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5.
Antarctic Conflict and
International Cooperation
Francisco Orrego Vicuna
THE EARLY TRENDS TOWARD ANTARCTIC CONFLICT
Antarctica is singled out today as the paramount example
of a region that has been successfully excluded from the
trends toward conflict and confrontation that generally
characterize the international community at large. It is
often thought that the fact that Antarctica is an isolated
community or the fact that it is positioned on the margin
of world maritime and trade routes can explain the excep-
tional condition of this region, where the preservation
of peace and the maintenance of international security
are some of the predominant political features.
However important these facts may be, they do not
fully explain the absence of conflict in this region. In
this regard it might be useful to draw a comparison with
the case of the Arctic, which is also a relatively
isolated region of the world because of its climatic
conditions and is similarly situated on the fringe of
major international routes.1 Nevertheless, this
situation has certainly not prevented the Arctic from
being an increasingly conflict-prone region, involving
not only the major powers of the world but also various
other countries that are geographically related to this
northern area.
Although Antarctica is today an area where peace has
been effectively preserved, this was not always so.
Moreover, it can be argued that in the past the antarctic
region was, proportionate to the degree of human activity
that took place there, as conflictive as any other area
and showing every sign of a progressive deterioration.
Had these trends remained unchecked, the region could
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well be experiencing today a confrontational situation
similar to that of the Arctic, be it in terms of boundary
disputes or rights of navigation and application of the
law of the sea or simply in terms of military strategy
and weapons development and deployment. This comparison
could apply to other regions of the world as well.
Before attempting to explain why none of this has
happened in Antarctica, it might be appropriate to recall
some of the basic conflicts that have affected the
continent in the past, a situation that is only too often
forgotten.
The conflicts that Antarctica has experienced in the
past can be grouped into four major categories or types:
(1) localized disputes about claims or boundaries,
(2) general disputes about claims prompting broader
international action, (3) conflicts about strategic uses
of the area, and (4) major rivalries between political
powers at the general international level.
LOCALIZED TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
The first type of conflict has involved discussions about
title to territory, effective occupation, and given
activities related to such territories. The Anglo-
Argentine-Chilean dispute over the Antarctic Peninsula
and associated islands has been one such conflict,
although at given points in time in the past the dispute
could be seen as escalating into some of the other types
mentioned.2 In this particular case the dispute
referred not only to legal and historic title and rights
but to every imaginable specific activity undertaken by
any of the three countries as well. Such activities
included expeditions, stations, personnel, stamps, and
other issues, which at the time embittered the relations
between these countries in a serious manner.
Another kind of conflict that can generally be included
In this category is that related to boundary delimitation
in the Antarctic. The United Kingdom and France had a
dispute about the precise limits of Adelie Land that was
settled by diplomatic means.3 It is interesting to
mention in this regard that at one point it was suggested
that this dispute be linked to that relating to the
controversy between the same countries about islands in
the English Channel. Chile and Argentina had in the past
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unsuccessful negotiations about delimitation in the
Antarctic Peninsula.4
On various occasions this type of conflict has in turn
been linked with conflicts or disputes that affect sub-
antarctic territories. The linkage between the Anglo-
Argentine dispute over the Falkland Islands and those
countries' respective claims to antarctic areas has been
quite clearly illustrated throughout diplomatic
history.5 A similar concern emerged in relation to the
controversy between Chile and Argentina over the maritime
delimitation at the southern tip of the South American
continent, insomuch as it was feared that any settlement
in such an area might have implications for antarctic
claims. A specific clause about delinking the two issues
was contemplated, first, in relation to the Beagle
Channel arbitration and, second, in the recent agreement
on maritime delimitation between the two countries.6
Problems of maritime delimitation are also beginning
to emerge in Antarctica. The sub-Antarctic French island
of Kerguelen has overlapping maritime areas with the
Australian islands of Heard and Macdonald.7 The
continental shelf of some of these islands extends into
the Antarctic Treaty area, just as the shelf of antarctic
territories and islands occasionally extends northward of
the treaty area. This poses difficult problems for the
precise definition of the area of mineral resources
regimes. Similarly, the antarctic convergence posed
difficult problems for the area of application of the
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, particularly in regard to the question of the
sub-Antarctic French islands.
Generally, this type of dispute has been handled by
means of diplomatic procedures. It is to be noted,
however, that direct diplomatic negotiations have not
been very successful, except for the above-mentioned
Anglo-French settlement of the boundary of Terre Adelie.
In general, all other questions have been left pending.
The judicial approach was attempted by the United Kingdom
on one occasion, but it did not succeed.8 The difficult
nature of territorial questions in Antarctica has indi-
cated that only through complex international
arrangements, such as that of the Antarctic Treaty, can
the issue be satisfactorily handled without prompting
more acute kinds of crises.
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GENERALIZED TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The second type of antarctic conflict refers to disputes
about claims that exceed the level of localized contro-
versy and as a consequence lead to broader international
action. One such example of a situation is when local
conflict eventually escalates into a more profound and
conflictive crisis, resulting in the threat or actual use
of force. At that point, the countries involved under-
take preparations or diplomatic actions of a more serious
nature.
The Anglo-Argentine-Chilean conflict resulted in a
situation of this kind in the 1950s, when the usual
diplomatic protest and other peaceful means gave way to
direct confrontation. Installations were reciprocally
destroyed, personnel harassment took place on both sides,
human relations deteriorated, and there was resort to
violence. As Bertram once wrote: "It should not pass
unremarked that the first and only shots so far fired in
anger in Antarctica were in 1952, when Argentines
attempted to allright a British party...."9
Naval movements of a military nature were intensified
as a result of this escalation, and readiness for further
action was quite apparent among the parties concerned.
The overall diplomatic relationship between those
countries also seriously deteriorated. It was in this
environment that the United Kingdom made its attempt to
take the case to the International Court of Justice, with
regard both to Argentina and to Chile; but it was
precisely because of the general deterioration that had
taken place that the initiative was aborted. Judicial
proceedings require a constructive attitude of mutual
trust and cooperation among the parties concerned.
A different approach was then conceived to ease
tensions. A tripartite naval declaration was signed in
1949 between Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom,
undertaking as a measure of detente not to send warships
south of 60°S latitude in order to prevent armed
engagements.l° This early form of demilitarization of
the continent proved successful, and it later influenced
the ideas that led to the signature of the Antarctic
Treaty. However, it was only the latter instrument that
really changed the political environment in Antarctica,
providing a framework to highlight cooperation and
minimize confrontation.
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STRATEGIC USES AND DISPUTES IN ANTARCTICA
Although there has been much argument over the signifi-
cance or insignificance of Antarctica in strategic terms,
this discussion has been largely theoretical. The fact
is that Antarctica has been used in the past for strategic
purposes and the conduct of warfare, a situation that
typifies the third category of antarctic dispute. In
this regard, it should not be forgotten that German
submarines operated in antarctic waters during World War
II, inflicting heavy damage on the merchant fleets and
fishing vessels of a number of countries.ll
The German and Japanese interests in Antarctica during
the war were enormously influential in the development of
territorial claims to that continent. The Norwegian
claim materialized at the moment when it was felt that a
potential German claim had to be stopped.l2 Germany
and Japan had been following U.S. policy toward Antarctica
very closely, with particular regard to whether the
United States was planning to make a claim of its
own,l3 an idea that in fact was actively considered at
the time. The USSR had occasionally looked into a
similar alternative.14
It is also interesting to remember that the Chilean
decree of 1940, which specified the limits of Chilets
antarctic claim, was directly prompted by a diplomatic
initiative of President Roosevelt, who was looking for
additional ways to prevent a German claim or the estab-
lishment of a German base in Antarctica.l5
It is not an exaggeration to conclude, therefore, that
as a consequence of growing interest in the issue of the
strategic uses of Antarctica, greater emphasis was placed
on sovereign claims. Nor is it mere chance that the
provisions of the Antarctic Treaty that freeze the ques-
tion of sovereignty have been coupled with provisions on
demilitarization and peaceful uses. The attainment of
one objective necessarily requires the achievement of the
other.
MAJOR-POWER RIVALRY IN ANTARCTICA
The fourth major type of conflict in Antarctica has been
that arising from superpower rivalry at the general
international level. The tensions and difficulties of
the cold war began to express themselves in relation to
Antarctica just as they became evident in the Arctic
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region. A number of political incidents that took place
between the United States and the USSR during the Inter-
national Geophysical Year were early indications of how
sensitive the power relationship had also become in
Antarctica.16
The geographical distribution of antarctic stations by
the two powers was also to some extent an expression of
the interest in establishing a presence throughout the
continent, a policy that was not unrelated to strategic
interest or to the eventual territorial claims that such
powers could ultimately decide to put forward. Both the
United States and the USSR actively considered in the
past the policy of making territorial claims in
Antarctica, and this position has been safeguarded by the
Antarctic Treaty in describing the two countries as those
having "a basis of claim. n It is not difficult to foresee
that if for any reason the Antarctic Treaty arrangements
were to collapse, and the strategic interests of the
major powers revived, a likely consequence might be that
these potential territorial claims would be made
effective, thereby introducing additional complications
in the already complex antarctic scenario.
The nuclear implications that such tensions between
the superpowers could have created would have been far
more dangerous than the above-mentioned forms of rivalry.
m e possibility of conducting nuclear explosions in
Antarctica had never been explicitly ruled out by either
of the major powers, nor had the eventual disposal of
nuclear wastes in the continent. While there were
continued references to peaceful uses, it is well known
that such-uses have been interpreted by the major powers
as being compatible with the conducting of peaceful
nuclear explosions. It was only through an active
diplomatic effort undertaken during the negotiation of
the Antarctic Treaty that such steps in the domain of
nuclear policy were specifically prohibited and remain so
until this day.~7
Just as the situation during World War II prompted
diplomatic initiatives to forestall possible moves by the
opposite side, so the cold war resulted in similar
approaches related to the broader international arrange-
ments sponsored by the major powers. The fact that the
American sector of Antarctica was included within the
geographical area covered by the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 is one such example. To
this extent, defense policies in relation to Antarctica
became interlinked with treaty arrangements primarily
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designed for other continents, thereby creating complex
legal and political relations.
The Antarctic Treaty came to stabilize in a meaningful
way the otherwise conflictive relationship in the area
between the powers mentioned. This was partly so because
of the specific provisions of the treaty regulating ques-
tions such as claims, peaceful uses, and prohibitions of
some activities but most importantly because of the
positive environment of international cooperation that
was established by means of these arrangements, this being
in direct contrast with the antagonisms that had prevailed
before. Major powers and other countries have learned to
work together in a constructive spirit, which has provided
the appropriate framework for a real process of detente
Here again the antarctic framework can provide a useful
example for similar efforts in other areas of the world.
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY:
COOPERATION AS A FACTOR OF STABILI ZATION
.
The Antarctic Treaty has made the difference between a
continent of rivalry and conflict and one of peace and
cooperation. AS this is a simple legal instrument, with
no elaborate provisions on institutions or on settlement
of disputes, the question must be asked as to how it has
made that significant difference, overcoming and diffusing
potential conflicts of a very serious and threatening
nature.
The treaty has directly tackled the key issues under-
lying such disputes by means of concise but effective
provisions. The most difficult question of sovereignty,
and the related policies of nonrecognition of claims,
have been harmonized in the terms of Article IV of the
treaty in a very pragmatic and realistic manner. No
attempt has been made to try to resolve the problem by
means of opting for one or another approach, since this
would have proved to be no solution at all and would
probably have led to a still more profound crisis. The
formulation of this article safeguards all relevant rights
while at the same time laying the groundwork for building
an effective mechanism of international cooperation. It
is on this basis that disputes about sovereignty have
come to be effectively controlled.
A similar result has been reached in relation to other
types of disputes by means of provisions on demilitariza-
tion and the prohibition of nuclear tests and nuclear
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dumping in Antarctica. These aspects of the treaty, taken
in conjaction with those mentioned above on the issue of
sovereignty, have disposed of most of the potentially
serious causes of tension in the area, thereby also
facilitating the gradual development of cooperation.
It should also be borne in mind that such approaches
and results were not the products of a secluded delibera-
tion among the countries concerned during the negotiation
of the treaty. Since the beginning of the century, every
possible idea in relation to the organization of antarctic
cooperation has been put forward by authors and govern-
ments, ranging from suggestions of subjecting Antarctica
to a regime of national sovereignties to those proposing
various forms of internationalization, not excluding
forms of common property of all nations.18 From this
point of view, the current debate at the U.N. and other
proposals are not at all new. What finally emerged as
the approach of the treaty was the outcome of detailed
consideration of all the alternatives, retaining those
that proved to be workable and feasible in the light of
antarctic experience.
Another important consideration is that the treaty
approach is not a rigid one; it has proved its capacity
to evolve and adapt to new circumstances ana requirements
of antarctic cooperation.
The various regimes dealing
with the conservation and development of natural resources
are paramount examples of this evolution, which, to the
required extent, has also included greater institutional
development. This evolution has also defused potential
conflicts relating to such resources, again not by opting
for one or another point of view but through pragmatic
formulations that take all necessary interests into
account. Sovereignty and cooperation have been integrated
with the positive attitudes that have made these develop-
ments possible.
It is in this perspective that the consequences of
undoing the working cooperation of the antarctic system
need to be evaluated and considered. Should the treaty
structure be affected in any significant manner, the
immediate consequence would be to impede its capacity to
control the underlying roots of conflict. The renewal of
territorial conflicts and political power struggles and
the ensuing arms race and related expenditures in the
area would automatically come to the fore, bringing
Antarctica in line with what is common in most other
areas of the world. ThiS indeed is an entirely unac-
ceptable perspective, particularly for those countries
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63
that are closest geographically to the continent and for
those that because of their condition as developing
countries have limited resources and political influence.
The Antarctic Treaty needs to be upheld as an instru-
ment of peace and cooperation in the area, not excluding
of course the capacity of the system to evolve in relation
to new requirements and the needs of the international
community. The proven effectiveness of the treaty in the
light of the many conflicts affecting Antarctica in the
past is a fundamental reason for its continuity.
NOTES
1. See generally Sugden, D. 1982. Arctic and
Antarctic. A Modern Geographical Synthesis, Basil
Blackwell (Oxford), 4 7 2 pp.
2. See generally Waldock, C. H. M. 1948. Disputed
sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.
BYBIL: 311-353; Pinochet de la Barra, O. 195S.
Chilean Sovereignty in Antarctica, Editorial del
Pacifico, S.A. (Santiago), 62 pp. Puig, J. C.
1960. La Antarctica Argentina ante el Derecho, R.
Depalma (Buenos Aires), 274 pp.
3. For the diplomatic correspondence between France and
the United Kingdom on the question of delimitation
of Terre Adelie, see Bush, W. M. 1982. Antarctica
and International Law, Oceana Publications, Inc.
(Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.), Vol. II, pp. 498-506.
4. Pinochet de la Barra, O. 1985. Antecedentes
historicos de la politica international de la Chile
en la Antarctica: Negociaciones Chileno-Argentinas
de 1906, 1907 y 1908. In F. Orrego Vicuna and M. T.
Infante, eds. Politica Antarctica de Chile.
Beck, P. J. 1983. Britain's Antarctic Dimension.
Int. Affairs 59:429-444.
6. Chile-Argentina: Treaty of Peace and Friendship,
signed on November 29, 1984; Article 15.
7. Bush, W. M. 1982. Antarctica and International
Law, Oceana Publications, Inc. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.)
Vol. II, p. 589.
International Court of Justice. 1955. Pleadings,
Antarctica cases (United Kingdom v. Argentina;
United Kingdom v. Chile).
Bertram, C. 1957. Arctic and Antarctic: A
Prospect of the Polar Regions, p. 105.
8.
9.
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64
10. See Statements of the Foreign Office of January 18,
1949. In M. M. Whiteman. 1963. Digest of
International Law, U.S. Department of State
(Washington, D.C.), Vol. 2, p. 1238.
11. See, for example, 1952. German raiders in the
Antarctic during the second world war. Polar Rec.
6:399-403.
12. Quigg, P. W. 1983. A Pole Apart: The Emerging
Issue of Antarctica, New Press, A Twentieth Century
Fund Report, McGraw-Hill Book Company (New York), p.
112.
13. See generally Sullivan, W., 1957-58. Antarctica in
a two-power world, Foreign Affairs 36:156.
14. Toma, P. A. 1956. Soviet attitude towards the
18.
acquisition of territorial sovereignty in the
Antarctic, Am. J. Int. Law 50:611-626.
15. Gajardo Villaroel, E. 1977. Apuntes pare un libro
sobre la historia diplomatica del Tratado Antartico
y la per ticipacion chilena en su elaboration, Rev.
Diffusion 10:41-74.
16. See generally Bullis, H. 1973. The political
legacy of the International Geophysical Year,
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and
Scientific Developments, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, November.
17. Pinochet de la Barra, O. 1985. La contribution de
Chile al Tratado Antartico. In F. Orr ego Vicuna and
M. T. Infante, eds. Politica Antarctica de Chile .
A forthcoming book on the emerging regime of
Antarctic mineral resources by the author of this
chapter discusses the broad range of ideas that have
been proposed to organize the Antarctic regime.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
major powers