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OCR for page 9
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the National Research Council convened the Pane! on Seismological
Research Requirements for a Comprehensive Test-Ban Mon~tonng System (hereinafter,
the panel) to examine issues associated with establishing an International Seismic
Monitoring System (ISMS) for verifying a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Negotiation of such a treaty is currently underway within the Conference on Disarma-
ment (CD), with prototype versions ofthe ISMS being explored in a series oftechnical
tests organized by the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE). The latest technical test,
GSETT-3, commenced January I, ~ 995, and may phase into the long-term operational
effort of the ISMS.
While various technologies, including seismology, are essential for monitoring
atmospheric and underwater explosions, seismology provides the primary means for
monitoring underground nuclear explosions. In many cases, seismic waves from buned
explosions can be recorded by global networks of seismometers, and the signals used
to detect, locate, and identify the source of the disturbance (allowing nuclear explosions
to be distinguished from conventional chemical explosions or natural earthquakes).
The seismological component of the CTBT monitoring system being considered
within the CD includes the acquisition and processing of seismic data from high-quality
stations and provision of the data to participating states to assist them in their national
verification functions. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) has requested
advice from the National Research Council (NRC) on how the data from the CTBT
monitoring system might best benefit the broader seismological community.
The NRC pane! has been charged with considenng the specific data characteris-
tics desired by the broad seismological community, the procedures for providing general
access to the ISMS data, and the nature of the research infrastructure that could best
support the United States' ability to perform CTBT~ monitoring. It should be noted that
the topics encompassed by this charge differ in nature. (~) The recommendations
regarding instrumentation characteristics are intended for technical specialists. (2) The
recommendations regarding data access involve policy issues for the U.S. National Data
' The specific charges to the panel are given in filll in Appendix A.
9
OCR for page 10
10
Comprehensive Test Ban Monitoring System
Center, U.S. government agencies involved in CTBT, and the treaty verification
community in general. (3) The research infrastructure recommendations involve the
federal agencies that support treaty monitoring research.
To address this broad range of issues, the pane} was constituted with expertise
from the nuclear monitoring, earthquake monitoring, and basic seismological research
arenas. The pane] obtained extensive technical advice from its affiliated members for
each of the tasks, along with soliciting additional input from many seismological
experts for each of the different topics. Two preliminary reports, addressing the first two
charges, were produced and distributed in response to deadlines for the GSE activities
related to GSETT-3 and associated planning for the final ISMS. This report provides
the panel's full response to all three tasks. Detailed discussion of each task is presented
in chapters 3, 4, and 5.
Planned International Seismic Monitoring System
To provide a context for considering the three charges before the panel, this
chapter outlines the current plans for the ISMS. (A prototype ISMS began operation
during GSETT-3, which commenced January i, 1995.) This chapter also presents an
overview of the existing U.S. operational capabilities associated with nuclear
monitoring, earthquake monitoring, and basic research activities.
The CTBT negotiations are in progress, and the ISMS mode} will evolve. A
recent concept for the ISMS is illustrated in Figure 2.1 (from Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Technologies, Second Quarter, 1994, p. ~ I). This system is focused
on nuclear monitoring and is neither designed nor intended to replace any existing
international efforts for earthquake monitoring or data acquisition for basic science
applications.
The current scenario for the ISMS envisions that two main categories of seismic
waveform data will flow into the system. The first comprises continuously telemetered
data from primary stations, many of which will be short-period arrays and all of which
will have at least one broadband three-component seismometer. The second category
of data will involve auxiliary stations, all equipped with a broadband three-component
sensor with on-demand, dial-up access. Only segmented time windows are expected
to be retrieved from auxiliary stations by the TSMS. Many, if not all, of the auxiliary
stations will be drawn from existing global seismographic networks, which currently
have procedures for accessing and archiving their continuous data. All TSMS stations
will have very high quality-control and maintenance requirements. A final category of
supplemental data that may be provided to the ISMS involves regional bulletins,
OCR for page 11
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12
Comprehensive Test Ban Monitoring System
parameter data such as arrival times and amplitudes of various seismic waves, and
possibly even waveform data from regional seismographic networks and other sources.
An TSMS International Data Center (ISMS-IDC) will receive data from the
network of primary stations and use them to produce an automated event list within
about one hour of the event. Based on this list. additional data from auxiliary stations
will be accessed as needed to refine the event list within 4 hours. Analysts will review
the upgraded primary-auxiliary event list and produce a final TSMS bulletin within 2
days of the end of the day of the event. The rapid preparation of this bulletin precludes
incorporation of many seismic observations acquired by international earthquake
monitoring efforts, so the ISMS-IDC bulletin will not be definitive with respect to
global earthquake activity. The degree to which the ISMS-IDC will pursue event
identification efforts related to nuclear event monitoring is still unresolved. All of the
seismic data and event parameters obtained by the ISMS-TDC will be available to ISMS
National Data Centers (ISMS-NDCs), which can utilize this information in independent
national verification functions.
Each ISMS-NDC may have responsibilities for providing its nation's primary
and auxiliary station data to the ISMS-TDC, retrieving seismic data and event
parameters from the TSMS-IDC, and servicing internal verification functions. For the
United States, it is likely that some of the additional national and multilateral data,
combined with ISMS data in national verification Unctions, will be classified, as will
the final nuclear monitoring event list. As a result, computer security issues will exist
at the interface between the classified operations and the ISMS-NDC. In addition, there
will be a need to ensure data validity within the ISMS-IDC-NDC system. The event list
produced by the U.S. national verification function will emphasize identification of
possible nuclear explosion signals and is not intended to produce the highest possible
quality event list of earthquakes. Indeed, for events readily identified as earthquakes on
the basis of location, depth, and/or signal character, no effort will be made to optimize
the event parameters. For small, shallow events in continental areas, the verification
event list is likely to be of very high quality, presumably superior to the event list ofthe
ISMS-IDC. In the past, the national event list produced by the U.S. nuclear monitoring
system has not been available to the unclassified corrununity. It appears unlikely that
this will change, as long as classified data streams are used in constructing the event list,
even if unclassified data play the major role.
The organizational structure ofthe U.S. ISMS-NDC and oversight responsibili-
ties are still unresolved, as is the issue of whether the classified national verification
function will be physically separate or collocated with the TSMS-NDC. (Although no
decision has been made, it seems probable that AFTAC will continue its role and be the
operator ofthe U.S. ISMS-NDC.) The mode} shown in Figure 2.] places the national
verification function under the ISMS-NDC, but this is not a required structure. This
OCR for page 13
INTRODUCTION
13
report will address some of the functionalities of the TSMS-NDC with respect to data
archival and distribution.
This TSMS concept is being tested under the ongoing GSETT-3 experiment. The
prototype ISMS-1[DC is located at the Center for Monitoring Research in Arlington,
Virginia, and is operated by ARPA. The prototype U.S. ISMS-NDC is operated by the
Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) at Patrick Air Force Base in Florida.
AFTAC will combine ISMS data with data from additional National Technical Means
(NTM) in the construction of its classified event list. The USGS has a functional role
in the data flow to the ISMS-NDC for GSETT-3, contributing seismic data streams that
comprise much of the U.S. component of GSETT-3.
Note that there is no specific pathway for data distribution from the ISMS-NDC
model in Figure 2.1. However, the GSE is presently considering its policies with respect
to external data distribution in the GSETT-3. It is broadly recognized that providing
access to the data is highly desirable. The panel views data distribution as an essential
function to include in GSETT-3, in order to evaluate data distribution mechanisms for
the future ISMS. Therefore, Chapter 4 of this report identifies possible pathways by
which the unclassified seismic data and event parameters from the U.S. ISMS-NDC can
be made available for other efforts related to nuclear test monitoring, earthquake
studies, and emergency response. We now review existing operational capabilities and
functions of different elements in the seismological systems supporting nuclear test and
earthquake monitoring.
Existing Seismological Systems
.
The current nuclear monitoring seismic system in the United States (Figure 2.2)
is largely a classified operation, with seismic arrays in the U.S. Atomic Energy
Detection Systems (USAEDS) providing data in real-time to AFTAC. The entire system
involves data acquisition, data archival, and data processing, but no data distribution.
A classified event bulletin with source-type discrimination and yield estimation for
suspected nuclear tests has been the primary product ofthis nuclear monitoring system.
This has been an almost entirely closed system, with limited external access to the data
used in nuclear monitoring operations, even when USAEDS data have been decIassi-
f~ed. In part, this is in compliance with bilateral agreements with the host countries for
USAEDS facilities, but even some unclassified data with no such restrictions have not
been available. This restricted access has precluded incorporation of the high-quality
seismological data from the nuclear monitoring arena into other national efforts
involving earthquake monitoring, research on earthquakes and earth structure, and even
research on nuclear monitoring. The Air Force does not have any responsibility to
OCR for page 14
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OCR for page 15
INTRODUCTION
15
support earthquake monitoring, but meeting the demands of CTBT monitoring requires
an external research and development program that can contribute to and profit from the
efforts of the broader research community.
Figure 2.3 shows the planned distribution of the primary stations for the
GSETT-3 operation, with those stations actually providing data to the ISMS-IDC as of
March I, ~ 995, being highlighted. Seventeen of the stations have only three-component
broadband instruments, and 15 include a broadband instrument and an array of
short-period vertical sensors. The global distribution of stations is expected to improve
continually and to number about 50 primary stations or arrays (49 were committed at
the time this report was prepared). As many as 100 auxiliary stations are planned as
well, with some of these being drawn from the existing global distribution of broadband
stations of the Federation of Digital Seismological Networks discussed below. At
present, about 40 such stations around the world have dial-up access capability. The
value of the auxiliary stations is often assessed in terms of enhanced location
capabilities of the ISMS; but their principal value may well lie in the additional
identification capabilities that they provide to the U.S. national verification function.
The U.S. earthquake monitoring system is a distributed operation involving
many organizations (greatly simplified in Figure 2.21. This effort is supported and
operated primarily by the USGS and the NSF-funded IRIS, in collaboration with many
university and private-sector efforts. Other goverrunent programs involved in
earthquake monitoring include the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the Nuclear Regulatory Co~runission (USNRC), Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and many state agencies. The National
Seismic System (Heaton et al. 1989) involves coordination ofthe large number (> 1000)
of regional network stations in the United States (Figure 2.4) operated by the USGS and
several collaborating universities. The USGS also operates the National Seismic
Network (NSN), which is a growing network that will involve about 50 broadband
stations deployed within North America. These USGS seismic stations are primarily
intended for earthquake monitoring in the seismogenic zones of the country, but the
improving accessibility of data from these operations has enabled important basic
research applications on global earth structure and earthquake source processes.
This U.S. effort is, in turn, part of a larger international effort that has many
organizations and collaborative arrangements. Numerous international and national
seismographic networks are involved, ranging from isolated stations to dense regional
networks of short-period seismometers to sparse global networks of broadband
seismometers. Thousands of seismic stations contribute data to the global system, as
illustrated by a map of stations contributing data to the International Seismic Centre
(TSC) in Figure 2.5. Several data centers acquire, archive, process, and distribute seismic
OCR for page 16
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20
Comprehensive Test Ban Monitoring System
data; the size, complexity, communications capabilities, and Ending limitations ofthe
system have precluded consolidation of all data into a single earthquake monitoring data
center. Nevertheless, a remarkable amount of data and the analyses of that data are
shared internationally within days and weeks of the time an event occurs.
While production of definitive bulletins of event parameters on time scales of
days to years is one of the primary objectives of the earthquake monitoring system,
rapid location and analysis of earthquakes are important for emergency response and
hazard mitigation (NRC Real-Time Seismology, 1991, Heaton et al., 19891. These
efforts have increased the requirement for real-time data processing of both regional and
global seismic data for activities of both the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and the USGS. These include tsunami warning systems
operated in Hawaii and Alaska as well as rapid earthquake location and magnitude
estimation performed by the USGS National Earthquake Information Center (NETC) in
Golden, Colorado. USGS has a major role in providing rapid assessment of international
earthquake disasters to the State Department, which is concerned about issues such as
political stability of the stricken country and disaster assistance. The USGS efforts in
global monitoring are also motivated by the fact that studying earthquakes around the
world is an effective means by which to understand the basic nature ofthese phenomena
and the natural hazards within the United States.
Unlike nuclear test monitoring, earthquake monitoring and basic seismological
research are concemed with precise information about all earthquake activity, including
the location, type of faulting, and energy release for events of all sizes. Many countries
operate additional regional and international seismographic networks and share data
with the NEIC and the ISC for preparation of earthquake bulletins.
The seismic research community extensively utilizes seismic data from
earthquake monitoring networks as well as data from global arrays deployed for basic
research. Seismological research is directed at enhanced understanding of earthquakes,
basic studies of earth structure and dynamics, and nuclear test monitoring. The nature
of this research requires readily accessible archives of current and past data. This
requirement has prompted the development of the extensive Incorporated Research
Institutions for Seismology (TRIS) Data Management System (DMS) as well as several
regional network data management systems affiliated with universities. Much of the
important international broadband seismic data has been centralized in the past few
years. Many international broadband networks are coordinated under the Federation of
Digital Seismographic Networks (FDSN), which now involves more than ~ 00 globally
distributed state-of-the-art broadband seismic observatories (Figure 2.61. The FDSN
data are all archived and distributed by the TRIS-DMS, which effectively serves as the
primary global data center for seismological research (Figure 2.2), supplemented by
USGS and university data centers. The diverse data requirements of various research
OCR for page 21
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22
Comprehensive Test Ban Monitoring System
applications make it valuable to maintain continuous data archives on-line whenever
possible, and this has strongly influenced the strategy of the TRIS-DMS.
Nuclear monitoring, earthquake monitoring, and basic seismological research
activities involve different agencies, data collection and analysis philosophies, and
levels of filnding, yet they share the unifying attribute of having continuous ground
motion recordings as their primary data sources. As long as seismic instrumentation
incorporates current technological capabilities that achieve large bandwidth and
dynamic range in the recording system, the seismic data watt have multiple applications.
In the past, data collected for one purpose or another have failed to achieve their
maximum potential due to limited instrumentation characteristics and/or limited access
to the data. There is now no technological excuse for this underutilization of data,
because digital seismic data can readily be archived in efficient data management
systems that allow multiple users to access the data, independent of their primary
objectives. Thus, ISMS data can be combined with existing seismic databases to the
benefit of earthquake analysis and investigations of the deep interior of Earth as well
as hazard studies and nuclear test monitoring.
planning, corrunitment to achieving broad data utilization, and an effective
means for widely distributing the data are required so that broad applications of the data
are not negated by an unnecessarily restrictive system design. Most ISMS data will be
of high quality, but they cannot begin to replace the data generated by the extensive
seismological infrastructure for earthquake monitoring and basic research described
above. However, ISMS data will benefit those efforts at relatively minor expense. The
U.S. national verification function will similarly continue to benefit from reciprocal
access to stations from earthquake monitoring and basic research activities (for
example, as a backup to ISMS stations when needed), as will the research and develop-
ment efforts supporting national verification capabilities.
This report will explore some ofthe many points of intersection ofthe different
seismological communities and watt advocate procedures that enable optimal utilization
of the various types of seismic data. No reliable cost estimates are available either for
handling and distributing the data or for funding the research. However. increases over
present expenditures are expected to be modest and incremental.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
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