consistent with the generally more advanced status of U.S. science, there is serious doubt as to whether the Soviets can reap significant direct military benefits from this flow in the near term. Moreover, U.S. openness gives this nation access to Soviet science in many key areas, and scientific contacts yield useful insights into Soviet institutions and society.

The principal mission of universities is education; in many American universities research has also become a major activity, but this research is intertwined with teaching and with the training of advanced research scientists and engineers. Participation in research teaches students to solve difficult, novel problems, often under the guidance of first-rate scientists. Federal policies in support of science have reinforced universities’ dual functions.

The system as it has recently evolved has been remarkably successful; American research universities attract some of the best minds from around the world and are the principal source of our scientific preeminence. The effectiveness of this research is now seriously threatened, however, by a number of economic and social forces.

Scientific communication is traditionally open and international in character. Scientific advance depends on worldwide access to all the prior findings in a field—and, often, in seemingly unrelated fields—and on systematic critical review of findings by the world scientific community. In addition to open international publication, there are many informal types of essential scientific communication, including circulation of prepublication drafts, discussions at scientific meetings, special seminars, and personal communications.

The government can restrict scientific communication in various ways. First, information bearing a particularly close relationship to national security may be subject to classification. This is the most stringent of the control systems because it serves to bar all unauthorized access.

Second, communications with foreign nationals may be restricted by export controls, such as those established by the Export Administration Act (EAA) and its associated Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and by the Arms Export Control Act and its associated International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).¹ Unless an exemption (or

Front Matter (R1-R16)

Executive Summary (1-8)

Introduction (9-12)

1 Current Knowledge About Unwanted Technology Transfer and Its Military Significance (13-21)

2 Universities and Scientific Communication (22-26)

3 The Current Control System (27-38)

4 General Conclusions: Balancing the Costs and Benefits of Controls (39-51)

5 Improving the Current System (52-64)

6 Compilation of Recommendations (65-90)

Appendix A: Memorandum from the Intelligence Subpanel to the Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security (91-96)

Appendix B: The Historical Context of National Security Concerns About Science and Technology (97-109)

Appendix C: A Study of the Responses of Industry to a Letter of Inquiry from the NAS Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security (110-116)

Appendix D: A Brief Analysis of University Research and Development Efforts Relating to National Security, 1940-1980 (117-119)

Appendix E: Voluntary Restraints on Research with National Security Implications: The Case of Cryptography, 1975-1982 (120-125)

Appendix F: The Role of Foreign Nationals Studying or Working in U.S. Universities and Other Sectors (126-135)

Appendix G: Letter from Five University Presidients (136-139)

Appendix H: Statement of Admiral B.R. Inman for the May 11, 1982, Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Technology Transfer (140-142)

Appendix I: Executive Order on National Security Information (143-170)

Appendix J: Correspondence Between the State Department and the University of Minnesota and M.I.T. Restricting Foreign Visitors (171-171)

Working Papers of the Panel (172-188)