervention
of the Parliament's president. Yet it must noted that while the
EP currently has little political power, both the Commission and
the individual member states have committed themselves to
enhancing the EP's power in the European decision making process
in the near future.201 Thus, the parliament may become an
important political force in determining the nature and extent of
export controls after 1992.
Furthermore, the EP's concern over CoCom has already led to
a series of consultations with the Commission on these issues.202
In previous years, the Commission avoided making public
statements on its position towards CoCom. More recently,
however, the Commission has indicated that it is concerned with
the possible repercussions of the CoCom export control regime
upon the creation of the Single Market.203 In its 1988 progress
201 See for example "Tackling the democratic deficit,"
Financial Times, 3.14.1990; "In 9 Languages, Parliament Demands a
Bigger Say," New York Times, 3.27.1990; the recent initiative by
France and Germany for some form political union by the beginning
of 1993 also envisions a greater political role for the EP.
202 The Metten report mentioned above led to a large scale
inquiry by the Commission into the CoCom system as well as
national export control systems in the EC.
203 Already in 1986 the Community recognized that Cocom pose
a major problem to the completion of the Single Market, see
''Strategische Export Kontrollen und EG-Binnenmark~," VWD,
2.12.1986.
85
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and the F.R.G. has introduced its own system that facilitates
Intra-CoCom trade in dual use goods.2~5 Yet these types of
liberalization measures are unlikely to resolve the contradiction
between Intra-Cocom and EC export controls. For one thing, the
individual country liberalizations apply to a relatively small
number of goods. As a consequence, a large number of dual use
goods would remain on the CoCom list and clash with the
provisions of Articles 113 and 223. Secondly, by leaving the
liberalization process to individual countries, member countries
would likely violate paragraph lube of Article 223, which states
that unilateral actions by members may not ''adversely affect the
conditions of competition in the common market regarding products
which are not intended for specifically military purposes." If
EC members start liberalizing on an individual bases, they
automatically create competitive asymmetries among themselves.
In addition, such unilateral liberalizing measures would probably
lead to a process of competitive deregulation among member
countries, which should not be the basis for the reform of the
CoCom lists.
A further problem arises from the fact that after the
creation of the Single Market, commercial policy with third
countries will become the sole responsibility of the Community.
Therefore, individual countries will not be allowed to decide on
215 "Pauschaigenehmigung fur West-West Handel,"
Handelsblatt, 2.S.1990; "Intra-Cocom Handel wird erieichtert,
H~ndlesblatt, 4.4.1990.
91
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export restrictions to third countries.216 Furthermore, even if
national export controls beyond the munitions list were
permitted, differences in the regulations and the way in which
they are administered (application time etc.) would represent a
form of industrial policy. Countries whose export control regime
is more liberal would unfairly support their own industries'
exports to third countries. Such unfair competition is entirely
irreconcilable with the completion of the internal market.
All these problems and contradictions indicate that the
Community and the Commission have little choice but to get
involved in the future of export controls within the EC. So far,
the Commission has not yet decided how to respond to the
challenges which CoCom presents to the creation of the internal
market; nor has it determined to what degree it will replace the
individual member states in administering export controls. This
indecisiveness largely reflects the individual members'
reservations about transferring control over an area of national
security into the hands of the Community.2~7
This is reflected in the old controversy between the
Commission and the Council over the scope of the common
216 Obviously this excludes the EC munitions list.
217 The other reason as to why the Community has not
presented its own opinion seem to be some internal differences
between two Directorate Generals (DG) that are primarily involved
in this issue on how to react to the challenge of CoCom. They are
DG I, which is responsible for external economic relations and DG
IIT which deals with the completion of the internal market.
92
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commercial policy.218 In its interpretation of the scope of
Article 113, the Commission has always her ~ that any measure that
restricts free trade to and from the EC falls within the
competence of the Community. The Council, on the other hand, has
~nterpre-ted Article 113 to mean that only those measures whose
primary goal is to limit the flow of goods to or from the
Community constitute commercial policy. The Council' s approach
ref lects the reluctance of individual nations to concede control
to the Community over a policy area which af fects their foreign
policy and security interests.
However, the hi f f erences between the Commi ss ion and the
individual countries have narrowed in the past year, especially
with regard to dual use goods. All EC members agree that the
threat from the Eastern bloc has dramatically decliner], and they
are now less inclined to consider the export of dual use goods as
undermining their national security. As a result, a shift in the
position of the Council seems likely.219 Such a shift would
strengthen the Community's ability to tackle the issue of export
controls.
Under any scenario, members would retain individual
218 See for example P . J. Kuyper, "New Developments in Trade
Sanctions and Export Controls by the I:EC, mimeo.
2~9 See for example the inaugural speech of the West German
EC-Presidency in the first half of 1988 by Hans-Dietrich Genscher
head of the Council to the European Parliament, in "Genscher:
COCOM-Beschrankungen gehen zu weit,i' Nachrichten fur den
AuBenhandel' 1.21.1988. This would especially be the case if no
progress were made in CoCom in the next year and the EC members
would consider to use Article 113 as a way to circumvent the
gentlemen agreement.
93
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sovereignty over the munitions list as defined both by CoCom and
the EC list. As to dual use goods, several scenarios are
possible. If CoCom streamlines the present list to a core list
which conforms to the exceptions granted under Article 223, then
there would be no need for the EC to intervene, since the
administration of export controls would fall in the domain of
national sovereignty. However, most officials agreed that there
will probably be a small residual list of dual use items which
will not fall under the narrow definition of Article 223 ~ but
whose exports EC members want to control for the foreseeable
future. This would require the establishment of an EC export
control regime, which would specify a Community list for dual use
goods, and which would eliminate the remaining physical barriers
to trade in those goods among EC me~bers.220 Yet while the
goods on the EC list would be able to circulate freely within the
Community, some control over their movements should remain. An
inner control mechanism is necessary to guarantee the proper end
use of dual goods and technology. It would also enable the EC
authorities to track the exact path of any dual use technology on
the EC list which left the common market without a previously
approved licence. Most respondents agreed that such a control
mechanism should utilize a 'paper trail" of accompanying
220 See also the Toussaint Resolution, Appendix B. No.
here section 12 & 13. The creation of such a list would be
complicated as it involves a whole series of complicated issues
relating to the harmonization of technical standards and norms,
better exchange of information on R & D, question of public
procurement and many others.
94
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documents, and should rely on the cooperation of the private
sector in order to maintain a record of the ~ ocation and use of
due 1 use goods .
The ef f ective implementation of an EC export regime requires
not only a common ~ ist but also common EC export control
practices. This does not necessary ly require a new centralized
bureaucracy at the EC level . Since national authorities wi ~ ~
remain in place to control those items that are exempted f rom
Article 113, they will be in a position to administer the newly
harmonized EC rules as well. However, given the current
discrepancies in the effectiveness of individual countries'
export control bureaucracies, some cooperative effort among the
twelve is necessary in order to harmonize their export control
procedures. The legal and organizational basis for an EC export
control regime is contained in Article 125 of the Schengen
accOr~.221
The prospects for such a harmonization are good, given the
fact that a similar EC agreement in the area of chemical weapons
precursors already exists. Since the early 1980s, discussions
had taken place within the framework of EPC on ways to coordinate
national policies on restricting the export of precursors to
221 The Schengen Accord was signed by West Germany, France,
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg in June of less. It
would have abolished border controls between the signatories.
However, concerns by the countries involved about the influx of
East Germans led to the postponement of the pact that was to take
effect on 1.1.1990. "Fears of German Influx Delay Pact on Open
Borders, Financial Times, 12.11.1989. According to officials
from the Commission, however, the treaty will go into effect in
July of this year.
95
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chemical weapons.222 H'--~ever, progress was initially impeded by
some nations' fears that policy coordination would infringe upon
national sovereignty in matters of security.223 The catalyst to
action was the revelation that the West-German chemical
engineering firm Immhausen exported what amounted to a chemical
weapons factory to Libya. Within a little more than a month, a
Council regulation was ratified which created an EC wide export
control regime for chemical weapons Precursors 224 Export
authorization was refused if "...there is reason to believe that
products under consideration will be used for the development or
production of chemical weapons or that there is a risk of their
being delivered directly or indirectly to belligerent countries
or to areas of serious international tension..." (see Appendix B.
No.5 for a copy of the regulation).
The case of the chemical weapons precursors demonstrates
that once the necessary political will on the part of the
individual EC members is created, it is possible to quickly
institute an EC wide regime to control the export of sensitive
goods . It seems likely that such political will is indeed
present in the case of dual use technology. All EC members agree
that the military threat emanat i ng from the Eastern bloc has
222 See for example EC Bulletin, No.3 (1984), section
2.4.3., p.SO; No.4 (1984) section 2.4.1., p.63; No5 (1984),
section 2.4.2., p.lO4.
223 See EC Bulletin No.5 (1987), section 2.4.1.
224 See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 428/89 of 20 February
1989 concerning the export of certain chemical products.
96
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declined drastically, and that as a consequence, the EC's primary
goal should be to help the economic reconstruction process in the
East through an infusion of high technology.225 This is
supported by a recent Commuity statement on its future relations
with Eastern Europe, "Economic, scientific and technical links
will be developed and diversified. This cooperation wit ~ back up
structural change in associated countire and help integrate them
into the international trade system. Particular weight will be
given to promoting transfers of technology and ecouraging
investment . It 226
Thus it is probably correct to assume that there is limited
resistance by individual nations to a Community wide effort to
control the residual dual use list.227 In fact, at the EC summit
shortly after the opening of the Berlin Wall, the 12 foreign
ministers agreed on the need to ease CoCom restrictions on high
22S As one EC official stated, "It is impossible to give aid
to Eastern Europe to help them develop their economies without
giving them access to Ladvanced] technology", as quoted in "East
Bloc Pot of Gold," National Journal, 2.10.199O, here p.314. For
the Commissions perspective on the recent developments in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union and its repercussions on the EC's
relations to these countries, see Mitteilung der Kommission and
den Rat, Auswirkungen der jungsten Vera~derungen in Mittel- und
Osteuropa auf die Be 2 i ehungen der Gemeinschaft zu den dortigen
Landern, Brussels, 1.23.1990, SEK(901111 fin.
226 Commission of the European Communities, The Development
of the Community's Relations with the Countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, 4.18.1990, SEC(90) 7}7 final, here p.4.
227 Interviews; this is also supported by a study of the
various cooperation agreements that have been concluded between
the Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the EC during the
last year.
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technology exports to Eastern Europe.228 Furthermore, the recent
initiatives by several EC members to push forward with the
establishment of a political union indicates the increasing
willingness by EC members to cooperate in matters of foreign
policy and even security. This is clearly indicated by the
communique issued at EC summit in Dublin where the Community
committed itself "to play a full part in the CSCE process; ....
its central role ...should be fully reflected through appropriate
represntation at the forthcoming CSCE summit and within future
structures which may emerge within the Helsinki process or
according to ther proposals recently pur forward."229 Finally,
if by the end of 1990 CoCom fails to come up with a drastically
reduced core list, EC member countries might actually welcome an
initiative by the Commission to develop its own list based on
article 223.
~~ "EC pledges aid to nations embracing democracy,"
Financial Times, 11.20.1989; "Les Douze Sont Favorables A On
Assouplissement Des Restrictions Du CoCom A Declare Mme Cresson,"
Agence Europe, No. 5135, 11.20.1989.
229 Commission of the European Communities, The Development
of the Conmunity's Relations with the Countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, 4.18.1990, SECt90) 717 final, here p.7. See also
"Presidency Conclusions," European Community News, No.2O
~ 4 . 30 . 1990 ); see also "France and West-Germany launch new drive
for European union, " Financial Times, 4 .20. 1990; "Bonn initiative
behind ambitious target, ~ Financial Times, 4.20. 1990; "Europeans
To Seek New Union, " Washington Post, 4 . 29 . 1990; "Europe ' s
Alliance Seeks Closer Ties, " New York Times, 4.29. 1990; "Paving
the Way f or Po l i t i ca l Un i on, '' Journ a l o f Cc:~=nerce, 4 . I ? . I 9 g O .
Another indication at increasing cooperation in Foreign policy
area is the recent Franco-Ger~an initiative with regard to the
Lithuanian crisis, see for example "Possible Compromise Signaled
by Kremlin, " Washington Post, 4.29. 1990; "Moscow Endorses Paris-
Bonn Effort In Lithuania Crisis, " New York Times, 4.29.1990 .
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To sum up, there is a strong likelihood that the Community
will get directly involved in addressing the problems created by
CoCom regarding the creation of the Single Market. This raises
yet another question that will confront EC and CoCom within the
next year. As mentioned earlier, the EC is currently not a
member of CoCom. However, if a residual list in the dual use
realm is created at the Community level, the EC would be
responsible for administering the residual list. Similarly, if
EC members decide to use Article 113 as a means to divert
responsibility for trade in dual use goods to the Community
level, the EC would be the legal representative administering
this segment of high technology trade. In both circumstances,
the Community would have to become a member or at least an
observer of CoCom. Whether the EC is in fact willing to do this
is not quite clear.230 So far it has expressed no desire --at
least not publicly-- to join.231 To the contrary, during a
recent debate in the EP the current president of the Council
Gerard Collins stated that the Council will not participate in
CoCom.232 In addition EC officials emphasize that CoCom is not
an internationally recognized organization. CoCom "has no legal
230 The EP has deplored "the fact that the Community ....has
not been represented in one form or another" in CoCom. And has
the requested the Commission to examine the possibility of the EC
becoming a member, see Toussaint Report op.cit. note , here
section 9(b) and (c).
231 This is further coplicated by the fact that Ireland is
not a participant in Cocom either, but an EC member country.
232 Debate on the oral question by Mrs Randizio-Plath and
Mr. Cot, 4.~.1990, Doc. B3-430/90 and 431/90.
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existence and agreements reached in COCOM have consequently no
legal status."233 This led many respondents to conlcude that the
EC cannot enter into any kind of official agreement with
Cocom.234 An additional problem arises because Ireland is not a
member of CoCom.235 If the EC joins CoCom, Ireland would
automatically become a member.
Finally, the question must be raised whether the EC should
join CoCom even if it could. The transformation in the Eastern
bloc has dramatically altered the overall political and economic
situation in Europe. The post World War Two European security
order and its numerous support structures --including CoCom--
must adapt to these changes. Many EC officials agreed that the
EC should focus on playing a constructive role in shaping the
future of Europe, rather than joining an outmoded institution
which derives its legitimacy from the continued existence of the
Cold War. This would involve the creation of an entirely
restructured export control regime that reflects the changing
nature of East-West relations, as well as new security threats
~ .
from novel technology and from countries that have not previously
been the main focus of attention in CoCom. Although a discussion
of these issues is not the focus of this study, the concluding
233 Note D'Information A La Commission, Achievement De La
Politique Com~erciale Dans La Perspective Ou Marche Unique,
1.9.1990.
234 Intervies; this assertion is not entirely correct as the
EC is also a member of the Australian group.
235 However, Ireland operates an export control system that
is similar to that of CoCom.
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section will sketch out some central considerations such a regime
shout d take into account.
101
Representative terms from entire chapter:
export control
