Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in the Post-Cold War Era (1994)

Dr. Valery N. Spector

2nd Vice President, RAS Elorma Corporation

Russian Academy of Sciences

Merrill B. Walters

President, W & S Consultants, Inc. and former Director of Nuclear Planning

NATO International Staff

The complicated and often contradictory problems associated with the control of dual-use technologies have been the subject of three interacademy meetings. We have agreed that the rapid growth in systems based upon those technologies and the production of weapons systems based upon those technology developments are potentially a major threat to future world peace and stability. Four closely related issues were identified as the principal focus of our deliberations: export administration, defense conversion, "brain drain," and science and technology development.

In countering the proliferation of dual-use technologies, both the United States and the Russian Federation are like ships in troubled seas. Both ships are over burdened with arms and dangerous munitions. Both have been flagships of large portions of the world and both have decided to sell or ditch substantial portions of their armaments, even though faced with surroundings that are not always friendly. Ship Russia has sustained somewhat more damage, with AWOL deck hands, brain drain and damage to the power plant and hull—perhaps above the water line. Ship America was idling for awhile without steering while it changed command. Ship Russia's direction has been erratic because of a continuing fist fight on the bridge. Meanwhile, smaller and less powerful ships, through the capabilities offered by dual-use technologies, can pose a threat to the security of any ship on the seas.

This metaphorical description illustrates some oft he similarities in our situation. However, there are many unique differences in our economic, geographic and social structures that directly affect how each nation sees its security and the threat posed by proliferating dual-use technologies. For example, Libya has announced that the United States is its number one enemy. Likewise, Latvia refers to the Russian Federation as its primary enemy. Without deeper analysis, it would seem that both cases are like Krylov's fable about a small dog barking at an elephant. However, closer consideration shows very different circumstances indeed. Not many American citizens live in Libya, while a

substantial part of the population of Latvia is Russian, which is being deprived of many of its basic rights. Libya is far removed geographically from the United States, while Latvia and Russia have a common border. The United States and Libya have never had a common military organization, but Latvia acquired a whole set of sophisticated conventional weapons when it gained its independence. Many of these weapons, as is the case in other newly independent states as well, will be dumped into the international weapons market, thus adding to the proliferation problem.

Even with a high level of desire and mutual understanding on both sides, some issues are very hard to bring to a common approach. For example, the wide range of differences in geographic areas of interest is clearly seen in the short illustrative list of countries contained in the following chart:

In the current state of affairs, there is very little overlap in the list of countries which are of priority concern to both nations. However, if the expansion of the sale and use of technologically sensitive weaponry is to be precluded, the list of countries to be limited, in terms of sensitive dual-use technology and foreign trade, should be expanded. On the other hand, as forcefully stated by Dr. Rittenhouse of the General Electric Corporation in his report at the second interacademy meeting on dual-use technologies in May 1992, the number of controlled items should be reduced to only those that are most dangerous to preclude serious damage to the continued growth of the international economies and industrial cooperation. Balancing the restrictions and control required to

counter proliferation of dual-use technology with the need for industrial and economic growth will be one of the more difficult issues to resolve.

Although the impact of the proliferation of dual-use technologies on their national security is seen differently by Russia and the United States, progress in the counter proliferation fight calls for both parties to change their attitudes and to attempt to see things as they are perceived by the other party. When this occurs, we feel that then there is a chance that this binocular view will develop a vision that is increased in power by two. Otherwise, mutual misunderstanding will continue to wreak havoc on the efforts to counter proliferation of dual-use technologies.

We are quite sure that not all hope of countering proliferation of dual-use technology is lost, and the very fact of the interacademy talks taking place indicates the desire to further our mutual issues, as laid out in our joint recommendations, to the attention of our respective governments. In spite of all the problems and differences, both governments must recognize the danger to world peace and stability posed by these dual-use technologies and take action to counter their proliferation. Meanwhile, we look forward to continuing our bilateral discussions in this stimulating, complicated, and very important area.