|
Items in cart [1] |
Questions? Call 888-624-8373 |
| Copyright © 2009. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Terms of Use and Privacy Statement |
Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page R1
Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence
Naval Studies Board
Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and
Applications
National Research Council
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS
Washington, D.C. 1997
OCR for page R2
Page ii
NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was
approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council,
whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy
of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute
of Medicine. The report has been reviewed by a group other than the
authors according to procedures approved by a Report Review
Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of
Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of
Medicine.
This work was performed under Department of Navy Contract
N00014-93-C-0089 issued by the Office of Naval Research under
contract authority NR 201-124. However, the content does not
necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the Department of
the Navy or the government, and no official endorsement should be
inferred.
The United States Government has at least a royalty-free,
nonexclusive, and irrevocable license throughout the world for
government purposes to publish, translate, reproduce, deliver,
perform, and dispose of all or any of this work, and to authorize
others so to do.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 96-71712
International Standard Book Number 0-309-05639-X
Additional copies of this report are available from:
National Academy Press
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Box 285
Washington, D.C. 20055
800-624-6242
202-334-3313 (in the Washington Metropolitan Area)
http://www.nap.edu
Naval Studies Board
National Research Council
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20418
Copyright 1997 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights
reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
OCR for page R3
Page iii
PARTICIPANTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR
CONFLICT DETERRENCE STUDY
Andrew J. Goodpaster, The Atlantic Council, Chair
Seymour J. Deitchman, Chevy Chase, Maryland, Vice
Chair
David S.C. Chu, Rand
Paul K. Davis, Rand
Richard L. Garwin, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center
John C. Hopkins, Los Alamos, New Mexico
Benjamin Huberman, Huberman Consulting Group
Glenn A. Kent, Rand
Robert L.J. Long, Annapolis, Maryland
C. Richard Nelson, The Atlantic Council
Paul H. Nitze, Johns Hopkins University
Robert B. Oakley, National Defense University
W.K.H. Panofsky, Stanford, California
Thomas C. Schelling, University of Maryland
Brent Scowcroft, Scowcroft Group
William Y. Smith, Falls Church, Virginia
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Brookings Institution
David L. Stanford, Science Applications International
Corporation
John D. Steinbruner, Brookings Institution
Victor A. Utgoff, Institute for Defense Analyses
Paul Wolfowitz, Johns Hopkins University
OCR for page R4
Page iv
NAVAL STUDIES BOARD
* David R. Heebner, Science
Applications International Corporation (ret.), Chair
George M. Whitesides, Harvard University, Vice Chair
* Albert J. Baciocco, Jr.,
The Baciocco Group, Inc.
* Alan Berman, Applied Research
Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University
Norman E. Betaque, Logistics Management Institute
Norval L. Broome, Mitre Corporation
* Gerald A. Cann, Raytheon
Company
* Seymour J. Deitchman, Chevy
Chase, Maryland, Special Advisor
Anthony J. DeMaria, DeMaria ElectroOptics Systems, Inc.
John F. Egan, Lockheed Martin Corporation
* Andrew J. Goodpaster, The
Atlantic Council, Special Advisor
Robert Hummel, Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New
York
University
David W. McCall, AT&T Bell Laboratories (ret.)
Robert J. Murray, Center for Naval Analyses
* Robert B. Oakley, National
Defense University
William J. Phillips, Northstar Associates, Inc.
Mara G. Prentiss, Jefferson Laboratory, Harvard University
* Herbert Rabin, University of
Maryland
Julie JCH Ryan, Booz, Allen and Hamilton
Harrison Shull, Naval Postgraduate School (ret.)
* Keith A. Smith, U.S. Marine
Corps (ret.)
Robert C. Spindel, Applied Physics Laboratory, University of
Washington
* David L. Stanford, Science
Applications International Corporation
H. Gregory Tornatore, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins
University
J. Pace VanDevender, Prosperity Institute
Vincent Vitto, Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
* Bruce Wald, Arlington Education
Consultants
Navy Liaison
Representatives
RADM John W. Craine, Jr., USN, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (N81)
RADM Richard A. Riddell, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (N91)
Paul G. Blatch, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(N911T1)
Ronald N. Kostoff, Office of Naval Research
Staff
Ronald D. Taylor, Director (as of October 2, 1995)
Associate Director (July 1, 1994, through September 29, 1995)
Lee M. Hunt, Director (through September 29, 1995)
Susan G. Campbell, Administrative Assistant
Mary (Dixie) Gordon, Information Officer
Christopher Hanna, Project Assistant
* Members who also participated in the
post-Cold War conflict deterrence study.
OCR for page R5
Page v
COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES,
MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS
Robert J. Hermann, United Technologies Corporation,
Co-chair
W. Carl Lineberger, University of Colorado, Co-chair
Peter M. Banks, Environmental Research Institute of
Michigan
Lawrence D. Brown, University of Pennsylvania
Ronald G. Douglas, Texas A&M University
John E. Estes, University of California at Santa Barbara
L. Louis Hegedus, Elf Atochem North America, Inc.
John E. Hopcroft, Cornell University
Rhonda J. Hughes, Bryn Mawr College
Shirley A. Jackson, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Kenneth H. Keller, University of Minnesota
Kenneth I. Kellermann, National Radio Astronomy Observatory
Margaret G. Kivelson, University of California at Los Angeles
Daniel Kleppner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
John Kreick, Sanders, a Lockheed Martin Company
Marsha I. Lester, University of Pennsylvania
Thomas A. Prince, California Institute of Technology
Nicholas P. Samios, Brookhaven National Laboratory
L.E. Scriven, University of Minnesota
Shmuel Winograd, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
Charles A. Zraket, Mitre Corporation (ret.)
Norman Metzger, Executive Director
OCR for page R6
Page vi
The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit,
self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in
scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance
of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare.
Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in
1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the
federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce
Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences.
The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964,
under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a
parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in
its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing
with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for
advising the federal government. The National Academy of
Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting
national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes
the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. William A. Wulf is
interim president of the National Academy of Engineering.
The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the
National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent
members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy
matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts
under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences
by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal
government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of
medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is
president of the Institute of Medicine.
The National Research Council was organized by the National
Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of
science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering
knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in
accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the
Council has become the principal operating agency of both the
National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of
Engineering in providing services to the government, the public,
and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is
administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of
Medicine. Dr. Bruce Alberts and Dr. William A. Wulf are chairman
and interim vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research
Council.
OCR for page R7
Page vii
Preface
This report responds to a request made by RADM T.D. Ryan, USN,
Director, Submarine Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, in a letter sent on January 6, 1994. The letter asked
the Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, to conduct a
study of deterrence in the emerging post-Cold War environment,
including attention to nuclear, conventional, economic, diplomatic,
and other means of deterring potential adversaries in the
acquisition and utilization of military capabilities,
state-sponsored terrorism, and interference with international
commerce and rights of free passage. The terms of reference for the
study resulting from Admiral Ryan's request called for efforts in
the following three areas:
• Based on the experience of the past 45 years, and with
due attention to the altered environment of international security
and the emerging characteristics of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps,
what constitutes a reasonable set of deterrence objectives and what
metrics are available for their quantitative assessment?
• From a comprehensive evaluation of existing deterrence
decision aids and simulations, as well as those adaptable to such
purposes, and utilizing a definition of the appropriate elements of
a deterrence decision aid, determine their adequacy as a tool for
shaping the Navy's deterrence posture, and recommend means for
their improvement.
• Utilizing the results of the first bulleted item above,
and drawing on the results of past Naval Studies Board and related
studies, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of existing and
emerging technologies and systems to carry out the various elements
of the deterrence mission of the Navy and Marine Corps.
As the Board began its work on the problem, extensive
preliminary effort was devoted to devising an approach that would
yield credible and useful results for the highest levels of
government and the Navy Department. It became clear that the Cold
War concept of deterrence had become so imbedded in all aspects of
the thinking of the national security community, and therefore the
Navy-in terms of Cold War conditions and relationships in the
international environment, U.S. understanding of the kinds of
threatening activities to be deterred, and U.S. military force
structure and force posture--that a study of the subject under the
new post-Cold War conditions would have to go back to first
principles. This meant that before starting to examine Navy and
Marine Corps technology and decision aids relating to deterrence,
it would be necessary to explore the meaning and the viability of
the deterrence concept itself in the new environment. Only then
could the subordinate technical questions posed in the terms of
reference be taken up. It was therefore decided to divide the study
into
OCR for page R8
OCR for page R9
OCR for page R10
OCR for page R11
OCR for page R12
OCR for page R13
OCR for page R14
OCR for page R15
OCR for page R16
Page viii
two phases along these lines: first, an effort to define the
meaning and the elements of deterrence under the new world
conditions, and then, an examination of the significance of this
new understanding of the concept of deterrence for the Navy and
Marine Corps, including the technical issues raised in the terms of
reference.
To carry out the first phase of the study, a special group of
participants1 was convened under
the chairmanship of GEN Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (retired), who
prepared a detailed outline to guide that part of the study. The
group consisted of individuals who could bring to bear from their
own experience the knowledge and understanding that had accumulated
over the five decades since World War II, in both the practice of
deterrence and in the measurement of its effectiveness. The group
explored the meaning of deterrence in the post-Cold War world,
identified enduring principles for the practice of deterrence, and
developed insights for new approaches to the practice of deterrence
and to associated analysis, modeling, and planning.
The special group of participants met only twice and received
and discussed the inputs reflected in the individual essays
presented in the appendixes. They made no attempt to reach
consensus on the wide variety of issues introduced. In this respect
this study and report differ from what is customary in studies
carried out under the aegis of the National Research Council. The
study participants' discussions served the valuable purpose of
clarifying the various ideas of individuals irrespective of the
different views introduced and still remaining after the
discussions.
The second phase of the study was carried out under the
leadership of David Heebner, the Naval Studies Board's chairman, by
Board members2with extensive experience in evaluating,
inserting, and using technology in the armed forces, especially in
the Navy and Marine Corps. This group also included experts in
modeling and simulation and their application to problems arising
in evaluation of systems and operations. The group was
knowledgeable about instances in the nation's history where actions
of military forces and deterrence policy interacted, and about
elements of prior Board studies that could contribute to
consideration of the subject at hand.
The two groups interacted to ensure a seamless connection in the
results of the two phases of the study. GEN Goodpaster was
appointed a special advisor to the Naval Studies Board for the
duration of the study. Several members of the Board participated in
the discussions by the special group of study participants, with
one Board member, Seymour Deitchman, serving as GEN Goodpaster's
vice chairman for that group. Richard Nelson, a member of the
special group of participants, contributed to the Board's
deliberations in the second phase of the study.
The chairman and the vice chairman of the special group of study
participants, together with Dr. Nelson, prepared this report's
first chapter,
1 The participants in this group are listed on
page iii.
2 These members are also identified on page
iv.
Page ix
entitled "Deterrence: An Overview." The chapter represents the
authors' summary and interpretation of the key points that emerged
from the special group of participants' examination of the meaning
of deterrence in the post-Cold War world. In addition, several of
these participants prepared papers on different aspects of the
problem of deterrence. These papers, signed by and the sole
responsibility of their authors, are provided in the appendixes to
this report. As a source of the richness of the ideas summarized in
Chapter 1's new look at the subject of deterrence, these papers
offer an opportunity for deeper understanding, and the reader is
therefore urged to explore them.
It is also the case that a subject of this complexity is not
easily assimilated during the conduct of urgent business in the
policy-making environment. To assist in this process, GEN
Goodpaster prepared a "bridging" chapter, Chapter 2, "Implications
for Deterrence Policy: Tasks for Policy Makers." This chapter
outlines in concrete terms the key changes from the old to the new
international environment, the major challenges presented to policy
makers by those changes, and the main areas in which important
unresolved issues remain.
The Naval Studies Board prepared Chapter 3, "Significance of
Post-Cold War Deterrence Concepts for the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps." This chapter takes up the specific questions posed in the
terms of reference, listing objectives of deterrence as well as
qualitative and quantitative measures by which the potential
success of any deterrent action might be judged. Specific emphases
in naval forces' capabilities that appear to be called for by the
review of deterrence policy needs are also presented and discussed,
and decision aids and their application in the deterrence context
are examined.
It should not be surprising that a subject as broad and
fundamental to U.S. national security posture as deterrence should
call forth diverse and often contradictory views of both the
concept and its implications for policy. As is pointed out in
Chapter 1, many such differences remain to be resolved through
experience in the international context, and in many cases
resolution will await the advent of specific circumstances and the
consequent need for decisions in matters of policy and application.
Areas of policy requiring continuing attention are highlighted in
context throughout the report. Many of the unresolved differences
regarding policy were also reflected as differences of view among
the study group participants. Every attempt has been made, in
Chapter 1, to acknowledge such differences. Special comments made
by study group participants in connection with statements in
Chapter 1 are included as footnotes at the appropriate points.
These views are enlarged on in the papers in the appendixes. All
special study group participants and participating Board members
also had the opportunity to review, comment on, and influence this,
the overall report of the study.
Page xi
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1
WHAT IS DETERRENCE IN THE POST-COLD
WAR WORLD?
1
ENDURING PRINCIPLES IN DETERRENCE
STRATEGY
2
DERIVATIVE POLICIES AND KEY
ISSUES
3
SIGNIFICANCE OF POST-COLD WAR
DETERRENCE CONCEPTS FOR THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
5
METRICS AND DECISION AIDS
6
1
DETERRENCE: AN OVERVIEW
GENAndrew J. Goodpaster, USA (retired)
and
C. Richard Nelson, The Atlantic Council
Seymour J. Deitchman, Institute for Defense Analyses (retired)
10
INTRODUCTION
10
THE MEANING OF DETERRENCE
12
THE NEW CONTEXT
15
ENDURING PRINCIPLES
21
DERIVATIVE POLICIES AND KEY
ISSUES
25
ANALYSIS, MODELING, AND PLANNING
36
2
IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE POLICY: TASKS
FOR POLICY MAKERS
GEN Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (retired), The
Atlantic Council
39
THE NEW DETERRENCE ENVIRONMENT
39
CREATING A FABRIC OF DETERRENCE
40
SOME DIFFICULT CHOICES
42
CONCLUDING REMARKS
44
3
SIGNIFICANCE OF POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE
CONCEPTS FOR THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
45
INTRODUCTION
45
OBJECTIVES AND METRICS IN DETERRENCE
STRATEGY
46
ENSURING U.S. NAVAL FORCES'
CAPABILITY FOR DETERRENCE
50
DECISION AIDS: INTELLIGENCE, GAMES,
MODELING, AND SIMULATION
60
Page xii
APPENDIX A: REVISING THE PRACTICE OF
DETERRENCE
John D. Steinbruner, Brookings
Institution
64
CHANGING CONTEXT
65
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
67
THE RUSSIAN CASE
68
THE SUBORDINATION AND REVISION OF
DETERRENCE
69
CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE
74
APPENDIX B: CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC
DETERRENCE AND PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS
Paul H. Nitze and J.H. McCall, Johns Hopkins
University
75
WHAT IS DETERRENCE? WHY AND HOW?
75
COLD WAR DETERRENCE AND THE LIMITS OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
76
POST-COLD WAR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
78
CURRENT CHALLENGES
80
APPENDIX C: EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
AND COALITIONS FOR DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL CHALLENGERS ARMED
WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Victor Utgoff, Institute for Defense
Analyses
83
INTRODUCTION
83
POTENTIAL FOR CHALLENGES TO A VITAL
U.S. REGIONAL INTEREST
84
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN CONFRONTATIONS
WITH REGIONAL PROLIFERATORS
85
CHANGED ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE
87
IMPLEMENTING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
UNILATERALLY
91
IMPLEMENTING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
THROUGH A COALITION
93
INCENTIVES TO JOIN THE COALITION AND
SUPPORT ITS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY
96
ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR COALITION
INVOLVEMENT IN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
98
CONCLUSIONS
102
Page xiii
APPENDIX D: THE REMAINING UNIQUE ROLE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE
Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, Stanford Linear
Accelerator Center (Emeritus)
104
BACKGROUND
104
THE HISTORY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
106
FUTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS MISSION
107
CONCLUSIONS
111
APPENDIX E: NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN POST-COLD
WAR DETERRENCE
John C. Hopkins (retired) and Steven A.
Maaranen, Los Alamos National Laboratory
113
INTRODUCTION: A DEFINITION OF
DETERRENCE
113
NUCLEAR VS. CONVENTIONAL
DETERRENCE
115
DETERRENCE VIA NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE
FUTURE
119
REQUIREMENTS FOR MAINTAINING NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE
121
APPENDIX F: NOTES ON THE ''BAND" BETWEEN
"EXISTENTIAL DETERRENCE" AND THE ACTUAL USE OF FORCE
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Brookings Institution
123
APPENDIX G.1: SPECIAL CHALLENGES IN
EXTENDING DETERRENCE IN THE NEW ERA
Paul K. Davis, Rand
132
A PROVOCATIVE PREMISE
132
TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR DETERRING
THREATS TO NONVITAL INTERESTS
132
POTENTIAL ACTIONS
140
APPENDIX G.2: DECISION MODELING AS AN AID
TO STRATEGIC PLANNING AND CRISIS ACTION
Paul K. Davis, Rand
141
ABSTRACT
141
INTRODUCTION
141
MODELING OPPONENTS AND THEIR
ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS
142
FACTORS TENDING TO INCREASE RISK
TAKING
150
Page xiv
A GENERIC SITUATION ENCOURAGING
AGGRESSION
151
CONCLUSIONS
152
BIBLIOGRAPHY
152
APPENDIX G.3: PROTECTING WEAK AND MEDIUM
STRENGTH STATES: ISSUES OF DETERRENCE, STABILITY, AND DECISION
MAKING
Paul K Davis, Rand
153
ABSTRACT
153
INTRODUCTION
153
DETERRENCE AT THE BEGINNING OF A NEW
CENTURY
154
AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF
DETERRENCE
158
DETERRING STRONG NEIGHBORS:
STRATEGIES FOR WEAK OR MEDIUM-STRONG STATES
167
EXTENDING DETERRENCE IN DEFENSE OF
WEAK OR MEDIUM STRONG STATES
172
RECOGNIZING THAT IMMEDIATE EXTENDED
DETERRENCE MAY FAIL
176
CONCLUSIONS: CHALLENGES FOR SECURITY
STRATEGY, DEFENSE PLANNING, AND CRISIS DECISION MAKING
177
BIBLIOGRAPHY
179
APPENDIX H: THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE,
NATIONAL ABM SYSTEMS, AND THE FUTURE OF DETERRENCE
Richard L. Garwin, IBM Thomas J. Watson
Research Center
182
CONTEXT
182
BACKGROUND
183
THE PROBLEM
184
NEAR-TERM OPTIONS FOR U.S. THEATER
MISSILE DEFENSE
186
WHAT IS THE THREAT?
186
THE BIG PROBLEM FOR CITY DEFENSE
188
REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE IN RELATION
TO THE ABM TREATY
191
CONCLUSIONS
198
APPENDIX I: DETERRENCE: CLASH AND
UTILIZATION OF VALUE SYSTEMS
Robert B. Oakley, National Defense
University
201
INTRODUCTION
201
BACKGROUND
202
Page xv
VALUE SYSTEMS IN THE CURRENT
WORLD
204
CASE STUDIES
208
CONCLUSION
212
NAVY- AND MARINE CORPS-SPECIFIC
IMPLICATIONS
213
APPENDIX J: CONTROLLING INSTABILITIES
CAUSED BY ROGUE GOVERNMENTS
Glenn A. Kent, Rand
215
THE EMERGING THREAT
215
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS THREAT
215
A DEFENSE IN DEPTH
215
AN APPROACH TO INTERCEPTING BALLISTIC
MISSILES AFTER LAUNCH
216
SUGGESTED ACTIONS
218
APPENDIX K: DETERRENCE-QUO
VADIS?
David L. Stanford, Science Applications
International Corporation
220
