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4
National-Urban Relations
in Foreign Federal Systems:
Lessons for the United States
Harold L Wolman
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the nature of the relationship
between national governments and large urban governments
in countries with political structures relatively simi-
lar to that of the United States. The United States has
always viewed itself as a unique country with distinct
problems and solutions. Yet the economic transformation
the advanced Western nations appear to be undergoing has
created similar problems for all of them, not the least
in terms of its impact on their urban areas. Thus, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) in its report, Managing Urban Change, cited a
list of problems affecting urban areas in the more
advanced OECD countries that would seem quite familiar
to most Americans. The OECD (1983a:50) made the follow-
ing observation:
Many cities of the OECD countries are exhibiting
social and economic problems of concern to policy-
makers which, when concentrated in certain areas,
are indicative of urban decline. Symptoms are
evident in the daily experience of their inhabi-
tants and in the newspaper headlines and evening
television programs:
· high levels of unemployment, low paid or irreg-
ular employment, closure of factories, shops and
offices;
· deteriorating housing conditions, the physical
decay of the built environment and infrastruc-
ture, vacant land and abandoned buildings;
91
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92
· severe social problems including low educa-
tional achievement, isolated elderly people,
single parent families, poverty and hopelessness;
· concentrations of ethnic minorities, often en-
countering discrimination in finding homes and
work;
· crime and vandalism, the occasional outbreak of
riots, and a general breakdown of law and order.
The economic forces underlying these problems appear
to be nearly universal (see Table 4-1).
TABLE 4-1 National Employment by Industrial Sector
(percentage)
Manufacturing
1973 1982
Services
1973 1982
Australia 23.9% 18.8% 49.5% 56.1%
Austria 35.7 31.0 43.5 49.1
Belgium 31.8 24.1
Canada 22.4 18.2 43.8 49.2
France 27.9a 24.7a 45.0 50.5
Japan 27.4 24.5 42.7 49.0
Netherlands 25.Ql 20.5a 53.3 60.0
New Zealand 25.0 24.0C 44.3 47.
Norway 23.5 19.7 44.8 52.9
Sweden 27.4 22.4 49.5 57.0
Switzerland 35.0 32.~ 42.4 47.3b
United Kingdom 32.2 25.4 48.0 56.3
United States 24.8 20.4 43.8 47.6
West Germany 36.4 35.0b 39.1 43.2
NOTE: ~Manufacturing. excludes construction. ~Ser-
vices. include trade, restaurants, and hotels; finance,
insurance, and real estate; and community social and
personal services.
al975 data.
b~g80 data.
C]981 data.
SOURCE: International Labor Organization (1983)
Yearbook of Labor Statistics.
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93
Western economies are transforming from specialization
in routine manufacturing processes to more complex
manufacturing and advanced services economies.
In all of the more advanced OECD countries, manufac-
turing employment is declining as a percentage of total
employment and service employment is increasing; this
~ the major urban
Manufacturing jobs
no longer are sufficient to employ the lower skilled
labor force that tends to be concentrated disproportion-
ately in central city areas. The OECD (1983a:62) con-
cludes that The consequences for the remaining inner
city residents may be prolonged unemployment or irreg-
ular and low paid employment..
The similarity of problems suggests that there may be
something to be learned from examining the relationship
of national government to urban government and the prob-
lems of urban areas in these countries. However, given
the distinctive structure of the American political sys-
tem and the inevitable difficulties of interpreting the
meaning of experience grounded in a specific foreign
context, it is desirable to limit the comparison to
those systems most similar to the U.S. system. Since
the United States is a federal political system, the
temptation to simply compare national-urban relations in
other federal systems is strong.
Before acceding to this temptation, however' some
further consideration is in order. Although scholars
have disagreed quite substantially on the proper defini-
tion of federalism, nearly every definition assumes the
existence of a regional level of government interposed
between national and local governments, with the re-
gional government having at least some spheres of
activity in which it is able to make final decisions
(i.e., it is not merely an administrative unit of cen-
tral government). Thus, Riker (1975:101) defines fed-
eralism as:
process is occurring more rapidly in
areas than in the nation as a whole.
· _ ~
A political organization in which the activities
of government are divided between regional gov-
ernments and a central government in such a way
that each kind of government has some activities
on which it makes final decisions.
The United States, Australia, Canada, Germany, Aus-
tria, and Switzerland all meet this definition, for all
have regional (state, provincial, etc.) bodies of gov-
ernment that have power to make final decisions in some
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94
spheres. Accordingly, all of those countries are in-
cluded in this comparison. But our concern is with
national-urban relations. Does the nonexistence of an
intermediate-level regional government in many countries
inevitably render the experience of those nations irrel-
evant to the United States?
In the United Kingdom, a country in which the sub-
stance of urban problems is close to our own, the cen-
tral government conducts relations with local govern-
ments, which have the ability to make final decisions
about important issues of urban policy. Central govern-
ment relations with local authorities are direct, be-
cause an intermediate government layer does not exist.
However, in the United States, where an intermediate
layer (states) does exist, the federal government also
conducts some relations directly with city governments.
As defined by Richard Bird (1980:12):
Systems in which there is some degree of autono-
mous decision making at different levels . . .
are considered to be federal systems. The es-
sence of federalism in this perspective is thus
not the extent to which the rights of subnational
governments are, in some sense, constitutionally
entrenched. Rather, it is that local or state
governments, are, in some relevant fashion, ef-
fective decision-making bodies.
Bird's argument is persuasive,-at least with respect to
the purpose of this study, which is to examine national-
urban relationships. Accordingly, while accepting as
federal the six major systems with intermediate levels
of government cited above, I have also included the
United Kingdom as a relevant nation for this analysis.
Choosing to focus primarily on federal systems, even
given this expanded definition, does have some conse-
quences. First, the urban problems identified earlier
are not as dramatic or as advanced in some of the coun-
tries, in particular, Canada and Australia, as they are
in others, in particular the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, and the United States* (see
Table 4-2). Other countries with urban problems similar
*Thus, large Canadian urban areas actually gained em-
ployment in the manufacturing sector between 1971 and
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95
to those of the United States, i.e., the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Sweden, are not included. In addition,
Austria has few large cities other than Vienna, which is
both a city and a state, and Australia's local govern-
ments perform few important functions. However, these
variations in country circumstances and structure can be
viewed as strengths of the analyses rather than as weak-
nesses, for they provide an additional range of experi-
ence and practice.
OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS
With the exception of the United Kingdom, all of the
countries under consideration are federal in terms of
Riker's definition, in that they they have regional
levels of government that possess policymaking rather
than solely administrative responsibilities.* As with
the U.S. Constitution, the Australian, Austrian, Swiss,
and German constitutions enumerate the powers of the
federal government and leave residual powers to the
states. The Canadian constitution, on the other hand,
leaves residual powers to the federal government. The
United Kingdom is, by contrast, a unitary state in which
all powers reside with the central government.
The German and Austrian federal systems differ mark-
edly from the others in that they divide governing func-
tions as well as powers among levels of government.
Thus, as Bernd Reissert (1980a:50) explains with respect
to the German system:
In general, responsibilities are divided not by
policy areas but by functions in the policymaking
process. On the one hand, the bulk of legisla-
tive powers, except in the field of education,
lies with the federation, and the federation is
1980, while Australian urban areas remained relatively
stable. However, losses in urban manufacturing employ-
ment were substantial in Germany' the United Kingdom,
and Switzerland (see Table 4-2).
*States in Australia, provinces in Canada, lands in Aus-
tria and the Federal Republic of Germany, and Cantons in
Switzerland. These regional levels of government are
referred to as states throughout the discussion. ^
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96
TABLE 4-2 Urban Employment and Population Change
Percent Percent
Change, Change, Percent
Total Manufacturing Change,
Unit Period EmPloYment Employment PoPulation
Australia
Brisbane M 1971-76 14.1% 1. 7% 27. 5%
Austria
Vienna M 1971-81 NA NA - 3. 2
Linz M 1971-81 NA NA 10. 7
Canada
Montreal M 1971-80 3.9 6.9 21.4
Toronto M 1971-80 15.7 22.3 6.7
Vancouver M 1971-80 0.1 1.7 7.8
Switzerland
Zurich M 1970-75 5.2 -15.3 -2.8
C 1970-75 3.4 -17.2 -13.1
Basel M 1970-75 8.9 1.0 - 5.1
C 1970-75 6.5 - 0.8 -15.4
Gene~ra M 1970-75 6.4 - 5.4 2.6
C 1970-75 2.8 -13. 9 -11.3
United Ringdom
London M 1975-77 - 3. 5 - 1.5 -10.1
C 1968-76 -24.8 NA -17. 7
Manchester M 1975-77 - 6.8 - 4.2 - 4.9
C NA NA -17. 4
Liverpool M 1975-77 - 4.6 - 6.8 - 8.7
C 1972-80 -19.4 NA -16.4 )
Baltimore M 1970-80 18.3 -18.0 5.0
C NA NA -13.1)
Chicago M 1970-80 9.6 -12.4 1.8
C NA NA -10. 8
Detroit M 1972-80 6.7 -12. 1 - 1.8
C NA NA -20. 5
West Germany
Munich M 1970-78 3.0 - 8.8 11.6
C 1970-78 NA NA 0.2
Bamburg M 1970-78 - 4.6 -16. 6 0.8
C 1970-78 NA NA - 7.2
Duisberg M 1970-78 - 8.9 - 8.1 - 8.1
C 1970-78 NA NA - 9. 6
NOTE: Figures on percentage change in population are for 1970-1980 for Switzerland; for
1971-1980, for United Kingdom; and for 1970-1980, for United States.
C ~ Central city.
M ~ Metropolitan area.
NA ~ Not available.
SOURCE: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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97
also responsible for most tax legislation and for
the allocation of taxes among different tiers of
government. State governments, however, have a
voice in the framing of federal legislation via
the Bundesrat (upper house of parliament), where
all federal laws affecting the interests of the
states require the approval of a majority of
state government votes. On the other hand,
policy implementation and spending are the domain
of the states and local government because the
federation does not have an administration of its
own to administer federal laws. Under the con-
stitution only foreign policy, the federal fi-
nances, the federal railways, the federal postal
service, the federal waterways, and the federal
armed forces are subject to direct federal admin-
istration. In all other policy areas, there are
no federal field agencies and all nonlegislative
functions are carried out by the states and local
government employing their own financial re-
sources, with the federal government having no
further say in the matter.
In all but one of the countries being examined, local
governments, as in the United States, are the creatures
of the state (intermediate) level of government; the one
exception is, again, the United Kingdom, where local
governments are creatures of the central government.
However, in Germany and Austria local governments have
constitutional recognition--that is, they are provided
with specific powers and standing by virtue of the fed-
eral constitution. In both countries local authorities
are given the power to deal with all matters of a purely
local nature not circumscribed by federal or state law.
By contrast, in Australia, local governments may do only
what they are expressly permitted to do by state author-
ity, the same situation that exists in the United King-
dom with respect to central-local relations.
Local governmental systems vary considerably among
the countries. Australia and Canada look much like the
United States in terms of their mixture of overlapping
general-purpose authorities and special districts, while
Germany, Austria, and Switzerland have more orderly
systems of local government. However, both Austria and
Germany also have city-states, a structural arrangement
that has, from time to time, been suggested for large
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98
U.S. cities, but never implemented. Vienna, the only
large urban area in Austria, functions as both a city
and a state, and, in Germany, Hamburg, Bremen, and
Berlin are city-states. These cities are thus treated
constitutionally and legislatively as states as well as
cities, and they perform state functions and receive
state tax-sharing and grant-equalization payments not
available to other cities. In both countries the city-
state arrangement appears to result from a continuation
of historic arrangements rather than from any well-
thoughtout, recent determination to treat these cities
differently.
Local governments play an important role in service
delivery in all of these countries with the exception of
Australia, where many of what are normally considered
local functions are performed by the state. The weak
role of Australian localities is reflected in Table 4-3,
which sets forth local government expenditures as a
percentage of total public sector general government
expenditure. Australian localities accounted for only
6.8 percent of total general government expenditure,
while localities in the other countries accounted for 20
percent or more.
TABLE 4-3 Local Government Expenditure as a
Percentage of General Government Expenditure
(1979)
Country
Percentage
.
Australia
Austria
Canada
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
West Germany
6.8
20.0
22.4
23.6
29.2
25.1
18.0
SOURCE: organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (1983a); plus
data from the United States and United
Kingdom derived by author.
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99
NATIONAL-URBAN RELATIONS
With the exception of the United Kingdom, direct
national-local relations of the sort that are prevalent
in the United States are rare; the federal government
interacts with urban governments primarily through state
governments. The constitutional division of powers is
between federal and state governments (although, as
noted, in Austria and Germany local authorities are
constitutionally given responsibility for ~local. mat-
ters).
Relationships Through the Grant System
In Australia, Austria, and Germany some federal taxes
are shared automatically with local as well as state
governments. Tax-sharing relationships involve guaran-
teed transfers rather than sustained national-local
relationships; there is no national effort to influence
local government policy or activity.
The provision of general grants also represents, in
formal terms, a financial transfer with no attempt to
affect local government activity (except spending lev-
els). Direct general grants from national to local gov-
ernments, such as the U.S. revenue sharing program,
occur only in the United Kingdom. However, in Germany,
Australia, and Austria, the federal government requires
that state governments distribute some of their tax
revenue in the form of grants to local authorities. In
the United Kingdom the Thatcher government has struc-
tured its general grant system to include incentives to
reduce local authority spending from local sources.
Specific or conditional grants represent a more
activist national government role. In Australia,
Canada, Austria, and the United Kingdom, some special-
purpose grants are made directly from the national gov-
ernment to local authorities, although not nearly to the
extent as in the United States. In Germany and Switzer-
land all federal grants must be made to the state rather
than local governments.
Mandates
In the United Kingdom, central government may di
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100
rectly legislate with respect to the nature and level of
services that local government provides. In essence,
the same situation exists in Germany and Austria, where
local autonomy is guaranteed, except where federal in-
terest is concerned. In the United States, federal di-
rection of local activity occurs primarily through the
use of conditions attached to the ~voluntary. receipt of
federal grants. This method is not utilized substan-
tially in any of the countries examined, although the
attachment of conditions to state grants is not uncommon
Relationship through Negotiations
Local government associations play an important and
quasi-formal role in consultations and, in some cases,
negotiations with the national governments in Germany,
Austria, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, but much
less so in Australia and Canada. In effect, these more
formal consultative arrangements with local government
associations substitute for the more direct federal
relationships with individual local governments in the
United States. In the United States, the role of local
government associations with respect to the federal gov-
ernment is less formal and more that of lobbying than of
consultation and negotiation. However, in both Austria
and the United Kingdom local government associations are
involved in formal negotiations with the national gov-
ernment over the distribution of tax sharing and general
grants, respectively. In Germany, according to the OECD
(1983b:18):
The Deutsche Stadtetag (Associations of Large
Towns) plays a definite role in work leading to
government and federal parliament decisions
liable to affect cities. Association representa-
tives must be consulted on all federal proposals
in regard to town planning, land use, local fi-
nance, and regional and local transport, and the
Association representatives sit on several minis-
terial committees with Bund and Lander ministers,
e.g. the finanzplanungsrat (Financial Planning
Committee).
In both Canada and Australia, local government asso-
ciations play a minor role with respect to the federal
, —
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101
government, but a much more important and formal role,
particularly in Canada, in grant negotiations with the
state government.
NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR URBAN PROBLEMS
In none of the countries in this study is there an
explicit national urban policy nor periodic national
urban policy reports, such as in the United States.
Nor, except in the United Kingdom, has the national
government accepted an important role in coping with the
problems brought about by changes in the structure of
the urban economy. To a large extent this is due to the
long-standing concern in these countries with the lag-
ging economies of peripheral regions, to which a variety
of regional development policies have traditionally been
addressed. Problems in large urban economies are rela-
tively recent and, in many of these countries, only
beginning to be perceived.
All of the national governments, however, are in-
volved to some extent with urban problems through pro-
grams addressed to specific urban concerns. Typically,
these programs are in housing, urban renewal, infra-
structure, and local transport. In most cases these
national programs are provided indirectly to local gov-
ernments through state governments. In general, how-
ever, with the exception of the United Kingdom, national
government concern with urban areas has not been nearly
so strong as in the United States.
In the United Kingdom, sinner cities. policy is aimed
explicitly at the regeneration of the inner areas of
cities. The Turban program. provides 75 percent match-
ing funds to local authorities for economic development
and social services in inner city areas. The central
government also provides cities with housing and trans-
port grants.
The German federal government provides urban renewal,
transportation (both streets and public transport), and
hospital construction aid for local governments and sets
the framework within which the funds may be used. How-
ever, the funds cannot be provided directly to local
governments. Instead, they are provided to the state
governments, which determine the distribution of funds
to local authorities and the specific purposes for which
they can be used. State implementation of the program
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capita equalization grants to local communities. These
grants make up 30 percent of the difference between fis-
cal need (calculated giving greater weight to cities
with larger populations) and fiscal capacity.
In Switzerland, federal tax sharing and special-
purpose grants are provided on an equalizing basis to
the states. Equalization is based on fiscal capacity
rather than need. States, in turn, make both general
and conditional grants on an equalizing basis to munici-
palities. Several states have horizontal equalization
schemes whereby municipalities with a high fiscal capac-
ity transfer part of their tax capacity to poorer munic-
ipalities.
The lack of direct federal-local grant relationships
is a striking difference between the United States and
other federal nations. In Austria, for example,
Pernthaler (1983:37) notes, folly a few direct federal
grants are made directly to communities. . . . An
attempt by the federal government to extend the range
was vehemently rejected for the states.. In Germany,
there are no direct federal-local grants. A 1975 sup-
reme court decision held that while the federal govern-
ment could define the broad proposal of grants for local
government--in particular urban renewal, transportation,
and hospital construction--the grants themselves had to
be provided to the states with both the specifics of the
grants and the distribution mechanism left at that level
of government. German urban programs are thus more
similar to U.S. block grants to the states for small-
city community development than to the community devel-
opment block grants that go directly from the federal
government to entitlement cities. In Canada, there are
almost no direct federal-local programs and the effort
to establish a federal agency for coordinating urban
affairs was ultimately scrapped as a result of provin-
cial opposition. In Australia, there are a small number
of direct federal grants to local governments, primarily
for social service purposes, but a 1974 national refer-
endum that would have greatly expanded federal govern-
ment grants to local governments was defeated.
CONCLUSION
The utility of comparing the United States with for-
eign countries frequently is seen to lie in the poten-
tial for transferring the policies or practices of those
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117
countries to the United States. While the possibility
of such transfers does exist, the difficulty inherent in
transplanting across systems of divergent political,
social and economic characteristics should not be under-
estimated.
Perhaps a more valuable benefit to be gained from
comparative analysis is that such analysis can both
broaden the sense of the possible and provide a frame-
work for better understanding our own behavior. The
process of comparative analysis should lead to question-
ing what frequently is simply assumed without question.
Thus, the most valuable lessons derived may well be les-
sons about ourselves rather than lessons about other
countries. In order to provoke the introspection re-
quired, it is useful to focus on the areas of greatest
difference between national-local relations in the
United States and in the other countries examined here.
First, the most striking difference is the relative
absence of equalization as an important objective of the
intergovernmental fiscal system in the United States
compared with the other countries. It is not probable
that this reflects a more equal distribution of income
among the states or among the major urban areas in the
United States than in other countries. More likely, it
reflects a strong U.S. aversion to redistribution as a
political goal as opposed to redistribution as an inci-
dental side effect, which of necessity, occurs in the
pursuit of other objectives. In fact, the U.S. grant
system, while mildly redistributive, is not equalizing.
Davis and Lucke (1982:350) found a correlation of .154
between the per capita state distribution of federal
grants in 1980 and state revenue capacity (that is,
those states with higher fiscal capacity received, on
average, more aid per capita than did states with lower
capacity). As a result, fiscal disparities among states
or among cities are much greater in the United States
than in the other countries. The lesson the United
States needs to learn is not how to set up equalizing
intergovernmental transfers; it is how to develop the
political will to do so.
Second, direct national-local relations through the
grant systems are much more prevalent in the United
States than in the other federal countries, where the
pattern is for federal grants to the state level and
state grants to the local level. To some extent this
reflects the U.S. history of relatively weak state
governments and underrepresentation of urban interests
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118
in state politics. The unwillingness of states to
address themselves to urban concerns during the 1950s
and 1960s, when urban problems began to emerge, led to
direct federal-local relationships, which continue to
exist (although President Reagan's block grants lead in
the other direction), even in an era in which states are
much more active and representative. However, to the
extent that city problems are concentrated in states
with low fiscal capacity, the lack of a strong system of
intergovernmental fiscal equalization among the states
reinforces the continued existence of direct national-
local grant relations.
Third, formal negotiations or consultations between
local government associations and the national government
--particularly with respect to grant arrangements--exist
in many of the other countries. In the United States
individual city governments and local government associ-
ations lobby the federal government, but they are rarely
brought so overtly into the governmental process.
To some extent this reflects another difference
between the United States and other federal countries.
Federalism is a much more formal and legalistic set of
arrangements in other federal countries, whereas in the
United States it is more the institutional structure
through which intergovernmental politics occurs.
Fourth, categorical or conditional grants are much
more prevalent in the United States, while general
grants are more prevalent in other countries. The
utilization of categorical grants in the United States
reflects the U.S. response to the problem of how to
pursue national objectives in a country with diverse
local political objectives. The problem does not arise
as much in countries with less regional political diver-
sity than the United States, such as Germany, Austria,
and Australia. (In countries with greater regional
political diversity, such as Canada, the federal govern-
ment has selected a much more limited set of national
objectives to pursue.)
The pursuit of national objectives is also dealt with
more directly in some countries. The U.K. central gov-
ernment, for example, simply mandates local government
to carry out what it deems to be local objectives; there
is no need to attach conditions to grants. In Germany
and Austria, the federal constitution gives local gov-
ernments autonomy, except where the federal government
defines a federal interest (i.e., posits national objec-
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119
Lives). In addition, in both countries constitutional
arrangements require state and local governments to
administer federal law.
Finally, state governments play a much stronger role
with respect to their urban areas in other federal coun-
tries than in the United States. This observation, the
explanation for which has already been touched on, sug-
gests that any national urban policy in the United
States should pay particularly close attention to the
role of the states. In particular, the problem of how
best to expand state responsibilities and actions for
urban areas within the context of national objectives
must be resolved. Reducing direct national-local grants
and moving from categorical to block grants will not
suffice if states do not themselves accept a more active
role. In many of the countries examined, the lower
direct federal government role in dealing with urban
areas was accompanied by federal inducements or require-
ments for states to pursue a more active urban role.
Perhaps this is a direction worthy of examination for
U.S. national urban policy.
REFERENCE LIST AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, W.
1979 Internal memorandum to members of the Advisory
Committee on Intergovernmental Relations on
USACIR's Comparative Study of Four Federal
Systems, May 8.
Auld, D.A., and Eden, L.B.
1983 Federal-provincial financial equalization and
the Canadian constitution. Government and
Policy December(1):475-487.
Baker, I.G.
1980 The impact of federalism on economic and fiscal
policy in Australia. Pp. 310-336 in R.L.
Mathews, ea., Federalism in Australia and the
Federal Republic of Germany: A Comparative
Study. Canberra: Australian National Univer-
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Beam, D.R., Conlan, T.J., and Walker, D.B.
1983 Federalism. Pp. 247-279 in A.W. Finifter, ea.,
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Bennett, R.J.
1984 The finance of cities in West Germany.
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1980 Central-Local Fiscal Relations and the Provi-
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1981 Regional and Urban Development, Trends and
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Conrad, C.-A.
1980 Local Governments in the Federal Republic of
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Council of Europe
1975 The Financial Structures of Local and Regional
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Davis, A., and Lucke, R.
1982 The rich-state-poor-state problem in a federal
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\
Representative terms from entire chapter:
central government
