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COMMISSIONED PAPERS
for the report
FINDING COMMON GROUND:
U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS IN A CHANGED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
JAPAN'S STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS: A NEW ERA
Donald Goldstein
THE STATE OF PERESTROIKA.
UNION
Joel Hellman
.
A SURVEY OF U.S. SPECIALISTS ON THE SOVIET
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY EXPORT CONTROLS
International Business-Government Counsellors, Inc.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTER BLOC COUNTRIES AND THEIR EFFECTS
ON COCOM, WEST GERMAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES
Wolfgang Reinicke
Panel on the Future Design and Implementation
of U.S. National Security Export Controls
Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy
National Academy of Sciences
National Academy of Engineering
Institute of Medicine
1991
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES
AND THEIR EFFECTS ON COCOM:
WEST GERMAN AND EUROPEAN PERS PECTIN7ES
Wo~ fgang H. }keinicke
The Brookings Institution
and
Yale University
May 29, 1990
a study prepared for the National Academy of Sciences ~ Panel
on the Future Design and Implementation of National Security
Export Controls
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IRE ~ am
ENDIVE SAY
1. ~rION
1.1. Purpose Of Stat
1.2. ~t~1~y
l.3. A Word Of Caution
2. ~ UNWED SO AND ~ COEVAL P~C OF A:
D=T~ ANON; ALIIES
2.1. me Political Disunion
2.1.1. Nature of E~st~ Pelatior~s: Creative Oration vs.
Eve Ant~i~
2.1.2. ~~ As An J~trL~t of Foreign Policy
2.2. me E~znic Dimension
2.2.1. On AS An J=tr~t of dial Policy
2.2.2. EXb~1 True: - tic Right vs. Primula
2.2.3. Tic Iin~: Cl~ Tim vs. The its
2.4. by
. · · .
1—111
1
1
2
2
4
s
5
10
~3
14
19
20
23
3. ~ DEMONIC ~~ IN ]~ EAST Ad 1'1~ ~fE=C~ONS t~ axes 25
3.1. ~ On Socratic public, On, arm On Unification 25
3.1.1. On Ed the Unified Any
3.~.2. SO arx! odium Run: Endemic Unity arm Politick
Division—~licati~ for don
3 .~.3 . three S~iz~1 aloes
3.2. Astern Eye
3 . 3 . ~ Sc viet Union
3.4. by
25
26
36
41
50
72
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4. (I: ~ EI3K)PEAN DIMENSION
4 . 1 . Icon
4.2. ExE=rt Controls: A (an Ran Foreign Policy?
4.3. Export Controls Ark The Marinate Of lye Single Market
S. C~SICtJ: IlIE FUIU~ OF ~ ~1~ AND ORES
AF~X A
Sac B
75
75
78
80
102
107
113
******************
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EXEC~T~ RI~RY
This study examines the Federal Republic of Germany's (F.R.G.)
and the European Community's (EC) perspectives on and disagreements
with the U.S. on the future of CoCom in light of the developments in
the Eastern bloc since the Fall of 1989. Three elements determine
the F.R.G.'s position. The first is a series of five policy
differences between the U.S. and the F.R.G. regarding adequate
responses of their governments to developments in the East. These
disagreements are historical in nature and have divided the allies
for many years. First, contrary to the U.S., the F.R.G. has always
emphasized a strategy towards the East that relies not only on the
maintenance of military security but also on economic cooperation.
This economic dimension of East-West relations is an important
instrument in improving the Federal Republic's overall relationship
with the East, and contributes to greater national security. Second,
due to the low degree of East West economic interdependence, the
F . R . G . views economic sanctions against the East as inef f ective .
Moreover, economic sanctions are mostly reactive and they do not
provide any constructive impetus for changing the overall East-West
relationship. Third, white the F . R. G . does not see any systematic
effort by the U. S. to use Cocom to further its commercial interests,
there is great concern that the impending liberalization process be
conducted in a way that avoids discrimination against particular
industrial sectors . Fourth, export controls are in stark
contradiction to the basic principles of the F.R.G.'s external trade
relations. Contrary to the U.S., where trade is a privilege regulated
through a licensing procedure, it is a basic right in the F.~.G.
Fifth, the economic ties of the F.R.G. with Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union have been of much greater intensity and historical
duration than those of the U.S. and the economic and political
interests at stake in East-West trade are of much greater
significance. Given the above, the F.R.G. argues that the reforms
currently underway in the East vindicate its traditional approach to
East-West relations. The degree of CoCom liberalization required
should not only be a function of the political and economic reforms
already achieved, it must be part of a broad strategy to encourage
the process of economic and~political reform in the Eastern bloc, and
to strengthen international stability.
The second element that determines the F.R.G.'s position with
regard to Cocom are the "structural realities" of the impending
unification of the two Germanies. They limit the range of policy
responses which can be undertaken without undermining both the
unification process and the progress of economic and political
renewal in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. With regard to East
Germany, CoCom must turn to the task of determining a special status
for the G.D.R. before July 1. The continued application of CoCom
rules in the dual-use area would severely undermine the monetary and
economic union. Dangerous nuclear safety standards, environmental
pollution and the continued presence of Soviet troops in East Germany
are three additional challenges that have to be addressed by policy
makers. In Eastern Europe, the G.D.R. should not be singled out as
i
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special case by CoCom. Discriminating in favor of the G. D. R. sends
the wrong signals to the rest of Eastern Europe and wil ~ intensify
the already enormous difficulties they face in reform) ng their
economies . The West German government is skeptical of the U. S.
propose ~ to institute a re-export control system in Eastern Europe .
Lack of expertise, experience, and f inancial resources in the East
make such a proposition infeasible. In addition, the inability of
German customs official s to operate on foreign territory and the need
to estate! ish a huge bureaucratic apparatus that might become
redundant before it is fur ly operational, make it difficult to
advocate such a solution. The F.R.G. also rejects a policy of
favorable consideration towards Eastern Europe. It gives the
liberalization process a transitory quality and allows the U.S. to
reverse the process with. a veto at any time discouraging private
sector investment . Wes- Germany advocates the general streaml ining
of the industrial ~ ist . : order to reduce it to a smal ~ core of
sensitive technology. Be Cowmen 70% and 90% of the items could be
eliminated creating a threshold that is below the current China green
line. Some of the remaining items may also be exported subject to an
end-use verification procedure.
From the F.R.G.'s perspective, numerous economic and political
reasons exist in support of treating the Soviet Union as an equal
among the Eas tern bloc countr i e s . Whi ~ e high techno 1 ogy imports
c annot s ubst i tute f or economic re f orm i n the Sovi et Un ion, a
liberalization of Cocom would help its realization. In addition, the
F . R. G . argues that the symbolic effect of isolating the Soviet Union
and the re f arm or i ented Sov i et ~ eaders i s po ~ i ~ i ca ~ ~ y de struct i ve .
Special consideration must also be given to the close economic ties
between the G. D. R. and the Soviet Union . The success of German
economi c un i on depends to a cons i derab} e degree on the cont inuat i on
of trade between the two countries . In addition, given the
complementary nature of the trade, the Soviet Union cons iders the
maintenance of the commercial treaties as vital to their national
security. The F . R. G . favors a substantial liberalization of the Sitcom
i ndustri a l ~ i st f or the Sovi et Un i on . Rather than continue a pa l ~ cy
based on technology denial, the F.R.G. advocates a regime based on
safeguards in the form of end-use certificates and on-site
inspection. The Soviet Union has reacted favorably to such a
proposition and has offered to establish a system of safeguards under
Western control.
Finally, the F.R.G. 's perspective on the issue of CoCom has been
inf luencec! by the pressure from the opposition and the business
community . This pressure has both reinforced the preexisting
inclination to liberalize Sitcom and has given the government little
room to maneuver in negotiating with the U.S. in CoCom.
Like the F.~.G., the EC rejects an approach which utilizes
economic strength as an instrument of political confrontation with
the Eastern bloc. This position arises both from the extensive
economic relations and significant industrial interests which have
developed between the two areas as well as the EC's commitment to the
dual track approach embedded in the CSCE process. From the
perspective of a common EC foreign policy, the European Parliament
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(EP) has criticized CoCom on several occasions and has urged the
Commission to take a position. Given that technology transfer fails
into the realm of national security, the Commission has until
recently not addressed the issue of export controls in terms of a
common EC security policy. However, export controls affect the EC not
only at the foreign policy level; a more important aspect of CoCom is
its effect on the EC's mandate to create a single market by early
1993. Here too, the EP has drawn attention to the conflict between
CoCom and the provisions of the EC treaty. National export controls
not only violate the mandate of the Single Market, they also create
competitive asymmetries among member states in their trade with third
countries. The developments in Eastern bloc thus have only reinforced
the EP's position to overhaul the entire CoCom system. The
Community will not accept the current export control practices by it
members as it threatens the entire purpose of "1992". With the
exception of a core munitions list that remains under the control of
national authorities intra EC trade must be liberalized. As to trade
in dual use technology with third countries it will be necessary to
harmonize export controls at the European level, though the actual
controls could still be administered on a national basis. However the
EC is not a member of CoCom and there are reasons to doubt whether it
has an interest in becoming one. In general, officials at the EC
agree that the Community should play a constructive role in shaping
the future security structure of Europe, rather than joining an
outmoded institution which derives its legitimacy from the Cold War.
The analysis of the West German and European perspectives on the
future of CoCom lead to the conclusion that the very concept of
strategic as defined by CoCom must be reconsidered. Given the
radically transformed political and military situation in Europe it
is in the security interest of European nations not to restrict the
f low of high technology to the East, but to promote and to enhance
it. This requires that the strategic criteria that define Western
security encompass a broader definition to include among other things
(a) the stabilization of the economic and political reform efforts in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and (b) the avoidance of ~
nuclear disaster caused by inadequate safety standards in nuclear
reactors as well as the drastic reduction of pollution in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union.
Two additional considerations should be included in a successful
reform effort. First, a new control scheme must be embedded in the
new security structure that is emerging in Europe. This could be
achieved through a multilateral export regime under the CSCE umbrel la
which is advocated by West Germany as wel ~ as the EC and could
provide substance to the calls of policy makers to develop new
political tasks for the disintegrating military alliances in both
East and West. Second, joint membership of East and West in this
export control system also addresses the common security threat from
potential military powers elsewhere in the world as well as new
technologies and weapons that have surfaced during the last decade.
It is questionable whether CoCom is capable of adapting to these new
conditions which require its reform.
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