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APPENDIX I
Deterrence: Clash and Utilization of Value Systems

Robert B. Oakley, National Defense University

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental security of the United States is not under any near-term threat. Nevertheless, our interests are global in today's interdependent world and we must be concerned with and prepared to counter a wide variety of threats to them. There are a few self-evident places where potential threats would be so serious as to almost certainly trigger a vigorous U.S. response, most notably clear military aggression by Iraq or Iran in the Gulf or by North Korea in NorthEast Asia. However, given the uncertain, unstable nature of this post-Cold War world—and the internal debate about where our vital or important interests lie and what situations warrant what kind of U.S. action—it is exceedingly difficult to foresee and thus plan for a response to specific contingencies. Therefore, one should be prepared to deter/deal with (i.e., dissuade, coerce, prevent, or limit and contain if prevention fails) various categories of threat from various quarters using those instruments best suited to the particular situation. Some of these will not be responsive to the sort of conventional deterrent actions that we have developed for threats seen as likely during the Cold War, i.e., usually direct, cross-border aggression, sometimes indirect subversion with state support, or organized international terrorism with state support, plus readiness to respond to state-initiated nuclear attack.

Even during the Cold War period, there were domestic debates over whether certain deterrent actions proposed by different administrations were justifiable (e.g., direct assistance to the Contras). More so today than before, the decision to take deterrent action, and what kind to take, must take into careful consideration the capability of the administration to generate sustained public and political support.

The range of situations for which deterrent action is considered today is broader than before, with greater emphasis on purely or primarily internal upheavals in countries with little or no outside involvement, no evident major threat to our interests, and often with limited near-term potential for spreading into broader conflict. The type of deterrent action envisaged also tends to be more varied, ranging from decisive use of major military power by the United States (often with U.N. approval) to coalition actions (often under U.S. control) that envisage the restricted application of military force (i.e., peace operations). There is also a greater tendency to look to economic sanctions as a deterrent, an alternative or a supplement to the use of military force. This general situation,



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Page 201 APPENDIX I Deterrence: Clash and Utilization of Value Systems Robert B. Oakley, National Defense University INTRODUCTION The fundamental security of the United States is not under any near-term threat. Nevertheless, our interests are global in today's interdependent world and we must be concerned with and prepared to counter a wide variety of threats to them. There are a few self-evident places where potential threats would be so serious as to almost certainly trigger a vigorous U.S. response, most notably clear military aggression by Iraq or Iran in the Gulf or by North Korea in NorthEast Asia. However, given the uncertain, unstable nature of this post-Cold War world—and the internal debate about where our vital or important interests lie and what situations warrant what kind of U.S. action—it is exceedingly difficult to foresee and thus plan for a response to specific contingencies. Therefore, one should be prepared to deter/deal with (i.e., dissuade, coerce, prevent, or limit and contain if prevention fails) various categories of threat from various quarters using those instruments best suited to the particular situation. Some of these will not be responsive to the sort of conventional deterrent actions that we have developed for threats seen as likely during the Cold War, i.e., usually direct, cross-border aggression, sometimes indirect subversion with state support, or organized international terrorism with state support, plus readiness to respond to state-initiated nuclear attack. Even during the Cold War period, there were domestic debates over whether certain deterrent actions proposed by different administrations were justifiable (e.g., direct assistance to the Contras). More so today than before, the decision to take deterrent action, and what kind to take, must take into careful consideration the capability of the administration to generate sustained public and political support. The range of situations for which deterrent action is considered today is broader than before, with greater emphasis on purely or primarily internal upheavals in countries with little or no outside involvement, no evident major threat to our interests, and often with limited near-term potential for spreading into broader conflict. The type of deterrent action envisaged also tends to be more varied, ranging from decisive use of major military power by the United States (often with U.N. approval) to coalition actions (often under U.S. control) that envisage the restricted application of military force (i.e., peace operations). There is also a greater tendency to look to economic sanctions as a deterrent, an alternative or a supplement to the use of military force. This general situation,

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Page 202 deriving from a world in uncertain transition, is apt to prevail though at least the first decade of the 21st century. Over the past 5 years it has placed an increasing strain on our national security strategy decisions, and operations—within successive administrations and upon the armed forces as well as between the administration, the Congress, and the public. As one looks ahead, it will be even more important to understand clearly the nature of deterrence not only as we perceive it, but also as it is likely to be perceived by those who may be subjected to deterrence. The outlook, values, and interests of decision makers for states or subnational entities apt to be subjected to deterrence will in many instances be quite different from our own. In the increasingly frequent event that we do not wish to resort to all-out war, this will be of great importance to the success or failure of deterrence. BACKGROUND During the Cold War, these threats came mostly from states whose interests and whose concepts of incentives and disincentives resembled our own closely enough for us to understand and develop deterrents likely to be effective. Thus, in the near term or over the long term, the United States and its allies were able to prevail over the Soviet-Cuban threat to the Caribbean and Central America; keep in check the North Korean conventional threat to South Korea; put an end to Iranian attacks on shipping and threats to our friends in the Gulf, and repulse Iraq's attack upon Kuwait; strengthen the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) states to the point that they were no longer vulnerable to Vietnam or China; and keep the Soviet Union from direct military intervention in the Middle East. We were also able to negotiate safely with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) the dangerous missile and nuclear issues, as well as limit conventional forces in Europe. However, there were several important exceptions where we failed to deter and/or win and where others had similar failures. The nature of these situations is instructive for issues of today's deterrence and the impact of different value systems. Our inability to prevail in Indo-China from 1960 to 1975, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon in 1983, came in part because we misperceived the cultures and motivations of those whom we were opposing. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 was primarily brought about not by U.S. actions but rather by the special motivation and the willingness of the Afghan Resistance to sacrifice, which the Soviets misperceived much as we did with respect to the Vietnamese. The U.S. decision in October 1993 to withdraw our forces from Somalia, after the failure to neutralize Aideed and his Somali National Alliance (SNA) militia, was comparable to Lebanon in 1983. Similarly, as discussed at our group's first meeting on February 22, 1995, Israel misjudged the culture and motivations of Egypt and Syria in 1973. It has also been unable to devise successful security strategies or tactics to deter Hisbollah in South Lebanon and Hamas in Israel and the Occupied Territories.

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Page 203 However, in the case of Hamas, events of October to December 1995 afforded genuinely hopeful prospects that its political and terrorist threats could be reduced over time to much less virulent levels and that the serious danger of it causing the collapse of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians had been overcome. Persistence by Israeli and Palestinian National Authority (PNA) leaders in concluding the Oslo negotiations, the timely handing over of major West Bank towns to the PNA, and preparations for elections produced a major boost in popular support for Arafat and the PNA at the expense of Hamas and other Palestinian radicals, and an increased will and capability of the former to apply tough controls to the latter. In South Lebanon, Israel was able to reach an understanding with Syria (and indirectly with Hisbollah) that conflict would be confined to the security zone in South Lebanon, with no Katyusha rockets fired into Israel and Israeli attacks outside the zone. Guerrilla warfare by Israel and its Lebanese allies vs. Hisbyollah and others continued unabated inside the zone. When increasing Israeli Defence Force casualties and a close election campaign brought the Israel government to bomb and shell targets outside the security zone, the resulting political uproar internationally led to Israel again reverting to the previous formula of containing the ongoing conflict. These examples raise the questions of commitment, morale, persistence, and sustained support for operations (especially when casualties continue) as vital elements of success or failure on both sides. Perceptions of these elements by the other party can be all-important, since they can lead one side or the other to believe it can break the will of the other over time. They also raise the question of containment vs. prevention, in both the short term and long term. The Long Commission found that basic U.S. misunderstanding of the political, cultural, and psychological factors in Lebanon (and Syria) were behind the policy decisions that led to U.S. Marines in 1983 becoming a party to the conflict in Lebanon and therefore being subjected to attack by the same ''unfair" or "inhuman" methods used by parties who did not have sophisticated weapons. We had a blind spot, caused in part by cultural misperception of the potential enemy and in part by a subconscious arrogance or feeling of military superiority and comfort stemming to some degree from our overwhelming technological and military capabilities. A roughly similar situation existed in Somalia 10 years later. In any event, not only the threat but also the actual use of carrier air and 16-inch guns failed to deter the attack on the Marines in Beirut; nor did helicopter gunships, AC 130s, and the Joint Special Operations Command deter Aideed's militias from attacking U.S. forces. In both cases, the failure to explain to the U.S. public and Congress what U.S. forces were doing, and why it was worth the risk, aggravated the backlash when trouble hit and brought about the withdrawal of the United States. This raises the question of our own value systems and how they can become a counterdeterrent, which is discussed below. It is a particularly important question given today's muddled perception of what the United States is willing to risk, and for what. For Israel, the Agranot Commission found a similar cultural and psychological blind spot: the implicit assumption that Israel had taught the

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Page 204 Arabs such a lasting lesson in 1967 and had such an overwhelmingly evident advantage in military sophistication and technology that Egypt and Syria had to be bluffing in 1973 rather than positioning their forces for an actual attack. VALUE SYSTEMS IN THE CURRENT WORLD Today, the likelihood of cultural misperceptions, especially by the United States, is even greater. Absent the Cold War, there is much greater diversity as to what forms the basis for major decisions by other governments; and ethnicity, religion, tribalism, and other cultural factors have much more influence than at any time since before World War I, alongside or together with a broadened concept of nationalism. At the same time, there has been a quantum leap in effectiveness of popular pressure upon governments, whether in the larger number of substantially more democratic states, or in transition states (e.g., China and Russia) or in some authoritarian states where there are powerful "special interest" groups. These could be ethnic, as in Croatia and Serbia, or religious as in Iran. (They both have a special fervor that makes deterrence more difficult.) Even long-established governments in the industrialized countries of Europe and Japan are having greater difficulty making what we would consider to be "rational" decisions or policies, rather than going with popular opinion down what seems a misguided path. Moreover, the power and solidity of the traditional nation state are being eroded by a number of factors, including the much freer flow of information, international business, and people between and among countries. In some countries, the central government has collapsed completely or has been on occasion so constricted by subnational groups or movements of one kind or another as to be virtually paralyzed (e.g., the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, Afghanistan, Georgia, Algeria, etc.). The world thus finds itself faced with subnational entities whose calculations and incentives and disincentives are at variance with those of most states. There are also transnational movements such as Islamic radicalism, narcotics trafficking, and international crime which are either new or stronger, replacing the transnational threats of communism or Arab nationalism in reinforcing national and subnational instability and threatening behavior. A reasonably accurate understanding of the impact of cultural factors on the attitudes and action of states and subnational movements has thus become still more important when it comes to designing and employing an effective set of deterrents. For deterrence to be effective in individual instances, and to enhance the potential future dissuasive power of deterrence—as well as to increase popular political support for such actions at home—the United States will usually need to make use of some form of coalition, formalized (e.g., United Nations Security Council [UNSC]) or informal, and almost always including regional states.1 This not only increases the total pressure (psychological, 1 Even when the United States has unilaterally taken the political and military lead to establish a coalition and provided most of the military might for a coalition to deter (or prevent/roll

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Page 205 military, economic, etc.) on the one to be deterred and eases the burden on the United States (military and financial), but it also offers the greatest promise for our understanding which approaches will work the best for particular nations (or subnational groups) with their peculiar cultures or value system. The regional states usually have much deeper understanding than does the United States of these factors and are therefore of great help, even if their military weakness makes them seem so much less capable as to be of dubious value as participants. They can also enable the U.S. message to get across more clearly to the intended recipient, so that the perception better matches the intent. Since many of the potential "lesser" threats that we might decide to deter are not threats to our security and are long term and often indirect in nature (i.e., threats to friendly states or regions that are not allies—and are not vital to our security), and since the difficulty of resolving the problem definitively is so great (i.e., totally mastering local factions/militias and/or establishing a durable, popular government), it may make great good sense to settle for containing a threat or problem. If a problem is not allowed to worsen and/or spread, containment could be adequate for our purposes. For instance, the immediate U.S. concern over fighting in Croatia and Bosnia was associated with fears of a repeat of Sarajevo triggering a Europe-wide war, via Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Such a spread could have raised the stakes to the point that U.S. ground forces would need to join the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in direct, large-scale intervention. Containment reduced the strategic negative effects of the fighting for the United States, even if the human and moral effects remained extremely negative. Although the U.N. peace operation (UNPROFOR) failed to stop the fighting (and the United States refused to provide any ground forces for fear of possible casualties where its vital interests were not evident), it played an important role in international efforts that mitigated death and suffering and successfully prevented the conflict from spreading. However, the concern of the United States and other European governments continued to grow over (1) continued fighting, (2) damage to the future efficacy of NATO, as well as the United Nations, and (3) the possible eventual spillover. This led to new-found U.S. resolve and leadership, including the will to commit 20,000 ground forces, back) what it considered to be unacceptable threats to its interests, it has gotten very substantial value out of the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council and sometimes the Organization of American States (OAS). This was notably the case in 1950 with Korea, 1965 with the Dominican Republic, 1990 with Iraq, 1992 with Somalia (UNITAF), and 1994 with Haiti. The endorsement has meant the difference between participation or nonparticipation of many states that contributed military forces and/or financing to these operations, which were outside the formal U.N. peacekeeping system. Without the UNSC (and OAS) endorsements and the additional participation, the U.S./coalition deterrent would have been much weaker in military and political power, as well as credibility and staying (or will) power. This weakness would have included the perception of the message by actual or potential enemies and the degree of support at home. In this sense "multilateralism" was of inestimably greater value than "unilateralism," very possibly the difference between success and failure, despite the major role of the United States.

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Page 206 and resulted in a peace agreement amongst warring parties and a 60,000-person force—under NATO command (IFOR) rather than the United Nations—to see to its implementation. Another sort of containment situation going beyond what is normally considered deterrence could be a failed state such as Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, or Burundi. Rather than press on to the ideal end result of a restored, stable democratic government—with the commitment, resources, time, and risk involved—it may be acceptable to stop the killing, lower the level of violence, and settle for imperfect local institutions that offer some hope for longer-term improvement. The international community has learned (the hard way) that it is most effective when it responds very quickly to the internal crisis in such situations, and when the nature of the response avoids neocolonization (significant nation building), especially when that requires long-term commitment of major military forces. The latter usually involves an intrusive outside role such as to produce a virulent, often violent backlash. Tragic as it might seem, limited humanitarian intervention to contain violence and care for the starving, the displaced, and refugees may well be the realistic answer. In the case of Cambodia, the international community undertook not only to end the decades-old combined internal-external conflict, but also to remake civil society into a liberal democracy. In the face of impending major conflict with the Khmer Rouge faction, initial objectives were sharply scaled back, external involvement ended, more than 300,000 refugees returned, elections were held, and the operation was terminated. However, the scaled-back operation meant that Western-style democracy has not taken root in the traditionally alien environment. The United States, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the United Nations have undertaken a similar mission in Haiti. Major human rights abuses and violence have been sharply reduced and elections held freely. However, the nature of Haitian democracy, which appears likely to prevail over intentional norms, will almost certainly fall short of original objectives, and some sort of continued but reduced international security support has proved to be needed to prevent a new outbreak of major violence. In trying to cope with this disorderly new world, the question of effective deterrence frequently comes back to the question of how vital is the perceived interest in deterring any particular situation and of the price one is willing to pay. The examples of Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in 1993, and the U.S. reaction, are seen around the world as guidelines on how to defeat U.S. forces. This means that for any deterrence involving actual or potential use of forces to be successful there must be a careful decision, fully explained and justified to the public, to take at least limited casualties, plus a message conveying to the one to be deterred that the United States is indeed willing to run such a risk. (During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia prior to May 4, 1993, the Somalis saw that the U.S. military was well prepared and did not shrink in dangerous situations. By mid-October 1993 the Haitian thugs had seen from events in Somalia that the United States could be scared off.) The public perception on both sides can be critical in situations short of an all-out U.S. military

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Page 207 commitment. More broadly, this means not only a readiness to run some risks but also a constancy of purpose and consistency of policy so that friend and potential foe are satisfied that the United States is credible. As we have seen, the sudden U.S. shift to firmness and resolution in Bosnia produced a peace agreement and shored up international resolve. In Somalia, initially, and in Haiti, firmness and overwhelming force led to an unopposed entry by peace forces as it has done for IFOR in Bosnia. Questions remain about the fate of the lofty political goals and overall security for local population after IFOR leaves Bosnia given the limitations placed upon its support for basically civilian objectives (including the police function and refugee reform). Questions also remain as to whether this apparent new firmness in U.S. foreign policy and world leadership will endure or whether there will be a return to apparent indecision, due to the nature of Clinton administration policy making, problems with Congress, and/or public lack of interest in active U.S. involvement abroad. The conclusions eventually drawn abroad on this basic question of commitment and consistency will have much more effect that any other single issue on the future effectiveness of U.S. deterrence. In today's world, economics plays a huge role, and the U.S. economy has become very intertwined with and dependent on the economics of East Asia, West Europe, Mexico, and Canada, not merely oil from the Gulf. Threats to these economic interests are more subtle and less susceptible to conventional forms of deterrence, especially since their long-term importance to the United States is less visible and less generally understood in the near term when deterrent action must be taken if it is to be effective. To protect our economic interests and security, the United States needs to nurture the web of interlocking global, regional, and bilateral economic, military, and political relationships it has initiated or helped others to develop over the past 50 years. This includes economic institutions and agreements such as the International Monetary Fund/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IMF/IBRD), regional development banks, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the G-7 (group of seven states [United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada, Japan, and Italy] for world economic issues), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO); political or security institutions such as the United Nations, European Union (EU), NATO (and the Partnership for Peace), OAS, and ASEAN; and even the weaker Organization of Security Cooperation for Europe (OSCE), Organization for African Unity (OAU), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); and Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). It also means formal bilateral military-to-military cooperation, as well as other special relationships with the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, Australia, Canada, Mexico, Egypt, and Israel, etc., and a variety of other bilateral and multilateral links between the United States and the rest of the world. In today's world, other organizations dealing with nonproliferation, the environment,

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Page 208 international crime, narcotics, terrorism, and so on, are becoming increasingly important. In addition to institutions and formal agreements, there are a variety of more tangible means that the United States has used effectively to support other countries and thereby deter or help overcome threats to them. These include a U.S. forward military presence, on the ground or at sea, temporary or permanent. The basing or temporary stationing of U.S. forces in a country (or a region) whose stability it wishes to support, prepositioning of military equipment, and training of and combined exercises with local forces are all signals of U.S. intent. When coupled with the perception of strong U.S. will, they can be powerful deterrents. On the other hand, as has been seen in Saudi Arabia today (and was seen widely in the 1950s and 1960s), an overly visible U.S. military presence can generate a backlash. By strengthening these relationships and demonstrating constancy rather than allowing them to be beset by doubt, the United States can increase its chances of heading off trouble and its capability of dissuasive deterrence, as well as its chances of success should preventive deterrence or containment be required. As discussed above, the regional and coalition elements of deterrence have assumed greater importance in today's world, particularly in dealing with the problem of different value systems. CASE STUDIES At this point, let us shift to a brief review of several case studies in deterrence where value systems have played a major role. An interesting case study is the Gulf War, where the United States began in early 1987 to develop a web of close military-to-military relationships with all five of the GCC states, employing instruments such as contingency planning, training (in the United States and in the region), joint exercises, and combined operations to protect shipping and the oil installations in the Gulf against Iranian (or Iraqi) attacks, using indigenous ports and airfields and involving local forces to a limited degree, consistent with their political caution and their military capabilities. U.S. military dispositions were worked out informally with Arab governments, with as little visibility as possible. There was also some involvement of naval vessels from the United Kingdom, France, and other NATO countries. The effectiveness of this U.S.-led operation (Earnest Will) in shutting down Iranian small-boat attacks on shipping, virtually stopping Iranian mine laying, and protecting offshore oil and gas platforms, was impressive to the Gulf states and to Iran. The latter concluded that the United States would persist and not be intimidated, particularly after the USS Stark was hit by a missile with 37 U.S. sailors killed and not a hint that the United States would terminate or curtail the operation. The perception of escalating U.S. pressure on Iran, plus increasingly effective Iraqi ground attacks, caused the Ayatollah Khomeni to "drink the bitter wine" and end the war.

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Page 209 The success of operation Earnest Will eased the doubts created by U.S. and Israeli covert arms supplies to Iran in 1985-1986 and regained ground in an area clearly considered vital to U.S. interests. The mutual confidence, knowledge, and habits of cooperation this developed were put to good military use after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Having these regional Islamic governments fully supporting and appearing alongside the U.S. and Western armies in Desert Storm, plus the unanimous U.N. Security Council endorsement, brought in other Moslem states that would otherwise not have participated (e.g., Egypt, Syria, and Morocco). Having such substantial Islamic participation in the coalition was critical in winning the local psychological operations (psyops) battle and defection of many Iraqi troops on the ground, as well as the much broader politico-religious struggle against Iraqi-supported and other radical Islamist groups in a number of Moslem states that tried to stir up animosity against the United States and against Desert Storm. Preinvasion regional attitudes (as well as those in the United States) may have encouraged Saddam Hussein to think he could get away with invading Kuwait, and thus weakened any dissuasive deterrent. However, positive regional attitudes toward Desert Storm plus practical cooperation were essential for success in prevention. The net effect of the 1990-1991 campaign, continued close U.S.-GCC military cooperation (including numerous exercises and prepositioning), the high priority consistently accorded the Gulf by the Clinton administration, and the rapid muscular U.S. and Kuwaiti response to the October 1994 forward Iraqi troop movements (followed by rapid Iraqi withdrawal) demonstrated how effective more conventional dissuasive deterrence can be in an area of vital interest when it is executed properly. Iraq could have punched into Saudi Arabia or Kuwait had it moved at once in October 1994 but was obviously deterred by the daunting prospect of what would come in response, once the United States moved more military force forward and had the strong support of regional states. However, when the United States decided upon retaliation against Iraq in September 1996 because of Iraq's limited action against its Kurdish population—with no sign of a threat to the south—it displayed a lack of political and cultural sensitivity. This meant an overt refusal by earlier "coalition" powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Western Europeans to allow use of their facilities for U.S. aircraft. Another threat that is getting priority attention is the effort to prevent Islamist radicalism from toppling pro-West or "moderate" regimes like dominoes. It is instructive to look at the differences between Algeria and Egypt, on the one hand, and Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan, on the other. In the latter three countries, a potentially explosive Islamic threat has been gradually defused over the past 5 years. With political encouragement and public and private economic help from Western Europe, the United States, and international and private financial institutions, the three have made serious inroads on socioeconomic problems, demonstrating their determination and capability to make progress in helping the population as a whole, as well as minimizing corruption. They have also allowed increased popular political participation,

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Page 210 including nonrevolutionary Moslem political parties, even while cracking down hard on radical revolutionary movements, Islamic and sectarian. In the case of Algeria, on the other hand, political participation by Islamic parties was suddenly nullified and has continued to be banned, while little progress has been made on the huge socioeconomic problems and the appearance of government corruption that brought popular support for the Islamist parties. Egypt is much closer to Algeria than to the other three in (mis)handling its problems, thereby giving Islamist radicals obvious advantages. It has had to fall back heavily upon oppression, which has had a positive security effect but is often a long-term boost to the opposition in such situations. The wrong way for the West to approach the problem of Islam is to see it as a monolithic, hostile ideology, as we once saw Communism, or to see it as one that is susceptible to a military solution, one which NATO is able and ready to challenge. For very sound reasons, King Hassan of Morocco publicly chastised former Secretary General Claes of NATO for making a public statement to just this effect, thereby giving an amplitude of powerful political ammunition to Iran, Iraq (although hardly Islamist, it has feigned such a posture with some positive effect), Libya, the Sudan, and other radical regimes and movements (e.g., Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, Ghamma of Egypt). NATO and the EU subsequently found means to ease the angst in North Africa caused by Claes's statements, and the impression that the new "Mediterranean" consultative arrangements with Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Israel were aimed at Islam. Had they not, it would have given a huge push toward a self-fulfilling prophecy, playing into the hands of Islamic radical opponents of the United States, NATO, and friendly Moslem regimes. Here is an issue where clashing with or utilizing, understanding, or misperceiving foreign culture and its repercussions can be of immense import. Mishandling the Islamist issue can cause great long-term damage to U.S. and Western interests, given the powerful boost that religion provides to ordinary political power and motivation, and its potentially destructive effect on the stability of friendly regimes, availability of oil, control of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation of terrorism, and large-scale exodus of refugees (from North Africa to Europe). (The U.S.-led campaign over 15 years to force a change in Iran's basic world outlook by economic pressure has had little effect. This is in part because the regime in Teheran has been able to portray the United States as anti-Islamic. Up until the new U.S. policy toward Bosnia, Islamist propaganda had substantial negative effect in portraying the United States as refusing to be involved because the Bosnians under attack were Moslem.) Another case study is Somalia, where adequate knowledge of Somali culture during Operation Restore Hope was combined with overwhelming force used with restraint, close cooperation with regional states, coordinated militarypolitical-humanitarian activities, and an excellent psyops/political-action campaign (aided by regional governments.) This combination succeeded in deterring any but isolated armed attacks on U.S. and other Unified Task Force (UNITAF) forces and kept casualties on all sides to a minimum. UNITAF

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Page 211 ensured that its Somali-language radio and newspaper had a different verse from the Koran every day, substantially reducing the effects of anti-U.S. and antiUNITAF propaganda by radical Islamist agitators. Using psyops and constant political dialogue, as well as the threat of force and continuous patrols to avoid surprise attack, the U.S. civilian and military leadership was able to restrain Aideed and the SNA, and other leaders and their militias, so that there were no major or sustained attacks on UNITAF, even at moments of considerable antiUNITAF anger and frustration for the Somalis. The United States and UNITAF were seen as basically even handed. They were able to get Somali factions and clans (warlords) to eschew force as the chosen means of political advancement, instead focusing them on peaceful political combat by means of their own choosing. One of the main reasons for the later armed confrontation by the United States and the United Nations with Aideed and his SNA was a shift in attitude and political posture by the former and a breakdown in dialogue with the latter. This caused Aideed to see them as hostile to his vital long-term interest in becoming the president of Somalia and caused them to see Aideed as an enemy who should and could be "marginalized." The United Nations also stopped cooperating with regional governments (which were advising against confrontation with Aideed), thereby cutting off a vital communications channel. Another factor contributing to the violent confrontation was an impression by the SNA that—compared with the confident, alert UNITAF-—the U.N. forces were less vigilant and were confused and uncertain over command and control, and when and whether to use force. Thus, during the second half of the operation in Somalia, deterrence failed, much as it had 10 years earlier in Lebanon. For Haiti the same basic combination of overwhelming force (used with restraint), political dialogue, and humanitarian and economic assistance effectively deterred potential armed resistance from Cedras and others, at the outset and subsequently. Like Aideed initially, their vital interests were not seen to be at risk (e.g., Cedras's freedom, fortune, and honor were all saved). Good psyops and the participation of a number of other Caribbean and some Latin American countries were an important part of the success achieved by the U.S.led multinational force during the first 15 months in Haiti. A final case study is that of North Korea. By working closely with Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia, the United States was able to enhance its knowledge of how to deal with a rogue state developing a nuclear capability, as well as to increase the psychological and political pressure, and the possibility of economic pressure, on Pyongyang. Aware of the essentiality of regional support, the United States modified its hardline, "stick but no carrot" approach and adopted one combining the two. In exchange, it obtained meaningful political support from China and others. The meeting between former President Carter and the late North Korean leader Kim Il Sung was critical. Yet without a significant U.S. buildup of both its own and ROK military power, and credible signals of its intent for an even greater buildup, the regional states might well

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Page 212 not have decided to join in applying nonmilitary pressure to Pyongyang. And the latter might not have agreed to the "framework" compromise agreement which froze its nuclear program, allowed International Atomic Energy Agency inspection, and greatly reduced any near-term prospects for conflict. Without regional cooperation, the odds are high either that there would have been a major confrontation and very possibly an armed conflict with North Korea and/or that the latter would not have suspended its nuclear activities. The United States was obliged to calculate its real interests in continuing to try and force Pyongyang's hand on its earlier limited nuclear activities, running the risk of no regional support and the danger of a conflict, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, pursuing a peaceful regional political solution that could block Pyongyang's ambitious future nuclear program but not provide an early answer to its previous activities. CONCLUSION Paradoxically, although the United States is the only superpower and enjoys overwhelming military superiority without a real threat to its security, it must arguably pay closer attention than at any time since before World War II to the interests, values, and attitudes of other countries if it is to protect its own longterm interests. This extends to its ability to deter threats to these interests. The collapse of the Soviet Union as a power and of Communism as an ideology left the United States more powerful but also removed the threat that caused many countries to turn toward the United States for protection and be attentive to its interests. The absence of such a threat makes them more independent, an independence that is reinforced in many countries by their economic progress (both absolute and relative to the United States) and by a higher degree of dependence by the U.S. economy on that of other countries. This means that despite its power the United States will need to work harder to retain the relationships established over the past half century, notably by displaying greater constancy and decisiveness, continuing its active involvement with and commitment of its material as well as political assets to international problems, and not succumbing to internal pressures to turn radically inward. It also means paying more attention to the value systems of other states (and subnational players) and being more willing to move quickly to help them if there is a threat to U.S. interests, before a situation moves to the level of a major crisis and requires a major commitment of resources to be effective. Conversely, it means moving more rapidly to deter potential threats, again before they materialize into action or reach a buildup stage where a major commitment of resources is required for any type of preventive deterrence to be successful. And, above all, it means dispelling the general impression abroad of the United States as turning every day more inward, unaware of or uninterested in the subtleties of the new world realities, assuming that, safe in its superpower status, it can retreat with impunity from its past commitments and make little

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Page 213 effort to maintain them, unwilling to commit more than sharply diminished material governmental assets for this purpose. NAVY- AND MARINE CORPS-SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS Several specific implications for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps emerge from looking at the above perspective in light of the study titled The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century (National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1996), as well as U.S. military operations over the 5 years since Desert Storm ended. First, the Navy must remain committed as a priority to keeping open vital sea lines of communication, to the degree possible in cooperation with other countries but by itself if need be. It must also remain committed to and capable of combined lower-scale logistics support for joint and combined/coalition operations. Second, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to have a critical role in deterring, or fighting if deterrence fails, major regional conflicts (MRCs). However, the likelihood of MRCs has gone down since the concept was developed during the Bottom-Up Review. Moreover, the best means of deterring an MRC or containing a conflict at a lesser level is by rapid action, visible on the ground to potential allies and foes. The nature and size of operations to be undertaken will vary tremendously, but few will require major combat, at least in the initial stage. This calls for continued emphasis on a flexible forward presence of highly capable personnel, weapons, and supplies, available for rapid action and prepared for any eventuality. Together with this, there should be the presence and perception of overwhelming U.S. forces relative to the potential or actual adversary. Perception is as important as reality, particularly in the early stages, so that psychological operations and other information warfare techniques can be particularly useful. Third, in most cases the United States will seek and should be able to obtain coalition partners for its operations, especially after any initial, rapid U.S. unilateral action or action with a very limited number of others. This is important in terms of better understanding local value systems, generating political support, and conveying the U.S. message to potential foes, as well as reducing the burden on the United States alone, even if there are operational drawbacks to many potential coalition members which must be controlled. This means constant attention by the Navy and Marine Corps to forward presence and collaborative activities with military forces of other countries, both to solidify cooperative attitudes and to enhance interoperability. Combined exercises and operations, training, common equipment, and other activities should be stressed, with local forces, as well as the presence of U.S. forces. Fourth, a better understanding of local and regional values is essential and can often be more important than firepower alone. This means more attention to area and language training and to the collection and, above all, analysis of intelligence. In the latter regard, nongovernmental sources are often better

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Page 214 informed on many important issues. The emphasis on forward presence, suggested above, can also contribute to this better understanding. Closer cooperation with the Department of State and local embassies, including the use of more political advisors, is another useful approach. This is true not only at the level of regional commanders in chief, but also at lower operational levels. Fifth, related to all of the above, including local political and cultural considerations, availability of U.S. air power, and force protection, are the JulySeptember 1996 problems that beset U.S. forces in the Gulf. Too much of a highly visible U.S. military presence 5 years after Desert Storm began to take its toll in terrorist attacks upon U.S. facilities and refusal to allow U.S. aircraft to use local air bases to attack Iraq. This reinforces earlier arguments for relying much more on aircraft carriers rather than assuming the availability of land facilities. Sixth, whether one likes it or not, in many situations military operations will be less than all-out war and will require close cooperation with civilian agencies of the United States and other governments, as well as international and nongovernmental or private voluntary organizations. Systematic training for such cooperation will be important for the future, particularly in the broad and variable concept of how to establish and operate most effectively civil military operations centers and/or humanitarian operations centers. For most limited military operations (as operations other than war), success will depend on a balanced approach combining four basic elements: • Military and security matters (including police, arms control, demobilization, and the like), • Humanitarian and economic matters (including relief, initial reconstruction, planning, and processes for longer-term rehabilitation), • Political and diplomatic matters (with various local authorities and other governments), and • Public information (both public affairs and psychological operations). Combining the assets of the Marine Corps and the Special Operations Command can frequently provide the most effective immediate approach to such problems, followed by larger and/or long-term involvement of other forces if necessary. These observations could easily be extended or amplified. However, they all seem to follow the general thrust of the Regional Conflict study in arguing for a lighter, more flexible Marine Corps able to deploy even more rapidly with strong Navy support and able to understand better and work more effectively with foreign countries. There should be no stinting on improved weapons and other technological advances. However, there should be recognition that in many operations, advanced technology and firepower will not be the total answer for success and, unless accompanied by other factors suggested above, could be counterproductive.