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Scientific Communication and National Security (1982)
Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (COSEPUP)

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. "3 The Current Control System." Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1982.

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Scientific Communication and National Security

the level of protection.2 (Other officials who reproduce or extract classified information must apply the same classification that was in the original source material.) The system provides that such information may be designated as either top secret, secret, or confidential. Information is to be classified only if, at the least, unauthorized disclosure could be expected to damage national security. The categories of information eligible for classification include “scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security” and “cryptology,” but there is a specific exemption for “[b]asic scientific research information not clearly related to the national security” (Exec. Order No. 12356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14877 (1982)).

The government must have some preexisting connection with the information in order to classify it. Although the Reagan order deleted a provision in the previous order prohibiting the classification of research information that was not itself the fruit of access to classified information until the government had acquired a proprietary interest, the information subject to classification is still defined to include only that information that is “owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government” (Exec. Order No. 12356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14883 (1982)). The safeguarding requirement, which applies only to employees, contractors, licensees, or grantees, suggests the limits of governmental power.

A person is eligible for access to classified information only upon a determination both that the individual is trustworthy—a status that is customarily demonstrated by a security clearance at an appropriate level—and that access is essential to the accomplishment of lawful and authorized government activities. Each agency is required to establish a system to assure adequate protection of classified information, and a variety of statutes impose stringent penalties for wrongful behavior in connection with the information.

Classification is the most stringent of the five control systems because it serves to control all access to the information. The other systems of control are directed at communications with foreign nationals and, in some cases, only at communication through publication.

EXPORT CONTROLS

The chief controls on the export of technical data arise under the Export Administration Act (EAA) (50 U.S.C. App. Section 2401 et seq.) and the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. Section 2778).3 The EAA,

2  

The order requires “an employee, contractor, licensee, or grantee” who originates information that is believed to require classification to safeguard the information pending a classification determination by an authorized official.

3  

Other control systems may be important in particular situations. For example, regulations administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Department of Energy govern the export of technology relating to nuclear equipment and materials.

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Front Matter (R1-R16)
Executive Summary (1-8)
Introduction (9-12)
1 Current Knowledge About Unwanted Technology Transfer and Its Military Significance (13-21)
2 Universities and Scientific Communication (22-26)
3 The Current Control System (27-38)
4 General Conclusions: Balancing the Costs and Benefits of Controls (39-51)
5 Improving the Current System (52-64)
6 Compilation of Recommendations (65-90)
Appendix A: Memorandum from the Intelligence Subpanel to the Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security (91-96)
Appendix B: The Historical Context of National Security Concerns About Science and Technology (97-109)
Appendix C: A Study of the Responses of Industry to a Letter of Inquiry from the NAS Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security (110-116)
Appendix D: A Brief Analysis of University Research and Development Efforts Relating to National Security, 1940-1980 (117-119)
Appendix E: Voluntary Restraints on Research with National Security Implications: The Case of Cryptography, 1975-1982 (120-125)
Appendix F: The Role of Foreign Nationals Studying or Working in U.S. Universities and Other Sectors (126-135)
Appendix G: Letter from Five University Presidients (136-139)
Appendix H: Statement of Admiral B.R. Inman for the May 11, 1982, Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Technology Transfer (140-142)
Appendix I: Executive Order on National Security Information (143-170)
Appendix J: Correspondence Between the State Department and the University of Minnesota and M.I.T. Restricting Foreign Visitors (171-171)
Working Papers of the Panel (172-188)