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AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION FOR THE JOINT PAPER OF THE U.S. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES - RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES WORKING GROUP ON STRUCTURAL (FUNCTIONAL) MATERIALS*

Dr. Robert A. Sprague

Division Staff Engineer

Aircraft Engines

General Electric

Dr. Albert C. Westwood

Vice President

Research and Technology

Martin Marietta Corporation

INTRODUCTION

With the end of Cold War, the relations between the United States and the Russian Federation have become less adversarial on many fronts, from foreign policy to commerce to science and technology. The hope is that the two countries' basic principles and goals have drawn closer. In this context, some of the key features of the Cold War, such as the regimes governing the export of sophisticated dual-use technology from West to East and from North to South, should be reviewed and possibly modified.

At the heart of the issue are questions of which technologies or uses should be controlled and which technologies can practically be controlled in terms of their manufacture and proliferation. Controllability depends strongly on the nature of the technology, its availability on global markets, and the organizational arrangements governing its use and distribution.

In the past, control efforts have consisted of measures taken by the United States and its allies in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) which assumed active attempts by agencies of the Soviet Union to divert sophisticated technology. Organizational arrangements range from product control lists, extensive export licensing procedures and strict enforcement mechanisms, to rigid physical controls

*  

Topic selected and approved at the 2nd U.S. National Academy of Sciences-Russian Academy of Science Joint Meeting on Dual-Use Technologies (Washington, May 1992) and presented at the 3rd U.S. National Academy of Sciences-Russian Academy of Science Joint Meeting on Dual-Use Technologies (Moscow, December 1992).



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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION FOR THE JOINT PAPER OF THE U.S. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES - RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES WORKING GROUP ON STRUCTURAL (FUNCTIONAL) MATERIALS* Dr. Robert A. Sprague Division Staff Engineer Aircraft Engines General Electric Dr. Albert C. Westwood Vice President Research and Technology Martin Marietta Corporation INTRODUCTION With the end of Cold War, the relations between the United States and the Russian Federation have become less adversarial on many fronts, from foreign policy to commerce to science and technology. The hope is that the two countries' basic principles and goals have drawn closer. In this context, some of the key features of the Cold War, such as the regimes governing the export of sophisticated dual-use technology from West to East and from North to South, should be reviewed and possibly modified. At the heart of the issue are questions of which technologies or uses should be controlled and which technologies can practically be controlled in terms of their manufacture and proliferation. Controllability depends strongly on the nature of the technology, its availability on global markets, and the organizational arrangements governing its use and distribution. In the past, control efforts have consisted of measures taken by the United States and its allies in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) which assumed active attempts by agencies of the Soviet Union to divert sophisticated technology. Organizational arrangements range from product control lists, extensive export licensing procedures and strict enforcement mechanisms, to rigid physical controls *   Topic selected and approved at the 2nd U.S. National Academy of Sciences-Russian Academy of Science Joint Meeting on Dual-Use Technologies (Washington, May 1992) and presented at the 3rd U.S. National Academy of Sciences-Russian Academy of Science Joint Meeting on Dual-Use Technologies (Moscow, December 1992).

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences over individual installations in the destination country. Simultaneously, the Soviet government took very similar measures to prevent advanced technologies from being obtained by the U.S. and its allies. Reliance on mutual cooperation was minimal. In recent years, remarkable progress has been made in recasting diplomatically the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia from one that has been fundamentally confrontational to one that is more mutually beneficial. The cooperation of Russians can be a powerful factor in the export control equation. If the Russians can demonstrate their ability and willingness to work with Western governments, vendors, and users in keeping sophisticated technologies from being diverted to military uses or restricted destination countries, it is possible that the iron-clad controls of the past can be eased to the benefit of commerce, scientific progress, and the Russian transition to a viable market economy. In any relationship, including that between countries, the reduction of confrontation does not lead immediately to an establishment of trust. The latter can be accomplished only through the multilateral establishment of procedures and mechanisms to achieve the goals of non-diversion and non-proliferation, and a series of small and incremental steps taken over time in which both parties demonstrate trust, trustworthiness, and a willingness to work together in mutually beneficial ways. These will necessarily involve an element of risk, since measures which give one party complete control over the actions of the other give the latter no opportunity to demonstrate independent good faith and cooperation. Russians must be given the opportunity to demonstrate they are both willing and able—in both theory and practice.—to respect the national security concerns of the United States and to cooperate in preventing the diversion and proliferation of sophisticated technologies, provided the United States does the same. In the past, the Soviet Union's willingness to control diversion and proliferation was questioned, but its ability to do so was not. Strong, centralized political and military institutions effectively regulated sensitive technologies. Today, there is reason to suspect that although Russia's willingness to control proliferation has increased, its ability to do so has decreased. Partly as a result, concerns about North-South proliferation of technologies to such countries as Iraq and Iran have grown. It is largely incumbent on the Russians to demonstrate to the Western community that effective, civilian control regimes can be established in spite of widespread fragmentation and decentralization of lines of authority. This paper examines the preset nature and inherent controllability of high performance structural materials (HPSM) and their enabling technologies. It addresses means of control in the context of broader efforts to create an environment in which the need for control is reduced.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences HPSM DEFINITION AND DISCUSSION HPSM are defined as dual-use capability materials used for either mechanical integrity or because of their unique functional capability, e.g., electronic materials. The main goal of the Russian Academy of Sciences in close cooperation with the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in the field of a strategic materials science is an overview of the research carried out on HPSM of both organic and inorganic nature over the following groups of functional properties, namely: Functional ceramics and ceramics composites, including high temperature superconducting ceramics, optic ceramics, near-zeroth expansion coefficient ceramics and ceramic composites. micro- and optoelectronic and electrotechnical ceramics and ceramic composites for substrates, ablating ceramics and ceramic composites; High performance refractory metal alloys; High temperature capability/highly oxidation resistant alloys and composites; Lightweight/high temperature capability intermetallic and composites components; Metal matrix composites; Carbon/carbon structures; Resin matrix composites of over 300ºC capability (thermostability enhancement additives and stabilizers); Electronics of organic materials, including organic and elementoorganic ferromagnets; composites; coatings, devices, and instruments with their application; polyfunctional polymers, conducting polymers and their composites, carbon containing materials, and clusters; second and higher order non-linearity materials - molecular and polymeric; gas transducers based on organic semiconductors, transducers of physical values and radiation; oligo- and polyorganosilsesquioxanes and elementoorganosilsesquioxanes binders and film forming materials; synthetic metals and organic superconductors; theoretical investigation and design of organic functional materials; Molecular electronics, including biomolecular sensors; molecular electronic elements; langmuir-Blodgett films and layers; Inorganic and organic materials for high performance non-linear optics; and Directional and single crystal components.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences All these branches of material science evidently have the highest impact on the effectiveness (especially in the targeting of high precision guided munitions), performance, reliability, and specific mass gain in defense systems. However, cost considerations keep these technologies substantially out of widespread application in civilian branches of industry despite their many functional properties, such as electromagnetic pulses protection, effective radio-frequency radiation absorption, the highest selectivity and sensitivity to changing environmental factors, high transparency and high nonlinearity, fast response, etc. Given a reduction in cost, these technologies may be of the highest prospective value for civilian production. Such highly classified technologies have had a decisive impact on the defense potential of both countries. Therefore, any proliferation of them may have a major influence on the of development of armaments in the third world. High performance structural materials (HPSM) are developed for and deployed in strategic applications such as launch and re-entry vehicles, satellites, subsonic and supersonic aircraft (particularly gas turbine powerplants), ground based air and space monitoring systems, and to a lesser extent, process equipment used to manufacture and support these systems. Materials research and development in major power countries has for four decades been a cornerstone of their national defense strategy. Characteristics of HPSM HPSM are characterized as those having application benefit generally not attainable with materials such as conventionally wrought iron, nickel, and tin alloys. Products containing HPSM offer advantageous performance advantages over systems containing conventional alloys. This is particularly true for military aerospace systems, but it is also relevant to commercial systems such as gas turbine engines. HPSM, because of their intended use, must also possess high reliability or, at a minimum, service life predictability. This characteristic generally requires an invention (or established laboratory feasible) to product application cycle of at least seven years. The effort during this period is related mainly to reliability realization as opposed to capability enhancement. Examples are the invention and reduction to practice of processing methods such as isothermal forging or directional casting, methods of obtaining high purity, and uniform fiber alignment. HPSM Products Enablers In addition to the product enablers cited above, it is often necessary to develop attachment methods for joining non-fusion weldable or reconciling differences in thermal expansion properties. Diffusion bonding, high temperature adhesives, and low fusion processes such as laser technology are therefore an integral part of HPSM product realization.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences These requirements cascade into a second tier of required capabilities such as process monitoring and control, process sensor technology and process thermal management. Also integral with HPSM realization is the design technology that enables benefit from their deployment. Low ductility, anisotropic properties, and mechanical attachment to dissimilar materials are examples of the system's required design expertise. Thus, the development of the enabling process and design technology that enable product benefits to be realized is characteristic of HPSM. HPSM Technology Acquisitions HPSM generally are acquired integrally with the system in which they are installed. While the removal and integration of these materials tell one much about their form and function, little can be learned relative to their manufacture and design features. However, when systems are deployed together with repair, maintenance and spare parts acquisition rights, much technology relating to HPSM can be gained. Transfer of capability to produce HPSM, such as single crystal airfoils, results in even greater, but not total, knowledge transfer. Total technology transfer would occur in the event that two parties agree jointly to design, develop, and deploy systems or sub-systems containing HPSM. Note, it is possible to develop large systems containing HPSM if the party with the HPSM knowledge produced the sub-system containing the HPSM. The coupling of these sub-systems into a complex device does not by itself transfer HPSM capability to the second party. This report is the result of extensive collection of data from academic institutions and their collaborators in industrial organizations that employ dual-use materials science technologies. It is aimed mainly at the following problems: Evaluation of the collected information from the point of view of dual-use technologies, i.e., their potential value for civilian applications and the potential danger of their proliferation on the level of know-how, existing apart from published results; and Presenting some recommendations for support and/or joint research in the above fields, with the goals of minimizing ''brain-drain'' while improving global prosperity.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences Framework for Confidence (Trust) Building Nowadays basic scientific knowledge diffuses extremely rapidly, and national boundaries are essentially transparent to such flows. On the other hand, specifics of discoveries and engineering knowledge, i.e., the information required to transform profitably a concept into a product, tends to be less mobile. There are several reasons for this: the knowledge exists as know-how in the minds of the practitioners and crucial details are not written down; industrial engineers tend not to travel or present papers at scientific conferences; patent protection via a fenced portfolio makes unauthorized use difficult and potentially expensive, and the production process is likely to utilize equipment that is not readily available and is complex in operation. For this and other reasons, it has been evident for some time that controls on the exploitation of advanced technologies probably are best applied at the design, manufacturing, and distribution phases, rather than in early basic R&D stages. This recognizes that there is scarcely any technology that cannot be utilized under given conditions for both peaceful and military purposes, be it radar, communications, biotechnology, or whatever. This is especially true for HPSM. Materials likely to be candidates for diversion to military purposes, however, are likely to exhibit certain distinctive characteristics, e.g., high strength, excellent corrosion anisotropic resistance, durability at high temperature, anisotropic property, specific coefficient of thermal expansion, superior function-to-density ratio, etc. Such properties are a consequence of a precisely controlled chemical composition and some specific and reproducible process that together result in a homogeneous or predictably in-homogeneous microstructure. Increasingly, nowadays, such microstructures are multiphase and of micron scale or less. Our Russian colleagues inform us that the following Russian Academy of Sciences institutes are leaders in materials science: Department of Electronics of Organic Materials, RAS, Moscow; Institute of Electrochemistry, RAS, Moscow; Institute of Organo-Element Compounds, RAS, Moscow; Joint Non-Linear Optics Laboratory of Electrophysical Institute, Ural Division of RAS at Technical University of Chelyabinsk, Chelyabinsk; Institute of Spectroscopy, RAS, Troitsk, Moscow Region; Institute of Organometallic Compounds, RAS, Nizhnii Novgorod; Institute of Crystallography, RAS, Moscow; Institute of Solid State Physics, RAS, Chernogolovka, Moscow Region; Kazan Physical Technical Institute, RAS, Kazan, Tatarstan; General Physics Institute, RAS, Moscow; Institute of Chemical Physics, RAS, Moscow; Ioffe Physical-Technical Institute, RAS, St. Petersburg; Shemyakin Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry, RAS, Moscow; Kapitza Institute for Physical Problems, RAS, Moscow. In a separate paper, our Russian counterparts propose a program on electronics of organic materials and a study on the multicomponent functional optic ceramics based on metal fluorides.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences HPSM Control Options for the control of HPSM necessitate consideration of the flow for manufacturing and distribution of these materials. This logic permits identification of certain opportunities for the monitoring and control of High Performance Structural Materials. Chemical Compositions: The production of HPSM generally requires that composition be controlled to extremely close tolerances. The presence of even a few parts per million of a specific impurity can markedly reduce performance, e.g., by causing segregation at grain boundaries that lead to embrittlement. Thus, one indicator of the likelihood that the intended product is an HPSM is the need for starting materials of ultra high purity (>99.99% pure). The preparation of such pure materials is non-trivial. It requires special equipment, the purchase of which can be noted, its location identified, and its usage monitored, perhaps on a random basis. Another leading indicator for the manufacturing of HPSM's is the use of specific, property-enhancing alloying elements, usually non-commodity materials such as boron, hafnium, ultra fine carbon fibers, etc. There are likely to be only a limited number of sources for such materials, so they, too, can be monitored. The requirements for the prevention of contamination during processing is a further indicator. This is likely to require the use of specific high purity refractory materials for melt containment and high purity inert gases to minimize oxidation during melting or heat treatment. Thus, monitoring the manufacture or purchase of highly pure materials, both as elements and as products (e.g., refractories), should provide a useful start towards limiting the unapproved production of HPSMs. Processing Equipment: The processing of HPSMs also requires equipment capable of precisely controlling temperature (to +5ºC at 1550ºC, for example), pressure, and working atmosphere, etc. The location of all such equipment should be recorded, and its operation routinely monitored. Manufacture of Useful Shapes: The benefit of the extraordinary properties of HPSMs, such as super strength and hardness, usually carries with it the penalty of making them difficult to manufacture. Shaping HPSMs can be tedious. Machining or grinding is slow and expensive, and joining is likely to require special procedures such as electron beam welding, explosive compaction, or advanced adhesives. Additionally, the end product will require sophisticated non-destructive analysis. All of these peculiarities provide opportunities for control. The cost and difficulty of shaping HPSMs has led to the trend towards the production of "near net shapes." Preferred ways of making these are by precision casting,

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences or the hot-isostatic pressing of ultra fine powders. Equipment for such processes is not yet common, and is likely to be available from only a limited number of sources, which also facilitates control. Product Distribution: Assuming that certain HPSMs can be produced without approval or detection, the next concern is to prevent distribution to inappropriate customers. Whether such customers are present within the country producing the HPSM, or whether they are abroad, will require that inspectors conduct routine checks on the loads of suspect trucks, ships or aircraft. And, such inspectors must be capable of quickly determining whether a material is, or is not, likely to be HPSM. Some simple tests can help. Hardness of non-magnetic material is usually related to strength, so that the measurement of the approximate hardness via a scratch tester or some other simple device could be a first screen. However, it may be that this requirement could be the subject of some innovative R&D, the object of which would be to design a direct recording device, capable of instantly reading out the hardness, approximate strength, elastic properties, surface chemical composition, presence of specific elements, and absorption spectrum via a surface contact probe. The development of such a device should be well within the capabilities of scientists at NIST and equivalent institutions in Russia, and might form an appropriate collaborative program. Other control suggestions and issues: Documentation and Trends: The advent of increasingly smart computer networks provides the opportunity for increasing efficient detection of trend indicators that can provide clues as to production intent. The development of a central HPSM database and diagnostic program that can integrate information from a variety of inspection/control sources and signal when a critical path of capability is emerging would be a control tool well worth developing. Laws and Penalties: Most advanced materials developments in the United States., Japan, and other countries are protected by patents, with legal opportunities for punishing persons who use the covered knowledge without permission. Russia must introduce such legal protection without delay if it is to expect foreign nations to transfer technology to it. Because the concept of private property still is not well established in Russia, it will be necessary to publicize extensively the issuance and significance of new intellectual property laws, and to develop severe punishments for breaking them. One suggestion that might enhance the effectiveness is that both the offender and his/her superior sustain appropriate punishment. This should catch management's attention. Spin-On vs. Spin-Off of HPSM: During the past several decades, most HPSM were developed in response to specific military needs. However, with declining military R&D budgets in both Russia and the United States, HPSM will arise increasingly in response to specific commercial applications, and will only subsequently be applied to

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences military purposes. In the United States, such a situation is termed spin-on (to military use) as opposed to the traditional spin-off (from military to commercial applications). Spin-on will be an increasingly likely event, especially for developments in the fields of electronics and photonics. However, since cost is a significant driver in the widespread use of structural materials (which explains the very limited advances which occurred in conventional aluminum alloys or cements over the past 50 years), it appears less likely that spin-on will be an important factor in HPSMs. In other words, HPSMs will continue to be produced principally for military purposes rather than for commercial purposes. A Possible Transition Model for Hard to Soft HPSM Control Many of today's complex commercial containing HPSM also have major content of non-strategic materials and related technologies. Joint ventures with the objective of marketing selected commercial systems on a global basis could be initiated within the parameters of the content of HPSM produced by COCOM nations. Remembering that HPSM are difficult to both produce and effectively incorporate into design, this initial approach would amount to relatively "hard" control. As trust, the development of common values, and data relative to HPSM control are increased between the United States and Russia, hard control could progressively lessen. In parallel, Russia would have to demonstrate its willingness to control other nations' strategic and legal entities (assets) via the prevention of technology re-export, copyright laws, etc. It is important to remember that the progressive disclosure of HPSM technology can increase the transfer of processing (manufacturing) technology and later incorporate the joint design of advanced systems. While such disclosure and cooperation may take a decade or more to evolve, joint activities could be initiated in a relatively short time frame.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences This page in the original is blank.