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OCR for page 177
6
Flood Risk Management:
Implications for the American River and
the United States
Since the mid-1960s, escalating costs and environmental opposition have
posed formidable barriers to the construction of new flood control projects (NRC,
1993~. Alternatives to construction increasingly are being sought, including
nonstructural measures to reduce exposure to flood damages and insurance to
compensate for damages incurred. Thus Congress's reluctance to authorize the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (US ACE) recommended flood control dry dam on
the American River (USAGE, Sacramento District, 1991) and its request to con-
tinue studies of other alternatives to address the flooding problem (P.L. 102-396)
are not unexpected.
In November 1994 the Sacramento District of the USACE published its
Alternatives Report (USAGE, Sacramento District, 1994a). Although providing
only limited detail, the report suggested that the District has responded to past
criticisms: it has reconsidered increased flood conveyance and environmental
restoration opportunities on the lower American River, credited storage in up-
stream hydroelectric reservoirs for flood control under certain circumstances, and
considered different assumptions about future Folsom flood operations. In addi-
tion, the Sacramento District has employed newly developed USACE risk analy-
sis procedures to compare alternatives.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the committee's understanding of
how the USACE planning and decisionmaking process, described in Chapter 1,
was applied in the American River Watershed Investigation (ARWI). The dis-
cussion considers the source of the controversy over acceptable alternatives to
address the American River flooding problem. Subsequent sections discuss the
following aspects of the American River controversy in more detail:
177
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178
FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN RIVER BASIN
· acceptable flood risk and the flood insurance program,
· water project cost sharing,
· communication of flood risk'
· improved approaches to flood risk management planning, and
the water policy and management context.
.
The chapter concludes with recommendations for reforms to current plan-
ning and decisionmaking for the American River situation. Because the commit-
tee believes that the lessons of the American River can be transferred to other
areas of the nation, parallel recommendations for reform of national policy on
flood risk management are also offered.
THE AMERICAN RIVER FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT
CONTROVERSY: THE KEY ISSUES
The Flood Control Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-874) authorized USACE to study
the American River basin in the interest of "flood control and allied purposes."
However, the funding to execute this authority was not provided until after the
1986 flood. In providing funds for a one-year reconnaissance study, the commit-
tee language in the Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 100-
202) defined a broad scope for the studies, although the priority was on the
imminent flood risk (USAGE, Sacramento District, 1991, hereafter the 1991
ARWI):
The conferees are aware that recent information presented by the Corps and the
Bureau in a series of three fact-finding hearings in Sacramento reveals that the
region may be under a greater threat from serious flooding than was previously
believed.... Within this assessment, the Corps should include its analysis of
the current and projected water supply demands in the American River basin.
Most USACE study authorities mandate that multiple purposes, including
flood control, navigation, hydroelectric power, water supply, recreation and fish
and wildlife habitat improvements, be addressed. The initial planning task is to
focus limited study resources on the most pressing planning problems and oppor-
tunities, and the congressional directions for the American River clearly pointed
to flood damage reduction through flood control as the priority. However, the
public comment record also indicated a strong interest in ensuring reliability and
reducing costs of water supply, in increasing hydroelectric power generating
capacity, in promoting restoration of environmental resources that had been de-
graded by past water development, and in protecting and enhancing recreational
opportunities (USAGE, Sacramento District, 1991, Appendix T). Indeed, many
who commented were critical of the Sacramento District's 1991 ARWI for its
failure to consider any purpose other than flood control.
With its planning attention focused on flood control, the Sacramento District
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN RIVER AND THE UNITED STATES
179
proceeded to examine the alternatives for reducing flood risk. Sound planning
practice demands that the range of alternatives include combinations of engineer-
ing, regulatory, and other public policy measures to, in this case, provide an
acceptable degree of flood damage reduction. For example, alternatives for
meeting the flood damage reduction purpose might include different sizes of
reservoir storage, different restrictions on floodplain settlement, and different
levee heights, all in different combinations. Many critics of the 1991 ARWI felt
that two sizes of dry dam, each designed without gates to foreclose the option of
permanent storage, received favored attention. Ironically, some chastised the
District for its focus on the dry dam because these critics wanted a more extensive
consideration of a new full-pool dam that would address the flood damage reduc-
tion as well as provide for many other purposes.
It is worth noting that USACE was instructed by language accompanying the
Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 100-202) to pay special
attention to flood control through a dry dam option (USAGE, Sacramento Dis-
trict,l991J:
The conferees . . . recognize that there may be additional flood protection af-
forded by a primarily peak-flow flood control facility (the so-called "dry dam")
on the North Fork of the American River above Folsom. The conferees there-
fore direct the Corps of Engineers to include further assessments of the relation-
ship between such a peak-flow flood control facility and the operation of Fol-
som Dam as they may pertain to incidental water, power and recreational
benefits.
The dissatisfaction with the limited purposes and alternatives considered by
the Sacramento District contributed, in part, to the failure of Congress to autho-
rize the dry dam proposal. First, even though the financial and environmental
impediments to implementing the full-pool alternative akin to Bureau of
Reclamation's originally proposed Auburn dam- were formidable, continued
support of the full-pool alternative is found among water supply interests. The
committee was told of "foothills" communities east of Sacramento (e.g., those
within the E1 Dorado Irrigation District) who see a full-pool alternative as a
means to ensure their access to water rights and to reduce their future water
supply pumping costs. Indeed, some of the SAFCA Board of Directors may still
favor a full-pool alternative for the water supply purpose. A dry dam that appears
to foreclose water supply expansion will have limited support among these inter-
ests.
Second, the dry dam also was opposed by canyon protection interests con-
cerned about the effects of occasional impoundment on soils, vegetation, and
wildlife in the American River canyon (see Chapter 31. Furthermore, canyon
protection interests worry that a dry dam will in time be converted to a permanent
pool. In opposing the dry dam, canyon protection interests openly state this
concern. By 1991, both those who opposed any dam in the canyon and those who
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180
FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN RIVER BASIN
favored a full-pool multipurpose Auburn reservoir had expressed strong dissatis-
faction with the dry dam alternative.
The dispute over the Auburn dam proposals has stalled the entire lower
American River study process. Recent planning efforts have sought to match
environmental restoration concerns with improved levee stability and convey-
ance in the Lower American River Parkway corridor. Agreement appears to be
near under the auspices of SAFCA's Lower American River Task Force (SAFCA,
1994a). However, there seems to be little progress on resolving disputes over
storage in the canyon. In the 1994 Alternatives Report, which has reanalyzed the
data, the Sacramento District continued to report that substantially reduced flood
risk and increased net benefits could be achieved by construction of storage at the
Auburn site. Therefore, a question remains: Can an alternative based on existing
storage and on the lower American River levees provide an acceptable level of
risk reduction for the city? The ongoing reevaluation of alternatives is expected
to help resolve this question.
USACE evaluation of alternatives is governed by the Water Resources
Council's Principles and Guidelines (P&G) (Water Resources Council, 1983~.
The P&G requires the federal agency to recommend the alternative that makes
the greatest contribution to national economic development (NED). This alterna-
tive maximizes net benefits over costs. The NED plan also must comply with
national environmental statutes, applicable executive orders, and other federal
planning requirements. The new USACE risk analysis procedures do not change
the requirement to develop an NED plan. As is noted in Chapter 4, the proce-
dures are intended to provide a more realistic and complete description of the risk
and uncertainty associated with reservoir and levee system performance, and the
associated flood damage reduction benefits.
The estimates of the value of the benefits needed to ascertain the NED plan
are obtained in various ways. For flood damage reduction, the avoided future
repair costs to property no longer exposed to flooding is the most widely em-
ployed benefit measure. Another measure of flood control benefits is the change
in property prices with versus without a flood control alternative. Other benefits
might be estimated for increased recreational opportunities or enhanced water
supply. The alternatives in the 1991 ARWI were compared primarily in terms of
flood control benefits.
Included in the flood control justification for the dry dam alternative were
benefits to be accrued for the still-to-be-developed Natomas area. Critics of the
1991 ARWI noted that this placed the federal government in the position of
building a project that would facilitate the development of a flood-prone area, a
position they deemed unacceptable. However, future growth in Natomas made
up only a small percentage of the total benefits, so removing these benefits from
the NED justification did not make any dry dam alternative economically unjus-
tified. Nonetheless, it is likely that the political support for a dry dam, given the
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN RIVER AND THE UNITED STATES
181
desire to retain the development near the city, may have been influenced by the
prospective development at Natomas (see Chapter 53.
The costs in an NED analysis include public and private sector investment
and future operation and maintenance spending, as well as monetary values for
foregone hydroelectric power generation or water supply. The P&G requirement
to comply with applicable environmental laws, which has been interpreted by
USACE to include full mitigation of any adverse environmental effects of an
alternative, adds to project cost.
The uncertain frequency, depth, and duration of inundation behind a dry dam
called into question the adequacy of the mitigation offered for damages in the
canyon. If the mitigation was not adequate, then the costs of mitigation were
understated. This concern, which is discussed in Chapter 3, was the central
environmental challenge to the dry dam and was the major mitigation feature of
any of the alternatives. However, criticisms of the many alternatives also have
been related to concerns about negative environmental effects or foregone oppor-
tunities for environmental restoration along the lower American River.
Preliminary cost estimates for the array of all alternatives were presented in
the 1994 Alternatives Report. Average annual costs (at an 8 percent discount
rate) range from $22 million for the minimum environmental impact plan having
first costs (up-front construction costs) of $258 million, to $68 million for the dry
dam designated as the 1991 NED alternative. In the 1991 ARWI, the first cost
estimate for the dry dam was $698 million and in the 1994 Alternatives Report it
was$661 million. The foregone benefits of water supply, power, and recreation
from Folsom reoperation are presented as $4 million per year. It appears from the
available information that these costs were estimated as the costs to construct
new storage ($300 per acre-foot) to replace these benefits at another site (USAGE,
Sacramento District, 1991~. If this was the estimation method, then this cost
estimate is an upper bound because replacement water supply, for example, might
be acquired from water markets at lower costs (Science Applications Interna-
tional, 1991~.
The project costs are shared between levels of government according to
formulas fixed by federal law. The 1994 Alternatives Report did not include any
cost sharing information; however, the 1991 ARWI indicated that the 1992 cost
of the selected plan would have required a $240.5 million local contribution, of
which $208 million would have been in contributions of lands, easements, rights
of way, and relocation. The most significant share of the nonfederal cost was
$107 million to relocate Highway 49. This cost would be borne by the state,
leaving $101 million as the local cost for the project (USAGE, Sacramento Dis-
trict, 19911.
For a flood control project, it is important to estimate the likelihood that an
area will be inundated. The "level of protection" has been used to indicate a
likelihood of flooding in any year. For ease of exposition, the reciprocal of the
annual likelihood that is, the average number of years between occurrences, or
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82
FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN RIVER BASIN
recurrence interval is commonly used. For example, a flood discharge with a 1-
percent chance of being exceeded in any year 1/100 is referred to as the 100-
year flood. (A discussion of the meaning and limitations of the term level of
protection is found in Chapter 4 and later in this chapter.)
The level of protection that is to be recommended by USACE policy tends to
coincide with whatever can be achieved by the NED alternative. Thus the NED
plan can result in different amounts of residual flood risk for different studies,
depending on the site-specific costs and benefits of flood damage reduction. The
NED plan in the 1991 ARWI offered a 400-year level of protection. However,
SAFCA, for reasons of cost and other considerations, identified a 200-year level
of protection from a dry dam alternative as the locally preferred plan. The
SAFCA choice was accommodated by USACE budget policy that permits select-
ing an alternative other than the NED plan if, in the words of the P&G, ". . . there
are overriding reasons for recommending another plan, based on other federal,
state, local, and international concerns." The SAFCA preferred plan was recom-
mended.
Those who were concerned about threats to the canyon asserted that an
acceptable level of protection could be achieved with levee elevation, reoperation
of Folsom, and other management measures, without any new storage facilities.
Critics argued that the only reason the dry dam was supported was to ensure
protection for new development in "deep floodplains" at Natomas. The critics
cast the choice as between "saving" the canyon and serving speculative land
development. However, some supporters of the dry dam felt that any alternative
with no storage was less reliable because of uncertainties in the hydrologic mod-
eling, the likely effectiveness of reoperation of Folsom, and the structural condi-
tion of the levees. In fact, the new USACE risk analysis procedures were devel-
oped to directly address and analyze such uncertainty (see Chapter 4~.
The Sacramento District favored the 400-year protection dry dam alterna-
tive, SAFCA sought 200-year protection through a dry dam, and others argued
that an acceptable level of protection was possible without a dry dam. Yet a
fourth perspective was that a level of protection only against the 100-year flood
was required by federal policy. EPA, for instance, cited FEMA flood insurance
purchase requirements as evidence that this was a national standard (Wieman,
19924. USACE policy should, according to EPA, be to develop alternatives that
equally achieved the minimum "protection" against the 100-year flood. Then the
"least environmentally damaging" alternative to meet that standard should be
chosen. This decision logic, rooted in rules of Section 404 (bit of the Clean
Water Act, was rejected by USACE as binding on their formal planning.
The 1991 ARWI study generated hundreds of letters and much interagency
comment. After considering this public agency input, the Sacramento District
finally supported the SAFCA preferred alternative, but that recommendation was
rejected by Congress at the urging of environmental and water supply interests.
Clearly, an "open comment process" did not satisfy those with the ability to block
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN RIVER AND THE UNITED STATES
183
implementation of a dry dam. Although local cost-sharing requirements certainly
required the district give serious consideration to the local project sponsor, in this
case SAFCA did not represent the myriad regional concerns regarding develop-
ment priorities and environmental issues. The planning process in 1991 was
preoccupied with reconciling differences between SAFCA and US ACE while
other interests were left to exercise political strategies outside the planning pro-
cess, ultimately with much success.
The proposed dry dam project only partially fulfilled the desires of the local
sponsor and did not meet the NED standard of the P&G. Yet even this compro-
mised project was opposed by an unusual combination of interests-those who
sought to stop any project in the canyon and those who wanted a full-pool reser-
voir. Although the two had diametrically opposed positions, neither stood to
satisfy its preferences if the 1991 ARWI preferred alternative were implemented.
Stopping the SAFCA preferred plan in order to fight for different alternatives in
the future must have appeared to each group to be in its own interest.
As of March 1995, it did not appear that these positions had changed signifi-
cantly. Canyon protection interests have continued to assert that no solution that
includes a dry dam could be implemented, but the support for a multipurpose dam
had been restated by other interests (Sacramento News and Report, 1995~. Mean-
while, SAFCA has continued to advance its preference for a 200-year level of
protection, whether or not involving a dry dam.
The current decisionmaking situation in the American River basin can be
described as a diffusion of separate interests having access to numerous political
and legal veto points. This situation is not unusual. USACE has found in recent
years that its recommendations are frequently challenged, often with success.
The committee thus decided that it was important to comment on selected aspects
of the planning and decision-making process, as well as to recommend reforms
for federal policy on flood risk, with the expectation that such observations will
contribute to reaching a decision in the American River basin.
THE CHOICE TO BE MADE:
ACCEPTABLE REMAINING FLOOD RISK
The committee has not identified any national standard for acceptable levels
of flood risk reduction, but it understands the intent of current national policy as
follows: investment (private or public) in hazardous areas should, to the extent
practicable, internalize the costs of choosing such a location by (1) contributing
to the cost of floodwater control works, (2) accepting reasonable restrictions on
development in flood-prone areas (foregone development value), and (3) paying
adequate insurance premiums against the flood risk remaining after structural and
nonstructural measures have been implemented.
The committee recognizes that settlement of floodprone areas may bring
advantages in terms of access to urban services, opportunities, and amenities (as
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84
FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN RIVER BASIN
in the case of the Natomas area see Chapter 51. However, the committee also
believes that such advantages must be balanced against the threat of water inun-
dating a settled area and the damages or loss of life related to the depth of
flooding, the velocity of the flow, and the rapidity and duration of the inundation.
Such balancing is the essence of flood risk management. Flood risk management
decisions are made by individuals and communities when they choose to locate
economic activity in flood-prone areas and when they choose to implement par-
ticular measures that will reduce the frequency of inundation in an area or the
susceptibility to damages from any inundation that does occur.
Flood risk in any year can be described by the expected damages from each
of the possible inundation events, weighted by the likelihood each event will
occur. Flood risk management decisions weigh the avoided damages (benefits'
of flood risk reduction against the cost of alternatives for reducing flood risk.
Costs of flood risk management are the budget outlays for a flood control project,
plus any unmitigated environmental damages from the project. Costs also in-
clude the foregone value of activities either removed from, or not located in, a
flood-prone area. However, in few instances will the benefits of removing all
flood risk justify the costs of an alternative to achieve those benefits. For the
American River, for example, flood risk management requires deciding the "ac-
ceptable" level of remaining flood risk after certain water control works are
constructed and nonstructural measures are implemented for Sacramento and
Natomas. There were the factors that led SAFCA to choose a project that yielded
a level of flood risk greater than that in the NED plan, but that had a lower cost.
The committee is not alone in calling for more attention to residual flood
risk. The 1994 report Sharing the Challenge also recommended that new flood-
plain occupants be required to purchase actuarially sound insurance equal to the
remaining expected flood damages with the alternative in place (especially for
areas that rely on levees, as in Sacramento-see Chapter 5~. Such insurance is
available through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The NFIP was
developed to ensure that new occupants of flood-prone areas bear a reasonable
share of the cost of floodplain occupancy. Expanding the purchase of natural
hazards insurance was an objective of a recent bipartisan congressional task force
on natural disasters (U.S. Congress, 19943. The task force felt that too-generous
disaster aid was an impediment to insurance sale. Its December 1994 report to
Congress, motivated by the escalating claims on federal funds by disaster aid
payments, stated, ". . . Federal disaster assistance can discourage individuals,
communities and state governments from taking action to prepare for, respond to
and recover from disasters." The task force went on to state, ". . . if homeowners
mistakenly believe that the federal government will rebuild their homes after a
natural disaster, they have less incentive to buy all-hazard insurance for their
homes."
Requiring floodplain communities and individuals to bear the costs of their
hazardous locations will help to inform them of flood risks. At present, the NFIP
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN RIVER AND THE UNITED STATES
185
focuses the attention of its purchase requirements on the 100-year floodplain. By
not requiring insurance against residual levels of flood risk, the NFIP may be
inadvertently stimulating floodplain development and fostering misunderstand-
ing of flood risk among the general public. In the committee's view, the decision
of SAFCA to choose a reduced-size flood risk reduction project, as well as
decisions to develop Natomas, has been made in the absence of a requirement to
bear reasonable responsibility for the remaining flood risk. Instead, there may be
an implicit assumption that such costs will be borne by others, either as disaster
aid payments or by a significant federal contribution to construction of flood
control works.
In addition to requiring the purchase of actuarially sound flood insurance
against residual risk for new development, other land use, emergency planning
and floodproofing measures should be pursued for the region as a whole. The
first component of a nonstructural plan should be the development and release of
information to the public on the nature and extent of flood risks in the region. An
inventory of high, medium, and low risk levees should be made available. Devel-
oped areas subject to seeps and boils or at some risk from levee overtopping
should be designated. Estimates of property damages and life loss owing to dam
failure or levee failures in different locations should be provided. Higher risk
areas can be compared to lower risk ares and this information can be used to
design nonstructural responses for both risk avoidance or to reduce residual risk.
Land use development options near Sacramento can be ranked from lowest
to highest in terms of flood hazard risk. For example, a land use development
scenario for the Rio Linda area could be compared to a land use development
scenario for the Natomas area in respect to relative flood hazards and the risk
exposure of new populations.
Regional emergency evacuation plans in the event of dam or levee failures,
or levee overtopping, should be prepared and distributed to neighborhood asso-
ciations and through the media. Residual risks may be reduced by home or
business owner actions through temporary floodproofing strategies such as win-
dow or door dam placement during high risk, levee-associated episodes. Areas
where this is a reasonable options should be identified, so that individual property
owners can add their own actions to government emergency responses. A com-
parable existing model to this in California is property owner participation in
earthquake "proofing" of structures and neighborhood planning for earthquake
emergency response.
Structural and nonstructural measures should be integrated in the regional
response to flood risks and measures can be phased in over time to increase
public acceptance and funding opportunities. For example, one integrated pack-
age might include reoperating Folsom Reservoir, increasing the capacity of the
Yolo Bypass, incremental rebuilding lower American River levees and restoring
riparian environments, instituting a flood warning and floodproofing program,
and requiring elevation of new structures. These measures could be phased in
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FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN RIVER BASIN
during the period it takes to finish planning, funding, and building a reservoir for
added protection or they could be adopted as the main flood risk reduction mea-
sures, if supported by the current USACE analysis. Funding might come from a
combination of sources including state environmental restoration programs, fed-
eral housing programs, flood control district assessments, and other federal, state,
and local sources.
WATER PROJECT COST SHARING
A product of the history of federal involvement in flood control project
construction in the American River basin, and the federal provision of flood
insurance and disaster aid, is a perception that flood risk management is a federal
responsibility. For example, the Natomas development plan is to intensely de-
velop a flood-prone area once an upgraded agricultural levee system is certified
by FEMA as providing "100-year protection" under the NFIP. The exposure to
life and property from storms of greater magnitude (lower frequency) is recog-
nized, but the presumption seems to be that this remaining flood risk can be
ignored, or else that federal or state funds will be employed to upgrade levees and
build water control structures.
At the turn of this century, floodwater control was motivated by a desire to
reclaim flood-prone lands for economic development purposes. Flood control
projects, typically levees, were planned by nonfederal governments and land-
owner cooperatives who based the desired level of protection on their best tech
nical assessment of the flood risk for an area in relation to the expected values of
the reclaimed land. The value of flood protection was established when the funds
for project construction were paid by benefiting landowners. As discussed in
Chapter 1, the levee districts along the American and Sacramento rivers origi-
nated at this time and were established with this financing and planning logic.
Although a full-fledged federal role in flood control was not established until
the Flood Control Act of 1936, federal spending for flood protection in the
Sacramento area began in 1917. Among the effects of the early federal presence
were a better integration of the disparate system of levees and bypasses, the
application of analytical efforts that took a basin perspective, and the shifting of
a share of the financial burden for flood control from benefiting landowners in the
basin to the national taxpayer. The federal financial role was justified by the
beliefs that the benefits from flood protection works extended far beyond the
lands protected to the nation as a whole and that the costs of floodwater control
would stress the ability of local communities to pay for their own protection
(Rosen and Reuss, 1988~.
Over time the financial responsibilities for flood control project construction
have been modified. The 1986 Water Resources Development Act established
that for new projects the federal government is to pay between 25 and 50 percent
of the cost of construction. Nonfederal interests are responsible for providing all
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN RIVER AND THE UNITED STATES
187
lands, easements, and rights of way necessary for the project construction. These
in-kind contributions can be used to offset the required cost share.
The nonfederal cost share for the selected American River dry dam project
was estimated to be $240.5 million. Of this cost, $107 million was in the form of
lands, easements, and rights of way, primarily for relocation of a bridge on
California Highway 49. This bridge relocation was deemed necessary because,
when all the storage is employed under an infrequent storm event, road access
across the upper canyon area would be cut off for several days. The Sacramento
District secured a commitment that the state would make the relocation, but there
was no obligation that the relocation be implemented as a condition of the federal
project being constructed. Thus, under the cost sharing rules the total cost of
$240.5 million significantly overstates the immediate financial obligation of the
city and the state. The committee is unable to comment on the cost sharing
responsibilities that would arise for the levees or for other alternatives because
the application of the formula to consider both in-kind and cash contributions
makes such calculations complex. Because of the complexity, the Sacramento
District did not report cost sharing burdens for the different alternatives in the
1994 Alternatives Report.
The committee understands the logic behind the original federal financial
participation in flood control works widespread benefits and limited ability to
pay. However, it finds that benefits for any American River project are not
widespread and that SAFCA, by national standards, has a significant ability to
pay. To reach this conclusion the committee first accepts the Sacramento
District's analysis that (1) $37 billion of property to be protected is located
entirely within the city and nearby areas and (2) that the damages avoided for all
alternatives justify the costs (1994 Alternatives Report). Next it calculates the
tax burden on the SAFCA community if the selected project had to be paid for
entirely by local beneficiaries. Because the available cost estimates are prelimi-
nary, these calculations should be considered illustrative. Assume a bond of
$600 million for a project sold at 8 percent interest for a 15-year term. At these
terms the annual cost to the locality would be around $70 million. This being so,
an assessment of $1.75 per $1,000 of the approximately $40 billion of property
value would be adequate to repay the bond. For a $20O,OOO property, the $600
million project would raise property taxes by $400 per year for 15 years.
It is also possible to spread the cost of a protection project over all residents
of the city, rather than limiting the burden to flood-prone property. Indeed, there
is some evidence from other areas that citizens of a city who do not own flood-
prone property are willing to tax themselves to help pay for a project to protect
flood-prone areas (Shabman and Stephenson, 19921. While the local cost burden
to fully fund a flood control alternative appears significant, if a project is built
these costs must fall somewhere in the national economy if they are not borne by
those who directly benefit from the project.
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FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN RIVER BASIN
The character of the area that would be inundated is also an important consider-
ation. Floodplains surrounded by rivers and having a bowl shape present a
different hazard than land that slopes up as one moves away from the river. How
deep would the water be? How much warning would there be? Could people
escape?
Some of the statistics described above could help illustrate these issues. One
way to add diversity to descriptions of flood risk is to have USACE, in coopera-
tion with those in the decision process, create realistic risk scenarios for the
different alternatives. The cooperative building of scenarios can be an excellent
way to communicate flood risk. For example, the following scenario is one
possible description of the vulnerability of the Sacramento and Natomas areas for
storm events that overtop the levee system:
Should levees protecting Sacramento south of the American River be threat-
ened, residents could attempt to move to higher ground to the south and west
farther away from the river, and the depth of flooding would generally not
exceed that at the rivers edge; few areas would experience flooding of more
than 10 feet. Natomas, on the other hand, is ringed by levees so that residents
trying to leave the area would have to find their way across the main highway
system to areas with higher ground that are primarily to the west. Moreover,
because Natomas is in a depression, a third of the area would flood to over 10
feet, and some to as much as 35 feet in depth. If the Natomas area is subject to
a 1 in 100 chance of being flooded in any year, then the probability of at least
one flood in 50 years is 40 percent. Therefore, the probability of a relatively
catastrophic event within the lifetime of most residents is roughly equal to the
probability of flipping a fair coin and getting heads.
IMPROVED APPROACHES TO
FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT PLANNING
As a result of laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
and the increased power of stakeholders such as environmental groups, the
USACE planning process has allowed increased public participation in all stages
of planning. The American River planning process, for instance, included three
public hearings, receipt of more than 2,000 comment letters and more than 650
pages of response by USACE (1991 ARWI, Appendix T). The result has been
escalating conflict over major water management alternatives. Conflicts can
occur when people disagree over "facts." People can also disagree because they
feel their interests are not being equitably served and because they have different
values (Lord, 1979~. In the American River case, value conflicts are especially
sharp. For example, as stated in one recent newspaper article, ". . . you have two
warring sides: environmentalists and dam supporters. They're religious wars;
conflicts of values that are unresolvable" (Hicks and Blechman, 19941.
The ability of USACE to act unilaterally in resolving conflict has diminished
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193
over the past three decades. In the past, there was a national consensus behind
water development, the public accepted without question the expertise housed in
executive agencies, and access to the courts and to the legislature to oppose
agency decisions was more limited. Today, decisionmaking on any plan requires
agreement among those who are affected by, and can block or advance, imple-
mentation of an alternative in a variety of different legal and political forums.
Resolution of conflict among those who can affect a decision could perhaps be
facilitated by the USACE planning process, although it is unlikely that USACE
planning and budgeting processes alone will be adequate for reaching all neces-
sary agreements for implementation of most large water projects.
Plan formulation demands the creation of the widest possible range of engi-
neering and institutional alternatives so that agreements can be reached among
multiple decisionmakers. The way that plans are formulated can secure support
from affected interests. Failure by the Sacramento District and SAFCA to ini-
tially incorporate a wide range of purposes and institutional adjustments as a part
of plan formulation, and to open the planning process to multiple interests, has
been a barrier to agreement on a flood risk management alternative for the Ameri-
can River.
Federal flood control planning in California in the past decade and a half has
been characterized by citizen groups or local governments who are not project
sponsors hiring their own consultants to determine what alternatives are techni-
cally feasible and to describe the social and environmental impacts mentioned in
federal reports more fully. Cases where this has occurred in federal projects in
California include not only the ARWI for Sacramento, but also Tecolote Creek,
San Diego; Mission Creek, Santa Barbara; Soquel Creek and San Lorenzo River,
Santa Cruz; San Pedro Creek, Pacifica; Walnut Creek in the City of Walnut
Creek; Wildcat Creek, Richmond; Murderers and Grayson Creek, Pleasanton;
Corte Madera Creek, Ross; Napa River, City of Napa; Dry Creek, Roseville; and,
Petaluma River, Petaluma (E. Cummings, California Department of Water Re-
sources, personal communication, October 3, 19941.
In the American River case, a variety of pro bono consultants were brought
in to help the Planning and Conservation League evaluate the draft environmental
impact report and propose project alternatives not provided by the USACE re-
ports. The Environmental Defense Fund hired a hydraulic engineering firm to
propose alternatives (Environmental Defense Fund, 1990; Jennings, 1991~. The
ad hoc planning investigations suggested alternative approaches to lowering flood
risks, including redesign and reoperation of Folsom Dam, operating upstream
hydroelectric reservoirs for flood storage, use of surcharge storage in Folsom,
and the potential for greater storage in the Sacramento River bypass system.
Since the congressional action on the 1991 ARWI, SAFCA has hired con-
sultants in geomorphology to help it develop a plan to integrate the rebuilding of
lower American River levees with riparian habitat restoration. This work has
been an analytical effort in support of the Lower American River Task Force,
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FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN RIVER BASIN
formed by SAFCA to build a consensus among general public and agency stake-
holders on finding compatibility between environmental restoration and flood
control purposes on the river below Folsom (SAFCA, 1994a). The original
proposal to riprap 20 miles of river levees along the American River has been
reframed to integrate levee strengthening and riparian restoration projects. By-
pass expansion, levee setback, and Sacramento River riparian restoration alterna-
tives are being studied. On the upper river, SAFCA has pursued research to help
in understanding potential ecological impacts of a dry or multipurpose dam.
Meanwhile, an interagency Yolo Basin Working Group and USACE began
an assessment of how to integrate flood protection and environmental restoration
purposes in the Yolo Bypass. By 1994, interagency agreements had been ap-
proved for the multi-objective management of the bypass for endangered species
protection, wetland and wildlife habitat restoration, and flood control (California
Resources Agency, 1993; Yolo Basin Foundation, 1994~. The intent is that the
lower American River levee and bypass improvement projects will enhance the
American River Parkway and bypass aesthetic and environmental values while
also performing a flood control function.
The American River experience prior to 1991, with its focus on flood protec-
tion through new storage, resulted in a planning process that was unable to define
acceptable alternatives. Failure to expand the planning purposes meant that the
Sacramento District could not develop a broad constituency of support, because
the plan made flood control a competing purpose against habitat restoration and
water supply, rather than developing an integrated package. If multiple purposes
had remained the focus of planning, as had been suggested by the original study
authorities, alternatives capable of coalition building might have emerged. For
example, the failure to include environmental restoration in the lower river as a
planning purpose, and the treatment of environmental considerations only as
mitigation requirements for the dry dam, may explain the difficulty in reaching
agreements. In the American River situation a restoration planning purpose
would have focused immediate attention on riparian habitat in the design of levee
repairs and on water flows to the delta in the formation of operational rules for all
projects in the basin.
However, two shifts in the USACE planning process have occurred, each of
which should create an opportunity for a new approach to plan formulation.
USACE now encourages a broader conception of project planning purposes,
including environmental restoration, although change has been difficult (Riley,
1989~. Also, USACE has emphasized planning partnerships in many controver-
sial water management situations (e.g., Columbia River and Florida Everglades
(Shabman, 19931~. For USACE planning to meet the "acceptability" test of the
P&G in a planning partnership, the agency must understand the barriers to agree-
ment and then suggest and analyze institutional and operational, as well as engi-
neering, measures in plan formulation as a means of securing agreements.
Resolution of the risk management disagreements for the American River
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN RIVER AND THE UNITED STATES
195
might be advanced by this new planning approach. A necessary step is to fully
incorporate water supply management, recreation, environmental restoration, and
hydroelectric power purposes throughout the planning process. The Sacramento
District appears to have directed its attention primarily to flood risk reduction and
in so doing has motivated opposition to its recommended flood control alterna-
tive. This planning approach might be explained by the original authorization
language for the study (stressing flood control and a dry dam), or it might be
explained by USACE budget priorities in the 1980s being limited to flood control
and navigation (Shabman, 1993~. Another possibility is that the district saw its
role in meeting these purposes strictly through construction of a storage project or
levees. If this was the case, then attention to these purposes, if water project
construction alternatives were the solution, led to a full-pool Auburn reservoir,
and the district concluded that this was not a viable alternative. In the 1991
ARWI the closest the Sacramento District came to addressing multiple purposes
was to discuss the option of converting the dry dam to a full pool at some future
date.
However, alternatives are not simply engineering measures. They are also
the institutional agreements that determine the financial, legal, and political ac-
ceptability of a project. Institutional adjustments that would be required for an
aggressive reoperation of Folsom, for use of upstream storage, for levee up-
grades, or for building acceptance for a dry dam have not been made part of the
plan formulation process. The committee has found two areas where this oppor-
tunity may have been missed, but emphasizes that the discussion of these oppor-
tunities is not meant to endorse any flood risk management approach.
One illustration can be drawn from the expressed concerns about purposes
other than flood control. While reoperating Folsom under conditions when the
reservoir does not recover its storage might reduce the reliability of the water
supply, technical means might be available to ensure reliable water from other
sources, but these have not been explored. For example, water released to create
flood control storage might be retained underground in overdrafted ground water
basins in the southern part of the state (Jaguette, 1978~. Another option to meet
water supply contracts would be to pump ground water from the Sacramento
groundwater basin, which currently has relatively low lifts (and hence costs) in
some parts of the basin. Protection against long-term ground water overdraft and
compensation to local ground water pumpers would be a part of any such alterna-
tive. Representatives of the Central Valley Project's (CVP) power contractors
have similar concerns about the availability and costs to their users from Folsom
reoperation. Also, it could be very difficult to offset losses to recreational stake-
holders, and it may also be much more difficult to meet delta environmental
requirements during drought years without adequate water in Folsom. However,
the use of Folsom will not result in massive losses to these interests in every year,
only in years where flood control operations are driven by large storm events.
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FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN RIVER BASIN
Perhaps some arrangement might be made in consideration of the low frequency
of the effects.
Additional study would be required to determine if these are technically
workable measures; however, the main point is that they all would require insti-
tutional adjustments through water and power markets and in other ways as well.
Thus if flood control beneficiaries of Folsom reoperation are willing to pay to
purchase pumped ground water and alternative power to make up for any losses
to the CVP, opposition to Folsom reoperation might be reduced. The Sacramento
District or its planning partners in the state and in SAFCA need to incorporate
analysis of such institutional measures in any plan formulation that includes
reoperation. As this report was in final preparation, SAFCA entered into a
contract with the Bureau of Reclamation that appears to implement many of the
institutional measures recommended here for gaining agreements on the reop-
eration of Folsom (U.S. Department of the Interior, 1994~.
Successful planning will recognize the interests that sought a full-pool Au-
burn reservoir and will define measures that might bring them into an agreement.
These measures will probably not center on obtaining "wet water" but on facili-
tating water transfer agreements, cash payments for water conservation programs,
or support for construction of water pumping and transfer facilities. While these
measures fall outside the Sacramento District's view of its implementation au-
thority, the failure to include such measures in plan formulation means that a
source of support for any flood risk management alternative is lost.
At some point, it may be determined that a desired amount of risk reduction
will require a dry dam near the Auburn site. Opponents of the dry dam are
concerned about two possible outcomes of such a decision, but institutional mea-
sures might be developed to facilitate agreement over concerns about impacts to
the American River canyon. First, opponents believe that a dry dam will eventu-
ally be converted to a full pool. It is considered politically prudent to oppose any
dam, lest a dry dam be the first step toward a full-pool reservoir. SAFCA's
suggestion for addressing this concern was to propose an ungated structure. The
committee finds an ungated design to be imprudent (see Chapter 3~. Earlier in
this section, the committee suggested the kinds of institutional measures that can
address the water supply purpose and in so doing reduce the pressure to construct
a reservoir with a permanent pool. In combination with such institutional mea-
sures, it might also be possible to ensure the pending wild and scenic status for
the American River, or to transfer canyon land ownership to a natural area trust,
as a condition of dry dam construction.
A second concern voiced by opponents to the dry dam is about the uncertain
environmental effects of occasional canyon inundation. The Sacramento District
has stated that inundation of the canyon would occur several years out of ten,
although the exact frequency has never been calculated because the district ap-
parently has not completed and reported on the flood control system operation
procedures for the dry dam. All that the District has suggested to the committee
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN RIVER AND THE UNITED STATES
_ ~ 1_ ~ ~1 ~, ~ ~
197
1S that the projects will be operated jointly, meaning that for high-frequency
events there will be some canyon inundation.
The committee believes that a suggestion of the Planning and Conservation
League of California with respect to the dry dam (Jennings, 1992' has received
too little attention as a possible focus for agreement (if there is a concern that the
risk of a no-storage option is unacceptable). The suggested operational strategy
would be to use the dry dam as "insurance" against extreme flows, driving down
the likelihood of use of the dry dam (for example, it might impound water only in
the 100 year 1 percent chance events. The first line of flood protection would
achieve high levels of flood damage reduction from a modified and reoperated
system with Folsom as the key element. What is significant here is that this
approach would reduce the likelihood of the dry dam impounding water, and
hence the possibility and frequency of environmental impacts occurring in the
canyon would be reduced. This strategy would require gates for operation of the
dry dam. As a bonus, a radically reduced frequency of inundation may make
relocation of highway 49 less necessary, reducing total project cost by over $100
million.
Also, a mitigation strategy for the uncertain effects of infrequent inundation
would be needed. An institutional response would be the creation and funding of
an "adaptive management" trust fund for the canyon. This fund would have
adequate assets to compensate for restoration or replacement elsewhere of the
environmental assets of the canyon following any inundation. It would be ini-
tially endowed by the beneficiaries of the flood control. Withdrawals from the
fund would be made after each inundation, and the amount withdrawn would be
replaced by charges against downstream flood control beneficiaries. With these
charges as a consideration, the use of the canyon as a last element used in any
flood event would be encouraged.
The committee recognizes that creativity in identifying and designing insti-
tutional measures may fall outside the authority of the Sacramento District. This
being the case, and given the central importance of institutional analysis, USACE
policy may need to encourage the Sacramento District to structure its planning
process differently. The environmental impact statement (EIS' established by the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the Fish and Wildlife Service
review of projects under the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958 provide
for public and agency participation in the formulation of USACE plans. The
development of the EIS, as practiced by the District, limits the public and other
local, state, and federal agencies to project review roles rather than integrating
their contributions into plan formulation. Early integration of disparate interests
could focus on building consensus about a full range of measures to be consid-
ered, including those that might lie outside the engineering and construction
mission of USACE. However, there is no assurance that other agencies and
interests will bring the necessary creativity to a newly opened planning process.
There is no formula for selecting any mix of agencies and public organizations
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FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN RIVER BASIN
that will bring these insights to planning, but simply acknowledging the need for
such creativity is a step in the necessary direction.
THE WATER POLICY AND MANAGEMENT CONTEXT
Flood risk management decisions for the American River must be addressed
within the larger context of California water management. Certain recent federal
environmental rulings may affect the opportunities to implement some of the
flood risk management alternatives for the American River. Oversight and coor-
dination of studies and proposals related to flood control and to other aspects of
water management will be required if any alternatives to address the potentially
conflicting purposes are to be implemented. The Sacramento District should not
be expected to, nor is it able to, provide this oversight and coordination function.
There are at least three relevant major federal proposals in various stages of
planning and implementation that relate to these environmental concerns: (1) a
proposal by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to increase water flow
to the Sacramento Delta to reduce the salinity intrusion and its effect on biota, (2)
a proposal by Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species Act to
increase flows to the delta to benefit the delta smelt and to declare threatened
status for the Sacramento splittail, and (3) several provisions of the Central Val-
ley Project Improvement Act (P.L. 102-575, Title 34~. There are also several
related state proposals.
Recently, EPA proposed a rule establishing three different water quality
criteria for the delta: (1) salinity criteria protecting estuarine habitat in the Suisun
Bay area, (2) salmon smolt survival indices protecting salmon migration, and (3)
an electrical conductivity criterion protecting striped bass spawning on the lower
San Joaquin River (EPA, 19943. The primary method for implementing these
proposals involves increases in delta outflow. EPA estimated that the increases
would average 540,000 acre-feet per year and go as high as 1.1 million acre-feet
in very dry years. These increased outflows would be needed primarily from
February through June.
In March 1994 the California State Water Resources Control Board disputed
the proposed criteria (CSWRCB, 1994), and EPA subsequently revised its pro-
posal. In an effort to resolve this dispute between federal and state regulatory
agencies, which had been ongoing since 1978, then Assistant Secretary of the
Interior Elizabeth Rieke and California Secretary for Resources Wheeler an-
nounced in June 1994 a Framework Agreement between the Governor's Water
Policy Council and the Federal Ecosystem Directorate. The agreement is de-
signed to resolve bay-delta management issues and coordinate the regulatory
process. Federal agencies involved in the pact are the National Marine Fisheries
Service, Bureau of Reclamation, Fish and Wildlife Service, and EPA. State
participants are the California Resources Agency (Department of Fish and Game,
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN RIVER AND THE UNITED STATES
199
Department of Water Resources) and the California Environmental Protection
Agency (including the State Water Resources Control Board).
A major reconciliation was announced on December 15, 1994. State and
federal officials, in cooperation with urban, agricultural, and environmental inter-
ests, agreed to implement a specific plan to provide ecosystem protection for the
bay-delta estuary. The provisions are intended to be in place for 3 years, at which
time they would be reviewed for possible revision. They include water quality
standards, limitations on exports from the delta, and assurances that the plan is
intended to create conditions in the delta that will avoid the need for any addi-
tional listings under the Endangered Species Act during the next 3 years.
It will be some time before final decisions are made implementing this
proposal and before it will be known how the additional flow, if mandated, will
be allocated among the various tributaries. However, it is almost certain that
Folsom operations would be affected by any increased flow requirement. Owing
to its proximity to the delta, Folsom is the first in line to ameliorate adverse water
quality in the delta.
In January 1994 the Fish and Wildlife Service released two related docu-
ments (USFWS, 19941. One proposes threatened status for the Sacramento
splittail (a large cyprinid fish); the other proposes the delta area as critical habitat
for the delta smelt. These two proposals are closely linked to the EPA salinity
criteria mentioned above, and the two agencies are working together to present a
unified program to benefit the relevant species.
The Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA, P.L. 102-575, Title
34) includes two major sections that may affect water routing from the American
River (USDI, 1993J. The first is an ambitious plan to double the numbers of
anadromous salmonids in the Sacramento-San Joaquin basin by the year 2002,
compared to the base period of 1967 to 1991. It would involve all of the major
tributaries of the Sacramento. The planning process is in very preliminary stages,
and there is little documentation available at this time. The two primary require-
ments are temperature control and increased minimum flows.
The doubling plan for anadromous fish in CVPIA is consistent with one
established by the California legislature in 1988 (Chapter 1545/88~. In the imple-
mentation of the state plan, the California Department of Fish and Game has a
proposal for anadromous fish enhancement (CDFG, 1993) that presumably will
be integrated into the CVPIA program. The other relevant section of CVPIA
directs the Secretary of the Interior to "dedicate and manage annually 800,000
acre-feet of Central Valley Project yield for the primary purpose of implementing
fish, wildlife, and habitat restoration." The source of this additional water is not
specified and is the subject of much debate as the new law is being implemented.
In the first year, part of the 800,000 acre-feet was dedicated to maintaining
releases of no less than 1,750 cubic feet per second from Nimbus Dam from
October 1993 through February 1994 (USDI, 1993~. Water provided from CVP
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FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN RIVER BASIN
for delta water quality under the December 1994 state-federal agreement will be
credited to the 800,000 acre-feet of obligation.
In the continuing effort to solve the myriad problems caused by too much or
too little water in the American River basin, more may be asked of Folsom than
it can possibly deliver. Efforts to develop reoperation plans will have to take
these demands into consideration. Coordination with other environmental con-
cerns such as the CVPIA needs to take place to establish regional ecological
management priorities. What is needed is enhanced capability for technical
systems analysis to support decisionmaking on conflicting water resources goals.
Meanwhile, the state's dedication of resources to data collection and statewide
planning that might resolve conflict has been radically reduced in recent years.
Further, California's Department of Water Resources is now largely funded by
revenues from state water project contractors, who represent mainly urban and
agricultural water supply interests. Limited resources to conduct data collection,
to conduct water policy research, and to create conflict resolution mechanisms
may inhibit the ability to reach agreements on such matters as competing de-
mands for the storage at Folsom.
CONCLUSION
Agreements on acceptable level of flood risk and on the alternatives to
achieve that level have escaped the American River planning process. If there is
to be a resolution of the issue of appropriate flood risk for the American River,
alternative planning approaches and new leadership from outside the Sacramento
District, while drawing on the resources and expertise housed in USACE and the
district, will be needed. Specific attention must be paid to enhanced risk commu-
nication to ensure that the full costs and benefits of different alternatives are
adequately understood by the public. Toward this end, federal policy should
increase the cost responsibility on project beneficiaries.
Based on careful consideration of these issues, the committee believes that
the following recommendations should be considered:
· Future federal participation in flood damage reduction projects for the
American River should be conditioned upon SAFCA, working with FEMA and
private insurers, requiring landowners to purchase actuarially sound flood insur-
ance against residual risk for new development at Natomas and for Sacramento.
In particular, SAFCA should either (1) institute a program to require that indi-
viduals purchase their own flood insurance related to the risk of the location and
development or (2) purchase group insurance for all landowners in the region and
recover purchase costs by assessments on landowners who receive coverage.
.
USACE, FEMA, and other federal agencies should adopt an agreement
governing federal participation in structural and nonstructural flood risk manage-
ment efforts to require that benefiting local communities have a program requir
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AMERICAN RIVER AND THE UNITED STATES
201
ing new development to purchase flood insurance at actuarially sound rates for
residual flood risk. Existing development should also purchase residual risk
insurance, presumably at lower rates than new development. The federal govern-
ment, working with private insurers, should develop provisions for sharing the
cost of flood insurance premiums with communities and individuals who imple-
ment structural and nonstructural flood damage reduction measures.
· Before authorizing additional federal financial commitments for flood
control on the American River, Congress should explicitly determine whether
flood control on the American River constitutes a problem warranting federal
involvement based on the presence of widespread national benefits or the limited
ability of the community to provide for its own flood protection.
.
Congress should reform cost sharing requirements in the 1986 Water
Resources Development Act (1) to increase the nonfederal cost share signifi-
cantly above currently authorized levels, granting exemptions to the higher rate
when it is demonstrated that flood control benefits are widespread or that the
benefiting communities have limited ability to pay for justified flood protection
and (2) to first define all cost sharing requirements as a share of total project costs
and then make allowances for documented in-kind contributions to be counted
toward the allocated cost share.
· The Sacramento District and SAFCA should report the flood risk on the
American River as a chance of flooding of 1 in 100 per year (or whatever figure
is appropriate). Such annual risk figures should also be converted to the risk over
longer time periods. For example, a 1 in 100 year risk results in a 40 percent
chance over the next 50 years that floodwaters will overtop or breach the levees
and inundate the Sacramento area. The 1986 flood in the area, which has been
estimated as a 70-year flood event, should be used as a reference to convey the
magnitude of larger and less frequent storms.
· The Sacramento District should act with SAFCA and other stakeholders
to build and publicize realistic scenarios to describe the consequences of a levee
being overtopped. Descriptions of the vulnerability of the Sacramento and
Natomas areas to storm events that overtop or breach the levee system should
clearly address the extreme depth of flooding possible, the transportation difficul-
ties that will be faced, and the problems involved in recovering from flooding in
a closed basin.
.
The traditional term "level of protection" misleads the public and is not
consistent with the analytical outcomes expected from the new USACE risk
analysis procedures. Therefore, USACE should select a technically sound risk
communication vocabulary and approach to communicating flood risk likelihood
and consequences (see Chapters 4 and 5) and use it consistently in all its reports
and presentations. In addition, USACE should work with FEMA, as well as other
agencies, the states, and private insurers, to develop a standardized vocabulary
that adequately conveys flood risk and vulnerability.
· The Sacramento District and SAFCA should expand the consensus-build
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FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN RIVER BASIN
ing efforts of the Lower American River Task Force for the purposes of (1)
addressing the full array of purposes that were originally part of the study autho-
rization, including water supply and allied purposes and (2) identifying institu-
tional agreements that can employed to address these purposes. In this effort, the
district and SAFCA might request the leadership and assistance of the State of
California's Resources Agency.
· USACE should issue guidance to its districts stressing the requirements to
maintain a broader view of water resource planning purposes and to address those
purposes throughout the planning process in the development and evaluation of
institutional as well as engineering measures.
· The state of California should not expect the flood control controversy on
the American River to be resolved solely through federal leadership. The state
needs to increase its participation in, and the resources it dedicates to, the
basinwide water resources planning needed to build a consensus on technical and
institutional strategies to manage competing water demands, including flood risk
management.
~, ~
· For especially contentious disagreements, USACE should advise its Dis-
tricts to facilitate but not dominate the local decisionmaking process. That role
includes provision of technical analysis as well as initiation of and participation
in decisionmaking forums (such as that initiated by SAFCA in the lower Ameri-
can River). USACE districts should assist agencies of the federal and state
governments and nongovernmental interests to cooperatively develop the data
and models, understanding of risks and trade-offs, and possibilities in the formu-
lation of alternatives early in the planning process.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
flood risk
