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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 Executive Summary The U.S. Department of Defense, through its executive agent the U.S. Army, is embarked on a Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) to destroy the nation's unitary chemical weapons.1 There are about 25,000 tons of chemical warfare agents in the U.S. stockpile, primarily the nerve agents GB and VX and the blister, or mustard, agents H, HD, and HT. These agents are contained in a variety of munitions and in bulk containers that are distributed among eight continental U.S. sites and Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean. The baseline incineration technology, developed by the Army, has undergone Operational Verification Testing at Johnston Island, to demonstrate that it can be used to destroy agent and weapons safely and meet all environmental standards. The baseline technology entails the transport of weapons from storage to destruction areas, manual unpacking, and automated disassembly. This approach results in four primary process streams requiring treatment: agent, energetics, metals parts, and dunnage (packing materials and other miscellaneous solid wastes).2 Agent is destroyed in one incinerator, energetics (explosives and propellants) are destroyed in a second, and metal parts are 1 The U.S. chemical weapons stockpile contains unitary and binary chemical weapons. Unitary chemical weapons contain agents that, by virtue of their molecular composition and structure, are highly toxic or lethal. By comparison, binary chemical agents consist of two nonlethal chemicals that, upon mixing, form a lethal chemical agent. Although slated for destruction in the same time frame as unitary weapons, binary weapons are not included in the CSDP and are not addressed in this report. These weapons will be destroyed as part of a separate Army program. 2 The critical materials to be destroyed are the agent (including that on metal parts and dunnage) and energetics. Agents are large molecules containing carbon, chlorine, hydrogen, phosphorus, fluorine, sulfur, nitrogen, and oxygen. To detoxify these agents, the molecular bonds need to be broken and the components reacted to produce less hazardous materials. Complete oxidation (mineralization) of molecules produces carbon dioxide, water, and nitrogen (N2), and fluorides, phosphates, and sulfates that can be removed as salts. Combustion is the most common oxidation process.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 detoxified in a third. A fourth incinerator, designed for dunnage, has not yet been used for hazardous waste disposal at Johnston Island.3 Afterburners that use fuel combustion are then used to destroy any further contaminants emitted by the incinerator and to achieve a high degree of oxidation. Exhaust from the afterburners is treated in a pollution abatement system. The Army has proposed a program plan to build similar plants at the eight continental storage sites. This plan must be approved by Congress. Concerns have been raised about the baseline incineration approach. Some groups and individuals have claimed that the Army's baseline technology poses risks to surrounding populations and the environment, risks that could be reduced by using alternative disposal technologies. Congress has also shown interest in the use of alternative technologies for disposal of the chemical stockpile. It has directed the Army to submit a report on the subject by December 31, 1993, based in part on the present study by the National Research Council (NRC) Committee on Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies. The present report addresses the possible use of alternative destruction technologies to replace partly or wholly or to be used in addition to the current baseline technology. The report considers the principal technologies that might be applied to the CSDP, strategies that might be used to manage the stockpile, and combinations of technologies that might be used. However, no specific recommendations are made here about the use of these technologies in the Army's disposal program. Another NRC Committee, the Committee on Review and Evaluation of the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, which provides continuing technical advice to the Army, will issue a report later this year that, based partly on the present report, may offer specific findings and recommendations for the use of alternative technologies in the CSDP. The present report is summarized here in sections on the requirements and other considerations for alternative technologies, the characteristics of proposed alternative technologies, options for gas and other waste stream handling to manage risks of special concern, strategies and system issues regarding the use of alternative technologies in the disposal program, and concluding observations. In its study, the committee examined a variety of technologies and processes, in part through a workshop at which developers made presentations on their technologies. Companies also provided information in writing. Although the committee has used such information provided by individual developers, it has not compared one company's technology with another's 3 Dunnage (packing materials, used protective suits, etc.) must be either destroyed or sent to a disposal site. Although incineration is one option, shipment to a hazardous waste landfill is an alternative.