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Page 1
Executive Summary
WHAT IS DETERRENCE IN THE POST-COLD
WAR WORLD?
"Deterrence" as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War.
During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at
preventing aggression against the United States and its close
allies by the hostile Communist power centers—the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China,
and North Korea; in particular, the strategy was devised to prevent
aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China.
Since the Cold War the risk of war among the major powers has
subsided to the lowest point in modern history. The changing nature
of the threats to U.S. and allied security interests have
stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept.
Current deterrence objectives include the following:
• To deter attack on the United States and its allies by
external forces ranging from the armed forces of hostile nations,
including "rogue" nations and diverse regional powers, to national
or multinational terrorist groups acting with such nations' active
or tacit support or encouragement;
• To deter similar attacks on allies with whom we have
mutual security treaties;
• To deter aggression against our own and our allies' vital
interests and security in areas where we have agreed those
interests and security are at stake; such threats may be made
against free use of the seas, airways, and space, and against key
sources of vital resources essential to our and our allies'
security and welfare, or they may result from the consequences of
disasters to humanity caused by international or civil
conflicts;
• To deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction; and
• To deter the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction in military conflict, especially when our own and
our allies' vital national security interests are at stake.
To achieve these objectives we1
must anticipate the possibility of a hostile action, detect its
potential onset, and then dissuade or otherwise deter the would be
aggressor from undertaking it, by posing a credible threat of
punishment that
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Page 1
Executive Summary
WHAT IS DETERRENCE IN THE POST-COLD
WAR WORLD?
"Deterrence" as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War.
During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at
preventing aggression against the United States and its close
allies by the hostile Communist power centers—the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China,
and North Korea; in particular, the strategy was devised to prevent
aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China.
Since the Cold War the risk of war among the major powers has
subsided to the lowest point in modern history. The changing nature
of the threats to U.S. and allied security interests have
stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept.
Current deterrence objectives include the following:
• To deter attack on the United States and its allies by
external forces ranging from the armed forces of hostile nations,
including "rogue" nations and diverse regional powers, to national
or multinational terrorist groups acting with such nations' active
or tacit support or encouragement;
• To deter similar attacks on allies with whom we have
mutual security treaties;
• To deter aggression against our own and our allies' vital
interests and security in areas where we have agreed those
interests and security are at stake; such threats may be made
against free use of the seas, airways, and space, and against key
sources of vital resources essential to our and our allies'
security and welfare, or they may result from the consequences of
disasters to humanity caused by international or civil
conflicts;
• To deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction; and
• To deter the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction in military conflict, especially when our own and
our allies' vital national security interests are at stake.
To achieve these objectives we1
must anticipate the possibility of a hostile action, detect its
potential onset, and then dissuade or otherwise deter the would be
aggressor from undertaking it, by posing a credible threat of
punishment that
1 Throughout the editorial "we" is used to
refer to the U.S. policy makers and decision makers who must devise
and decide on deterrence actions in any particular case.
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the aggressor would find unacceptable and, especially, a promise
that success of the aggressive action will be denied. Sometimes the
dissuasion will involve inducements to change behavior, and
reassurance that the "deterree" will not be attacked.
The approach to deterrence will involve a range of activities on
our part, in the political, diplomatic, economic, and military
spheres, independently or in concert. A strategy of deterrence
therefore could be concerned with much of the threatening or
violent activity that can now affect the United States on the
international scene, and deterring such activity can encompass
almost all of U.S. foreign policy actions. However, the potential
or actual use of effective military force will underlie all
deterrence efforts-—even deterrence of actions in the economic
and political areas should they appear sufficiently threatening to
our security.
ENDURING PRINCIPLES IN DETERRENCE
STRATEGY
Despite the changed international climate and the diffuse
quality of our current security concerns, many of the principles
that supported earlier deterrence strategy endure. They include the
following:
• National interests. We must define our national
interests so as to know whom we wish to deter from doing what to
whom, by what means, and under what circumstances. In doing so, we
must recognize that interests change with circumstances—while
we might find peaceful evolution of international relationships and
governments in areas of national interest acceptable, violent
change in those relationships through invasion, sustained terrorist
attack, or severe internal conflict can pose serious threats to our
interests and those of our allies that must be deterred.
• Credibility. Deterrence can succeed only if the
combination of threat and incentives is credible. This requires
demonstrated political will, as evidenced in the willingness to
sustain economic costs, to endure human casualties, and to take
risks in support of the deterrence efforts. The military force
invoked as part of the deterrence action must be clearly capable of
achieving the promised military objectives.
• Communication and perceptions. The actions desired
from the object of deterrence—the "deterree"—and
consequences of the failure of deterrence must be communicated
clearly, in terms the recipient of the communications will
understand. Warnings, promises, and communications must be suited
to the value system of the deterree, and must be acceptable within
the value systems of the United States and its actual or potential
coalition partners. They must be commensurate with values the
deterree holds dear, and with the deterree's political as
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avoid misconceptions or miscommunications brought about by
cultural blind spots of any of the parties to the interaction.
• Applicability. The steps we propose to take in a
deterrence action must be suited to the degree of risk to the
nation and its interests. Deterrence may fail. We must decide
whether the subsequent expenditures, casualties, and other
consequences for the nation are commensurate with the nature and
value of the interests that are threatened. This will determine the
nature and degree of the deterrence actions to be taken.
• Intelligence. There is a need for enhanced
intelligence to warn of threats to our interests while there is
time for deterrence actions to be undertaken. There is a need for
evaluators of intelligence data and potentially threatening
situations to avoid biases derived from U.S.-oriented perspectives
about ongoing events; they must understand the values and
perspectives of those we seek to deter and of other potential
participants in the events. A separate group of high-level analysts
dedicated to thinking about strategic issues may have to be created
to achieve the needed level of objectivity.
DERIVATIVE POLICIES AND KEY
ISSUES
Weapons of Mass Destruction
With the heightened emphasis on deterring proliferation of all
weapons of mass destruction, there has been a tendency to think
about nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons all together under
the "weapons of mass destruction" rubric. However, nuclear weapons
remain unique in their vast and instantaneous destructive power.
Passive defense against chemical and biological weapons is easier
than passive defense against nuclear weapons (although we have
given far less attention to protection against biological weapons
than against chemical weapons, and such attention is very much
needed). In an unprotected environment, chemical weapons may tend
to have more localized effects. Biological weapons may take more
time to make their effects felt; however, in ultimate impact they
may be as devastating as nuclear weapons, or even more so. The
employment and effects of all these weapons are so different from
each other that each must be treated as a separate entity.
Policies Involving the Role and Use of
Nuclear Weapons
The role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War environment is
a matter of some controversy. Most agree that the threat of nuclear
weapons use is appropriate to deter the threat or use of nuclear
weapons against us and also
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against allies protected by the U.S. shield, most of whom do not
have nuclear holdings. There is an issue about the extent to which
nuclear weapons can be supplanted in deterrence by the threat of
using advanced, precision-guided conventional weapons against the
bases of political, economic, and military power of an aggressor;
the times over which the two kinds of weapons act, and their
effects, differ greatly. Experts also disagree on whether it would
be appropriate to invoke a nuclear response to the use of chemical
and/or biological weapons. They disagree, too, on whether nuclear
weapons should be used to deter conventional attacks on vital U.S.
interests or on particular allies; the prospect of such need has
nearly vanished with the disappearance of the NATOWarsaw Pact
confrontation, but it might arise in another context in the future.
Finally, the issue of whether we should declare policies such as
"no first use of nuclear weapons" remains to be resolved.
These issues involving nuclear weapons in the deterrent role
await resolution as international relationships in the post-Cold
War world evolve. However, nuclear weapons, at whatever numbers our
treaty commitments allow, will remain a cornerstone of U.S.
national security. All the other policy issues involving nuclear
weapons must be resolved in ways that are compatible with that
reality. Resolution of many of them will await particular
circumstances in which specific decisions are needed; the decision
will not necessarily be the same in all cases.
Applying Deterrence Policy
Many factors will determine specific deterrence actions as
threats to our interests arise. Deterrence will usually have to act
in a world setting that involves the United States in coalitions,
some of them ad hoc. Thus deterrence policy and actions in specific
situations will have to address the specific strategic needs and
military, as well as other, capabilities of coalition partners, in
addition to our own. We shall also have to decide, in any
situation, whether the mere existence of appropriate military
forces as background to other, nonmilitary steps—an
"existential deterrent"—is sufficient to deter the threatening
action, or whether movement and positioning of those forces are
indicated, and if so, which forces. We shall also have to
anticipate the potential need for escalation in case initial steps
do not deter the onset of the threatened action, and the degree of
U.S. escalation needed to deter escalation by the opponent.
Missile Defenses
Defense against ballistic missiles will remain an important
element in many deterrence calculations. The extent to which the
United States should develop and deploy active missile defenses
remains highly controversial. Theater missile defenses, currently
permitted under the U.S.-Russian Antiballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty, could be forced by the evolution of the theater-level
threat to grow in capability to the point that their technical
characteristics also challenge some of the ABM treaty constraints.
This issue will require continual
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review in overall U.S. national strategy, in terms of threats,
costs, and effectiveness; impact on the security of the United
States, our allies, and others; and other important factors.
SIGNIFICANCE OF POST-COLD WAR
DETERRENCE CONCEPTS FOR THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps will be among the military forces
called upon to implement U.S. deterrence policy and strategy.
Within their total capability, a number of their qualities,
systems, and characteristics suit them especially to support
deterrence strategy. For this purpose, special emphasis in the
structure and support of the naval forces should be given to the
following:
• Sustain the SSBN force. The strategic ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN) force is a key element of the U.S. nuclear
retaliatory force, becoming a relatively larger part of that force
as the START treaties are implemented. It is therefore an essential
part of our nuclear deterrent. The qualities that have made it
especially valuable—its essential invulnerability, its
stealth, its ability to change operational areas at will, its long
time on station-—commend it as a continuing key element of
future deterrence strategy. Sustaining this force implies
commitment to continual modernization of its capabilities to meet
future conditions.
• Increase the ratio of offensive to defensive
capability in naval forces. The high level of command
integration, the technical capability, and the global reach of the
forces of the former Soviet Union dictated the balance among
offensive and defensive capabilities of U.S. naval forces during
the Cold War. That balance must now change in response to the new
world conditions. In addition, some defensive capabilities have
evolved to the extent that their use can contribute significantly
to the offensive capability of the forces. Specific areas of naval
force development that deserve special emphasis include the
following
— Precision attack. The ability to locate and
identify specific targets and place precisely timed weapons
accurately on them with minimal U.S. casualties, minimal civilian
casualties, and minimal collateral damage;
— Theater missile defense. The ability to maneuver
fleet defenses that are effective against ballistic and cruise
missile attack into areas where they can defend allies from such
attack;
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— Undersea warfare. The ability of the essentially
invulnerable submarine force to make accurate conventional attacks
against key targets on land, and to contribute to offensive mine
warfare, together with the ability of the naval forces to sweep
waters in areas of operation clear of threatening quiet submarines,
and to prevent the laying of mine fields in such waters or to
neutralize or destroy them if deployed; and
— Effective blockade. The ability to stop materiel
and people from crossing a nation's borders, to enable imposition
of effective sanctions.
• Sustain the naval forces' forward presence. The
forward presence of naval forces enables friendly engagement of the
"existential deterrent"-—existing powerful forces—in
peacetime activities that can contribute to the fabric of
deterrence; it enables force augmentation or maneuvers associated
with deterrence, without infringing the sovereignty of any nation
involved in a crisis at times when such maneuvers may be especially
sensitive; and it enables rapid military response to crises where,
if initial deterrence fails, there would still be a need to deter
escalation. Thus, the forward presence of naval forces is an
essential part of U.S. deterrence posture.
• Incorporate deterrence in the overall naval forces'
planning process. This includes enhancing the aspects of naval
intelligence germane to deterrence; incorporating deterrence into
training at many levels, ranging from training and curricula in the
war colleges to training in planning and operations especially
relevant to deterrence; and budgeting to make certain that the
deterrence aspects of the naval forces are adequately planned and
supported. Naval force planning activities should also include
participation in arms control initiatives to ensure that impacts of
agreements affecting naval forces' deterrent capabilities are
accounted for. All the parts of this process must be coordinated
and interrelated to each other in a balanced, fully integrated
program.
METRICS AND DECISION AIDS
It is impossible to denote the potential success or failure of a
deterrence action or policy in precise terms because a large
element of the outcome of any such activity must involve human
judgments and reactions to specific situations, according to the
specific value systems of unique individuals who may be involved.
Nevertheless, it is possible to list a number of qualitative and
quantitative factors by which the adequacy and appropriateness of
deterrence actions and forces may be judged. They include:
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• Detection. Determination that a hostile or
threatening action in some part of the world is possible,
potentially invited by circumstances, or actually in the making, in
time to take anticipatory action.
• Evaluation. Understanding the nature of the threat
to U.S. interests and those of our allies, the consequences for
those interests, and implications for U.S. security if the
threatened action is successful. This includes deciding each part
of the continuum of deterrence capabilities, and how much we are
willing to risk—in treasure, casualties, impact on our
international position—by responding, or by not responding,
especially with military force.
• Coalition building. Reviewing whether an alliance
is in place that can serve as part of the deterrence activity, or
whether one is required, how one could be built, and how it would
be utilized.
• Level of confidence in our understanding of the key
participants. The extent to which we understand what may be
motivating the opponent, within the opponent's own value system,
and the risks the opponent might be willing to take; and achieving
similar understandings about the United States and our allies.
• Appropriateness of the planned action and of the
military response if one is planned. Consideration of
appropriateness must include review of all the actions planned,
including the association between the non-military and the military
parts of the response, including the forces that will be involved,
how each component of the response is intended to contribute to
deterrence in the specific situation, and evaluation of the chances
of success by each.
• Timing. The extent to which the response can be
appropriately timed to anticipate hostile moves on the opponent's
part, to bring the requisite deterrent force to bear when it is
needed at the place where it is needed, and to communicate intent
and capability within the opponent's planning cycle.
• Communication and credibility. We must judge
whether we have adequately communicated—by message, movement
of forces, or other means, or several means together—our
intended response in the event that an action we wish to deter is
taken, and we must judge the credibility of the communication in
light of both present and prior circumstances.
These metrics can form a checklist for planning and for response
in specific situations.
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In addition to accurate and reliable intelligence inputs,
decision aids for deterrence include models, simulations, and
games. Many are available; the chief enhancement needed is the
ability to represent decision processes within the participants'
value systems. The chief value of these additional decision aids is
in enforcing disciplined thinking about a problem through ordering
of the problem's elements, enabling evaluation of its critical
parameters, and helping the decision maker avoid entrapment in his
or her own frame of reference. They can also provide useful
insights to help strengthen deterrence programs and activities.
Principles to follow in selecting and applying such decision
aids include the following:
• Decision aids should incorporate the capacity for
decision making and for representation of values and patterns of
influence among all the participants; in particular, they should be
able to represent the uncertainties in value systems and reasoning
patterns, they should avoid stereotypes (such as ''the Arab mind"
or "the Chinese mind"), and they should be capable of building
strategies that cover the most important possible variants in
understanding an adversary's mindset;
• Decision aids should not be expected to foretell with
confidence the outcomes of ongoing or contemplated deterrence
actions, because the precise unfolding of events depends on many
elements of chance and many unknowns;
• Decision aids should be used for training, learning, and
practice;
• Decision aids should be used for analysis, to help
identify gaps and uncertainties in our understanding of situations
and of participants in events—applicable to hypothetical
situations, as practice and learning devices, or to real
situations; and
• Decision aids should explicitly portray for their users
the levels of confidence in the information and representation of
the values on which the decision aids are based.
The value of deterrence decision aids available to U.S. decision
makers can be enhanced by a number of steps. These include:
• Enhancing the ability to represent decision processes of
U.S., adversary, and coalition participants, all within their own
value systems and with attention to the specifics of the
participants' leadership and their circumstances;
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• Calibrating decision aids against real experience gained
through past events;
• Making deterrence an explicit part of ongoing gaming
exercises used for diverse planning and training purposes;
• Periodically undertaking political and military war games
of deterrence per se;
• Learning how other countries use models and games in
situations applicable to deterrence—the issues, opponents, and
outcomes they consider;
• Keeping abreast of activities in the various institutes
for conflict resolution supported by U.S. universities,
foundations, and corporations, as a source of input for the Navy
Department's models, simulations, and games relevant to deterrence;
and
• Incorporating post-Cold War deterrence explicitly into
Naval War College curricula, to obtain the benefit of the students'
thinking and to train future leaders.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
naval forces
