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10 Fishing _= Fishing has long been considered to be a major cause of the declines in salmon abundance of the late nineteenth century and continues to be increasingly restricted. But fishing is only one cause of salmon mortality. Mortality caused by other human economic developments or activities (dams, habitat loss or deg- radation, pollution, and water diversions) and by natural factors (predators, dis- ease, and environmental variability) together usually exceed fishing mortality and thus influence the rate of fishing that a salmon population can sustain. Com- mercial, recreational, and treaty fishing, however, generally occur late in the salmon life cycle and can significantly reduce the number of spawning adults and thus have a more direct effect than other sources of mortality on the population size remaining to reproduce. For example, following a major environmental change or catastrophic event, or human-caused mortalities in other stages of the life cycle, reduction of fishing mortality might be the only way to protect the surviving salmon and allow enough of them to spawn to sustain the population. For this reason, and because fishing is often easier to control than other causes of mortality, control of fishing is often used to maintain spawning population sizes. SALMON FISHERIES IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST Early History In the 1830s, commercial salmon fishing by non-Indians began on the Co- lumbia River. Not many salmon were taken, because a method of storage for sale had not been perfected. Canning technology arrived at the Sacramento River in 254
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FISHING 255 the 1860s, but salmon runs there were already in poor condition because of overfishing, hydraulic mining, and habitat destruction. Salmon canning spread to the Columbia River in the middle 1860s and to Puget Sound in the 1870s (Goode and others, 1884-1887, Cobb 1930~. Market demand was high, and the Columbia River fleet grew from two gill-net boats in 1866 to more than 1,500 early in the 1880s. By that time, Alaska salmon fisheries also were developing, and their overwhelming influence on the supply of West Coast salmon had begun. Catches in the Columbia River reached peaks in the 1880s and again in World War I. The number of gill-net boats reached a peak of 2,800 by the middle l910s (C. L. Smith 1979:108~. As exploitation rates grew, catches changed from spring-caught chinook to summer and fall chinook, coho, sockeye, and steelhead, all of which were fished to provide a year-round supply for canning (Cobb 1930, Craig and Hacker 1940J. Summer chinook were preferred and by the end of World War I, the summer run was overfished. By 1915, ocean trolling had begun in an attempt to get around the closed season that was introduced to allow salmon escapement from river fishing. The gasoline engine and refrigeration appeared in the early l900s and made ocean fishing possible. After World War I, a surplus of Alaska-caught salmon and the Great Depres- sion reduced the salmon fishery, and it stayed reduced until the middle 1940s. After World War II, fishing increased by extending out into the ocean. Recre- ational angling became important in rivers and the ocean. Along the coast, many began commercial fishing as salmon trollers; later, some changed to trawling for other species. Until the 1970s, ocean trolling took larger and larger shares of the chinook and coho salmon caught. The expansion of ocean fisheries placed the burden of responsibility for conservation on fishers closer to the spawning grounds, including the American Indians. Regulations increased on these more proximal users, who then argued that fishery-management plans did not treat them fairly. Arguments by Indian fishers culminated in 1974 with Judge Boldt's interpretation of the 1855 Treaty of Medicine Creek. Judge Boldt interpreted the statement that "the right of taking fish . . . is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the territory" to mean a 50/50 allocation between Indians and non-Indians of the catchable fish passing through the tribes' fishing grounds. His decision expanded the established Indian exemption from state regulation of fishing within the reser- vation to all usual and accustomed fishing areas of the treaty tribes (Bruun 19821. Extended jurisdiction under the Magnuson Fishery and Conservation Act of 1976 exerted additional limitations on ocean fisheries. With declining salmon abundance, the ex-vessel value of non-Indian troll salmon fishing fluctuated by a factor of ten, as shown in Figure 10-1 (from PFMC l995:IV-141. However, these coastal ocean fisheries account for only a small portion of the total catch of salmon.
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FISHING 257 The 1990s The major groups that fish are treaty Indians; nontreaty commercial fishers; and charter, guided, and general recreational anglers. Treaty fisheries use nets and trolling for ceremonial, subsistence, and commercial purposes. Nontreaty commercial fishers use ocean trolling and nets in the lower Columbia River and Puget Sound. Most recreational charters fish the ocean using hook and line. Anglers fish from jetties, river banks, and private boats in the ocean, estuaries, and rivers. The 1990s have been poor for all fishing groups in the areas managed by the Pacific Fisheries Management Council (PFMC). Only 53~o of ocean trollers registered in the 1990s reported landings, and the average landings by weight in the 1990s were only 43% of those in the 1980s. For the Columbia River gill-net fishery, 1993 was at 57% of the 1979 high of 1,524 licenses. Indian fishers in the 1990s caught only half as much as those in the early 1940s, even though their proportional allocation increased from 5% to 50%. Ocean recreational fishers' effort and catch in the 1990s averaged about 80% of those in the 1980s, although the chinook or coho caught per angler trip remained about the same. For Puget Sound, recreational catches of chinook and coho declined. Both treaty and nontreaty commercial fishers' catches in Puget Sound did not decline as much as those of commercial ocean fishers, probably because catches in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound take five species and rely heavily on sockeye and pink returns to the Fraser River (Table 10-1~. TABLE 10-1 Commercial Net and Troll Salmon Catches in Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound (Washington Statistical Areas 5 through 13) Catch (thousands of fish) Year ChinookCohoPinkaSockeyeChum 1971-1975 157.9748.32,057.3409.32,196.8 1976-1980 229.6901.93,090.5702.91,373.4 1981-1985 215.5950.73,294.9756.71,837.2 1986 223.91,357.10.11,155.82,751.3 1987 213.11,782.22,069.81,301.61,946.1 1988 231.41,237.50.11568.7849.4 1989 253.9965.43,427.7886.52,251.7 1990 250.21,067.70.31,100.52,166.7 1991 143.3598.73288.51,021.21,828.1 1992 136.1400.00.41,380.7616.5 1993 81.0183.72,097.91,131.12,692.6 aPink salmon runs are strong only in odd years. Source: Data from PFMC 1994, Table B-37.
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25s UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST Catches and returns to the numerous terminal fisheries (i.e., near the termi- nus of the salmons' upstream migration to the spawning grounds) and inriver fisheries are highly variable, but in general they are also lower than 10-15 years ago. Coho catches and returns, in particular, are characterized by high annual variability and are now in low abundance. Where terminal catches have been maintained, it has often been because of curtailment of more distant fishing or because of hatchery production. Allocations between terminal and ocean fisheries within the Pacific North- west states are complicated by international allocation issues. Canada and the United States have competed for Fraser River sockeye almost from the beginning of commercial fishing. The debate broadened throughout the North Pacific Ocean with the development of ocean troll fisheries and high-seas fishing. The major international issue remaining in the 1990s concerns fishing agreements between Canada and the United States. Fishery and management history is considered below first for high-seas fisheries involving interactions with Japan and the Soviet Union and second for the Canadian and United States interactions. The concepts underlying salmon management are discussed in detail in Chapter 11. Fishery-Management Institutions Since 1977, PFMC has coordinated fishery management in the Pacific North- west states. PFMC is one of eight regional fishery-management councils created by the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. The regional management councils are innovative institutions made up of governor- appointed citizens with knowledge of fisheries or fish conservation and members of relevant state and federal agencies. PFMC jurisdiction covers ocean waters 3- 200 miles from shore and anadromous species throughout the range of their migration. The council recommends rules for salmon management to the secre- tary of commerce, who has final authority. PFMC coordinates federal and state actions with respect to salmon manage- ment for California, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington. Technical advice comes from a Salmon Technical Team with representatives of the American Indian tribes; Washington, California, and Oregon fishery agencies; the National Marine Fisheries Service; and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. A Klamath River Technical Advisory Team provides guidance on the management of Klamath populations. An industry advisory body, the Salmon Advisory Subpanel, in- cludes representatives of most groups concerned with salmon management- consumers, processors, anglers, charter operators, gillnetters, trollers, and treaty tribes. International aspects are addressed through the Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC), a bilaterally funded commission created under the Pacific Salmon Treaty. The commission is composed of three advisory panels with equal numbers of Canadian and U.S. members from the fisheries industry, American Indians, and
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FISHING 259 government appointees. There are also several scientific advisory committees and a secretariat. Panels are aligned geographically and functionally. The north- ern panel addresses fisheries and populations in northern and central British Columbia and southeastern Alaska, including the transboundary rivers in south- eastern Alaska. The southern panel addresses issues in southern British Colum- bia and the Pacific Northwest states, excluding Fraser River sockeye and pinks. The Fraser panel evolved from the former International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission and manages Canadian and U.S. fisheries for sockeye and pink salmon in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, outer Puget Sound, and Canadian waters off the Fraser River. The Fraser panel is the only PSC body with any within-season management capacity, and commission staff collect catch, escapement, and bio- logical data. Puget Sound salmon management is the most complex domestically and internationally. In domestic salmon management, Puget Sound operates under a cooperative arrangement that has evolved since the Boldt decision (see Clark 19853. The Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission and Washington state jointly manage catch in Puget Sound in accord with international agreements reached in PSC. Commercial fishing in the Columbia River is divided between Oregon and Washington. The Columbia River Compact was created in 1918 to manage Columbia River fisheries. The Washington Department of Fisheries and Wildlife and the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife share responsibilities. The compact meets before all major seasons and sets regulations. The U.S. v Oregon (Belloni) decisions of 1969 and 1975 require that catch be allocated between treaty and nontreaty fishers. Regulations must meet the requirements of the Columbia River Fish Management Plan, approved by the U.S. District Court in 1988. Idaho too has an interest in how river catches are managed; Idaho has felt that its interests have not been considered in compact decisions. The Northwest Power Act (1980) requires that the dam-induced losses of salmon in the Columbia Basin be mitigated. The Northwest Power Planning Council (NPPC) determined that Bonneville Power Administration ratepayers are responsible for 8-11 million fish per year above the 2.5 million that were being produced in the late 1970s (Lee 1993a). The act provides monetary re- sources from the sale of electric power for improving salmon populations. NPPC has set overall goals for salmon restoration in the Columbia Basin (Strategy for Salmon, NPPC 1992a). All the region's ratepayers, through NPPC, have an interest in the status of salmon. Anglers and nontreaty tribes in eastern Oregon, eastern Washington, and Idaho are the farthest upstream consumers of Columbia River salmon spawning in tributaries of the Snake and middle Columbia rivers. They compete most directly against escapement goals for their catch. Because escapement goals have seldom been met, fisheries for these upriver anglers and nontreaty tribes have been affected most severely. Chinook angling in Idaho has been eliminated
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260 UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST since the early 1970s, and wild steelhead cannot be kept. Yet, Idaho has had no voice in the Columbia River Compact. Similar problems occur among states in the management of coastal fisheries where individual states' different rules for opening dates, size limits, and gear restrictions have resulted in intraregional conflicts. PFMC has worked to coordinate state rules. The pattern has been for rules to become more time-, location-, and population-specific with the effect of reducing fishing times, locations, and gear. With the listing of several salmon populations as endangered in the Snake River, the National Marine Fisheries Service takes on an even more important role in salmon management because the endangered-species authority rests with it. Endangered-species listing requires that state and regional planning be coordi- nated with efforts to restore endangered salmon populations- another layer of review for all salmon-fishing rules established by PFMC. Fishery-Management Data Data needed for salmon management are complex, voluminous, and expen- sive because of the large number of salmon populations, fisheries, communities, and management agencies, as well as the complex, wide-ranging life histories of salmon. Often, several agencies must cooperate to collect data for assessment of a single population. Basic catch, escapement, and economic data are reported annually by several organizations, such as PSC, PFMC, the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission, and state and treaty fishery agencies. The data are used in numerous analyses and reports but often are considered inadequate for accurate determination of the biological basis of salmon population dynamics and the social and economic aspects of fishery regulation. Agencies have difficulty in funding the elaborate management process. They lack resources to evaluate appropriate sampling strategies to get accurate catch data, to determine the rela- tive weight of different incentives for fishing, and to estimate costs of and earn- ings from fishing. As discussed later, the data limitations have had a serious influence on our ability to assess and manage salmon appropriately. One of the difficult data problems is to quantify nonreported fish deaths associated with salmon and other fisheries. For salmon, these deaths are associ- ated with the release of undersized fish in hook-and-line and some seine fisheries, dropout from gill nets, and incidental catch of juveniles in seine fisheries. Inci- dental deaths of chinook have been estimated at 30-50% of the reported catch during the middle 1980s (PSC 1987', but estimates for other salmon have not been developed. Trawl fisheries are another source of deaths. The vast majority of salmon caught in trawl fisheries are chinook, followed by chum in some areas and some years. The largest trawl-associated mortality occurs in the Bering Sea but does not influence Pacific Northwest salmon. However, trawl fisheries in the Gulf of Alaska and off Washington, Oregon, and California might influence Pacific Northwest salmon (Table 10-2~. The catches are variable, but could be
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FISHING 261 TABLE 10-2 Estimated Catches of Salmon in Trawl Fisheries No. Fish Caught in Trawl Fisheries Gulf ofWashington, Oregon, YearAlaskaand California 19775,22214,627 197845603a5,924 197921,460a8,666 198036,0698,433 198130,86011,474 19826,967a11,798 198313,8745,143 198475,846a10,255 198620,82043,790 19871,221a13,285 1988147a16,168 1989pa9,199 199021,085617 199150,8736,358 199226,0905?099 1993b74,8538,373 aDid not include U.S. domestic trawl catches. bPreliminary estimates. Source: Data from Low and Berger 1994 (Table 4). large in some years and are comparable with the catch in past Japanese high-seas fisheries. The incidental deaths today are associated with U.S. trawl fisheries but previously were associated with foreign or joint-venture fisheries. Human fishers also compete with nonhuman consumers. Sea lions and seals consume many salmon. Marine-mammal populations have been growing rapidly (Beach et al. 1985, Olesiuk et al. 1990) since implementation of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Sea lions and seals, abundant in British Columbia and the Pacific Northwest, take salmon as far upstream as Bonneville Dam and Willamette Falls in the Columbia basin and at other places of fish concentration, such as Ballard Locks in Seattle (see Box 2-11. Palmisano et al. (1993) estimated that incidental loss due to marine-mammal predation can be as much as 16% of the human salmon catch. Park (1993) claimed that marine mammals including killer whales and birds take more salmon than are caught by humans. Those deaths usually are considered natural deaths but the rate of increase in these predators can be a concern, especially when salmon are at low abundance, or the predators concentrate on depressed salmon populations near and at their spawn- ing grounds.
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262 UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES High-Seas Fishing Japan began exploring offshore salmon fishing in the early 1930s as its access to salmon along the Kamchatka Peninsula became more restricted by the Soviet Union. By 1936, the Japanese fleet in the Bering Sea caught the attention of U.S. fishers in Bristol Bay. Japan agreed to discontinue the expansion in 1938, and World War II soon curtailed such activities. After the war, the Japanese fleet again began to move seaward. Concerns in Canada and the United States led to the 1952 International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pa- cific Ocean. The convention called for Japan to abstain from fishing for salmon east of longitude 175°W to minimize its catch of North American salmon. The abstention line was subject to review by the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission to determine whether another line separated Asian and North Ameri- can salmon better or divided the catch more equitably. Canada and the United States were to provide evidence that their populations were used fully. All three countries were to cooperate in scientific investigations of the distribution and origin of salmon on the high seas. A 1956 agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union further restricted Japan's high-seas salmon fishery. The resulting Japan-Soviet Northwest Fisher- ies Commission established total allowable catches and other regulations in areas west of the abstention line through negotiations that were extended and often difficult. The annual quota for the Japanese catches of salmon declined steadily. The commission also imposed time and area closures and effort limitations to reduce the catches of salmon originating in Asia (Fredin et al. 1977~. Japan's high-seas fishery became increasingly contentious as it expanded and as investigations proceeded, because Asian and North American populations were more mixed than had been expected, the fishery caught immature salmon, and the origins of the large catches were unknown. The abstention line, however, was not changed until the nations unilaterally extended their fishery jurisdictions to 200 miles. The United States declared that its exclusive fishery-management zone extended throughout the migratory range of anadromous species (Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976) an assertion that was ac- cepted by Japan and other nations seeking to fish within the U.S.200-mile fishery zone (Burke 19911. The locations of the U.S. Aleutian Islands extended the new U.S. zone considerably west of the abstention line and north and south of the islands into areas in which Japan had fished traditionally. In 1977, the Soviet Union also declared a 200-mile zone and terminated Japanese salmon fishing there. In 1978, Japan negotiated new agreements with the Soviet Union and with Canada and the United States. On February 15, 1979, a new protocol with Canada and the United States amended the original 1952 convention. The proto- col continued scientific studies and cooperation, closed fishing southeast of lati
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FISHING 263 tude 56°N and longitude 175°E, limited mothership fleet-days northeast of lati- tude 56°N, and limited fishing within the U.S. 200-mile fishing zone. A detailed history of the agreements between Japan, Canada, and the United States is in Jackson and Royce ~ 19861. Japan's high-seas salmon fishing was restricted again both in 1985 through a new Japan-Soviet agreement and in 1986 through amend- ments to the Japan, Canada, and U.S. protocol of 1979. Quota reductions contin- ued through the Japan-Soviet agreements, as did increases in fees. The amended protocol with the United States and Canada phased out the mothership fleet in the central Bering Sea, moved the eastern boundary of the land-based fishery another degree west, and intensified studies in land-based fishing south of latitude 46°N to determine the continent of origin of salmon caught in this area. By the late 1980s, Japan's high-seas fishing for salmon had been reduced substantially. The number of vessels in its land-based fleet declined from 374 in the early 1970s to 83 in 1991 (Myers et al. 1993~. The mothership fleet was reduced from 16 motherships and 460 catcher boats in the 1950s to one mothership with 43 catcher boats in 1988. A side effect of the many agreements was the displacement of Japanese fishing vessels. The vessels became the first to use drift gill nets to catch neon flying squid (Ommastrephes bartrami) in the central North Pacific (Ignell 19911. By the middle 1980s, the landed catch was averaging 258,000 metric tons/year annually and involved over 700 vessels from Japan, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea. Estimates of the total salmon deaths, including all species and origins, in the Japanese squid drift-net fishery have been 1,614 in 1989 and 141,279 in 1990 (Anon. 1991), 103,895 in 1990 (Yatsu et al. 1993), and 231,000 in 1990 (Pella et al. 1993~. The estimate of total salmon deaths in the 1990 Korean fishery was only 4,036 (Pella et al. 1993), and estimates of the Taiwanese catch were not developed, because only two salmon had been observed. Through the late 1980s, world opposition to the use of high-seas drift nets increased. Concerns over the incidental catch of salmon, marine mammals, seabirds, and other fish in squid drift-nets increased public pressure on Japan, Korea, and Taiwan to stop their use. Forty years of effort to minimize the interception of North American salmon on the high seas culminated in 1992 when Japan notified the Japan-Russia Fish- eries Joint Commission of its decision to stop high-seas salmon fishing in 1992 and the United Nations adopted resolution A/RES/46/215 (February 10, 1992) ensuring a "global moratorium on all large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing . . ., by 31 December 1992." Will the absence of this fishing by Japan aid in the recovery of salmon in the Pacific Northwest states? The answer is probably no, because these fisheries previously caught few salmon originating in the Pacific Northwest. Information regarding this conclusion is summarized below for various species and fisheries. Japan's salmon fishery never intercepted large numbers of sockeye, pink, and chum originating in the Pacific Northwest, and as early as 1977 the fishing boundaries had eliminated the likelihood of any major interception (Neave et al.
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264 UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 1976, Fredin et al. 1977, Takagi et al. 1981, Harris 1987, 1988, Myers et al. 19931. Adult tagging and scale-pattern analyses indicated that coho from south- eastern Alaska and Bntish Columbia were absent or rare south of latitude 50°N between longitude 160°E and 175°W (Harris 1988~. However, in 1991, two coho tagged in Washington and Oregon were caught far to the west, indicating that intermingling with Asian and Alaskan populations occurs at least occasionally (Myers et al. 19931. The distribution of chinook in Japan's fishing areas remains uncertain because few tags were recovered from high-seas tagging programs, but high-seas tagging and biological markers have indicated a potential for mixing between Asian and North American chinook in the central North Pacific (Myers et al. 1993~. However, interception of large numbers of Pacific Northwest chinook is unlikely, given both the predominance of Kamchatkan and Alaskan chinook in catches even from land-based fishing and the relatively small catches of chinook on the high seas. In addition, catches of coho and chinook by Japan's mothership fishery northwest of latitude 46°N and longitude 175°W and south of latitude 52°N (Figure 10-2) were not consistently large and could not account for declines in populations after the late 1970s. The effect of distant fisheries on steelhead could be more important because their life history differs from that of the other anadromous salmon. Coded-wire tags have identified steelhead originating in the Pacific Northwest as far west as longitude 163°E and as far south as latitude 41°N (Burgner et al. 19921. Data on 4,000 3,500 3~000 a_ v, cat: cat 2~500 2~000 1,500 ·East of l75E O i, ~ x~ ~9~ ~96 At ~9~ x9( ~9~ x9; Catch Year 300 :~ cot o ~ 150 ._ ., I o 5: 7 a_ 250 50 ·East of l75E O ~9~ x~9~ ~9~ ~9; ~9~ x9( ~9~' ~9 Catch Year FIGURE 10-2 Japanese mothership fishery catch of coho (left) and chinook (right) in the North Pacific (southwest of 52°N and 175°W), 1952-1991. Total height of bars repre- sents total catch in this region, and black bars indicate catch taken between 175°E and 175°W.
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FISHING 265 steelhead in Japan's mothership and land-based fisheries before the 1980s were not available but later data indicate that catches were much smaller in the mothership fishery than in the land-based fishery (Burgner et al. 19921. In the land-based fishery, the steelhead catch declined from 23,000 in 1981 to 1,000 in 1991; populations from British Columbia, Washington, Idaho, and Oregon would dominate this catch (Myers et al. 1993~. Thus, the land-based fishery, particu- larly before the 1979 protocol, could have intercepted substantial numbers of steelhead from the Pacific Northwest (Burgner et al. 19921. Regarding the effect of Japan's high-seas squid fishery on salmon, the Dis- cussion Group on Salmon and Squids (Anon. 1991) concluded that the incidental catch of salmon had no known important biological effect overall but could if concentrated on specific populations. The latter seems unlikely in the central Pacific, but about half the 1990 incidental salmon deaths occurred in July be- tween longitude 170°E and 172°E at latitude 41°N, and most of them were of coho and chum (Pella et al. 19931. However, earlier information indicates that the fish killed would be predominantly of Asian origin and have virtually no effect on fish originating in the Pacific Northwest. These comments pertain to legal squid drift nets, but a substantial illegal catch of salmon also occurred on the high seas (Pella et al. 19931. The opportunity existed because salmon occur near the northern boundary of the squid fishery. Pella et al. (1993) suggested that at least 10,000 metric tons of salmon (5.5 million fish) was killed illegally in a recent year. With the absence of a drift-net fishery on the high seas, illegal harvest should be reduced greatly, but the issue merits monitoring. Canadian and U.S. Fishery Interactions Canada and the United States have a long history of competitive fishing and of fishing agreements. Their relations, although not having the notoriety of the high-seas issues above, have influenced the use and conservation of Pacific North- west salmon. Shepard (1967), Argue et al. (1987), Roos (1991), and Parsons (1993) provided historical overviews of major events and agreements. Brief discussions of the major fisheries are presented here as background to the discus- sion of the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty between Canada and the United States concerning Pacific salmon. Fraser River Sockeye Starting in 1866, Fraser River sockeye provided the base of Canada's devel- oping salmon-canning industry. But by about the turn of the century, catches of Fraser River sockeye by non-Indian trap fishers in the U.S. San Juan Islands rivaled the Canadian catches. This greatly disturbed Canadian fishermen. As early as 1902, reports of the Commissioner for Fisheries of British Columbia reflected the concern (Babcock 19023:
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266 UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST Unfortunately, there is a divided jurisdiction on the fishing grounds of the Fras- er River. The American fishing grounds on Puget Sound must be considered a part of the Fraser River district, as the sockeye captured there were bred in and are endeavoring to return to that river. This divided authority prevents, at least for the present time, the making of suitable protective laws which justly affect the fishery interests on both sides of the lines. The United States took about 60% of the Fraser sockeye catch until 1935 (Figure 10-35. The period includes the catastrophic rockslides at the Fraser River's Hell's Gate in 1913 and 1914 (Roos 1991~. Competitive overfishing and the rockslides severely depressed production. The need for cooperation in managing catches and restoring production was obvious, but almost 35 years of debate passed before a meaningful bilateral agreement was achieved (Roos 1991~. A convention between Canada and the United States for the protection, preserva- tion, and extension of the sockeye fishery was signed in 1930 but was not ratified by the United States until 1937 and did not begin regulating harvest until 1946, because additional research was required before implementation. Equal shares of the Fraser River sockeye catch were achieved in convention waters with an average annual U.S. catch of 1.66 million sockeye in 1946-1985 (about 44% of the total Fraser catch in 1946-1977~. After 1977, the expansion of Canadian fisheries outside the convention areas and the increasing proportion of sockeye migrating through Johnstone Strait (i.e., exclusively Canadian waters) reduced the U.S. portion to about 25% (Figure 10-4~. However, the United States still 35 30 o ~ 25 20 15 10 is O _ 1893 1913 cat ~1 ~1 . . . . . ......................... l ............. _ ~. A Atoll 1~- JNJ: A~V;\!9 \1 ~ 1933 1953 1973 1993 Return Year |-Total Catch -U.S. Proportion of Total Catch | 0.8 0.6 0.4 o 0.2 ,~,3 - Q &: FIGURE 10-3 Historical total catch of Fraser River sockeye salmon, 1893-1993, and proportion of catch taken by fisheries in United States. Total catch includes catch by all gears in all areas reported to have harvested Fraser River sockeye. Source: Data provided by Pacific Salmon Commission.
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FISHING 30 ~ 25 _ 20 .e ~ 15 - c~ 10 5 :\A I .......... . Y 1 ~ ~ i, ,~ I 'V ~ ~ O '1 ' ' 1946 1953 1960 ..... ~4 1967 1974 1981 1988 Catch Year | ·U.S. Catch ~U.S. Proportion of Total Catch teetotal Run ~ 267 0.6 ~ I= 0.5 o _. o o &: - Q FIGURE 10-4 Total runs of Fraser River sockeye salmon since regulatory control by International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission in 1946 and proportion of total catch taken by fisheries in United States. Height of black bar indicates catch taken by United States. Total catch includes catch by all gears in all areas reported to have harvested Fraser River sockeye. Source: Data provided by Pacific Salmon Commission. receives a substantial catch of Fraser River sockeye; the U.S. average take has been 1.96 million annually from 1986 to 1993 (Figure 10-41. Fraser River Pinks Fraser pinks were reduced severely by the Hell's Gate slides (Rounsefell and Kelez 1938, Ricker 1989~. The decline was not as evident as for sockeye, be- cause pinks were not in demand by early fisheries, and catches of Fraser pinks were mixed with Puget Sound pinks. Catches in the Fraser River-Puget Sound region declined to 5.3 million pinks in 1939 but recovered after reduced fishing during World War II. As the total catch of pinks increased from 1945 to 1951, the U.S. portion of the catch in convention waters continued at 70% of the total (Roos 19911. In the early l950s, Canada began expressing interest in establishing a pink salmon agreement to restore their production in the Fraser River. Canada also increased its fisheries at the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and by the middle l950s, the U.S. portion of the pink catch was reduced to about 46%. The Pink Salmon Protocol to the 1936 convention was ratified in 1957. Since 1959, the United States has caught an average of 2.1 million Fraser River pinks (in odd years only), or about 30% of the total (Figure 10-51.
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268 25 r_ v: O 20 ._ - - .s it_ PI - UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 'V ''''''''''''''''''v'''''''''''''''~''''''''''' ~_ _ ~1 15 10 O. 1959 1965 1971 1977 1 , . 1 . O 1983 1989 Return Year | U.S. Catch -U.S. Proportion of Total Catch I~Total Run C - 0 . 5 - 0.4 ~ - 0.3 O 0.2 =. _ &: Q FIGURE 10-5 Total runs of Fraser River pink salmon since regulatory control by Inter- national Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission in 1959 and proportion of total catch taken by fisheries in United States. Height of black bar indicates catch taken by United States Total catch includes catch by all gears in all areas reported to have harvested Fraser River pink salmon. Source: Data provided by Pacific Salmon Commission except for prelimi- nary 1993 spawning escapement value (Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans). Ocean Trolling Competition between Canada and the United States also occurred (and still occurs) in the ocean troll fisheries. The substantial decline of U.S. chinook catches by ocean trolling in the early l950s coincided with a rapid increase in chinook catches by trollers in British Columbia (Figure 10-6a). Changes in coho catches between U.S. and Canadian trollers are not as striking, except for the divergence from Washington catches of southeastern Alaska and British Colum- bia catches after 1976 (Figure 10-6b). Concerns about ocean troll fisheries are similar to those about high-seas salmon fisheries: trolling catches immature fish in addition to mature fish, deaths include incidental deaths of small, sublegal fish that are hooked and released, and the origins of the fish caught are unknown. U.S. and Canadian chinook and coho mix extensively along the Pacific coast (see Table 10-3, for example), and neither country can take its own production in ocean troll fisheries without incidentally catching the other's production as well. A notable difference from the high-seas situation is that each country intercepts salmon bound for the other country and, until 1978, trollers from both countries often shared fishing grounds (Milne 1964, Argue et al. 1987~. In southern British Columbia, Canada sees the interception of U.S. chinook and coho as its only means to balance U.S. catch of Fraser River sockeye and
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FISHING 2.5 Chinook S. E. Alaska rat 1` 2 _ ........ ... J l7 ~ -Washington , I 'l .'"' ~ ~ I;' i 1 . 5 _. . . . i' jL; 1 ,. ~-. J ~ ~A/\? o 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 Catch Year FIGURE 10-6a Trends in troll-fishery catch of chinook salmon by fishers from south- eastern Alaska, and Bntish Columbia. For comparison, catch trends are relative to aver- age catches between 1946-1950 within each region. Mean values for these regions were 4.93 million pounds Washington state landed, 457,000 fish landed in southeastern Alas- ka, and 536,900 fish landed by B.C. fishers. pinks. Recently, Canadian and U.S. scientists published agreed-on estimates of Canadian interceptions in the troll fishery along the west coast of Vancouver Island (Table 10-4~. The data indicate an average annual interception of 236,700 chinook and 1.08 million coho. Interceptions of U.S. salmon also occur in other Canadian fisheries; the above values represent 77% of the total Canadian inter- ceptions of coho (PSC 1994a) but only 50-60% of the total interceptions of chinook (PSC 1993a). Role of Southeastern Alaska U.S. fisheries in southeastern Alaska have both a direct and an indirect effect on Pacific Northwest salmon. They not only intercept those chinook from the Pacific Northwest states that migrate far to the north (Appendix I, PSC 1993b, PSC 1994b, Table 10-5), but they also intercept large numbers of Canadian salmon, including sockeye returning to the Fraser River. Alaskan interceptions 269
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270 1 0.5 _. O _ 1905 1915 1925 1935 UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 3 2.5 2 _.. Coho --- S.E. Alaska --B.C. -Washington ....n ' . '\i ~ i; i; t`, 1;, - -1~- --~- ......... at, 1 1 1 .. . . 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 ~ I I I I I I I I I ~ I I ~ I I I I ~ 1 1 1 1 1 ~ . 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 Catch Year FIGURE 10-6b Trends in troll-fishery catch of coho salmon by fishers from southeastern Alaska, and British Columbia. For comparison, catch trends are relative to average catch- es between 1946-1950 within each region. Mean values for these regions were 4.27 mil- lion pounds Washington state landed, 1.16 million fish landed in southeastern Alaska, and 1.73 million fish landed by B.C fishermen. TABLE 10-3 Distribution of Total Fishing Deaths Based on Coded-Wire Tag Recoveries for Fall Chinook % of Total Recoveries Averaged from 1988 to 1992 Recovery Locations Robertson Creek Fall Chinooka Snake River Fall Chinookb Southeastern Alaska (all gear) West Coast Vancouver Island troll (B.C.) Other B.C. ocean fisheries Pacific Marine Fishery Commission fisheries Total ocean recoveries Terminal catch, Columbia River Terminal catch, Barkley Sound Total catch recoveries Freshwater escapement 28.0 7.51 15.4 0.2 51.1 17.2 68.3 31.7 4.6 5.7 8.7 9.0 38.0 60.3 39.7 aData on Robertson Creek from Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (B. Riddell, Pacific Biological Station, Nanaimo, B.C.). bData on Snake River chinook from Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fisheries Commission (Feb. 10, 1994).
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FISHING 27 TABLE 10-4 Vancouver Island (West Coast) Troll- Fishery Catcha and Estimated Percentage of U.S. Populations Caught Chinookb cohoc Catch% U.S. Catch % U.S. 1984 460,057 64%2,172,166 50% 1985 354,068 61%1,389,055 84% 1986 342,063 75%2,156,833 70% 1987 378,936 89%1,821,347 48% 1988 408,724 87%1,595,801 51% 1989 203,695 69%1,952,009 70% 1990 297,974 59%1,863,608 46% 1991 202,919 59%1,889,946 49% 1992 346,741 NA1,671,829 NA 1993 273,305 NA948,474 NA a Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans statistical areas 21-27 and 121-127. b Estimates of stock proportions for chinook salmon from PSC Report JIC (93)-1 (PSC 1993a). CEstimates of stock proportions for coho from PSC Report TCCOHO (94)-1 (PSC 1994a). NA = analysis not yet available. of Canadian sockeye, chinook, and coho are substantially larger than Canada's interception of Alaskan production of the same species (PSC 1993a, PSC 1994a). Interception estimates for pink and chum are under review, but the technical basis for the estimates is weaker than for sockeye, chinook, and coho. Canada believes that the interception imbalance in southeastern Alaska and northern British Co- lumbia has worsened over time and should be redressed (Canadian Discussion Paper, presented to the Pacific Salmon Commission, Feb. 12, 19931. It is a difficult problem for Alaskan managers. Alaskan fisheries have a long history of catching U.S., transboundary (Stikine, Taku, Alsek, Unuk, Whiting, and Chilkat rivers), and Canadian salmon, and their interceptions occur incidentally in fisher- ies on returning U.S. salmon. Alaskan managers consistently argue that reducing interceptions in these large mixed-population fisheries is impractical. Canadian fishers are equally insistent that to improve management of salmon spawning in northern British Columbia, the Alaskan interceptions should be curtailed. The indirect effect of Alaskan fisheries on Pacific Northwest salmon is simply that in the absence of progress on Alaska-Canada transboundary fisheries, Canada has resisted change in its southern British Columbia fisheries, so pressures are main- tained on the entire U.S. delegation. Reducing Canadian interceptions of salmon originating in Pacific Northwest states to levels that will allow these salmon
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272 UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST TABLE 10-5 Annual Distribution of Total Fishing Mortalitya for Washington and Oregon Chinook Populations Caught in S.E. Alaska for 1985-1993 Fishing Location (%? all gears included) Southeast British Northwestern Population Location Alaska Columbia United States Queets Falls Coastal Washington 37.4 36.4 26.1 Cowlitz Falls Lower Columbia River 9.4 31.0 59.6 Columbia River Middle Columbia River 21.4 31.5 47.1 fall brights Hanford Reach Middle Columbia River 30.3 27.4 42.3 wild fall brightsb Lewis River Lower Columbia River 12.0 31.1 56.9 fall wild Lyons Ferry Snake River, 9.23 8.8 52.0 fall brightsC Middle Columbia River Willamette Springs Lower Columbia River 19.0 11.9 69.1 (Oregon) Salmon River Falls North coastal Oregon 27.6 36.1 36.3 aTotal fishing mortality includes reported catch and estimated mortalities associated with fishing (e.g., hook-and-release of under-sized fish in troll and recreational fisheries, drop-out from nets, etc.). bAverage for years, 1990-1993. CAverage for years, 1988-1993. Source: PSC 1994b. populations to be sustained will require compromise not only by Canada and Pacific Northwest states, but also by Alaska. The Pacific Salmon Treaty The 1985 treaty is the first comprehensive fishery agreement on Pacific salmon between Canada and the United States. Its principles (Article III) follow: 1. With respect to stocks subject to this Treaty, each Party shall conduct its fisheries and its salmon enhancement programs so as to: a) prevent overfishing and provide for optimum production; and b) provide for each Party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters. 2. In fulfilling their obligations pursuant to paragraph 1, the Parties shall cooperate in management, research and enhancement.
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FISHING 273 3. In fulfilling their obligations pursuant to paragraph 1, the Parties shall take into account: a' the desirability in most cases of reducing interceptions; b) the desirability in most cases of avoiding undue disruptions of existing fisheries; and c) annual variations in abundance of the stocks. Article III (l.b) often is referred to as the equity principle; the treaty provides opportunity to conserve and rebuild production of salmon from the Pacific North- west and for both countries to benefit from their increased production. Annexes in the treaty provide a mechanism to limit interception of Pacific Northwest chinook and coho salmon in ocean troll fisheries, limits to interceptions of chum salmon by fisheries in southern British Columbia and Washington State, contin- ued exploitation of Fraser River sockeye and pink salmon, and a general obliga- tion not to initiate new interception fisheries and not to redirect existing fisheries intentionally to increase interceptions. Total catches of Fraser sockeye and pinks are limited and, unlike the previous Fraser convention, apply to U.S. catch of these populations wherever they are caught inside and outside the area managed by the Fraser panel. Agreements on the conduct of fisheries are contained in chapters of Annex IV and can be revised whenever appropriate, although achiev- ing consensus on changes in the annex has been difficult. Potential benefits of the treaty for Pacific Northwest salmon are not being fully achieved, as indicated by the recent inabilities of the parties to renegotiate the fishing annexes. Fundamentally, the parties differ in their application of the treaty principles. The United States emphasizes the need to prevent overfishing and to adjust fisheries for conservation. Its approach to the equity principle is that determining national benefits from salmon production will be difficult tech- nically and should be considered over a longer term. Canada agrees with the need for conservation and rebuilding of production but links these with parallel actions to address equity. Without adequate progress toward addressing equity and in light of recent U.S. proposals for fishing annexes to increase U.S. intercep- tions particularly of Fraser sockeye, renegotiation of the 1994 fishing annexes failed. This is of serious concern for the conservation and rehabilitation of Pacific Northwest salmon. Without a 1994 agreement, ocean troll and recre- ational fisheries of Washington and Oregon are closed, and Canadian fisheries continue to intercept the same populations without any changes in management plans. CONCLUSION Since the nineteenth century, in an effort to maximize catch, salmon fisheries of the Pacific Northwest have exploited a mix of wild-spawning and hatchery- produced salmon. Fishing moved farther into the ocean to catch more and better
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274 UPSTREaM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST quality salmon earlier in their life cycle, but the stream origins of these fish were unknown. Societal pressures pushed catch levels toward those which only the most-productive populations could sustain, but they were often too high for natu- ral populations. Mixed-stock fisheries developed for human convenience, and society watched as local breeding populations of salmon went to extinction or were depressed severely. Fishing impacts and the promotion of regional eco- nomic growth combined to alter salmons' environment to their detriment. The existing technocratic model for fishery management, productivity enhancement, and environmental modification has not been able to sustain salmon catches or the diversity of salmon populations. The result has been a major reduction in economic opportunity for fishers. All fishers have without doubt suffered possi- bly irreparable injury from the status of salmon and the management prescrip- tions to deal with it. The decline in income is much greater than that in any other major resource industry in the Pacific Northwest, and catches by American In- dian fishers are now smaller in numbers of fish than before the Boldt decision. The committee concludes that fishery management objectives must explic- itly recognize the need to conserve and expand the genetic diversity of the salmon resource. To accomplish this, emphasis must be given to minimum sustainable escapements and filling out the dendritic structure of salmon habitats. A more holistic management approach must recognize the connections be- tween the genetic resource base, habitat, and the resulting salmon production; it must also account for the uncertainty in our scientific advice and for inherent environmental variability. The committee has outlined a process intended to improve the potential sustainability of salmon in the Pacific Northwest. Further- more, the committee does not believe that the sustainability of Pacific Northwest salmon can be achieved without limiting the interceptions of U.S. salmon in Canada and obtaining the cooperation of Alaska. An effective and cooperative Pacific Salmon Treaty is necessary. The committee does not provide specific recommendations about altering specific fisheries, because there are numerous options and interactions between fisheries. Achieving agreement on changes in fisheries will be difficult and necessitates an effective institutional process.
Representative terms from entire chapter: