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OCR for page 285
20.
Pane] Discussion on Nonliving Resources
The panel consisted of Robert H. Rutford (Moderator),
Roger Wilson, Geoffrey F. Larminie, and Adriaan Bos.
REMARKS BY ROGER WILSON
Wilson indicated that he would take a political per-
spective on Beeby's presentation (Chapter 19). He shared
Beeby's view that the "gap" in the Atlantic Treaty System
(ATS) on the subject of minerals requires filling but
disagreed with the treaty consultative parties' belief
that that gap should be filled with a regime that under
certain circumstances would permit minerals development.
In his opinion, once a regime or a mechanism to govern
minerals development existed, minerals development would
sooner or later take place.
He questioned the lack of serious consideration given
to the nondevelopment option and believed that the reason
for this is that antarctic policy is fashioned primarily
by civil servants in the foreign affairs ministries of
states parties to the Antarctic Treaty who are not
directly answerable to the public. mis means that no
express public mandate, which might challenge conven-
tional wisdom, is sought or derived from discussions
within and between political parties. He asked,
rhetorically, how many governments had ever made
antarctic policy a part of their political platforms, or
sought a mandate on antarctic policy, and expressed
surprise that few have done so given the serious regard
accorded by governments to Antarctica.
He referred specifically to the 1975 New Zealand world
park proposal, recalled by Beeby, which received little
support from other treaty nations. The 1975 New Zealand
government was a Labour Party government, yet today the
same party has chosen to continue along the path leading
to minerals development. Wilson did not know why this
policy change had occurred, but he noted that the New
285
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286
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a significant
investment in the existing policy and would have diffi-
culty reversing it ~
tally different policy direction, taken in the absence of
a public mandate, most likely on the advice of civil
servants who do not have to answer to the public.
On another point, he noted the acknowledgment by BeebY
that perhaps the consultative parties to the Antarctic
Treaty had not adequately explained their efforts to
negotiate a minerals regime to the rest of the world,
which implied that, had they explained, no one would have
challenged their efforts. In Wilson's view, the problem
is a more fundamental one. To illustrate his point, he
quoted the provision of Recommendation XI-1 specifying
that one of the principles on which a minerals regime
should be based is that "the Consultative Parties, in
dealing with the question of mineral resources in
Antarctica, should not prejudice the interests of all
mankind in Antarctica. n He questioned the presumption of
the Antarctic Treaty states in appointing themselves to
determine what the "interests of mankind" are.
Wilson doubted whether the primary way Beeby had
described in which the minerals regime would take account
of the interests of the international community at large
was indeed sufficient: maintaining good relations with
other international organizations having competence south
of 60°S latitude. In his view, the fundamental n interests
of all mankind" in Antarctica lie in the maintenance of
peace in the area and in the results of the science
conducted there. The question is then whether these
interests are better served by a proexploitation regime
or by a protection-oriented regime; Wilson believed
humankind's interests could not be guaranteed if minerals
exploitation--at best marginal and/or subsidized--were to
take place. Nor, clearly, could protection of wildlife
or wilderness values be guaranteed.
Wilson raised questions about whether two recent
seismic research projects complied with the policy of
"voluntary restraint" quoted by Beeby from Recommendation
XI-1. He named the Japanese government program carried
out with the Hakurei Maru and the 1983-1984 vovaae of the
once more. one result is a fundamen-
u.~. government research vessel, S.P. Lee, noting that
once initial investments are made, it would be difficult
to halt the momentum toward minerals development. The
S.P. Lee program had received early promises of funding
from the Circum-Pacific Council for Minerals and Energy
Research, a private-industry body whose chairman is an
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287
independent U.S. oil company executive, Michael T.
Halbouty, but this did not work out in the long run.
On the subject of prospecting, he questioned why
prospecting in Antarctica should not be subject to
specific authorization under the regime, particularly
when many of the consultative parties to the treaty
required prior authorization within their own territories.
He ventured that Beeby was optimistic in assuming that
countries would not ignore the principles of the regime,
including the environmental principles, as he felt had
occurred under the CCAMLR, or that political pressures
might not ultimately preempt them.
_
He expressed doubts
that the advisory committee described in Beeby's presen-
tation would be able to fulfill its task, because the
scientists appointed would have numerous commitments on
their time, might be appointed on political grounds or to
carry out the political aims of their governments, and
might not be expert in the disciplines required, or,
conversely, to meet the requirement of technical com-
petence they might be those most interested in developing
antarctic minerals. He believed that the nonpolitical
antarctic environmental protection agency proposed by
Greenpeace (see Chapter 14), staffed with full-time
professionals, deserves serious consideration.
Wilson also criticized the decision making institutions
of the minerals regime as being biased in favor of devel-
opment, since only those states actually engaged in
minerals development activities, during such time as they
are engaged in them, can join the consultative parties to
the Antarctic Treaty as decision making members in the
institutions of the regime; states in favor of environ-
mental protection would not have the same sort of say at
the decision making level as those interested in exploit-
ing mineral resources in Antarctica.
Clearly the decision
making institutions promote minerals activities by giving
decision making power to the exploiters.
Wilson cautioned against possible failures to comply
with the rules established by the regime and wondered
whether members of the decision making commission under
the regime would accept the responsibility to discipline
one another once a possible disagreement over compliance
arose. His lack of confidence stemmed from the difficulty
Greenpeace had encountered in seeking consideration
during Antarctic Treaty meetings of possible noncompliance
by the French government with the Antarctic Treaty Agreed
Measures with respect to its construction of an airstrip
to serve the French claim in Antarctica.
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288
In conclusion, Wilson advocated a more open system for
the minerals regime and that all options be considered,
including the possibility of forgoing minerals develop-
ment completely.
REMARKS BY GEOFFREY F. LARMINIE
Larminie suggested that perhaps a definition of "all
mankind" was in order, and noted that by his calculations
more than 80 percent of the world's population is already
represented within the ATS.
REMARKS BY ADRIAAN BOS
Bos commented that Beeby's presentation dealt mainly with
the politics within the ATS. However, the minerals regime
negotiations have recently attracted the attention of the
wider international community, and for that reason the
establishment of the minerals regime has become a global
political concern, raising issues new to the ATS frame-
work. He agreed that the consultative parties might have
done a better job in explaining their activities to the
world at large, but like Wilson he doubted whether this
would have prevented questions and tensions arising today
about the system.
He cited the language in Recommendation XI-1, which
refers to a minerals regime "elaborated by the Consulta-
tive Parties," to illustrate how quickly things have
changed since 1981; in 1984 the decision was taken to
invite the nonconsultative parties to the Antarctic
Treaty to take part in these negotiations. He added that
it remains to be seen whether the involvement of the
outside world can be further enhanced.
He questioned the meaning of the Recommendation XI-1
stipulation that The Antarctic Treaty must be maintained
in its entirety, for, while the achievements of the
treaty are admirable and should be maintained, it might
be difficult to ask states party to the minerals regime
that are not party to the Antarctic Treaty to accept
this. He suggested that they might be asked to respect
the achievements of the Antarctic Treaty without being
asked to maintain the treaty in its entirety.
Bos found the phraseology of Recommendation XI-1,
where it refers to "not prejudicing] the interests of
all mankind," too negative. He stressed the need to find
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289
ways to guarantee that the regime be in "the interests of
mankind," since this will be the test for acceptance of
the regime by the international community. Moreover, he
noted that one should not think only in terms of economic
benefit; a continuing moratorium on minerals development
activities for the time being might also be seen to be in
The interests of all mankind."
SUMMARY
The discussion elaborated on a number of points raised by
Beeby (Chapter 19) and by the panelists. Many of these
addressed the role of states and organizations currently
not involved in the antarctic minerals regime
negotiations:
· Their involvement in policy formulation at the
negotiation stage;
· Their involvement in the implementation of the
minerals regime once completed, and specifically in
its decision making processes; and
Their involvement in potential minerals
development activities and benefits therefrom.
(The questions of how the minerals regime will take
account of international interests at large and the
relationship of the ATS to the United Nations system are
discussed further in the next section.)
Other points referred to the earlier technical dis-
cussion and the relationship between the timing for
possible antarctic minerals development activities and
political considerations of urgency in completing the
regime. The proposal for a moratorium on antarctic
minerals development was also debated.
Several questions produced more detailed descriptions
of how the minerals regime, as now contemplated, would
operate in practice. Among the points covered were the
following: area of application; the framework of the
regime; institutions; environmental protection and
safety; effects on scientific research; prospecting;
environmental protection and confidentiality of data; and
enforcement and reporting requirements.
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290
PARTICIPATION
Various approaches to widening international participa-
tion with respect to antarctic minerals were considered
In lieu of basing a minerals regime on any one of the
four different "theologies that arise in antarctic
minerals debates--world park, claimant, nonclai~nant, or
common heritage of humankind--it was argued that the ATS
should remain ' ecumenical ' . The contentious issue, how-
ever, was: Who should reconcile these theologies and
how? Some participants believed that those appointed to
define the Interests of all mankind" should not have a
material interest in their trust and that they should be
responsible to a higher authority. Equally important was
the question of right: Who should appoint those under-
taking the definition? Others asked whether a basis for
management other than the ATS would likely represent more
effectively and equitably "the interests of all mankindn;
they stated that "right" derived, among other things,
from the fact that the ATS worked; and that the rights
and obligations generated by the Antarctic Treaty were
exclusive only as between states parties and neither
granted rights to nor obligated third parties without
their consent.
CO+ON HERITAGE OF MANKIND
Beeby's comments on the applicability of the common
heritage of mankind concept to Antarctica provoked
opposing views from those who believed that Article IV of
the Antarctic Treaty suspends the applicability of the
claims as long as it is in effect; they did not accept,
as debated earlier in the workshop (Section II) , that the
claims are still very much alive, nor did they neces-
sar fly believe that these claims will ~ emain alive in
perpetuity (citing histor ical examples of reversals of
territorial claims and the fact that in the Law of the
Sea negotiations a number of states had in effect reduced
their claims to offshore rights). Others repeated that
there is a distinction between the deep seabed and outer
space, where the common heritage concept has been
applied, and Antarctica.
Several speakers criticized Beeby's characterization
of the common heritage as having a strong exploitation
orientation; they noted that it encompasses concepts of
peaceful use, environmental protection and management,
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291
and rational use of resources for present and future
generations--all of which are fully consistent with the
objectives of the ATS. Nor did they agree with Larminie's
percentage-of-world population" definition of mankind,
because the political meaning of the concept is widely
understood to refer to all countries, whether rich or
poor, developed or developing, technologically advantaged
or disadvantaged. Others shared Beeby's view that the
environmental provisions developed through a global
conference, such as those governing deep seabed mining in
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, would be far worse
than those contemplated in the antarctic mineral regime.
PARTICIPATION IN THE MINERALS REGIME NEGOTIATIONS
Beeby's point that the motivation for the minerals regime
talks is essentially political rather than economic in
nature led one participant to conclude that this is all
the more reason to involve more states than the consulta-
tive parties in these talks Moreover, discussions in
the United Nations would not necessarily mean that the
common heritage concept would be applied; the U.N. could
simply provide the forum that would lead to agreement on
how to design a minerals regime acceptable to the wider
international community.
Another point of view preferred that the minerals
negotiations take place within the Antarctic Treaty
framework in order to strengthen the system currently
working effectively in Antarctica. Within this context,
however, numerous speakers supported opening the negotia-
tions to a broader circle than the small group demon-
strating substantial interest in antarctic science. This
would avoid the negative ramifications of presenting to
the world at large, at some point in the future, a fait
accompli.
These participants noted that the invitation to the
nonconsultative parties to take part, for the first time,
in the fifth meeting in these negotiations, February
26-March 8, 1985, in Rio de Janeiro, meant that any
country that acceded to the treaty could take part in the
negotiations: the negotiations are no longer closed.
Nevertheless, they encouraged making the role of the
nonconsultative parties an attractive one, so that
additional states will accede to the Antarctic Treaty.
For this reason, it would be important to involve the
wider group of states fully in these forums and to avoid
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292
excessive heads-of-delegation meetings that would be
restricted to representatives of consultative parties.
Another suggestion to broaden the dialogue on an
antarctic minerals regime returned to the idea of a
strategy for environmental management in Antarctica,
along the lines of the antarctic conservation strategy
suggested by Heap and Holdgate in Chapter 13. A series
of sessions on this topic could include scientists,
diplomats, and individuals knowledgeable about resource
management issues. These sessions could also develop a
research agenda that would respond to the needs of those
with management and decision-making responsibilities.
Improving the information policies with respect to the
minerals negotiations would also help to dispel feelings
of exclusion. One participant saw no reason why the
basic text of the minerals regime should not be available
both to help inform interested outside parties and to
allow the negotiations to benefit from relevant comments
and criticisms.
PARTICIPATION IN THE ADOPTION OF THE MINERALS REGIME
Returning to the question of who has the right to deter-
mine the future of Antarctica, one participant questioned
whether, if not in the negotiations, then at the stage
when the final product of the minerals negotiations would
be formalized, a wider circle might then be involved. He
suggested, however, that the final diplomatic conference
would also be dominated by those who had negotiated the
agreement and that the invitations and rules of proce-
dures would be controlled by them. Others acknowledged
that such a diplomatic conference is likely to be held
and indicated that at a minimum it will include all those
who had participated in the negotiations.
PARTICIPATION IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MINERALS REGIME
Participation in the implementation and decision making
processes of the completed minerals regime was distin-
guished from participation in the negotiation of the
regime. The ongoing talks clearly contemplated accession
by states other than the consultative parties, as noted
in Beeby's presentation of the areas of agreement in
Recommendation XI-1, so the regime would not be a closed
one. It was also noted that majority participation by
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293
international community members in the regime would be a
factor in avoiding the possibility that minerals operators
would seek sponsorship from a state not party to the min-
erals regime and operate outside its regulatory framework.
The feasibility of broadening participation beyond
governments and potential operators in the institutions
of the regime produced the comment that further effort is
required to determine how to institutionalize the con-
cerned public in debates under the regime in a fruitful
manner. There was support for the idea that should
problems arise, in one way or another decisions taken on
them should be accepted not only by Antarctic Treaty
states but also by the outside world. The problem is how
to put this into practice. Participation by observers
from international organizations in the institutions of
the minerals regime was clearly contemplated in the nego-
tiations, and it was pointed out that these organizations
have constructive contributions to make.
PARTICIPATION IN ACTIVITIES AND BENEFITS
Several speakers addressed possibilities for wider
involvement in potential minerals activities and benefits
therefrom. It is critical that the regime reflect
principles of justice and effectiveness, which does not
necessarily mean application of the common heritage
concept. Justice in the minerals regime would mean that
it must provide ab initio opportunities for all countries
concerned with future resources exploitation to partici-
pate, including interested developing states. But justice
and effectiveness would also mean taking account of the
experience of the ATS. Moreover, while the 1982 Law of
The Sea Convention is a good source of principles and
norms that could be applied in Antarctica, care should be
taken not to fall into the excessive detail found in that
convention.
Various options for breathing life into the concept of
humankind's interest in Antarctica have been considered
in the minerals regime negotiations and these will receive
further attention in forthcoming meetings. These options
include joint ventures, particularly if they encourage
participants from developing counties, and revenue shar-
ing, although lack of knowledge about the economics of
antarctic minerals development would make it difficult to
develop the kind of precise formula for revenue sharing
found in Article 82 of the Law of the Sea Convention.
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294
Caution was expressed about providing encouragement or
incentives for minerals activities that might actually
stimulate such activities and imply benefits where none
in fact exist.
Finally, the establishment of a fund for scientific
research was proposed, to help interested countries
lacking financial resources and appropriate organizations
to take part in scientific activities in Antarctica.
Although numerous details remain to be worked out, the
funds could be drawn from fees on minerals activities and
they would be available only to countries within the ATS,
because those countries would have demonstrated some
commitment to the treaty. (See Chapter 27 for further
comments on the fund.)
URGENCY AND TIMING OF MINERALS ACTIVITIES
Debate over the reasons for urgency in negotiating the
minerals regime revealed additional views to that of the
preventive approach ("plugging a gap,n Filling a vacuum,"
Putting out a fire") as a means to avoid renewed con-
flicts over territorial sovereignty should prospects for
minerals development improve.
One such justification for the effort to conclude a
minerals regime at this time was that the regime should
be balanced between environmental protection and develop-
ment considerations and that it would be easier to
accomplish this before the identification of concrete
minerals interests in Antarctica.
Some speakers disagree with an earlier remark that the
urgency came about as a move to preempt possible pressure
for a universalist regime and U.N. involvement.
Others questioned how the evident lack of immediacy
with respect to potential minerals activities could be
reconciled on the one hand, with the adoption of the
policy of Voluntary restraint" quoted by Beeby from
Recommendation IX-1, and, on the other hand, with the
ongoing seismic research projects named by panelist
Wilson. They wondered if characterizations of lack of
immediacy were not tailored to allay the concerns of
states not party to the Antarctic Treaty. They also
challenged the durability of the preventive approach,
which once faced with the motivation and technology to
conduct minerals activity in Antarctica might not be able
to withstand the pressures.
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295
There was some discussion about the deterrent effects
of the long lead time, referred to in Croasdale's presen-
tation (Chapter 17), needed to develop the requisite
technology for antarctic operation, in the face of a jump
in the price of oil or government incentives for
investors.
It was pointed out that, while there is no current
interest in commercial minerals activities in Antarctica,
there is some interest today in prospecting, and this is
another factor behind the urgency of completing a minerals
regime; the regime would have to be in place in order to
regulate prospecting and to provide mechanisms and pro-
cedures to deal with the eventuality of a discovery by a
prospector.
With respect to the long lead time, a minerals expert
described present technological systems as fairly coarse.
There is no direct sensing mechanism to find oil and gas
in Antarctica, and the search for hydrocarbons is long,
slow, expensive and extremely uncertain. AS was noted
earlier, the logistics of antarctic operations are
formidable: First, a base of operations with a suitable
communications system would have to be established. Then
it would be necessary to ferry rig crews in and out,
since the average driller is used to two weeks on and two
weeks off duty and would not be attracted by a three
month stay offshore Antarctica. In addition, there would
have to be a logistic/supply base with an airstrip on
land, and some idea of the size and cost of such a
facility could be gained by a quick comparison with, for
example, the existing U.S. base at McMurdo Sound for the
support of scientific study in Antarctica.
On the other hand, there is no doubt that Arctic
offshore minerals exploitation technology will continue
to be advanced and that the economics of minerals
development will depend on factors outside humanity's
control, such as the size of deposits eventually dis-
covered, the cost of money, and minerals markets. For
these reasons, one should not assume that antarctic
minerals exploitation will be uneconomic for many years
to come. In fact, the minerals regime negotiations
should presume that antarctic minerals development will
be economic and to establish a regime to effectively
govern commercial operations.
There was some consideration of Wilson's nondevelopment
option and whether it was practical, realistic or politi-
cally feasible--given the range of nations involved in
Antarctica--to set aside minerals development until one
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296
is faced with the possibility some time in the future of,
say, discovery of gold in Antarctica.
The alternative of a binding moratorium on minerals
development for a specified period of years was contrasted
with the current policy of voluntary restraint adopted in
Recommendation IX-1, which is a tenuous one, contingent
on progress in the minerals regime negotiations. The
moratorium option would permit time to learn more about
the antarctic environment and the nature and effects of
possible minerals operations, so that sounder judgments
could be made. This possibility, however, is in effect
what those negotiating the regime are contemplating, with
the difference that there would be no specific term in
years. It was suggested that if a formal moratorium on
minerals activities were adopted, it should be reviewed
halfway through.
Government officials participating disagreed with
Wilson's challenge to the bona fides of governments'
decisions to proceed with the minerals regime negotia-
tions and noted that their governments had in fact sought
and received support for these policies.
THE REGIME
Area of Application
That the area of application of the International Seabed
Authority contemplated in the 1982 Law of the Sea Conven-
tion might overlap with that of the antarctic minerals
regime, as noted in Section II, brought the response that
there is a reason for the vague language in the minerals
regime with respect to the area of application of the
regime; nevertheless, in the end, the antarctic minerals
regime will not extend beyond the continental shelf as
defined by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Moreover,
the minerals regime will have to coordinate with the
International Seabed Authority in the future with respect
to environmental protection south of 60°S latitude.
The Framework
Provision of additional details about the framework
nature of the regime described by Beeby's pre$entation--
which because of the present lack of knowledge about the
area and possible operations there would avoid including
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297
detailed terms and conditions until they are required--
was prompted by one participant's statement that as soon
as the first contract is concluded, it would in fact
specify detailed terms and conditions that will serve as
a precedent for future contracts.
In response, it was noted that a contract concluded
for the development of one type of mineral resource in
Antarctica would not likely be relevant to the development
of another mineral resource in another part of Antarctica.
It is more probable that certain areas in Antarctica--as
elsewhere in the world--because of their physical, envi-
ronmental, and geological nature and characteristics,
should be treated as units. It would simply not be pos-
sible to write detailed regulations applicable to all or
even some of these potential resource management
provinces. In addition, at this point it would be
impossible to predict whether interest would emerge in
mineral resource exploration and development in Antarc-
tica, and, if so, where, when, and for what specific
resource(s).
For these reasons, it is not possible at this stage to
seek to elaborate detailed mining codes for Antarctica.
What is needed is to construct a framework that would
identify the decisions that will be necessary to deter-
mine the acceptability of possible mineral resource
activities and the basic criteria against which such
decisions will be made and to provide for the establish-
ment of the institutions necessary to make these
decisions and oversee any activities that might be
permitted.
More specifically, such a framework regime would
· Prohibit mineral resource exploration and
development unless specifically authorized through the
institutions of the regime;
· Provide as general criteria that no mineral
resource activity take place unless
(1) there is sufficient information to judge its
possible impacts,
(2) assessment of its possible impacts indicates
that it would not pose unreasonable risk to the
environment, and
(3) technology and procedures exist to permit
safe operations;
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298
· Provide for the establishment of decision making
machinery, along with an advisory body to provide
expert scientific, technical, and environmental
advice, to apply the general criteria to all decisions
about possible mineral resource activities;
· Provide, if and when there were sufficient
information to define a resource province in which
exploration and development activities could be
considered, that the machinery would establish the
general terms and conditions to which such activities
must conform, including exclusion of such activities
in any areas that had been or should be protected; and
· Provide for the consideration of specific
proposals for exploration and development activities
at specific sites and for elaboration by the machinery
of the detailed conditions that would govern any
proposals that were approved.
Such a framework regime would involve no presumption
about whether mineral resource activities should or should
not take place in Antarctica and would allow the necessary
specific regulations to be developed if and when
necessary.
Institutions
Because the more precise details of the regime would be
developed only following the adoption of the regime, the
machinery and procedures for taking these decisions would
be very important. This would stimulate states' interest
in becoming parties to the future minerals regime so that
they could take part in the decision making process.
Various speakers stressed that to achieve balance in
the decision making institutions of the regime, both
kinds of states should be represented, those active in
research or minerals activities and those merely inter-
ested in the regime without being primarily concerned
with benefits from exploitation. This recalled the dis-
cussion of the International Whaling Commission member-
ship on the basis of Gulland's contribution to the
workshop (Chapters 15 and 16).
The smaller regulatory committees described by Beeby's
paper would not be composed solely of the state or states
claiming sovereignty in an identified resource province
of Antarctica and the state wishing to undertake or
sponsor minerals activities in that area; there would be
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.
299
additional representatives on these committees. Thus,
there is no possibility that if, say, an Australian were
to apply to conduct operations in the Australian claimed
sector, Australia could sit alone on the regulatory
committee.
Environmental Protection and Safety
Many speakers noted that concern for environmental and
safety aspects of the minerals regime is being given
paramount importance by those negotiating the minerals
regime as well as by those outside. The work of the
Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) in
assessing the potential environmental implications of
minerals activities was referred to (SCAR groups of
specialists produced the 1977 Preliminary Assessment of
the Environmental Impact of Mineral Exploration/
Exploitation in Antarctica and the 1981 and 1983 reports
on Antarctic Environmental Implications of Possible
Minerals Exploration and Exploitation), as was the 1984
report of the SCAR Working Group on Logistics, which
states with respect to the proposed minerals regime:
The group discussed the possible impact on
scientific support services of those activities
likely to be involved in any commercial activities
related to exploration for or exploitation of
mineral resources. It was agreed that there is a
need to ensure that within the documentation of a
minerals regime there should be included a state-
ment that all planned commercial activities in
Antarctica should give special attention to all
aspects of safety and have appropriate search and
rescue resources adequate to meet any emergency.
No commercial activity should rely to any extent
on those services maintained by operations
agencies in support of national antarctic research
programs.
There were suggestions that the SCAR/International
Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
seminar (Bonn, April 1985), discussed in Chapters 10-14,
could contribute to the definition of areas that should
be protected from minerals activities in Antarctica as
well as to the definition of the resource provinces that
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would be identified under the regime were interest in
actual minerals activities to develop.
Representatives of environmental organizations argued
that they do not deserve to be characterized as single-
issue constituencies because they work on a wide range of
long-term issues and questions that affect the inter-
national community and have followed antarctic matters
for nearly 15 years. In the context of the antarctic
minerals regime, they have supported freedom of scientific
investigation and the free exchange of results from
Antarctica, the maintenance of the demilitarized status
of Antarctica, and the importance of protecting wilderness
values and wildlife there. Members of these organizations
feared that the threat of minerals activities in Antarc-
tica could jeopardize these values.
Members of the scientific community also expressed con-
cern about the impacts of minerals activities on scien-
tific research programs and the scientific value of
Antarctica, and they raised again the question of the
long-term value of scientific activities in relation to
the short-term value of potential minerals activities
noted in Section III. They were worried in addition that
funds would be diverted to research related to possible
minerals activities and away from scientific research,
but they differed on the extent to which they believed
this has already occurred in different countries.
Prospecting
Two subjects arose with respect to prospecting: environ-
mental considerations and confidentiality of data.
Several participants echoed Roger Wilson's comment that
prospecting should be subject to regulation, but it was
pointed out that there would be controls over prospecting
in the minerals regime described by Beeby. Any pros-
pecting would have to comply with the environmental
principles set forth in the regime and would thus be
subject to a judgment that prospecting was taking place
in accordance with them. In addition, a notification of
prospecting would have to include an environmental impact
assessment. Moreover, it appears likely that in the
final regime the decision making commission will be given
power to formulate and apply controls with respect to
prospecting activities, and it is also possible that a
form of review of prospecting activities could be
initiated. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the
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final regime will require prior authorization of pros-
pecting, not least because prospecting would be indis-
tinguishable from scientific research under the Antarctic
Treaty.
This discussion led to one on the importance of
ensuring that preminerals development activities do not
jeopardize that openness of results guaranteed under the
Antarctic Treaty; that is, free exchange of scientific
results should not be obstructed by efforts to retain
prospecting data as proprietary data, for this information
would be of value to the whole international community.
One participant suggested that in order to find out what
resources exist in Antarctica, governments could adopt a
noncommercial approach and pool efforts and results,
enhancing the Antarctic Treaty's emphasis on scientific
cooperation. Others warned that the prospector should
not be required to compromise his investment by turning
over data of a proprietary nature and insisted that the
rules for data collection in the minerals regime should
be clear. The distinction between prospecting and the
subsequent stage of exploration would be based on the
concept of right; prospecting does not convey exclusive
rights to an area, whereas exploration does.
One technical expert ventured that the concept of
confidentiality might be being introduced too early in
Antarctica. Many more surface geological data would be
required, as will results from several stratigraphic
information holes. The early introduction of confiden-
tiality could mean that the only entities that would
undertake this work would be commercial organizations.
He also stressed that current Antarctic Treaty practices
should be improved with respect to seismic data exchange;
that is, that the seismic tapes, not just summaries of
work done, should be made freely available. He noted
that the important element is not the data tapes them-
selves but the interpretation of the raw data. He cited
the example of the North Sea, where jurisdictional lines
were drawn before 1959 and there are now voluminous
bibliographies of freely available data. In fact,
industry has made its data available more quickly than is
common among the community of academic scientists.
ENFORCEMENT AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
As discussed in Chapters 5, 7 and 11, the absence of
agreed national jurisdiction in Antarctica requires a
strong alternative enforcement mechanism.
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On the other hand, referring to the doubts expressed
by Gulland (Chapter 15) about the effectiveness of the
CCAMLR enforcement system, one participant maintained
that the site-specific nature of an oil operation would
make that activity far easier to monitor over time than
would be the case with fishing activities. One would
also need to carry out an environmental impact assessment
and collect the baseline data required to complete it,
because this would not have been done in Antarctica, and
it would be necessary to make provision for monitoring
during and after the operation as well as for remedial
measures required or contemplated as a result of the
operation.
Reporting requirements were also seen as an important
part of the future regime, and several speakers expressed
interest in further discussion of inspection under the
minerals regime. (See Chapter 14 for additional comments
on inspection.)
Representative terms from entire chapter:
antarctic treaty
