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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force 2 Technological Prospects for DOD's M&S This chapter begins by noting the broad range of applications for M&S. Some documented examples assessing its value follow. Next discussed is the special integrative role that M&S is coming to play, which will be crucial as warfare operations become more technically and organizationally complex, and as the systems to support such operations become similarly so. The panel then offers some illustrative forecasts and visions of the future, looking both at applications (the demand-pull side of the problem) and at technology (supply-push). APPLICATION AREAS M&S is an enabling technology. Figure 2.1 lists some of the many applications of M&S in DOD for which M&S is increasingly essential in this role. While the applications of M&S are already numerous, the benefits of reusability and integration have by no means been realized in current systems, and cannot be until the necessary infrastructure is created. DATA ON THE VALUE OF M&S FOR ACQUISITION, OT&E, AND TRAINING Much of the vision discussed above is yet to be demonstrated, and it will be years before the results are in. However, there already exists a good deal of data on the value of M&S.
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force Figure 2.1 Partial Taxonomy of applications of M&S. Acquisition Applications: Rates of Return on M&S Investment Table 2.1 provides data on the return on investment (ROI) on M&S investment for tools, methods, databases, and supporting techniques used to assess the lethality and vulnerability of weapon systems milestone decisions and the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) process. The typical ROI was between $20 and $30 returned for each $1 invested (see next-to-last column). A number of the systems are used by naval forces. Exercise Examples Reforger and Kernel Blitz In the realm of exercises, one of the better known examples of using M&S was in the 1992 exercise that replaced the early Reforger exercises involving U.S. and other NATO forces. Cost savings were reported on the order of $36 million, and participants believed that training of staffs and planners was improved (Worley et al., 1996, p. 14, drawing on an earlier study by Simpson et al., 1995). Kernel Blitz was a fleet training exercise (FLEETEX) including live ships, submarines, aircraft, and land troops. The simulation portion augmented the fleet with additional synthetic ships, submarines, aircraft, and weapons. The simulation center used several existing computer facilities (including both coasts) and existing communications capability to link to platforms. A purpose of the exercise was to show that the use of simulated assets could add realism and complexity to training exercises. It is notoriously difficult to estimate cost savings or cost avoidance due to M&S because, in practice, one could not afford to use the real aircraft, ships, and submarines included in the simulations. However, if one calculates what doing so would have cost, then the Kernel Blitz exercise saved about $16 million. Much more important, however, is that the M&S enhance -
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force TABLE 2.1 Return-on-Investment Data in Acquisition Work Program Type Analysis Total Invest ($M) Direct Savings ($M) R O I Program Result Standard Missile SM-2 BLK IIIA Cost Reduction 2.25 47.0 21 Accepted Phalanx CIWS Performance Evaluation 8.12 125.0 15 Continued Phalanx CIWS Product Upgrade 6.63 200.0 30 Accepted AIM-7P Sea Sparrow Lethality Analysis, End Game 0.7 16.0 23 Accepted Phoenix Missile Lethality Analysis, End Game 2.23 70.0 31 Accepted ECM vs. AMRAAM Lethality Analysis, End Game 0.58 10.5 18 Eval. Continues AMRAAM End Game 6.5 250.0 38 Continued Bomb Fragment Data Arena Tests 0.0825 0.9 11 Continued BLU-109 Lethality Testing 0.0825 3.0 36 Continued Air-to-Air Missile Lethality plus Engagement 20.0 75.0 4 Continued Wide Area Anti-Armor Munition Lethality Analysis 0.75 30.0 40 Canceled Hypervelocity Missile Lethality Analysis 0.5 10.0 20 Canceled ISAS Lethality Analysis 0.75 40.0 53 Canceled Kinetic Energy Penetrator (KEP) Lethality Analysis 1.1 50.0 45 Canceled JP 233 Runway Attack Munition Lethality and Vulnerability Analysis 1.1 54.0 49 Canceled Boosted Kinetic Energy Penetrator Runway Vulnerability Models 2.75 130.0 47 Canceled JAVELIN ATGM Analytic Simulation 0.62 14.0 23 Accepted M2 Bradley FVS Engineering Design 0.88 30.0 34 Accepted M1A2 Vulnerability Damage Prediction 1.83 30.0 16 Cost Avoidance M1A2 Block 3 Design Vulnerability 1.76 100.0 57 Terminated SOURCE: Adapted from Worley et al. (1996), after data presented inDOD (1995), Chap. VI.
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force ment allowed the scope and quality of the exercise to be improved at a very low marginal cost. A study by the Center for Naval Analyses (Neuberger and Shea, 1995) reached the following conclusion based largely on the Kernel Blitz experience: At this point, simulation should be viewed as enriching training and increasing readiness rather than reducing costs. Operational Testing: F/A-18 Weapons Software Support Facility As a third example, the panel draws on work by Michelle Bailey of the Navy's China Lake facility (see Worley et al., 1996). The F/A-18 Weapons Software Support Facility (WSSF) at China Lake, California, is used for integration, checkout, and validation and verification of avionics software with actual avionics hardware operating as a total aircraft system. The WSSF is actually several facilities containing avionics hardware, simulations of flight dynamics, weapons simulations, and operator consoles. Several different methods have been used to estimate its cost effectiveness, but, again, the calculations are confounded by the fact that in practice one could not have flown live aircraft enough to provide the information collected in the facility's laboratory. After all, flight costs are roughly $2,800 per hour, while laboratory costs are more like $930 per hour for F/A-18s. The principal conclusion reached was that the real value added of the WSSF is that an aircraft as complex as the F/A-18 is not possible without this type of test facility. One could not fly it enough to test it. There is a danger in just looking at cost savings as the measure of whether or not one invests in M&S. As more is demanded from our warfighting systems— including the need to make them safer, more accurate, more environmentally friendly, more stealthy, longer range, and so on—one will have to demand more from our test and training systems. M&S AS A CROSS-CUTTING FOUNDATION TECHNOLOGY As one looks to the future, M&S will be critical not just in individual areas, but as a cross-cutting technology. To appreciate this, let us next consider “the stovepipe problem” about which so many senior leaders have railed. Why Old Stovepipes No Longer Work Most large organizations such as the U.S. military tend over time to break into semi-independent units with relatively little lateral communication and coordination. Such “stovepiping” ( Figure 2.2 ) is also characteristic of the hardware, software, and M&S systems developed to serve these units. There are many reasons for stovepipes, which can be seen as modules for specialization and efficiency.
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force FIGURE 2.2 M&S in a joint world: Making stovepipes work. This said, modules are supposed to connect nicely (suggested by the arrows), but the DOD's stovepipes often do not. Also, some of the traditional stovepipes are no longer the appropriate modules, as has become increasingly evident with the emphasis on jointness in technically and organizationally complex littoral operations, including precision strike with aircraft and missiles launched from ships, submarines, and air fields. These issues were noted and addressed vigorously within the Navy during the late 1980s by Admiral William Owens, who later, as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, created the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) groups specifically tasked to address cross-cutting functions such as surveillance and reconnaissance, and precision strike across Service lines. Such issues are evident in Joint Vision 2010 (Shalikashvili, 1996). Even in the peacetime world, such stovepipes as R&D, acquisition, test and evaluation, and operations have proved troublesome as the DOD attempts to facilitate the development and fielding of advanced capabilities at much less cost and in much shorter time. So it is that we see advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs) designed specifically to cut across the stovepipes and involve everyone from engineers to operators early in the acquisition process. Cross-cutting and integration are, in many respects, the name of the game. Here M&S has a special role. To a large extent M&S will be the glue, or even the cross-pollinator. For example, it will be an essential element of the
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force command and control system, of operations planning, and of doctrine development. The cross-cutting will be across Service components, functional areas, and levels of command structure in each. As but one example, officers from all Services will develop an increasingly common perspective of a theater operation by training and planning with joint systems with embedded simulations. This in turn will force resolution of issues such as interservice communication protocols, a long-standing obstacle to effective operations. Further, it will facilitate standardization of planning formats and terminology. 1 Advanced Distributed Simulation A major component of DOD's M&S vision, probably the principal component in the view of some, is advanced distributed simulation. This now has roots extending back more than a decade, primarily to early efforts in distributed war gaming and the pioneering SIMNET program sponsored by DARPA. Much has been written about distributed simulation and the associated visions for the future, including the synthetic theater of war (STOW) concept, which is currently being pursued. 2 Two points should probably be noted here, however. First, distributed simulation is already a practical reality, something used more or less routinely by the Services and commands. Second, the cutting-edge research on the STOW concept will take many years to reach maturity because of the many technical challenges and the need to educate and train a new generation of people to assimilate and exploit the new capabilities. Ubiquitous M&S as Infrastructure and “Cross-Pollinator” With the diversity of application areas in mind, Figure 2.3 presents a vision for the future. The intention is to indicate that in and out of each activity such as test and evaluation will be flowing not only information, but also models and data. By no means will everything be connected to everything—whether in the sense of distributed interactive simulation or in any other way. Many workers in a given domain will spend much of their time with domain-specific tools that are never shared. But a substantial degree of reuse and sharing will occur: because it will greatly benefit those doing the work. The analogies here are perhaps best seen in today's commercial PC software, which we exploit routinely to swap manuscripts, briefings, and spreadsheets; to collaborate at intercontinental distances; and to operate in “virtual organizations.” 1 Reportedly, operations in Bosnia have been quite instructive in this regard. The United States has established an excellent command and control system with theater-level surveillance and reconnaissance. This has indeed motivated the kinds of problem-solving the panel refers to here. 2 See “Special Issue on Distributed Interactive Simulation,” Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 83, No. 8, August 1995.
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force FIGURE 2.3 M&S as the infrastructure for many DOD activities. In the future, there will be much more in this background infrastructure, which the panel discusses further later in the report. Note that a high degree of interface standardization is needed to implement such a vision. However, the infrastructure provided by M&S will be more difficult to put into place than the physical data links of communication systems and the software programs within computers. To put it differently, if achieving portability of manuscripts with formatting and graphics has been difficult and long in coming, 3 then we should expect much greater difficulties when the interfaces must communicate ideas and interpretations, not just bits. Computer scientists refer here to the difference between transmitting syntactical and semantic information, a problem familiar to commanders who learn in command-and-staff school how easily the intention of orders can be misinterpreted even if the structure of the order message is correct. Elaborating, Figure 2.3 illustrates the notion that there is more involved than just model objects and databases. Indeed, a key element of the M&S infrastructure is commonality of intellectual constructs. To put this in perspective, readers may appreciate how universal the concepts, constructs, and notation of calculus are today, and how important they are in communication and collaboration. Similarly, fluid dynamicists worldwide can communicate readily about fluid flow. By contrast, we do not today have commonly accepted foundational concepts, terminology, and theory for M&S. One indicator of this is the difficulty with which workers operating at different levels of resolution have communicating and cooperating. Part of the problem is technical and methodological; another part is what many see as underinvestment in and undervaluing of military science. 4 It is troubling that the words “science” and “theory” are explicitly avoided in so much discussion of DOD's M&S, apparently because of a belief that they are associated with vague abstractions rather than practical matters. 5 This belief may be understandable, but it is wrong-headed. Exploiting the potential of M&S will require breakthroughs in understanding military phenomena and in representing them mathematically and in simulation programs. To make the point more strongly, consider the contrast: excellent processing algorithms, graphics, and distributed simulation technology are available currently, but no major models are able to represent, for example, highly nonlinear warfare with dispersed forces and decentralized forms of command-and-control in the information age. 3 It had certainly not been adequately achieved as this report was prepared by a virtual panel connected electronically. Compatibility problems were numerous and annoying.
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force BOX 2.1 Representative Benefits from a High-Quality M&S Infrastructure Redesign forces and doctrine for 21st century Enhance training, from crew member to JTF commander Allow commander to visualize battle at different levels of detail Design new systems to meet needs of all concerned, e.g., operators, designers, manufacturers, logisticians, and do so better and more cheaply Make optimal use of limited and expensive test assets Returning to the theme of M&S infrastructure, a new vision of M&S is emerging in which it not only provides cross-pollination between existing, legacy stovepiped systems, but also will provide a new level of integrated support for many activities within each of the services and the previous stovepipe. The investment in such an infrastructure would be substantial, but there are many specific benefits feasible, as suggested in Box 2.1 . Consider first that the entire U.S. force structure should be redesigned for the next era of warfare. How should new force structures and doctrines be conceived and evaluated, especially in the absence of wars in which to try them out? M&S should play a major role. Little need be said about the importance to training, because this is widely 4 This is a major theme in Davis and Blumenthal (1991). 5 One example of this avoidance can be seen in documents about the validation of models. There are references to “logical” validation and to “comparisons” with data and other models, but no reference to, say, “grounding in more fundamental theory.” It is encouraging, however, that the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and the Joint Staff now have a joint “science and technology” plan, rather than merely a technology plan.
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force recognized, except that the use of M&S for “training” should extend all the way from crew members to commanders. Part of the training of commanders will involve learning how to use advanced C4ISR capabilities to “visualize” the battle-field—not only in the large view, but at several levels of detail. New systems, of course, will be conceived, designed, and developed with heavy use of M&S. The opportunity exists through M&S to improve their suitability for all concerned —e.g., the operators, manufacturers, and logisticians— and to do so better and less expensively than in the past. It is no longer inevitable that next-generation weapon systems will always be much more expensive than the systems they replace. The last example in Box 2.1 relates to test assets, whether they be the National Test Facility or an exercise with allies. M&S can strongly leverage the value of tests, not only for those participating in them directly, but also as a source of data for subsequent analysis. In summary, there are many reasons for the Department of the Navy to be very interested in and concerned about the future of M&S in its domain. For this it will need a high-level policy and strategy. SOME OBSERVATIONS, FORECASTS, AND IMAGES A primary DOD effort in recent years has been to reform the acquisition process. The legacy process has been one of sequential activities resulting in long development times, high costs, and in some cases inability to achieve the desired product. A major problem has been separation of the various communities involved in system acquisition and use. These communities include operators, the acquisition authority, designers, manufacturers, testers, and maintainers. All must interact closely during the system development process so that the resultant product reflects all their needs. Failure to do so means, for example, that the needs of the operators and maintainers are not fully understood by the designers of the system. The result is a system that does not meet its needs or that undergoes expensive and time-consuming modification to meet them. Figure 2.4 is an example of the vision for an improved acquisition process with emphasis in particular on the use of M&S (see Shiflett et al., 1995). In this vision, simulations are used early to better understand military needs and to test operational concepts for accomplishing missions and tasks. This permits a better statement of requirements, especially because the simulations in question bring together scientists, analysts, and warfighters (e.g., representatives from the commanders-in-chief (CINCs) and from the Service's doctrine organizations). Simulation is also used extensively for interim tests and demonstrations, again involving the ultimate users, the warfighters. The result, it is hoped, will be reduced program risk, a faster development process, and a smooth transition into the field. In the overall vision for enhancing acquisition, the increased use of simula-
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force FIGURE 2.4 Simulation and reform of the acquisition process. SOURCE: Adapted from Shiflett et al. (1995). tion is also accompanied by the widespread sharing of digital design information. The goal is an integrated design database to which all relevant parties have access. This means that the numerous engineers involved in the design process can readily share their data and will always have access to the latest design. Design inconsistencies will be reduced in this way, thereby eliminating costly and time-consuming rework in the manufactured product. In addition, design information can be reviewed by the manufacturers, who can identify design elements that would be particularly costly to produce before a commitment to production is made. The designs would be modified, and if necessary checked with the operators through the use of simulation to see that key requirements remain satisfied. The use of simulation referred to thus far in this section is for operational purposes. This includes both virtual simulations where the behavior of the particular system (e.g., aircraft) can be examined in some detail and more aggregate combat simulations where the utility of the system at a higher mission level can be examined. In addition, engineering simulations play a key role in aiding the designers. Such simulations allow them to analyze, for example, the aerodynamic behavior and signature of an aircraft. The use of these simulations in conjunction with integrated digital design representations should allow designers to execute their tasks much more rapidly, thereby allowing a much greater set of design possibilities to be explored. The result should be a better and possibly less costly design. Another perspective, that of investment versus time, is given in Figure 2.5 .
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force FIGURE 2.5 Two visions of investment versus time in acquisition. SOURCE: Adapted from a briefing to the panel by CDR Dennis McBride, USN, of ONR and previously of DARPA, 1996. The point here is that by investing earlier in simulation testing of concepts, one can discard lesser designs fairly early and pick the best not long thereafter. Further, because of the heavy interaction with users and the critical use of integrated digital design representations, as discussed above, the hope is that initial operational capability (IOC) can be earlier with much lower cost. While leading to reduced overall cost, this approach, as noted in the figure, does require greater up-front cost. Program managers alone could be reluctant to make that commitment because the benefits will not be realized during their tenure. Thus, realization of this approach could well require higher-level policy direction. The overall vision being described here is often referred to as simulation-based acquisition (see Appendix C for a more detailed discussion). In some measure, this vision is being realized now. The most prominent example of an integrated digital design representation is that used by Boeing on the 777 aircraft for describing the static configuration of the aircraft. Simulation is already widely used in the acquisition process, 6 although not in the integrated sense implied here. The integration of simulation, digital designs, and design tools has been conceptually demonstrated in the DARPA Simulation-based Design program. 7 All these examples provide opti- 6 See Patenaude (1996). The study was conducted for the Deputy Director, Test, Systems Engineering and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. 7 The study can be found online at http://www.sbdhost.parl.com .
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force mism that the vision of simulation-based acquisition can be realized. Full realization of the vision would require significant further research and development, with key capabilities needed being multi-resolution modeling, multidisciplinary design optimization, and interface standards development (see appendixes ). At this time, three general actions appear most appropriate to move further toward the vision of simulation-based acquisition. First is the establishment of a pilot project(s) to develop simulation-based acquisition capabilities that would feed into a major naval program (e.g., aircraft or ship). This would serve to overcome the program manager's reluctance to devote his funds to increased up-front expenses and would promote demonstration, assessment, and transition of simulation-based acquisition capability in the Navy more generally. Second is experimentation involving participants from the involved communities (e.g., operators, designers, manufacturers, maintainers) aimed at developing the necessary interface standards among simulations, design data, and design tools. This would be analogous to the proto-federation experiments carried out under the direction of DMSO in development of the high-level architecture for simulation. Third is the establishment of a research program to develop those longer-term capabilities required for full realization of the simulation-based acquisition vision. This component is important since, as noted, significant research challenges still remain to achieving the vision. TOOLS FOR DECISION SUPPORT Sometimes in forecasting activities it is useful to develop scenarios to illustrate what might be possible in the future, with no guarantees. The purpose is to help develop potential visions. Visions can always be amended later with the benefit of more knowledge, but, in the meantime, they can contribute to innovation and communication. The panel offers the following vignette in that spirit. Imagined Vignette—Decision Support in an Intervention Operation The joint task force commander has a profound problem. The President has ordered U.S. forces to intervene in an ongoing war in the small nation of Blakos. The objectives include rescuing U.S. nationals and nationals of other friendly countries and securing and stabilizing events in the port-city capital of Lazune. The Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, are asking the commander for his recommended course of action. Earlier today, as his carrier battle group and a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) sailed toward Lazune, he asked his staff to prepare alternative courses of action. They did so and presented him with two options: an assault on Lazune in approximately 6 hours with forces already available to him, or a delayed assault that would be launched in approximately 72 hours. The delayed operation would be able to employ the
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force 82nd division ready brigade (DRB), staged from a friendly nearby island. The DRB is already en route, but would not be able to conduct an assault sooner than 72 hours because of the need to stage and to base and prepare enough appropriate aircraft. The delay would also provide the commander with a squadron of Air Force tactical fighters with substantial air-to-ground capability. His staff has used onboard decision support systems and has drawn on expertise and analysis available from CONUS with a seamlessness that is remarkable. A portion of the staff is now developing and testing detailed versions of the courses of action with M&S that reproduces with high fidelity the time lines of all the key operational tasks that would have to be performed. At this point, they have recommended the delay option because simulation has indicated that the early assault would be defeated by Blakos forces in Lazune and arriving within the next 6 hours. Unfortunately, the delay may mean the loss of many American and friendly lives because intercepted communications indicate a Blakos intention to capture the embassies and kill their occupants. The commander is also worried because he is not confident his staff was right in their first assessment. To be sure, their arguments seemed reasonable. However, he is troubled because models are models. He is now starting a meeting in the control center to discuss the issues in more detail. The commander thanks the staff for their work, but notes the dilemma. Is it possible that the first course of action might succeed? More specifically, he asks the staff what caused it to fail in the initial analysis. Had he asked such a question a year earlier in a similar crisis, there would have been some pained expressions because the earlier M&S had been opaque. Now, however, the staff can respond. The decision support system not only had reported the expected outcome, but also had conducted an exploratory analysis varying dozens of major assumptions. The result was a depiction of projected outcome as a function of those assumptions. To comprehend the results, it was necessary to sit in the control room with its graphical displays. There, however, he could “fly through the space of possibilities” by merely asking “what ifs?” The staff has gotten results only in the last half hour, but they are now able to report that the big problems are associated with the SA-X-25 surface-to-air missile (SAM) and the expected presence of a battalion-sized ground force in the vicinity of the embassies. The commander now asks for more details. He learns from a sharp lieuten ant that intelligence is not in fact certain whether the missiles in place are SA-X-25s or an earlier version against which U.S. countermeasures are now known to be reliable, although the simulation's algorithms and data assume otherwise. Another officer notes that the “battalion-sized force” is a motley group of poorly trained soldiers, and two of the associated companies will be straggling in for the next 12 hours. The simulations suggest that if they are only half as effective as U.S. forces would be with the equipment ascribed to them in a surprise-free battle, then they should collapse quickly under assault by the MEU 's forces—if the battle group's aircraft can operate immediately without extensive counter-
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force SAM operations. The commander now asks whether more information can be obtained on the missiles by dispatching electronic-warfare aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). As it happens, real-time reports are coming in from UAVs. Based on the radar signals they are being illuminated with, it seems that the SAMs are the older, vulnerable variety. Real-time satellite imagery is also coming in, and it indicates that the enemy ground forces are not yet taking up defensive positions and indeed appear to be disorganized. The commander also learns that there is no evidence that the Blakos forces know that his battle group is almost within striking range. Disinformation released through the news media is claiming that U.S. forces are only now heading toward the region and will not be there for a week. Now the situation looks favorable for the immediate assault: perhaps the operation can actually accomplish its objectives, although the risks are substantial. The commander now directs a maximum-fidelity simulation, essentially a mission rehearsal, for the first option. It must be accomplished quickly because the time for decision is now. Fortunately, the decision support system has almost unlimited computer power as the result of both on-board and distributed processing. Over the next hour the commander sees the mission simulation taking form and is able to “see” it in detail. He is even able to stop it and make changes. For example, he instructs staff to make model changes to reflect the new information on the SAMs' vulnerabilities to countermeasures, and the apparent feasibility of disconnecting the SAM with information warfare attacks on the regional command post of the Blakos army, even if the command post is dispersed. Further, he is able to give contingent orders and see the simulation responding to the circumstances that arise. The most important part of the simulation involves the penetration of aircraft and their immediate destruction of two key SAM installations. Also critical is the certainty with which the battle group's long-range precision strike, from both aircraft and missiles, will be able to destroy the last two companies of enemy forces as they approach Lazune. If they will only stay on the roads, as concentrated as they currently are, it will be a duck shoot. But if they disperse or go into the jungle for a breather, the attack might be an abject failure. Success could turn into failure within minutes. The simulation has a great deal of detail available, however, regarding potential areas for the forces to rest in cover. The good news is that there will be none available for a window of time lasting about an hour. Planning continues and preparations are made in earnest for the nearterm assault. Still it may be called off if new information dictates. As we leave off, the decision support system suggests that the odds are 2:1 for an overwhelming success, 3:1 for either that or a success with losses of perhaps 100 men and 10 aircraft. The odds of mission failure, with severe losses to embassy personnel, are estimated at 1 in 10. But the odds are constantly being recalculated, and the key factors determining them highlighted for examination. This purely hypothetical story has a number of features. For example, it postulates an M&S-based decision-support system that is intimately connected
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force with course-of-action development and assessment, mission rehearsal, and real-time intelligence and adaptive planning. Further, this system not only generates “expected” outcomes, but also searches and finds the variables that would change those outcomes, thereby helping the commander to focus information collection and examine some assumptions in more detail. The M&S is postulated to be not only comprehensible, but readily changeable. And it generates estimates of risk. None of this, of course, is plausible today for complex simulations. Mid-term Tools for Commanders The preceding material was relatively long-term speculation, but there are mid-term possibilities that are much less speculative. Battlefield Spreadsheet A battlefield spreadsheet (BFS) would be analogous to the financial spreadsheets now commonly used. It would be a simple model constructed by the user that will automatically propagate the effects of assumed changes in timing, forces, and so on across the battlefield. Changes in estimated number of survivors, time to move, duration of battles, and so on, would also be depicted. The first BFS may be a simple aggregate model or single entity (e.g., planning a single aircraft attack), with later extensions to variable resolution in the first case and many entities in the second. One technique for this would be to have a powerful computer (or net of computers) playing out many runs of many variants of the scenarios in the background, with the BFS being more a display mechanism than a computation mechanism. A BFS could thus track the variability in the outcomes. Mixed Initiative Planning Mixed initiative planning (MIP) would be an outgrowth of the command forces/semiautomated forces (CFOR/SAFOR) technology. Currently, the semiautomated forces are fully automated at and below a certain echelon, and manual above that. 8 Work is under way to develop planning tools that work collaboratively with a planner to suggest options, check dependencies, constraints, and effectiveness, and so on. There are many tools currently available to make low-level suggestions about optimal time to launch missiles, how to find routes, and so on. But a mixed-initiative planner would do much more, for example, suggest- 8 SAFOR systems typically provide a capability for the user to manually override the automated low-level behaviors, so the split between manual echelons and automated echelons is somewhat variable in the course of a simulation. Moreover, many scripted aggregate models would do well to achieve even this level of interaction. However, the point is that such systems do not collaborate with the user— either they run on full automatic, or they are manually steered, but there is nothing in between.
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Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force ing not only what route from A to B an armor force might take, but also what A and B should be, what position should be occupied before getting to A, what scheme of maneuver could be employed in the final assault, whether enemy forces should be fixed with artillery or maneuver forces, and so on. Such suggestions call for considerable “understanding ” of the situation, tactics, and so on. The commercial analog would be the “wizards” developed by Microsoft for tools like Excel. Again, the MIP will grow out of CFOR/SAFOR and exercise-planning tools, not the commercial side. This is quite technically feasible, and the primary obstacles are often said to be lack of management and government vision to do it. Extrapolating these to the 20- to 30-year time span is speculative, but BFS and MIP will be extended to more types of weapon systems and more Joint applications of them. Serious modeling of precision strikes will occur, as well as continued planning for very large scale action. MIP will be applied in a two-sided fashion, so that plans and actions on one's own part would be countered by a simulated opponent that at least made some effort to adapt. MIP and BFS will be applied at multiple levels simultaneously. Planning tools will be extended to include realistic modeling of economic factors. This will include both the effect of combat action on the enemy's ability to fight and the enemy's effort to overcome those effects. Some work on such matters is beginning. OTHER M&S-RELATED FORECASTS Due to advances in many of the technologies that support M&S applications, one can anticipate all of the following: 9 By 2005, basic large-scale interoperability support. By 2010 to 2015, operationally robust support for large-scale maneuvers, including some agent-based mission-domain model checking. By 2015, credible simulation of combat operations before and during combat, including two-sided information warfare simulation. Greatly improved semiautomated forces (SAFOR). Speech- and natural-language interfaces to M&S. Agent-based mediation of input and output and of system configuration when constructing M&S for a given purpose. Greatly improved virtual reality systems with three dimensions and tactile and auditory stimuli. Users will enter the virtual reality and alter parameters. 9 Abstracted from U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (1995), pp. 69ff.
Representative terms from entire chapter: