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Page 45
3 Significance of Post-Cold War
Deterrence Concepts for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
INTRODUCTION
The first two chapters of this report discuss the meaning of
deterrence in the post-Cold War period, the key elements of a
post-Cold War deterrence strategy, and critical issues in devising
such a strategy. This chapter examines the significance of these
observations for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. It first
identifies the demands of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and
provides a short list of objectives for such a strategy.
Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about
the potential success or failure of deterrence are then outlined.
Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to
meet the objectives of deterrence. This chapter then examines
capabilities of the U.S. naval forces that can especially
contribute to fulfilling deterrence objectives. The final section
examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision
aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations
calling for deterrence, and in improving the potential for
deterrent actions to be successful.
The terms of reference for this study inquire about the
"strengths and weaknesses of existing and emerging technologies and
systems" to contribute to the naval forces' part in carrying out
deterrence strategies. As discussed in this chapter, technology is
considered to be a technical means of achieving a practical
purpose. In recent years, amidst great concern about U.S. retention
of its military technical superiority, certain underlying technical
capabilities that enable the construction of the military systems
discussed in this report have come to be termed "critical
technologies." However, as indicated by much of the discussion in
Chapters 1 and 2, the technologies as such can have no intrinsic
deterrence value independent of their articulation in military
systems and the application of those systems to solving real-world
problems (whether the systems are a class of weapons such as
nuclear weapons or an entire force such as the strategic ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN) force). Such use is described by
enumeration of capabilities that the systems confer on their users.
Thus this chapter concentrates on capabilities needed by the
naval forces to help carry out those deterrence strategies.
The capabilities needed include military systems as well as
qualitative proficiency in intelligence, training, organization,
and implementation of innovative concepts of operation. The
technologies needed both to provide the systems and to support the
qualitative proficiency exist today, either embedded in current
systems and the activities using them or being applied to the
development of advanced systems and activities. It is the judgment
of the Naval
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Page 45
3 Significance of Post-Cold War
Deterrence Concepts for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
INTRODUCTION
The first two chapters of this report discuss the meaning of
deterrence in the post-Cold War period, the key elements of a
post-Cold War deterrence strategy, and critical issues in devising
such a strategy. This chapter examines the significance of these
observations for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. It first
identifies the demands of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and
provides a short list of objectives for such a strategy.
Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about
the potential success or failure of deterrence are then outlined.
Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to
meet the objectives of deterrence. This chapter then examines
capabilities of the U.S. naval forces that can especially
contribute to fulfilling deterrence objectives. The final section
examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision
aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations
calling for deterrence, and in improving the potential for
deterrent actions to be successful.
The terms of reference for this study inquire about the
"strengths and weaknesses of existing and emerging technologies and
systems" to contribute to the naval forces' part in carrying out
deterrence strategies. As discussed in this chapter, technology is
considered to be a technical means of achieving a practical
purpose. In recent years, amidst great concern about U.S. retention
of its military technical superiority, certain underlying technical
capabilities that enable the construction of the military systems
discussed in this report have come to be termed "critical
technologies." However, as indicated by much of the discussion in
Chapters 1 and 2, the technologies as such can have no intrinsic
deterrence value independent of their articulation in military
systems and the application of those systems to solving real-world
problems (whether the systems are a class of weapons such as
nuclear weapons or an entire force such as the strategic ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN) force). Such use is described by
enumeration of capabilities that the systems confer on their users.
Thus this chapter concentrates on capabilities needed by the
naval forces to help carry out those deterrence strategies.
The capabilities needed include military systems as well as
qualitative proficiency in intelligence, training, organization,
and implementation of innovative concepts of operation. The
technologies needed both to provide the systems and to support the
qualitative proficiency exist today, either embedded in current
systems and the activities using them or being applied to the
development of advanced systems and activities. It is the judgment
of the Naval
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Page 46
Studies Board in carrying out this review that appropriate
application of diverse known technologies and the existing or
developmental capabilities they support (which are described in
connection with the discussion of specific force capabilities
needed), rather than pursuit of new technologies, is the most
important current need in advancing the naval forces' contribution
to a national deterrence strategy.
OBJECTIVES AND METRICS IN DETERRENCE
STRATEGY
Objectives of Deterrence
The basic objective of deterrence remains what it has been since
the origin of the strategic concept of deterrence during the Cold
War: to influence the behavior of nations so that they do not
undertake aggression against the United States and U.S. interests
across the world. During the Cold War, deterrence strategy was
aimed mainly at preventing aggression by the hostile Communist
power centers—the USSR and its allies, Communist China, and
North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent a
nuclear attack by the USSR or China.
The range of nations and other groups and the types of behavior
we seek to deter have expanded enormously since the Cold War.
Current U.S. security concerns must still include defense of the
U.S. homeland and protection of allies with whom we have treaty
obligations guaranteeing our mutual security. But they also extend
to guarding a broad range of interests that directly and indirectly
affect our national security. While these broader concerns have
always been apparent, they are now articulated more explicitly as
part of our need to deter actions inimical to our national
security. The concerns range from free use of the seas, the
airways, and space for international commerce and security-related
activities, through protection of sources of key resources and the
friendly nations that control and furnish them, to encouraging the
growth of a community of democratic nations in a peacefully
evolving world through which our own security will be enhanced. The
U.S.-furnished security umbrella may thus be extended by the
National Command Authorities (NCA) and Congress to include other
nations or regions with which we do not have explicit mutual
defense agreements.
The nature of the aggression with which we are now concerned
also includes many kinds of activities different from military
attack. International terrorism, whether sponsored by rogue nations
or undertaken by transnational groups in furtherance of broad
agendas that hostile nations may share, has become a threat and
therefore an object of deterrence policy. The spread of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is now a top-priority
national security concern. Economic warfare, political subversion,
and even humanitarian concerns engendered by widespread human
suffering attending ethnic conflict, by the breakdown of nations'
internal order, and by regional conflict have all come to the fore
as affecting U.S. security directly or indirectly in many ways.
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The task of deterring activities that are inimical to our
interests has become equally broad. We must detect the potential
onset of a hostile action and then dissuade or otherwise deter the
would-be aggressor from undertaking it by posing a credible threat
of punishment that the aggressor would find unacceptable and,
especially, a clear plan convincing enough to show that success of
the aggressive action will be denied. Sometimes the dissuasion will
involve positive inducements to change behavior and reassurance
that the "deterree" will not be attacked. The approach taken to
accomplish deterrence will involve a range of activities on our
part, in the political, diplomatic, economic, and military
spheres.
Thus, a strategy of deterrence must now address much of the
threatening or violent activity on the international scene that can
affect the United States, and deterring such activity can encompass
almost all U.S. foreign policy actions. However, it is apparent
that the potential or actual use of effective military force will
underlie all deterrence efforts, perhaps including those that
respond to economic or political actions that appear sufficiently
threatening to our security. The "use" of military force may
involve as little as moving forces into position to act rapidly, or
selected military actions involving armed conflict. Moreover,
deterrence may fail, especially in cases where communications may
be misunderstood or where, as in terrorism, the aggressor believes
a strategy has been devised that can deny the opportunity for
reprisal. If deterrence fails, a military response must deny
success to the aggressor, and this may involve rendering the
aggressor incapable of further aggression for the immediate or for
the long-term future, as circumstances dictate.
Based on the broad national security considerations sketched
above, U.S. military forces must be able to meet the following
deterrence objectives:
• To deter attack on the United States and its allies by
external forces ranging from the armed forces of hostile nations to
national or multinational terrorist groups;
• To deter similar attacks on allies with whom we have
mutual security treaties;
• To deter aggression against our own and our allies' vital
interests and security in areas when we agree those interests and
security are at stake;
• To deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction; and
• To deter the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction in military conflict, especially when our own and
our allies' national security interests are at stake.
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How to Measure the Chances for
Success
Before proceeding to a discussion of Navy and Marine Corps
military capabilities required to enhance the success of deterrent
strategy, it is useful to review the criteria by which various
deterrence alternatives can be compared, how it might be judged
whether any particular act of deterrence might work, and how that
would be demonstrated.
Deterrence capacity or potential of deterrence cannot be
measured quantitatively. The motivation for aggressive acts, the
planning, and the perception of advantage or disadvantage in
possible responses to those acts, or even of the likelihood of
various levels of response, all reside within the minds of the
leaders and members of the nations or groups involved. However well
we believe we understand the driving factors, that comprehension
can never be perfect. Indeed, in many cases we may not know whether
''deterrence" worked, even after the fact. For example, the U.S.
deployment of forces to the Persian Gulf in October 1994 was
intended to discourage amassing Iraqi forces from crossing into
Kuwait again. Although those Iraqi forces stood down, it is not
known whether their initial intent was to invade Kuwait, whether
there was some other objective in amassing those forces, or what
they might have done to exploit a target of opportunity if we had
not reacted.
Thus, in the final analysis, assessment of the potential
effectiveness of a deterrence policy or action is highly
subjective. Nevertheless, certain metrics can play a role in
guiding and refining such judgments. The key measures for gauging
how successful deterrence might be in protecting the interests of
the United States and its allies are summarized below. In this
formulation it should be understood that the term "metrics" refers
to qualitative as well as quantitative measures.
• Detection. To what extent can we determine whether
a hostile or threatening action in some part of the world is
possible, potentially invited by circumstances, or actually in the
making? Is our intelligence, and especially our intelligence
analysis, sufficiently on the alert and effective enough to keep us
from being surprised by a fait accompli?
• Evaluation. How serious is the threat to U.S.
interests and those of our allies? What are the consequences for
those interests, and for U.S. security, if the threatened action is
successful? What steps are likely to counter the threat
effectively? In particular, is a military response in order, or
required? How much are we willing to risk-in treasure, casualties,
impact on our international position-by responding, or by not
responding, especially militarily? Have we begun to plan for an
action? Can plans be completed in time?
• Coalition building. Is an alliance in place that
can help? Must it be alerted? Must a coalition be built to meet
unique circumstances? Are the elements of a new coalition in place,
or must we start from scratch?
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• Have we started, given that a risk of aggression is
detected? What actions must be taken to ensure the coalition's
effectiveness—e.g., interoperable communications, commonly
understood command-and control doctrines, and so on. What
deterrence actions could be undertaken to enlarge or solidify the
coalition? What modifications to original plans would they
entail?
• Level of confidence in our understanding of the key
participants. How well do we understand what motivates the
adversary and the risks the adversary might be willing to take,
within the opponent's own value system? Do we understand how the
opponent would view any deterrent actions we might take, and what
the response might be? What does the adversary hold dear, so that
the threat of its loss or failure will discourage the anticipated
hostile action (noting, for example, that, as with Egypt in the
1973 Arab-Israeli war, a loss might matter less than simply
undertaking the conflict)? What inducements might elicit a positive
response to attempts at dissuasion? The most important aspect of
these judgments is that they be free of preconceptions arising from
our own value system, and that they account for the unexpected and
what may in our view be irrational. Similar considerations will
apply to actual or potential coalition partners, including, at
times, our closest allies. All the metrics described here must be
viewed in the context of this understanding of the opponent and the
other participants in an action.
• Appropriateness of the planned action. Will a
military response -e.g., movement of forces to an area or a
heightening of the alert status of forces—have the desired
effect or will it be counterproductive, or possibly stimulate a
preemptive attack? Will positive inducements or "reassurance" be
more suited to the situation? Or is a combination of such measures
called for?
• Appropriateness of the military response. Are the
forces to be brought to bear the appropriate ones for the
situation? Are they the right size, and do they have the right
capability, to meet and defeat the anticipated hostile move? This
issue must be judged with respect to three aspects: our own
understanding of the forces needed to respond to the anticipated
aggression, the opponent's perception of the forces' capability,
and our allies' or coalition partners' perception of the forces'
appropriateness in view of their own obligation to commit forces.
It may not be appropriate or necessary to deploy instantly the full
force that may ultimately be involved, but we should be convinced
that we can build up to that capability when we need to, and the
ability to do so should be visible as a latent promise to the
others involved.
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• Timing. The response must be appropriately timed
to anticipate, and therefore forestall, any hostile moves on the
adversary's part; it must be rapid enough to bring the requisite
military force to bear when it is needed at the place where it is
needed; and it must be appropriately timed to communicate intent
and capability, consistent with the adversary's planning cycle.
• Communication and credibility. We must judge
whether we have adequately communicated-by message, movement of
forces, or other means, or several means together-our intended
response in the event that an action we wish to deter is taken, and
we must judge the credibility of the communication in light of both
present and prior circumstances. Any communication must convey the
national will to undertake the action, despite our transparent and
often argumentative public decision process. If circumstances
suggest that communications have an element of ambiguity (in order
not to be provocative at the moment), then we should judge whether
we have made clear what the alternatives and their respective
consequences are; vague statements subject to misinterpretation
should be avoided. And, we must be clear about what prior events
may indicate about the credibility of the currently promised
response.
These metrics can form a checklist against which the potential
utility and effectiveness of planned deterrence policies,
strategies, and actions, in both general and specific
circumstances, may be tested. They are also the metrics involved in
judgments about the force requirements and the decision aids that
are reviewed below.1
ENSURING U.S. NAVAL FORCES' CAPABILITY
FOR DETERRENCE
U.S. naval forces include the Navy and the Marine Corps and all
auxiliary elements needed to operate them, and in time of war, the
U.S. Coast Guard. Every element of the naval force structure
contributes to naval forces' operations in peace, deterrence, and
war. Nevertheless, special aspects of naval force structure and
operation have an immediate and direct bearing on deterrence policy
and strategy. These aspects range from essential combat
capabilities to matters of support and preparation that are equally
important and even more complex to implement.
Sustain the Strategic Ballistic
Missile Submarine Force
It is likely that nuclear weapons held by the United States and
its allies will in the future be used only to deter the use of
nuclear weapons by others. This
1 "Requirements" in the
sense of "needs," not in the sense of the formal "requirements
process" by which military systems are acquired.
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will include deterrence of nuclear attacks on the United States
and attacks on allied countries, including those, like Germany and
Japan, that have renounced acquisition of nuclear weapons in favor
of reliance on U.S. extended deterrence. As pointed out in Chapters
1 and 2, however, the threat to use nuclear weapons in retaliation
may be important in particular circumstances to deter the use of
chemical and biological weapons and even to deter overwhelming
conventional attacks on close allies. These latter applications,
beyond the use of nuclear weapons to deter the use of nuclear
weapons, will likely not be decided upon until specific
circumstances present the need for decision. Whatever the ultimate
policy decisions may be, the weapons and the capability to use them
must be available, even for the most restrictive policy.
Moreover, with the uncertainties of nuclear weapons holdings by
other, possibly hostile nations, and the risk of spreading nuclear
weapons capability either through leakage from former Soviet
stockpiles or by the failure of restraints on nuclear
proliferation, the nuclear forces we retain "must be sufficient to
deter any combination of attackers who may have such weapons from
using them against us or our closest allies" (Chapter 1, p. 20).
The START treaties limit the numbers and types of strategic
delivery systems, but there is still room within those limits for
an adequate, devastating response to a nuclear attack and for other
uses should the NCA so decide.
The SSBN force accounts for a large share of the U.S. strategic
force posture under current provisions of the START treaties. The
qualities that have made it especially valuable—its essential
invulnerability, its stealth, its flexibility and ability to change
operating areas, its long time on station— commend it as a
continuing key element of future deterrence strategy. Indeed, these
qualities will be even more valuable as the world becomes more
complex and as potential sources of attack, and uncertainty about
the source of any particular attack, increase. These qualities of
the SSBN force, in conjunction with the needs expressed above,
argue for its retention, and for its continuing modernization and
ongoing readiness for action, into the indefinite future. Since
adversaries in a prospective action may not be known until shortly
before a conflict begins, and since the kinds of targets may depend
on ad hoc decisions about the circumstances in which nuclear
weapons may be used, part of the readiness for action must include
the ability to change targeting and warhead mixes rapidly. Clearly,
such readiness would require receipt of a broad range of
intelligence inputs to an intelligence database that is routinely
updated with minimum time lag, in addition to a system that would
allow those inputs to be applied on short notice.
Increase the Ratio of Offensive to
Defensive Capability
During the Cold War era, the ratio of offensive to defensive
systems and investment was conditioned by preparation for possible
conflict with the USSR and its allies. U.S. naval forces were
confronted with the need to be able to counter a highly organized
opponent possessing effective weapons, a highly
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integrated command-and-control system, and a worldwide reach.
During the 45 years of preparation and readiness to meet such a
contingency, U.S. naval forces built a formidable defensive and
offensive capability. However, the nature of anticipated opposition
has now changed, while new kinds of weapons and, especially,
information technology, now enable us to better focus our deterrent
capabilities, including offensive forces.
While the military capability of some regional powers will
continue to be formidable,2it will at least for the foreseeable
future lack the degree of integration and the geographic scope that
characterized Soviet forces. Thus the defenses built into our naval
forces should, if they continue to evolve and incorporate new
technology, enable the United States to overcome attacks by
opposing regional powers for a long time to come. It is essential
that military commanders and leaders fully understand the
significance of the new naval force technology and manage its
introduction and use so as to gain its full capability for helping
to achieve deterrence. Moreover, the military capacity provided by
the modern and improving naval force defenses, the greater mobility
and speed of the Marine Corps in amphibious operations, and the
advancing weaponry and command, control, communications, computing,
and intelligence (C3I) systems
will allow even defensive capability to be used in ways that
advance military offensive strength. Moreover, the nature of the
potential opposition has changed, requiring a more shoreward
orientation of the fleet now that the midocean threat of Soviet
naval forces has declined. The time thus appears appropriate to
think about changing the relative offensive and defensive
orientations of naval forces' capability and of investment in the
naval forces, especially in the areas outlined below. In doing this
it should be borne in mind that the division between "offense" and
"defense" in naval systems is not hard and fast. Defensive
capabilities that allow naval forces to carry their offensive
combat power closer to the enemy, and to protect areas and
installations outside the naval force itself, can be considered as
contributing to the force's offensive capability.
Although the following key areas are discussed separately, they
form a continuum of mutually reinforcing capabilities.
• Precision attack. The importance of responding
rapidly to aggression and minimizing collateral damage and civilian
casualties, as well as U.S. casualties, is emphasized in Chapters 1
and 2. The capability now exists to locate targets and attack them
precisely from long distances, using either attack airplanes with
guided weapons or long-range guided missiles launched from fleet
combatants or attack submarines. This capability may also be
appropriate for responding to the threatened or
2 Naval
Studies Board, National Research Council, Future
Aircraft Carrier Technology, Vol. I, National
Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1991; and The Navy
and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict, 1996. See
also Defense Science Board, The Navy and Marine
Corps in Regional Conflict: Investments for 21st Century Military
Superiority, Executive Summary Briefing, November
1995.
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hostile use of weapons of mass destruction, and it has become an
essential element of a conventional-weapons military response that
can rapidly deny success to an aggressor's attack. Much remains to
be done, and should be done, to ensure the full development of the
precision attack capability of the naval forces.3 Especially
worthy of note is the need to provide, in the joint operational
environment and using all-source data, full situational awareness,
accurate targeting, and effective joint and combined command and
control of the precision attack systems and forces, in addition to
accurate guided weapons suitable to the problem.
• Theater missile defense. Ballistic missiles with
ranges from 200 to over 1,000 miles are proliferating among large
and small nations around the world. Even if they do not deliver the
weapons of mass destruction that they are capable of delivering,
their use with conventional warheads—and often even their
presence alone-—can have a profound political as well as
military impact on regional conflict. As evidenced during the Gulf
War, the application of even a limited defense against such attacks
can also have important political and military significance.
Defenses against ballistic missile attack will, in the future, be
an even more important part of our developing, joint military
capability. The theater missile defense (TMD) systems will
ultimately cover the gamut of defense possibilities, from finding
and destroying command centers and launchers, through destruction
of missiles in boost and ascent phase to prevent dispersal of
chemical and bacteriological submunitions and to prevent damage by
nuclear warheads either detonating within damage range or following
purely ballistic trajectories to their targets after intercept, to
terminal defense against weapons that leak through. The imperative
of preventing effective attacks by ballistic missiles that may
carry warheads of mass destruction leads to the concept of placing
a "cap" over an aggressor state to prevent such attacks from
reaching beyond the aggressor's borders, with terminal defense as
final "insurance." In this sense, TMD enhances overall offensive
capability.
Naval TMD will have the value of mobility—the ability to
move into place with high readiness on short notice—on ships
(ranging from carriers with attack aviation to surface combatants
with vertical launch bays) configured to use the defenses, usually
in conjunction with joint surveillance, warning, and targeting
capabilities furnished by other forces available to the regional
commander in chief (CINC). Naval TMD can thus provide "offensive
defense" rapidly, from the open ocean or from positions near the
coast or even in a port. Because of its
3 Naval Studies Board,
National Research Council, The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional
Conflict, 1996.
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mobility, naval TMD may be difficult for an aggressor's forces
to target. In transmitting signals of resolve and in demonstrating
quickly available capability, movement of naval TMD forces would
have high deterrence value in brewing crises. For all these
reasons, fleet TMD will be an important tool in implementing
national deterrence strategy, and it must be part of the naval
forces.
• Undersea warfare-conventional attack submarines and
mines. The undersea environment that made possible the nuclear
deterrence achieved through the SSBN force offers similar
possibilities for deterrence of potential regional conflicts along
the littoral.4 U.S. conventional attack submarines such
as the improved Los Angeles class (SSN 688I) and the new nuclear
attack submarine that is being designed at the time of this writing
can launch highly accurate land attack missiles with conventional
warheads, capable of deep penetration of an opponent's territory to
strike against critical elements of the opponent's war-making
potential and national command structure, with devastating effect.
The power of such missile attacks was demonstarted during the Gulf
War and in the 1993 raid against the Iraqi intelligence
headquarters.
As in the strategic deterrence case, the existence of this force
guarantees the U.S. ability to punish an aggressor while the force
itself remains essentially invulnerable to an opponent's
anticipatory or retaliatory actions. While it may be argued that
this part of the deterrent force is invisible and therefore would
have uncertain value for deterrence during the acute phase of a
crisis, appropriate public discussion can make clear the existence
of the force and the damage that it can do (as was the case with
the strategic SSBN force). It could also be indicated to a would-be
aggressor at a critical time that the force is in place and ready
for action. The "deterree" would not be safe in assuming that such
an indication is false, thereby adding to its deterrent value.
Finally, the submarine force is in a position to carry out
surveillance and other useful military operations as enhancements
to the capability of the remaining naval force deterrent. This
capability includes offensive mine warfare to deny an opponent the
use of certain seas or even the opponent's own harbors, should a
potential or actual trangression be serious enough to warrant
offensive mine deployments. Thus, supporting and improving all
aspects of the deterrent value of the conventional undersea force
in national policy and force planning activities deserve serious
attention at all levels of Navy and national security planning.
4 Naval
Studies Board, National Research Council, The Navy
and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict,
1996.
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Quiet, modern submarines and the ability to use mine warfare are
also among the capabilities accruing to many regional powers.
Antisubmarine warfare during the Cold War was viewed to a great
extent as a means of protecting the U.S. fleet from submarine
attack and as a means for preventing enemy SSBNs from launching
their ballistic missiles against the United States and our allies.
While these missions continue, they are overshadowed in potential
regional conflicts by the need to keep submarines—which may be
conventionally powered or nuclear powered—from interfering
with fleet movements and shipping in littoral waters where we may
be responding to the threat of an attack. Those that have the
capacity to do so must also be prevented from launching cruise
missiles against friendly installations on shore. As in TMD,
defending against such submarines will run the gamut from attacking
their bases and support facilities to finding and sinking them, as
well as ensuring effective terminal defense against torpedos and
cruise missiles. Having a demonstrable capability to clear coastal
waters of hostile submarines is a way of showing that we can carry
the war to the opponent by denying the use of a key military system
and destroying that system, and is therefore an essential
contributor to the naval forces' deterrent value.
Similarly, mine warfare in the ocean and along the littoral,
even the use of mines of antique vintage, is a widely available
capability. It can deny ships' movement and the ability to land
Marine Corps forces in crisis zones. The ability to neutralize,
clear, or avoid mine fields is crucial to U.S. naval forces'
successful response to crises and military action in crises. Part
of this ability will be to track, via the naval and national
intelligence systems, a potential aggressor's mining capability
from manufacture to storage to deployment and then to counter it,
either by destroying the mines ashore or by otherwise denying the
emplacement of minefields or by being able to clear such fields
from international or coastal waters with relative impunity after
they have been emplaced. Knowledge that the United States has
invested in this capability, demonstration (through exercises or
actual operations) that it is effective, and movement of the
appropriate forces into place in time of crisis must be part of the
naval forces' contribution to deterrence. In a recent white paper
the chief of naval operations emphasized the importance of
countermine warfare.5 Greatly expanded efforts, with high
priority, are planned for this area by the naval forces;
5 Memorandum by ADM J.M. Boorda, USN,
Chief of Naval Operations, Mine
Countermeasures—An Integral Part of Our Strategy and
Forces, 13 December 1995; and
Concept of Operationsfor Mine Countermeasures in the 21st
Century, Mine Warfare Branch, Expeditionary
Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
September 1995.
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they should be continued and encouraged as part of the national
deterrence strategy.6
• Effective blockade. Naval forces must be able to
establish an effective blockade when called upon. One of the means
available to the United States and its allies to combat aggression
is denial of movement of supplies, people, and materiel into or out
of an aggressor's country. Without arguing the relative merits of
sanctions—a diplomatic term that covers forms of
blockade—as a tool of foreign policy, it can be observed that
the United States, acting with its allies and often through the
United Nations, has invoked sanctions as either punishment or
threat, as a part of coercive diplomacy intended to deter the onset
or continuation of aggressive acts that would be harmful to U.S.
interests. In many cases the sanctions have had only limited
success in achieving the objectives for which they were invoked.
One reason for only partial success has been the ability of the
object of the sanctions to avoid their full effect by evading the
blockade through smuggling. Naval forces are the chosen instrument
to enforce blockades against any entity with a coastline and
waterways. To be effective, a blockade needs the ability to detect
smugglers, who will operate at odd times, in relatively
inaccessible areas, and disguised to appear as part of permitted
commerce. U.S. naval forces must be able to intercept them and to
confiscate their goods or to turn them back to their sources. All
this must be done in a way that does not inflict casualties on
permitted commerce and on those engaged in such commerce, even
while allowing the forces to overcome military or paramilitary
resistance
Although the effective enforcement of a blockade may appear
inherent in naval forces' combat capabilities, to be fully
effective those capabilities must be explicitly trained for and
designed to operate well in the special circumstances that
blockades require—operations against clandestine forces in
difficult environments. Preparing for such operations in the
interest of deterring larger conflicts is a capability that the
Navy Department must consciously cultivate.
Sustain the Naval Forces' Forward
Presence
One of the elements of deterrence is the "existential
deterrent": the visible existence of military forces that can be
called upon to carry out the military actions of a deterrence
strategy. However, as noted in Chapter 1 and in several of the
appendixes of this report, there is room for a potential aggressor
to doubt whether the forces in existence will be used without some
appropriately timed signal affirming the will to use them. Thus,
movement of appropriate forces when some undesired international
action is a prospect is an important part of a
6 Naval Studies Board,
National Research Council, Mine Countermeasures Technology, Vols.
I-IV, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.,
1993-1994.
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deterrence strategy. Such "movement" can take many forms:
heightened alert of intercontinental missile forces; movement of
especially vulnerable force elements out of harm's way, for
example, moving ships out of a harbor or aircraft off an airfield,
or moving potential hostages away from the risk of capture before a
military attack; visible attention to minefields, both offensive
and defensive; or movement of powerful combat forces into position
for a rapid response. In connection with the last item, the amount
of force moved, in relation to the amount of force initially in
place, is also a relevant parameter— moving a large force to
augment a small force in place may send a stronger signal than the
one sent by making a small addition to a large force in place.
The continuum of activity across which deterrence must be
effective ranges from small aggressive acts that are threatening in
the long run to major military attacks. The "low end" tends to be
the most "fuzzy," presenting the greatest likelihood of some needed
activity by the U.S. military, as well as the greatest uncertainty
about whether deterrence will work; offering the greatest scope for
action by non-national groups; and increasing the likelihood of
national debate about potential U.S. involvement. In response to
low-end activity, timely actions suited to the environment and the
situation, carried out by forward forces able to demonstrate a
capability for rapid follow-up by major force, may have a better
chance of deterring undesirable developments than would forces
brought in after the initiation of an incident. The forward posture
of these forces would also enable a more rapid response should
initial deterrence fail, and such forces would be better positioned
to help deter escalation. Included in the scope of action for such
forward forces are operations other than war, heightened
surveillance, and force augmentation in response to "testing" by a
potential opponent.
No matter what particular maneuvers are needed to deter an
impending crisis, the force to be moved must be flexible and as
nearly in place as possible to enable a timely and appropriate
response or anticipatory move. Naval forces in forward posture are
ideally suited to these requirements. They can be kept on station,
visible, for extended periods while preparing for conflict or
engaging peacefully with potential coalition partners, or even
opponents, in acts intended either to make crisis response more
effective or to avert crises. They can undertake preparatory
maneuvers without infringing any nation's sovereignty and without
placing pressure on a country to accept U.S. forces on its soil at
especially sensitive times, and they can apply military power
rapidly from the sea in locations where there are no bases into
which land-based combat forces can deploy.
Another aspect of a forward posture is the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF), maintained by the Army and the Marine
Corps on ships in safe harbors closer to expected theaters of
operation than the continental United States. The MFP enables rapid
deployment of combat personnel by air and rapid "marrying up" of
personnel and equipment in or near the theater of operations. A key
element of the naval forces' mission in the forward area is
protecting MPF ships
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and ensuring their safe transit to an operational area, thus
contributing essential strength to the forward posture of those
forces.
Incorporate Deterrence in the Overall
Naval Forces' Planning Process
It is clear that all aspects of naval force structure can at one
time or another be involved in deterrence actions as well as in
military action that may result if deterrence fails. Although some
especially important aspects of the naval force structure bearing
on deterrence are clearly not separable from the force structure
and operational capability as a whole, they nevertheless require
emphasis in preparing U.S. naval forces to participate in a
national deterrence strategy. Thus, the explicit concept of
deterrence must be incorporated into the overall naval forces'
planning process. This is of critical importance in three areas:
intelligence, training, and budgeting.
• Intelligence. The need for intelligence to inform
deterrence actions goes beyond the usual description of a threat
that includes order of battle, force size, and questions of
technical capability with which military forces-as distinct from
national intelligence agencies-tend to be concerned in their
peacetime planning. Since naval forces in a forward posture during
peacetime are in close contact with both friends and potential foes
as a routine matter, they may be positioned so as to gain
understanding of those external forces that bears on adversaries'
values, intentions, and plans for diverse contingencies. This
knowledge may come about by purposeful intelligence activity,
including human intelligence gathering and surveillance leading to
detection and interpretation of significant force movements and
related matters, or by simple observation and growing knowledge of
indigenous forces and actors through day-to-day contact. In any
case, the relevance of such matters and therefore the need to
gather data in these areas must be emphasized in naval forces'
intelligence activity and in the naval forces' contributions to and
acceptance of inputs from joint intelligence activities.
• Training. Naval forces' training for actual combat
is a usual matter of concern in force planning and needs no
additional comment in the current context. Training for effective
implementation of low-end deterrence strategy places added
requirements on the training process. It must include attention to
operations other than war, since it is in these operations that
much of the interplay of forces that will enable or inhibit
deterrence will take place. In addition, it must be recognized as a
factor in the use of military force today that the news media will
be present, and that their reports from the scene will have an
important impact on public opinion and on national views of the
nature and
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appropriateness of responses in a developing crisis. Finally,
military forces and commanders must recognize that there may well
be imperatives for the national civilian leadership that dictate
the application of military force under conditions of force level,
environment, and timing that are less than desirable by strictly
military criteria. All this argues strongly for an emphasis on
operations other than war and, in addition, for awareness of the
potentially powerful influence of factors extraneous to military
operations per se, in training naval forces for participation in a
deterrence strategy.
• Budgeting. It was not an objective of this
analysis to ascertain whether the budget levels or the budgeting
process for the naval forces are adequate to meet national
deterrence objectives. However, the importance of including the
qualities of the forces that especially contribute to deterrence
merits comment with regard to budgeting considerations. It is
apparent that the kind of force planning that will especially
contribute to successful deterrence involves a seamless progression
from designating the appropriate forces, through integrating their
various capabilities, to ensuring that the parts of the forces
especially relevant to a deterrence strategy (such as the ability
to move forces into place rapidly) are not neglected. The budgeting
process that was in effect during the Cold War tended to separate
interrelated force elements into different categories, so that
specific systems, training, and supporting infrastructure were all
considered separately from each other. In such a process, the
funding levels and objectives can easily assume unbalanced and
inappropriate relationships with each other. The most effective
allocation of resources, for deterrence as well as for combat
missions, could not be guaranteed under such circumstances.
The older system is gradually being supplanted by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council process, being instituted through
the Joint Staff as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
In the new process, field commanders have a greater voice in
setting operational requirements. This new approach will provide
more opportunity to review military force needs in an integrated
manner that will mitigate the inefficiencies and avoid the
capability gaps inherent in the earlier compartmented budgeting
process. The Naval Studies Board, in connection with this review of
deterrence, urges the acceleration of this change in the budgeting
process, believing that it will lead to more effective naval forces
within the available budgets, and to forces better suited to
deterrence missions, with relevant technological advances available
in a shorter time, than the earlier process produced.
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• Arms control. The naval forces should have an
important role in future arms control negotiations, since naval
forces' elements germane to deterrence are likely to be affected by
any resulting agreements. Taking on such a role also requires
advanced preparation by the naval forces to maintain credibility on
the subject and to ensure that Service positions bearing the
authority of Service leadership are advanced and addressed.
DECISION AIDS: INTELLIGENCE, GAMES,
MODELING, AND SIMULATION
The key decision aids for an effective deterrence strategy are
accurate information about and understanding of a particular
situation, the context, and the issues and the participants in any
events of concern, as well as understanding of the relative merits
of various approaches to the situation based on having thought
through similar situations and experimented with ideas about how to
treat them.
The key elements of information—i.e., intelligence and
understanding—are highlighted throughout this report. They
include a thorough understanding of the issues, nations, and
individuals involved in events-—including an objective view of
actual or potential opponents' objectives, values,
strengths, and weaknesses, as well as a thorough understanding of
actual or potential allies' values, strengths, weaknesses,
and motivations. We must also have a clear view of our own
objectives, values, resolve, and capabilities to influence any
situation. Included in understanding of the opposition is an
accurate view of what that nation or group holds dear that can be
threatened or used as an inducement to acceptable behavior in a
crisis. Current intelligence must find indicators of impending
actions that the United States would wish to deter, in time to
allow assessment, decision, and anticipatory deterrent action.
Aside from actual experience, practice in managing situations
involving deterrence can be gained through the use of models,
simulations, and games involving representation of the participants
in an action, including the U.S. officials who would play a part in
such activities. The models, simulations, and games providing
opportunities for such experimentation are legion. Most have been
devised to study the interplay of forces in warfare and to evaluate
military system and force performance. Those applicable to
deterrence must also include qualities bearing on deterrence
action, such as the capacity for decision making relevant to such
action. The needed qualities are reviewed briefly in Chapter 1;
some essential elements of such decision aids are examined in
detail in the three papers included in Appendix G.
A review of the uses of models, simulations, and games as
decision aids to deterrence suggests the conclusion that the choice
of specific decision aids is not a critical decision in itself;
many of the existing decision tools can be applied to good
advantage. Their chief value is in requiring disciplined thinking
about a problem through ordering of the problem's elements and
enabling evaluation of
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its critical parameters. The key criteria in selecting any tool
to aid decision making, and especially models and simulations used
to support games that apply to specific situations, should be the
following:
• The ability to evaluate the metrics of deterrence,
outlined above, in specific situations; and
• The ability to take the users out of their own frame of
reference so that they can view a situation from the points of view
of all the participants in the action.7
Except for enhancing their ability to meet these criteria, it is
more important to invest in utilization of existing models, games,
and simulations for learning than to expend resources in seeking
their continuous improvement.
Principles to follow in selecting and applying such decision
aids include the following:
• Decision aids should incorporate the capacity for
decision making and for representation of values and patterns of
influence among all the participants; subordinate models and
simulations designed for specific purposes, such as evaluating
duels between military forces, can be used to supplement decision
aids that have the
• Decision aids should not be expected to foretell with
confidence the outcomes of ongoing or contemplated deterrence
actions, because the precise unfolding of events depends on many
elements of chance and many unknowns, so that the resulting
predictions could easily lead to faulty conclusions and
policies.
• Decision aids should be used for training, learning, and
practice.
7 An example of the level
of detail required in such a view that emerged from an actual
crisis some years ago was the consideration on the part of the U.S.
leadership of a plan to disrupt the telephone system of the target
country, to inhibit its ability to counter U.S. deterrence actions.
What was not accounted for was the fact that the country's
telephone system was very unreliable and was routinely out of
action for such long periods that the country's leadership had
learned to function without it (anecdote from the experience of one
of the participants in the study group). Another example is
contained in the description of U.S. motivation and Iraqi reaction
to Secretary of State James Baker's proposal to meet with Iraqi
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in early January 1991, just before the
start of the Gulf War. The U.S. intent was to show that we would
make every effort to allow the Iraqis to agree to withdraw from
Kuwait and thus to back away from the certainty of an undesirable
war that they could only lose. The Iraqi interpretation of the
proposal was that the United States had a failure of resolve, and
Saddam Hussein's determination to remain in Kuwait, which had been
wavering as the Desert Shield buildup continued, was reinforced
(Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals'
War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, Little, Brown
and Company, Boston, 1995, p. 195).
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• Decision aids should be used for analysis, to help
identify gaps and uncertainties in our understanding of situations
and of participants in events—the analyses can be applicable
to hypothetical situations, as devices for practice and learning,
or to real situations, to help assess the consequences of different
courses of action. In addition they should be ''competitive," to
help the decision makers using them to view situations from outside
their own frames of reference.
• Decision aids should explicitly state for their users the
levels of confidence in the information and in the representation
of the values of the "players" and other characteristics on which
the decision aids are based.
The value of deterrence decision aids available to U.S. decision
makers can be enhanced by a number of steps. These include:
• Enhancing the ability to represent decision processes of
U.S., adversary, and coalition participants, all within their own
value systems and with attention to the specifics of the
participants' leadership and their circumstances;
• Calibrating decision aids against real experience, to
"bench mark" them and understand their strengths and
weaknesses;
• Making deterrence an explicit part of ongoing gaming
exercises used for diverse planning and training purposes, such as
the Navy's annual "global war game" at the Naval War College and
strategic war games run from time to time under Joint Staff and
Service auspices, and especially games involving members of the
National Command Authorities (NCA), with concentration on the
activities preliminary to war rather than on the playout of
war;
• Periodically undertaking political and military war games
of deterrence per se, in which the beginning of warfare among the
opponents represents a "loss" and the end of the game;
• Learning how other countries use models and games in
situations applicable to deterrence—the issues they examine,
the opponents they consider, the outcomes they seek;
• Learning about and keeping abreast of activities in the
various institutes for conflict resolution supported by U.S.
universities, foundations, and corporations, as a source of input
for the Navy Department's models, simulations, and games relevant
to deterrence; and
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• Incorporating post-Cold War deterrence explicitly into
Naval War College curricula, to gain the benefit of the students'
thinking and theses on the subject and to heighten students'
awareness of the special problems associated with deterrence to
help them in their future assignments. This step must include
conveying a sense of judgment regarding the circumstances that
affect the national will to undertake deterrent actions that may
entail significant human, economic, and political costs. It also
includes cultivation of the political skills that will be needed by
naval forces' commanders in the complex deterrence situations they
may face. Assignments such as National War College studies, where
such matters are considered on a joint Service basis, should be
encouraged.
The kinds of preparation inherent in the uses and enhancement of
decision aids that are described above should strongly reinforce
the ability of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps to contribute to U.S.
deterrence policy and strategy. Just as the evolution of Cold War
deterrence strategy took place as events unfolded and analysts and
policy makers both anticipated and reviewed them over a long period
of years, so also will the appropriate application of available
decision aids contribute to the development of deterrence policy
and strategy in the current post-Cold War period.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
decision aids
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