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OCR for page 13
The Baseline Nuclear Exchange
The conclusions of any study of the consequences of nuclear war depend
on the level and nature of the weapons exchange. The baseline case for
this study, consistent with the mission statement, depicts a major
nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The
committee has not chosen the baseline assumptions to depict either the
"most likely" general war scenario or the "worst-case. general war
scenario. In defining the baseline case, the committee has sought to
establish a credible, generalized account of the extent of a possible
general nuclear war in the mid-1980s; hence it is not necessary to
specify the manner in which this general war might begin or might
escalate from the initial use of nuclear weapons or to designate
specific weapons for specific targets.
United States and Soviet nuclear forces reportedly now include
about 50,000 nuclear weapons, with a total yield of some 13,000 Mt.
About 25,000 of these nuclear weapons, with a yield of about 12,000 Mt.
are on systems with strategic or major theater missions. The other
25,000 weapons, mostly of much smaller yield, are designed for tactical
battlefield, air defense, antisubmarine, naval, and other special
missions. In this analysis the committee has assumed (see Table 3.1)
that approximately one-half of these weapons. or 25,000, would actually
~ _ _ This would include
12,500 strategic and major theater weapons with a yield of 6000 Mt and
12,500 tactical weapons with a yield of 500 Mt. The fraction of
one-half has been applied to take into account the following factors
that would reduce the number of weapons actually delivered on target:
~ _ , ,
be detonated, with a total Yield of about 6500 Mt.
weapons destroyed by courter for ce attacks, weapons destroyed by
defenses, weapon systems unreliable under combat conditions, and
, _ _, _, _ ~
weapons held in reserve. This assumption should be within a factor of
2 of the exchange in a general nuclear war.
The weapons in this exchange are all assumed to he 1 ~ ME Or lenn.
with a major fraction less than 1.0 Mt.
_ This represents a shift from
many earlier analyses, which included significant numbers of 10- and
20-Mt bombs and missile warheads. -~
The elimination of very high yield
weapons reflects the fact that both nations have, in recent years, been
increasing the accuracy and fractionating the payloads of their
missiles to obtain larger numbers of lower yield warheads. Similarly,
multimegaton bombs have been replaced by more and smaller bombs and by
13
OCR for page 14
14
TABLE 3.1 Baseline Case:
Weapon Size Distribution
Yield per Warhead (Mt) Number Total Yield (Mt)
A. Total Detonated
1.5 220330
1.0 2,7002,700
0.75 330250
0.5 3,6001,800
0.25 2,400600
0.05 toO.153,200320
Tactical {misc.) 12,500 500
~25,000 6,500
B. Ground Bursts
1.0 to 1.5 400 500
0.5 2,000 1,000
2,400 1,500
large numbers of stand-off cruise missiles with smaller yields. By
1985, there will probably be few, if any, multimegaton weapons deployed
by either the United States or the Soviet Union, unless present trends
are reversed.
In a general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet
Union, the committee has assumed that all member nations of NATO and
the Warsaw Pact would be involved and targeted for strategic weapons.
The significance of this assumption to the study is that a number of
targets located in urban areas, which are the major source of smoke,
are found outside the United States and Soviet Union. It is further
assumed that tactical nuclear war would for the most part be confined
to the NATO/Warsaw Pact area (European Front) and the oceans. While
other key allies and countries could well become involved in such a
conflict, the committee did not have a specific military rationale for
including targets in these nations. Moreover, modest numbers of
military targets in such countries would not significantly alter the
study results.
The description of specific targets in all of these countries for
12,500 strategic and major theater weapons would be a difficult
undertaking with no enduring validity. Even if the specific targeting
plans of the nuclear powers were adopted, such detail could be
misleading in suggesting that there would be a unique predictable
pattern to a general nuclear exchange. Moreover, such detail is not
relevant to this study, which relies on models that do not have as
inputs the actual locations of targets. Factors such as proximity to
oceans might be important to more sophisticated future models.
The committee has assumed that each side would give highest
priority to Counter force" attacks against the vulnerable components of
OCR for page 15
15
the other side's threatening strategic forces and against the command,
control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) facilities necessary
to operate those forces effectively. It is also assumed that high
priority would be given to destroying key military bases and
transportation and communications nodes necessary for theater
operations, particularly in Europe. The committee has assigned
approximately 9000 effective warheads with a yield of some 5000 Mt to
these missions. This would be consistent with each side's attacking
each of the other side's strategic missile silos with two weapons in
order to improve the kill probability; multiple attacks on several
hundred military and civilian airfields capable of sustaining
redeployed strategic aircraft; multiple attacks on submarine and naval
bases; extensive attacks against the central civilian and military
command and control systems, the critical nodes in the military
communications system and facilities necessary to exploit intelligence
assets for real-time targeting and damage assessment; and multiple
attacks on several hundred major theater military targets.
The committee has assumed that each side would, as a second
priority, attack the other's economic base necessary to sustain its
. .. .. · · . . · · · · · .. .
_
military efforts. These "countervalue" targets WOULD include plants
producing military equipment, important components, and materials,
petroleum refineries and storage, and electric power plants, as well as
key transportation and communication nodes. In this scenario, some
3500 effective warheads with a yield of 1500 Mt would be used against
such targets.
While neither side would target population per se, the committee
has assumed that neither would refrain from attacking urban areas if
military or economic targets were located there. Most economic targets
are co-located with urban areas, and many military targets, such as
airfields capable of sustaining redeployed strategic aircraft, naval
bases, and C I facilities, are also co-located with urban areas. The
number of economic targets not co-located with urban areas may be
comparable to the number of military targets that are co-located with
urban areas. Therefore, for the purpose of this study the committee
nas assumed that some ~5uu weapons wits a yield of approximately 1500
Mt would strike urban areas. Specifically, as a first approximation,
it is assumed that economic targets and co-located military targets
would be distributed in the largest 1000 NATO/Warsaw Pact urban areas
roughly in proportion to the population of those areas.
the chapter on fires resulting from such an attack, it is assumed that
there would be one-third overlap of areas exposed to 20 cal/cm2.
These assumptions imply that fire ignition would occur over 50 percent
of the areas of these cities.
The committee has assumed that both sides would fuze their warheads
for air or ground burst to optimize military effectiveness against the
targets under attack and not to increase population fatalities. With
this in mind, it is estimated that about 25 percent (1500 Mt) of the
total yield would be ground bursts. One ground burst is assumed
against each silo and other hardened target.
Given the large number and wide distribution of possible targets in
this scenario, it is assumed as a first approximation that the targets
As detailed in
OCR for page 16
16
and megatonnage would be distributed evenly over the land areas from
latitudes 30°N to 70°N. A more precise approximation of this
distribution of megatonnage could be determined by examining the
density of known major strategic targets and urban areas within these
latitudes; however, such detail would not add appreciable precision to
the present estimation of atmospheric consequences until knowledge
about soot production, transport, and removal is much improved.
It is important to note that this weapons exchange assumes that all
targets would have been chosen to have direct or indirect impact on the
ability of the two sides to conduct or sustain military operations or
to emerge from the hostilities in a superior position. No targets
would be chosen to maximize worldwide population fatalities or
long-term effects on the biosphere. Consequently, it is assumed that
there would be no attacks on urban areas in countries not directly
involved in the conflict. The committee has assumed that there would
be no attacks solely designed to ignite or sustain forest fires--and no
attacks on oil fields, since the destruction of storage facilities and
refineries would provide more immediate and effective denial of
petroleum products. In addition, it is assumed that the war at sea
would be directed against specific ships and submarines.
In this 6500-Mt baseline case, no large multimegaton weapons would
be employed by either side. In order to examine the atmospheric
effects of very high yield explosions, the committee has also analyzed
a second case--an 8500-Mt excursion--in which sufficient multimegaton
(i.e., 20 Mt) missile warheads would be deployed to permit successful
delivery of approximately 100 such weapons on superhard, high-value
targets, in addition to the 6500-Mt baseline megatonnage. It is
assumed that these would all be surface bursts.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
military targets
