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OCR for page 13
Overview of Dredging Issues
The adequacy of American ports to meet the nation's present and future
needs became the focus of major policy attention in the early 1980s.
The issue attained sufficient importance to be addressed both by
President Reagan in his 1983 State of the Union message and in the
-
Democratic party's response to that message (Democratic National
Committee, 1983~. Two complex developments converged to focus this
high-level attention on the adequacy of ports. The first was the
changing character of the U.S. economy vis a vis the world economy,
and the changing character of commercial shipping into and out of the
nation's ports. The second development was the unraveling of a social
contract that had evolved over 150 years between the federal govern-
ment and the ports concerning how both maintenance and new construc-
tion dredging would be funded, managed, and regulated. By the early
1980s these two general developments were characterized by:
Proposals from 24 ports for improvement dredging projects based
on the perception that such capabilities were critical to their
future competitiveness.
· More than a decade of paralysis for federally funded new
construction dredging and major delay for some ports willing to
fund their own construction dredging.
The most powerful pressure for developing the capacity to handle
large ships is the claim that such ships offer lower-cost transporta-
tion. Advocates of additional port dredging contend that without the
capacity to handle large, economically efficient ships, commerce into
and out of the United States must either use smaller, higher-cost
ships or larger ships must enter and leave the nation's ports less
than fully loaded. In either case, higher transportation costs are
the result. These higher transportation costs, it is argued, have the
effect of increasing the price of American products on the world mar-
ket and raising the landed price of foreign imports.
The controversy over ports revolves around dredging. Resolution of
(1) Does the
United States need additional port capacity to handle larger ships?
(2) Is dredging the most attractive way for the United States to
handle larger ships? (3) How should dredging be funded and what are
that controversy requires finding answers to six issues:
13
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the implications for dredging of various funding approaches? (The
committee in defining its task specifically excluded recommendations
about funding formulas, since this is a political choice which will be
made by Congress.) (4) What are the causes of the slowdown in de-
cision making for local projects and the stalemate for federal
projects, and what are the ways to bring increased speed, predict-
ability, and stability to the decision making process? (5) What are
the problems associated with design and implementation of new con-
struction and maintenance dredging and how can they be dealt with?
(6) What are the environmental problems associated with dredging and
how can they be most effectively managed?
Traditionally, dredging has been divided between federal and local
projects. Federal projects are paid for with congressionally appro-
priated funds and are carried out by the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers. In general, federal projects deal with the construction and
maintenance of major access channels, maneuvering areas, and emergency
anchorages in U.S. ports.
Local projects are characterized by nonfederal funding and gen-
erally deal with construction and maintenance dredging of berths and
minor channels, or landfill projects (or both). Local projects do not
require congressional action and are normally not managed by the Corps,
but they are subject to detailed regulatory review which rests
primarily with the Corps.
Construction dredging normally involves creating new navigational
facilities or the improvement of those that exist by underwater exca-
vation. Maintenance dredging involves the removal of materials as
necessary to keep facilities at the originally constructed depths and
widths. Although the physical activities required to carry out these
two types of dredging are similar, the issues associated with them may
be quite different. Differences range from how the decisions to
dredge are made through how the dredging is funded, to regulatory ap-
proval procedures. Although controversy surrounds both maintenance
and construction dredging, clearly construction dredging--specifically
whether there is a need to handle larger, deeper-draft vessels, and if
so, who should pay for it--is the key issue driving the present
national debate.
The subject of this report is an investigation of several issues
associated with port dredging. It is organized around three general
questions: (1) Is additional port construction and maintenance
dredging necessary now or over the next two decades? (2) What im-
pediments and barriers militate against carrying out additional
dredging if it is needed? (3) What alternatives offer promise of
mitigating or effectively responding to those impediments in order
that any needed dredging can be carried out?
Proponents of new or additional port dredging have identified three
areas of need. The first is for additional capacity to handle deep-
draft ships and more traffic. The deep-draft ships most commonly
referred to are liquid- and dry-bulk carriers requiring water depths
of 50 ft or more. The second is the need in a number of ports for
additional depths to handle ships requiring water depths of 40 to 45
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ft. (The vessels most often cited in this category are latest-genera-
tion containerships, but a number of vessels in the world fleet re-
quire water depths in this range. The third need is for additional
maintenance dredging.
Assessing the nation's dredging needs requires setting them in a
more general context. Specifically, it is necessary to understand the
role of ports in the broader world economy and transportation system
to assess whether additional capacity is needed, and if needed,
whether there are alternative ways of meeting the nation's port
requirements that are more attractive than dredging. Proponents and
opponents of port dredging and the alternatives to dredging range
across a broad spectrum. Some contend that U.S. ports are adequate;
others contend that there are more cost-effective ways than dredging
to meet the nat~on's need to handle large vessels.
In assessing present and future port needs and ways of meeting
those needs, this report applies five broad criteria: economics,
navigational safety, environmental implications, national security and
defense, and implications for future ocean transportation flexibility.
Ports are one component of a five-component international or
coastwise transportation system. In the case of exports, the first
component is the inland transportation network that carries goods from
points within the United States to ports. U.S. ports represent
component two of the system, which involves the transfer of goods
between the inland transportation system and oceangoing vessels.
Component three involves the oceangoing vessel moving from a U.S. port
to a foreign port. Component four involves the receiving port
transferring cargo from the oceangoing vessel to an inland
transportation system. And the final component involves the receiving
country's inland transportation system delivering the cargo from the
port to its final destination. The same five components are, of
course, involved in coastwise traffic (between domestic ports) and ark
reversed in the case of imports.
CHANGES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
Concern with ports is intimately tied to the concern with
international competitiveness which has become intense with the
changing relationship between the U.S. and the world economy. Over
the last two decades this change has accelerated rapidly as the U.S.
economy has moved from the post-war period of satisfying domestic
markets and supplying the world with a vast array of goods and
commodities to one which is now the largest component of an
increasingly interdependent world economy. For the first two decades
following World War II, foreign trade was not a significant factor
with regard to U.S. economic well-being. By 1980, however, 19 percent
of the goods made in the United States were exported (up from 9
percent in 1970), and more than 22 percent of the goods consumed in
the United States were imported (up from 9 percent in 19701. A
perhaps even more telling statistic is that "by 1980 more than 70
percent of all goods produced in the United States were actively
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16
competing with foreign-made goods" (Reich, 19831. It is these
economic changes that underpin an increasingly widely held belief that
the future economic well-being of the United States is dependent on
the nation's capacity to compete in a world economy.
There is a growing view that the United States must pursue every
avenue in its effort to increase its competitiveness and therefore its
exports. That is because exports are needed to pay for an
increasingly high volume of imports. In 1984 the U.S. experienced its
largest-ever trade imbalance with imports exceeding exports by more
than $100 billion. Two options are frequently identified for
addressing this trade imbalance. One is to restrict imports into the
United States by using public policy to build barriers to those
imports. As the trade imbalance has grown, increasing pressures have
developed for taking such restrictive policy action. The other
proposal is to increase the competitiveness of U.S. exports such that
those exports are capable of paying for imports. Free international
trade, and therefore, opposition to building barriers to imports has
characterized every Administration since the end of World War II. It
is widely believed, however, that unless the United States can become
more competitive, the pressures for restricting imports will become
irresistible. It is in this context, then, that the present and
future adequacy of U.S. ports has become an integral part of the
broader debate over the future competitiveness of the United States in
the world economy.
Key to understanding the changing relationship of the U.S. to the
world economy is an appreciation of the changing character of this
nation's imports and exports. Reich (1983) suggests some of the
changes: "During the 1970s the share of American manufactured goods
in total world sales declined by 23 percent while every other
industrialized nation except Britain maintained or expanded its
share. American's diminishing presence in the international market
has been particularly marked in capital-intensive, high-volume
industries. Since 1963, the U.S. proportion of world automobile sales
has declined by almost one-third. United States sales of industrial
machinery also declined by one-third; sales of agricultural machines
by 45 percent; telecommunications machinery by 50 percent;
metalworking machinery by 55 percent."
In the period immediately following World War II when the
industrial capacity of Europe and Japan was being rebuilt, the United
States experienced an export boom and supplied some 60 percent of the
world's manufactured goods. As Europe and Japan regained industrial
capacity, trade between the United States and these other areas of the
world moved into relative balance. Within the last decade, the flow
of mass-produced industrial goods has reversed with the United States
becoming a major importer and Europe and the Pacific Rim countries
becoming major exporters.
In the present period, U.S. exports have come to be dominated by
such bulk commodities as coal, grain, and timber and by what are now
regularly characterized as high-technology products, plus
sophisticated services such as communications and computer software.
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17
Highlights of the changing character of U.S. trade in the past 50
years are presented in the following table. In 1947, as indicated on
the table, the United States had a $9.5 billion trade surplus, as the
nation supplied the world.
Highlights of U.S. Export and Import Trade: Exports Minus Imports (in
millions of dollars)
Agri- Fuels Capi- Con- Auto- Mili
cultural and Lu- Chemi- tal sumer motive tary
Year Goods bricants cals Goods Goods Products Goods Other Total
1930-4594333518-922827-271782
1937-45939522486-3835322-184265
194716041013553314495811471748909530
1960857-73911284949-505633804-12265528
1970558-1384221610557-4834-22421230-31633303
19738023-6369313713928-8481-45431385-58541863
198124308-713331199545680-22864-117503608-11325-27566
SOURCE: Branson, 1984.
This early post-World War II boom utilized ports built and expanded
during the 1930s, when an extensive program of public works was
undertaken to provide employment in response to the Depression and to
establish the infrastructure for regional economic development. Many
of the dredged navigational facilities authorized for ports in the
1930s and 1940s are still being maintained as they were created then.
The vessels that came into service following World War II were the
war-surplus "handy-size" tanker, and the Liberty and Victory general
cargo ships. These small, flexible vessels were nicely accommodated
by U.S. ports.
In the 1960s, as industrial capacity recovered elsewhere, world
trade grew rapidly. The economic activities of all nations benefitted
from inexpensive Middle Eastern oil. To serve expanding world trade,
shipowners began building a different type of fleet. Ships became
increasingly larger and more specialized; for example, supertankers.
As the United States accelerated its oil imports, the need was
perceived for ports capable of serving supertankers. Efforts to
develop these facilities became controversial when major oil spills
occurred in the Santa Barbara Channel on the Pacific Coast and
elsewhere in the world. After considerable controversy, however,
Congress enacted the Deepwater Ports Act of 1974, which provided for
the development of offshore petroleum facilities. One was built
(Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, or LOOP) by five oil companies in 1979.
Plans for other such facilities, however, were abandoned as the
consequences of the oil disruptions of the 1970s were felt and Middle
Eastern oil imports declined. A key factor, of course, was a nearly
tenfold increase in oil prices. Worldwide, the transport of oil
plummetted.
The oil shocks of the 1970s had equally serious consequences for
the nation's trade balance. A few data suggest the implications of
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these developments. In 1970, imported oil cost the nation $2
billion. By 1974, the cost of these imports rose to $6.5 billion, and
by 1980, oil imports cost the nation $78.9 billion. Estimates are
that in 1984 oil imports will cost about $60 billion. Almost all
projections suggest that a high oil import bill will continue.
Worldwide, one response to accelerating oil costs was to search for
alternative energy sources. The most abundant, readily available
alternative was coal and around the world, nations quickly sought to
substitute coal for some of their oil imports. It was this rapid move
to coal that focused the present national attention on the inadequacy
of ports. With large, readily available coal reserves, the United
States experienced a surge in demand for its steam coal in 1980. That
demand was triggered by a combination of the Iranian oil disruption
and unstable conditions in other major coal exporting nations. During
1980, newspapers in the United States were full of reports of large
numbers of colliers waiting for weeks and sometimes months to gain
access to U.S. coal~loading facilities.
A number of studies during this period (Energy Information
Administration, 1981; ICE, Inc., 1981; National Coal Association,
1981; Wilson, 1980) concluded that the United States had an
opportunity to become a major supplier of a massive new world market
for steam coal. To gain and secure that market, however, it was
repeatedly noted that the United States would need to be able to
handle the most efficient dry or combination bulk carriers requiring
water depths greater than those available in U.S. coal ports.
In the years since 1980, the development of a world oil surplus,
the declining price of oil, a strong dollar, and the reestablishment
of political stability in Poland and labor stability in Australia have
reduced the demand for steam coal exports from the United States.
Whether the present situation with regard to world energy will be
sustained for a long period remains an open question. A major oil
disruption in the Persian Gulf could trigger renewed demand for U.S.
coal exports.
In combination, then, the changing role of the U.S. in the world
economy, the changing character of U.S. exports and imports, and the
unpredictable world energy situation have created substantial
uncertainty with regard to future port capacity needs. Projecting the
future size and character of world shipping is extremely difficult.
As a result, few mid- and long-term shipping forecasts have been made
in recent years. Lloyd's Register of Shipping (1984) suggests why
such forecasts are not being made by noting: "World shipping and ship
building are experiencing the worst economic recession in the last 50
years and the interaction of technical, commercial, and political
factors makes it very difficult to predict the likely rate of
recovery."
The hesitancy in making long-term forecasts is readily understood
when one reviews the inaccuracy of forecasts made in the past (see
Figure 1, Appendix Gel. Estimates of liquid cargoes, principally oil,
show the most striking contrast with actual cargoes carried.
*Tables and full-page figures have been placed in Appendix G for the
convenience of the reader.
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19
While the total volume of goods and commodities carried in
oceanborne trade follows the world economy, the relationship that
previously prevailed between world GNP growth and growth in demand for
oceanborne transport was disrupted in the 1970s. In the following
table, oceanborne transport is divided into three categories: oil,
bulk, and other. From 1965 to 1973, the growth in the quantity of oil
transported annually averaged a rate that was more than twice the rate
of growth of the world GNP. From 1973 through 1980, the quantity of
oil being transported remained almost stable while world GNP was
growing at an annual rate of 2.3 percent. In the case of bulk
commodities, the quantities being transported continued to grow more
rapidly than GNP but less rapidly than during the 1965-1973 period.
By comparison, during the 1973-1980 period, the quantities of other
commodities in ocean transport grew at a rate, when compared to world
GNP, that was rougly twice that of the 1965-1973 period.
Annual Average Increase (%), World GNP and Oceanborne Freight
Transportation
.
Total Oil Bulk Other
:
World Ton- Ton- Ton
Period GNP Tons Miles Tons Miles Tons Miles Tons
1965-1973 4.6 8.4 12.9 10.5 16.0 7.9 10.2 5.2
1973-1980 2.3 2.2 1.2 0.2 -1.0 3.0 3.9 4.9
.. . . . .
aCoal, grain, bauxite/alumina, iron ore, rock phosphate
SOURCE: Maritime Transport Committee, 1981.
Ton
Miles
-
6.4
5.7
One result of these changes and optimistic forecasts was that
vessels ordered during the period of growth became surplus. For the
first time since World War II, during both 1982 and 1983, the total
deadweight of the world fleet declined, yet the rate of scrapping was
insufficient to bring cargo-carrying capacity into balance with
available cargoes.
Nonetheless, shipowners continued to order vessels in 1983, "as
covert and overt subsidies [encouraged] owners to replace aging
vessels,...in addition, the [shipbuilding] industry was offering more
efficiently designed ships with the emphasis on fuel economy, and
finance was freely available" (Lloyd's Register of Shipping, 1984~.
A particular emphasis has been on containerships which are
typically employed in the liner trades. The growth of trade in goods
that can be packed and shipped in containers offers partial
explanation. The number of containerships increased 5.7 percent in
1983; their container-carrying capacity increased 7.5 percent
(Maritime Transport Committee, 1984~.
Table 1 (Appendix G) indicates the variety of vessels in the world
fleet that called on ports of the United States in 1980 (engaging in
foreign trade). Considerable specialization of vessel types can be
seen in this list, much of it matching the changing mix of U.S.
imports and exports previously discussed. Design drafts for a number
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of the bulk carriers exceed the water depths of many U.S. ports. For
bulk carriers with more than 46 feet of draft, water-depth limitations
would prevent their being fully loaded, incoming or outgoing, in most
of the major bulk-commodity ports in the United States (except Los
Angeles, Long Beach, an oil terminal in Bellingham, Washington, or
grain terminals in Seattle and Tacoma).
SUMMARY
What can one conclude from this mix of changing and sometimes
conflicting data? The changing relationship of the U.S. to the world
economy and the changing character of the world's commercial fleet
make confident projections of future shipping patterns extremely
difficult. So far as the needs of U.S. ports are concerned, and
specifically the need for new construction dredging, the picture is
characterized by great uncertainty. That uncertainty has doubtless
been a factor contributing to the stalemate in new port construction
activities.
PORT DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES
The second factor contributing to the U.S. port construction stalemate
has been what was previously characterized as the unraveling of the
social contract between the federal government and the nation's ports
concerning funding, management, and regulation of dredging. To
appreciate what has occurred, a brief review of the evolution of that
social contract is useful.
The beginning of this history occurred in the very early years of
the Republic. Prior to 1824, river and harbor improvements were
commonly executed and paid for by state and local governments. In
this early period, federal responsibility covered navigation and
safety services such as coastal charts, lighthouses, and beacons.
Congress authorized states and individual ports to levy tonnage duties
to pay for such work (Hill, 1957~.
Direct federal involvement in port construction and maintenance,
specifically dredging, was initiated in 1824 with the passage of the
General Survey Act. Under this legislation, Congress made its first
appropriations for rivers and harbors improvements. Since that time,
the federal role in port construction and maintenance has been
inextricably tied to the development of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers. The Corps was initially chosen because of its unique
engineering expertise. President James Monroe advocated that the
Corps serve as the national planning organization for rivers and
harbors. Congress, however, rejected the notion of any national
planning responsibility on the part of an executive agency and
established a pattern of deciding and funding port developments on a
case-by-case basis.
The rejection by Congress of President Monroe's proposal for a
national planning role for the Corps and the decision to authorize and
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fund port projects on a case-by-case basis deserves special emphasis.
It established a detailed decision-making role for Congress (and the
Corps) which has meant that for more than 150 years, the Corps has
carried out the mandates of Congress with Presidents having only very
limited oversight and management control of these activities.
This special relationship between the Corps and Congress has been
the object of criticism off and on for the last 150 years. The nature
of that criticism has remained essentially the same. Examples of the
criticism are as follows: The system provides no national plan for
ports and makes no distinction between ports of national versus local
value; the process is dominated by logrolling and pork barrel
tradeoffs; the system reflects sectional favoritism; and the system
funds many projects that cannot be justified on an economic basis
(Hill, 1957~. As early as 1830, President Andrew Jackson
pocket-vetoed a rivers and harbors bill because it did not distinguish
between works of national and those of local value. If the criticism
of the system that developed has remained consistent, so has the basic
framework of the relationships among Congress, the Corps, the Office
of the President, and a range of local and national interest groups.
The most distinctive characteristic of the system is the level of
detailed control that Congress exercises with regard to Corps projects
generally and port projects specifically. Corps projects are
distinctive in that Congress provides year-to-year funding for
multiyear construction projects.
This year-to-year funding is in contrast to the more typical
full-funding approach, which characterizes major construction projects
carried out by most other federal executive agencies. Under the
full-funding approach Congress includes the entire cost for multiyear
projects in a single annual budget. Pull funding allows the executive
agency much more authority and discretion than year-to-year funding
(Scheppach, 1977~. Specifically, full funding allows the executive
agency to reprogram funds from one project to another independent of
specific Congressional approval. Second, multiyear funding gives the
White House, through the Office of Management and Budget,
substantially more control over the agency than is the case with the
year-to-year funding that characterizes Corps projects.
Alternatively, the project-specific, year-by-year funding approach
results in a uniquely tight budgetary relationship between Congress
and the Corps and gives the Corps a great deal of independence from
the normal executive budget process (See Ferejohn, 1974; Maass, 1951;
and Hill, 1957~. From the congressional side, this funding approach
allows Congress and the specific congressmen and senators concerned
with individual projects a great deal of control. Key to the success
of a project is the capacity of the congressmen interested in specific
projects to negotiate with their peers in a process that essentially
involves trading support for each other's public works activities.
Individual ports, then, develop tight links both to the local Corps
districts and to their congressmen in promoting new construction.
These represent micropolitical systems organized around individual
ports.
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Over the course of nearly a century and a half, the decision making
process in Congress associated with the rivers and harbors legislation
demonstrated a capacity to respond to perceived port needs. The
history of this decision making process is one that has involved
swings between periods of growth and periods when few new public works
were undertaken. Viewed historically, however, this decision making
system has generally proved satisfactory for those interested in port
development.
Beginning in the early 1970s, however, it was no longer possible
for Congress to evolve decisions which allowed for the initiation of
major, new, federally funded port projects. Several factors have been
suggested as major contributors to this stalemate, but three are
regularly identified. They are: (1) broad public concern with
environmental consequences, (2) rising budgetary deficits, and (3)
basic changes in public attitudes toward major federal construction
projects.
During the 1970s, broad public concern developed with environmental
protection. In response to this public concern, Congress passed
several pieces of environmental legislation mandating a variety of
federal agencies to put environmental regulatory programs in place.
In the case of port construction projects, the Corps was assigned
responsibility for assessing the environmental consequences of port
projects and assuring through a complex approval process that
environmental concerns would be an integral part of the decisions
made. As a part of this development, local citizens groups and a
variety of state and federal agencies with environmental
responsibilities became active participants in the decision making
associated with port construction. Two consequences resulted from
these developments. First, the process of port construction became
significantly more complex, and second, the time required to meet
these environmental responsibilities extended the period and cost
required to carry out major port projects.
Also, beginning in the 1970s, public concern with ever larger
deficits increased. No longer able to count on getting their fair
share of an ever-expanding federal budget, political leaders and their
constituencies faced difficult tradeoffs among programs and projects.
Political tradeoffs have always shaped the nation's policies and
certainly its choice of public works projects. But by the late 1970s
and the early 1980s, there existed such a mismatch between the
public's expectations for government services and the government's
fiscal capacity to deliver them that stalemate began to characterize
many areas of public policy. (See Levine, 1980, for a collection of
essays on the financial crisis in the public sector.)
As deficits grew, so-called discretionary federal funding became
the focus of intense attention. Many saw the omnibus water-resources
projects bill (for all water projects funded by the federal
government, including port dredging) as containing the most
discretionary of federal expenditures. It should be noted that one of
the characteristics of these public works expenditures is that all it
takes to contain such expenditures is inaction. The annual funding
approach reflected in the rivers and harbors legislation, therefore,
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required on the part of those congressmen opposing public works
expenditures only that they refuse to join a consensus in funding
authorized projects.
At a more general level, during the 1970s, there were increasing
calls for a brake on big government. Although these calls for
reducing the size of government meant different things to different
people, a common theme was opposition to special interest projects
viewed as being uneconomic. During the Carter Administration, there
was particularly strong opposition in the White House to Western water
projects. These projects were regularly criticized as uneconomic and
inefficient expenditures of federal funds. Since port dredging is
handled in the same legislation as these and other public works to
develop water resources, dredging projects were also opposed.
Remember that the original rationale for handling diverse public works
projects in a single piece of legislation was the desire to utilize
the engineering expertise of the Corps. Recall also that criticism of
the local and uneconomic character of many public works projects goes
back to the early 19th century. Present-day critics frequently see no
distinction between port construction and the construction of dams and
other water projects. The case-by-case authorization and annual
funding approach in combination with the lack of any enabling
legislation or broadly stated national policy which provides criteria
for distinguishing between projects of local and national value, left
the nation, by the 1980s, without an established framework for setting
priorities among public works projects--as, for example, between dams
and ports.
Many of the proponents of additional port construction argue that
there is a fundamental difference between a major port that links the
United States to the world economy, an economy on which the nation is
increasingly interdependent, and a dam serving a local area of the
United States. These proponents emphasize that major ports are
clearly of great importance nationally, while many other public works
projects are, in fact, primarily in the local or regional interest.
In the face of changing attitudes toward federal public works
projects, a growing federal deficit, and broadly based public concern
about environmental values, the system for making decisions about port
construction that had evolved incrementally over the history of the
American Republic was becalmed. Given the belief that additional port
capacity is essential to the economic well-being of the United States
and at the same time opposing additional large public expenditures,
the Reagan Administration early in its first term sought to break the
logjam on ports by proposing establishment of a port user fee. The
rationale behind the Reagan Administration's user fee proposal was
that it would allow nationally important port construction to be
undertaken, and ensure equity and efficiency. That is, those who
benefit pay, thus equity is achieved; only those projects that can pay
their own way are carried out, thus efficiency is achieved.
In seeking to understand the nation's port needs, the impediments
to achieving those needs and the options for dealing with those
impediments, this report investigates a broad set of concerns. These
range from economic and engineering concerns through institutional and
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environmental concerns to the general character of worldwide
oceanborne shipping. Conceptually, this report starts with the most
general questions. Although additional construction and maintenance
dredging has powerful advocates, it is important to note that there
are opponents who have concluded that new construction dredging is
unnecessary. The crux of the debate over dredging needs revolves
around the costs and benefits of the additional investments that would
be required for U.S. ports to be able to handle ships of larger size.
This report, then, moves in Chapter 4 to an investigation of the
relative advantages and disadvantages to the United States of being
able to handle larger-volume ships. In Chapter 5, the report
investigates the relative attractiveness of additional dredging in
existing ports versus a variety of other ways of handling large-volume
ships. Chapter 6 considers the various proposed approaches to funding
federal projects and their implications for the over-all port
construction and maintenance system. Chapter 7 describes the
institutional decision making system for dredging and ways of bringing
stability, predictability, and speed to that decision making. Chapter
8 addresses technical needs and issues associated with both new
construction and maintenance dredging. Chapter 9 assesses the
environmental issues associated with dredging, the state of scientific
knowledge with regard to these issues, and some approaches to
addressing the issues.
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The Army Engineers and the Nation's
Representative terms from entire chapter:
world economy
